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Abstract 
If communities are to become a viable means of implementing social policy then 
community practitioners must individually examine their personal praxis. Therefore, in 
discovering a community's aims and objectives, a management model is needed that 
offers every practitioner a reflexive means of understanding peoples' beliefs, values, and 
attitudes. 
This proposition is critically examined through a philosophical framework that explores 
individuals' diverse perspectives on community, derived from their adherence to 
contending ontological and epistemological propositions about the social world, and its 
related ethical and motivational dimensions. 
Following a philosophical analysis, the taxonomy of social reality perspectives, 
developed by Dixon (2003) and Dixon and Dogan (2002; 2003a, b, c, d; 2004). is 
systematically used to explore the contending views on social reality. Thus, 
methodological configurations are associated with logical categories, (1) naturalist 
agency, underpinning the self-interested (free-riding) homo economicus\ (2) naturalist 
structuralism, underpinning the obligation driven homo hierarchus; (3) hermeneutic 
structuralism, underpinning the conversation-saturated homo sociologicus (Archer, 2000: 
4); and (4) hermeneutic agency, underpinning homo existentialis. 
The disciplines of social psychology, ethics, and political science are employed to 
explore selected facets of human nature, moral principles, and political ideology chosen, 
by associates of each set of methodological configurations, in particular relational 
situations. 
Informed by this investigation a sample of community practitioners were questioned 
about their praxis. This reveals that a substantial majority understand and accept an 
objective and knowable social worid where people are self-interested. Therefore, these 
practitioners perceive community as a setting where they can influence the decisions of 
others through discourse and judge its ethical merits by the degree of loyalty and 
obligation extended to their projects. Thus, it is apparent that community practitioners 
should evaluate their praxis, through critical self-reflection, if they are to develop suitably 
robust and durable symbiotic relationships with adherents to each of the four social reality 
perceptions. 
This research leads to a new logic, based on the innovative interpretation of ontotogical 
and epistemotogical configurations offered in the seminal work of Bhaskar (1978 and 
1979) and Archer (1989, 1995, 2000 and 2003). Here, an emerging social ontology 
informs the construction of more specific theories conceming the dynamics of community 
in identifiable localities. Therefore, it now becomes possible to construct a management 
model, incorporating contending social realities, the techniques of mediation and the 
results of changing cognition and cognitive dissonance, that facilitates community 
practitioner's critical self-reflection and construction of managerial strategies based on 
community member's contending perceptions of social reality. 
Contents 
List of figures ix 
List of tables xi 
Author's Declaration xii 
Acknowledgement xiv 
1 Community and Community Praxis: The Complex and Contradictory 
Nature of Managing Community 1 
2 The Nature of Society: How do we Explain or Understand Social Life? 39 
3 Contending Facets of Human Nature 96 
4 Contending Explanations of Personal Ethics 121 
5 Contending Ideological Perspectives 170 
6 The Cognitive Consistency of Community Practitioners: An Empirical 
Investigation 225 
Appendix 6.1: Categorical Preferences for Contending Reality 
Perceptions 286 
7 Accommodating the Four Contending Perspectives on Community 
Reality 289 
8 Conclusion: Managing Community through a Multifaceted Model. 329 
Bibliography 338 
Appendix I Copy questionnaire "Community Workers and Community 
Reality" 372 
Pub//ca//ons 
1. Dixon, J., Sanderson, A. and Tripathi, S. (2004) "Improving Public Sector 
Leadership: Philosophical Dispositions and Situational Leadership", in 
Proceedings of 2004 EFMD Conference on Public Sector Management 
Development (CD Rom), Brussels: European Foundation for Management 
Development. Pages 378-400. 
2. Dixon. J„ Dogan, R. and Sanderson. A. (2005) "Community and 
Communitarlanism: A Philosophical Investigation", Community Development 
Jouma/, 40(1): 4-16. Pages 401^15. 
3. Dixon, J., Sanderson. A. and Tripathi, S. (2005) "Managing in a Paradoxical 
Public Sector Environment: The Leadership Challenge of Ambiguity", in 
Proceedings of 2005 EFMD Conference on Public Sector Management 
Development and Radical Change (CD Rom), Brussels: European Foundation 
for Management Development. Pages 416-427. 
4. Dixon, J.. Tripathi, S., Sanderson. A., Gray. C . Rosewall. I. and Sherriff. I. 
(2005) "Accessible Higher Education: Meeting the Challenges of HE in FE", in 
Foundation Degree Forward Journal, No.6: 34-38. Pages 428-435. 
5. Dixon. J., Sanderson, A. and Tripathi. S. (2006) "Ethics. Trust and the Public 
Interest: The Contending Modes of Societal Governance", in Governance of 
the State, (eds. Kakabadse. N.K. and Kakabadse, A.) London: Palgrave. 
Pages 436-456. 
6. Dixon. J.. Sanderson. A. and Tripathi. S. (2006) "Community Empowerment: 
Developing Post-Bureaucratic Management Skills." in Proceedings of 2006 
EFMD Conference on Public Sector Management Development (CD Rom), 
Brussels: European Foundation for Management Development. Pages 457-
480. 
7. Sanderson, A. (2006) "The Appropriate Role of the State within the Ethical 
Paradigm." in Proceedings of the Plymouth Business School and School of 
Sociology, Politics and Law (eds. Barton, A. and Lean, J.) University of 
Plymouth. Pages 481-499. 
List of Figures 
2.1 The Contending Epistemological Perspectives 46 
2.2 The Contending Ontological Perspectives 77 
2.3 The Contending Social Reality Perspectives 94 
4.1 The Ethical Foundations of the Contending Social Reality 
Perspectives 123 
4.2 The Continuum of Co-operation 136 
5.1 The Ideological Foundations of the Contending Social 
Reality Perspectives 171 
5.2 Paulo Friere's "Praxis" Cycle of Action-Reflection-Action 177 
5.3 Gramsci's Theory of Hegemony 179 
5.4 Rights and Responsibilities 201 
5.5 Hermeneutic Structuralism: The Paradigm for Policy Making 207 
6.1 The Likert Scale used in the Questionnaire 256 
6.2 Aggregated Scores for all Statements that adhere to 
the Hermeneutic Structuralist Perspective on Social Reality 263 
6.3 A Typology of Modes of Welfare Delivery 280 
6.1.1 Aggregated Scores for all Statements that adhere to 
the Naturalist Structuralist Perspective on Social Reality 286 
6.1.2 Aggregated Scores for all Statements that adhere to 
ix 
the Naturalist Agency Perspective on Social Reality 287 
6.1.3 Aggregated Scores for all Statements that adhere to 
the Hemneneutic Agency Perspective on Social Reality 288 
7.1 Whittington*s Typology of Operational Strategy 291 
7.2 Analytical Dualism. Social Reality Perspectives and 
Community Members 321 
7.3 The Conflict Triangle 324 
List of Tables 
6.1 The responses made to each statement that adheres to the 
hermeneutic structuralist perspective on social reality 263 
6.2 Preferred adherence to a certain perspective of social reality 
in relation to human nature, facts, the social world, community, 
decision-making and ethics 264 
6.1.1 The responses made to each statement that adheres to the 
naturalist structuralist perspective on social reality 286 
6.1.2 The responses made to each statement that adheres to the 
naturalist agency perspective on social reality 287 
6.1.3 The responses made to each statement that adheres to the 
hermeneutic agency perspective on social reality 288 
XI 
AUTHOR'S DECLARATION 
At no time during the registration for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy has the 
author been registered for any other University award without prior agreement of 
the Graduate Committee. 
This study was financed with the aid of a three year PhD scholarship from the 
Faculty of Social Science and Business at the University of Plymouth. 
A programme of advanced study was undertaken, which included a 
Postgraduate Diploma in Social Research. 
Relevant seminars and conferences were attended at which work was 
presented; external institutions were visited for consultation purposes and several 
papers prepared for publication. 
Publications 
2006 
1. "The Appropriate Role of the State within the Ethical Paradigm," in Proceedings 
of the Plymouth Business School and School of Sociology, Politics and Law, 
(eds. Barton, A. and Lean, J.) University of Plymouth. 
2. With Dixon, J. and Tripathi. S. "Community Empowerment: Developing Post-
Bureaucratic Management Skills," in Proceedings of 2006 EFMD Conference 
on Public Sector Management Development (CD Rom), Brussels: European 
Foundation for Management Development. 
3. With Dixon, J. and Tripathi, S. "Ethics, Trust and the Public Interest: The 
Contending Modes of Societal Governance", in Governance of the State, (eds. 
Kakabadse. N.K. and Kakabadse, A.) London: Palgrave. 
Xll 
2005 
1. With Dixon, J. and Dogan, R. "Community and Communitarianism: A 
Philosophical Investigation", Community Development Journal, 40 (1): 4-16. 
2. With Dixon. J. and Tripathi. S. "Managing in a Paradoxical Public Sector 
Environment: The Leadership Challenge of Ambiguity", in Proceedings of 2005 
EFMD Conference on Public Sector Management Development and Radical 
Change (CD Rom), Brussels: European Foundation for Management 
Development. 
Non-refereed Paper 
3. With Dixon. J., Tripathi. S., Gray, C , Rosewall, I. and Sherriff, I. "Accessible 
Higher Education: Meeting the Challenges of HE in FE" in Foundation Degree 
Fonward Journal. No.6: 34-38. 
2004 
1. With Dixon. J. and Tripathi, S. "Improving Public Sector Leadership: 
Philosophical Dispositions and Situational Leadership", in Proceedings of 2004 
EFMD Conference on Public Sector Management Development (CD Rom), 
Brussels: European Foundation for Management Development, 
Presentations and Conferences Attended 
1. European Foundation for Management Development, Brussels, June 2004. 
2. European Foundation for Management Development, Nottingham, March 
2005. 
3. University of Plymouth Postgraduate Symposium, January 2006. 
4. University of Plymouth Colleges. Plymouth, July 2005. 
5. "Putting Research into Practice" Foundation Degree Forward, Plymouth, April 
2006. 
XIII 
6. European Foundation for Management Development, Aix-en-Provence, June 
2006. 
7. University of Plymouth Colleges. Plymouth, July 2006. 
Word count of main body of thesis — 80.989 
Signed 
XIV 
Acknowledgement 
I owe an academic debt to my Director of Studies, Professor John Dixon. He 
has inspired, theoretically supported and critically evaluated my thesis. He has 
helped me as an instigator, and his ability to bring variegated shafts of light into 
focus, has inspiring my capacity to synthesise and apply the work of numerous 
academics and commentators. 
X V 
Community and Community Praxis: The Complex and 
Contradictory Nature of Managing Community 
The notion of "community" is difficult to define as "it is not just that the term 
has been used ambiguously; it has been contested, fought over and appropriated 
for different uses and interests to justify different politics, policies and practices" 
(Mayo, 1994: 48). This controversy can result in the conclusion that, although it "is 
a useful categorisation, community must remain an essentially contested concept" 
(Popple, 1995: 4). For instance, should it be understood only in terms of a locality 
or incorporate communities of interest, which can be based on ethnicity, sexual 
preference, gender or age. and which "serve to balance the restricted outlooks of 
some geographic communities" (Tam, 1998: 204). The latter is advocated by Tam 
as it offers a means whereby citizens "would be able to develop social bonds 
which cut across local and national boundaries" (1998: 205) and thereby enhance 
their capacity to contribute to their own neighbourhoods. This argument reflects 
contemporary geographic mobility that can result in the weakening of individual's 
emotive bonds of attachment to a particular area (Tam. 1998: 205). Thus, this 
thesis adopts an operational definition that recognises communities of 
locality that coalesce with communities of interest. 
Notwithstanding any definitional difficulties, both explicit and implicit claims 
continue are made for community building organisations, which can be 
summarised as follows (Kendall, 2003: 113): 
• Confidence, as experience of successful collective action is gained; 
• Skills acquired, of relevance for economic, social or political life; 
• Individuals* self-esteem and communities' reputation fostered; 
• A sense of control over life regained, bolstered or enhanced; and 
• Fatalism or 'poverty of expectations' replaced by attitudes and perspectives 
that are more positive. 
Thus, inclusive community participation seems a quintessential element within 
the concept of community, indeed Tarn considers that the extent that "communities 
adopt co-operative enquiry in their collective deliberations" (1998: 16) will 
determine the extent that common community values can emerge. Thus, 
communities are (Tam, 1998: 31-32): 
built upon the structures involving human interactions — not just in families 
and neighbourhood areas, but also in schools, business organisations, state 
institutions, professional and community groups, voluntary associations, and 
international networks. In all cases, necessary reforms need to facilitate the 
development of citizens' attitudes and abilities as effective participants of 
inclusive communities, with the help of education, work opportunities, and 
collective protection. 
This definition resonates with Etzioni's description of the concept,^ therefore, 
when he constructs his case that endorses the body of thought know as 
communitarianism he confidently makes the assertion that community members 
are willing to accept a key role in furnishing the needs of their neighbours. He 
argues that once individuals have discharged their personal responsibilities they 
are obliged to pro-actively promote the well being of relatives, friends and others in 
the community or communities to which they belong (Etzioni, 1995a: 144). This 
case, for the application of reciprocity in care and compassion, is a familiar theme 
' Elzioni (1995a: 119-122) defines community as including all types of social groups, such as 
schools, organisations, families, neighbourtioods and interest groups. 
in communitarian literature as theorists (Bellah, 1995/6; Sandal, 1992; Tam, 1998) 
argue for a balance between individual rights and collective obligations and 
responsibilities. 
This aim leaves the traditional sociological divide between gemeinschaft, or the 
traditional rural community, and the urban autonomous state of gesellschaft, 
rendered redundant. Thus, community is understood as existing in shared 
common experiences, as well as in local neighbourhoods. But, all these 
participant groups are expected to aspire to achieve "new communities in which 
people have choices and readily accommodate divergent subcommunities" 
(Etzioni. 1995a: 122), whilst still maintaining common values and belief systems. 
The notion that the unfulfilled "unencumbered self would find that their 
fundamental desire to create a purposeful self-identity is only possible through 
relationships with other community members is crucial to those who proselytise 
active engagement in community groups. Arising from this understanding, it is 
expected that greater social cohesion would result from unrestricted human 
autonomy in a process where, as Mclntyre notes, citizens "would grow to 
understand themselves...only in the context of the community" (cited in Arthur, 
1998: 357). In this paradigm, Sandel (1992: 19) has recognised that a citizen 
cannot choose their purpose in life without recourse to their cultural inheritance. 
This rich history of attachments and commitments is an essential part of an 
individual's social reality but is only accessible through the medium of group 
discourse. Therefore, if the individual becomes deprived of community interaction 
they would be unable to reach their true potential, as they are forced into a 
meaningless conundrum, rootless and unclear about their true vocation. 
However, a dilemma exists for those actively seeking to develop/engage with 
community participation — community practitioners — as there is a gap between 
aspirations and community reality, in terms of both community engagement and 
outcomes. This disparity is a source of frustration to politicians and others who 
promote community as a source of intentional individual collective action, where 
high levels of participation can be harnessed to provide an effective mode of 
delivery for, and evaluation of, social policy outcomes (Miller and Ahmed, 1999: 
269). There is no doubt that this enthusiasm for the causal capacity of community 
has been stimulated, both in theory and practice, to facilitate the cultural 
transformation necessary to engineer the rolling back of the crisis-ridden welfare 
state (Aldridge, 1998: 9). In this scenario, governments, arid their host societies, 
have begun to acknowledge the ineffectiveness of command-type public policy 
instruments (Kooiman, 1993; Weimer and Vining, 1997) and to attribute their 
inadequacy to policy failures (Bovens and t'Hart, 1990; Bovens et al., 2001; Gray, 
1998; Sieber, 1981). This has lead to a renewed focus on community 
organisations as presenting an opportunity for improved interactive governance 
(Amin ef a/., 2002) and an emphasis on engagement with tenants and residents at 
neighbourhood level to stimulate community economic development (Henderson, 
1991; Lipietz, 1992 and Daly and Cobb 1994). 
However, the failure to initiate a high level of community participation could lie in 
fundamental misunderstanding of its dynamics. As Popple (1995; 3-4) notes 
"community has both descriptive and evaluative meanings, and is as much an 
ideological construct as a description of reality." Moreover, not only do Tam and 
Etzioni neglect the ideological aspect but they also fail to address the philosophical 
and ethical dimensions of community interaction. Therefore, it is asserted here that 
it is necessary to have a more rigorous and robust understanding of community 
dynamics if this concept is to act as a purposeful unit of analysis in the delivery of 
social policy. 
Empowering Community Members: Models of Praxis 
Etzioni argues that there is a need to confront "inauthentic democratic politics" 
(1968: 637) as this type of government dis-empowers the majority by restricting 
societal power to a periodic vote at an election that offers a restricted choice. So 
communities should seek to stimulate the active society where there would be an 
emphasis on an "egalitarian distribution of power" (Etzioni, 1968: 517). In seeking . 
to achieve this aim, the principle of subsidiarity is invoked. This maintains that a 
group, or groups, that are in the closest proximity to a problem should attend to its 
definition and resolution, with intervention by other groups restricted to the time 
when support is required. So only when the family unit cannot achieve its aims 
should the local school, health centre, or other larger organisation take 
responsibility (Etzioni, 1995a: 44). Thus, dependence on the state is downgraded 
to the choice of last resort as active communities take control of their own destiny. 
However, whilst effective community initiatives are generally understood as "a 
product of a complex interplay of people and organisations" (Parsons. 1995: 185) 
rather than the result of directives from a governing elite within this scenario 
community work praxis is pre-dominantly influenced by either the pluralist or the 
radical approach. 
The Pluralist Approach 
Tam and Etzioni would maintain that further ideological analysis of community is 
unnecessary, provided individuals are furnished with democratic forums where 
they can undertake meaningful rather than tokenistic roles in their communities. 
Therefore, they can accept that the "user-led services and alternatives" (Croft and 
Beresford, 1996: 195), where people can "plan, act monitor and evaluate" 
(Chambers, 1998: 135) the needs arising in their community, are a sufficient 
incentive for high levels of committed community activity. Thus, their model of 
participation is based on local people having a purposeful involvement in decision 
making about issues that effect their lives (Croft and Beresford 1989, 1992; 
Beresford and Croft 1995). This approach maintains a pluralist position focused on 
micro change that emphasises "technical skills and knowledge" (Popple: 1994: 25) 
where the professional practitioner is recognised as possessing competencies that 
are missing from the skills, attributes and knowledge possessed by the community 
activist. There are only two key concerns in this reputedly vibrant framework: that 
local people do not "exclude or discriminate against some groups", and that the 
"people who get involved may be unrepresentative" (Beresford and Croft, 1993: 
207) thus, praxis is infomied by the "structural nature of deprivation" (Popple, 
1994: 25) and social exclusion. However, as is reflected in the communitarians' 
belief in the inherent goodness that exists within the social nature of people 
(Etzioni, 1995a, 1997), it is envisaged that any local suppression of pluralism and 
dissent can, over a period of time, be resolved. 
This model of community practice intervention offers the participating 
community member a limited decision making capacity as networks of 
organisations develop partnerships to address community imperatives through a 
synthesis of ideas and resources. This will involve "clarity and consensus about 
participatory principles and values" (Webster, 2003: 163) that might, through the 
encouragement of active citizenship and community consultation, lead to improved 
local interactive governance (Stoker, 2000). 
However, the fragility of relationships amongst community members was clearly 
reflected in the results of a study that found people to be reluctant to enter into 
exchanges with other community members, unless they could interact with those 
in a similar position to themselves to their mutual benefit (Homans, 1951). This 
style of interdependence, governed by self-perception, has also been observed in 
the cultural and/or financial disadvantages that may limit people's ability to 
participate in the affairs of their community or communities (Lister. 1990). 
Furthermore, there is also a tendency for organisations operating at the 
community level to impose standards of correct behaviour leaving people with 
limited resources, who are already aware of their poor profiles, having an 
additional disincentive for becoming actively involved in a group decision-making 
process (Mik-Meyer, 2001). 
Although doubt exists about the vision of partnerships delivering a new pattern 
of multiplex community relationships, nevertheless recent research has affirmed 
that "most citizens do seem to engage in some sort of civic activism, even though 
most are relatively low-cost actions" (Pattie ef a/., 2003: 465). This study made a 
distinction between citizens who participated in autonomous activities; those who 
opted to communicate with people in authority, such as counsellors or local 
government officials; and those who prefer collective action. If a community 
member is involved in "one of these types...[they]...need not be engaged to those 
linked to other types" (Pattie et a/.. 2003: 465). Thus, community participation 
appears to be situated in a paradigm of multi-causal characteristics, from which a 
general distinction is discernible between those who prefer acts of informal 
volunteering and those who become actively involved in formal frameworks. The 
existence of this dichotomy was recognised in a conclusion drawn from the 2001 
Home Office Citizenship Survey — namely that joining up with community 
networks was a pursuit of the affluent, whilst their poorer neighbours preferred 
one-to-one involvement (Home Office Research Development Statistics, 2003). 
Therefore, community practitioners adopting a pluralist praxis, could give more 
attention to the plurality in types of volunteering cultures (Williams and Windebank, 
2003). These dynamics might well reveal some of the reasons why new service 
planning and delivery in the health sector, through primary care groups and trusts, 
continue to operate through a hierarchical structure, where managers and 
practitioners exercise considerable more influence than patients and community 
members (Milewa et a/., 2002). As Popple notes "pluralist community work tends 
to placate rather than liberate the groups that come within its orbit" (1994: 26). as it 
can function as a deterministic mechanism rather than a conduit to empower 
community members. 
Moreover, if academics aspire to the development of a better understanding of 
the rationale behind the diverse dialogues between community stakeholders then 
this aim implies that a theoretical base be created which can adequately reflect the 
heterogeneity of experiences amongst members of different communities (McKie, 
2003). Therefore, the argument leads to the supposition that "we should talk less 
about community and more about power and relationships" (Loughran, 2003: 179). 
Furthermore, it has been observed that once some specific issue that has 
encouraged community involvement is resolved "community cohesion often 
collapses" (Abbott, 1996: 95). Thus pluralist community initiatives can fail to make 
effective theoretical and practice connections between individual's experience and 
the changing nature of contemporary society (Popple, 1994: 26). This omission 
has resulted in a call for the dimensions of "sustainability in participation, equity in 
participation and the dynamic socio-political context" to be added to research 
programmes, which have only focussed on needs assessment, leadership, 
resource mobilisation, management and organisation (Eyre and Gauld, 2003). 
The Radical Approach 
This model of praxis perceives the community member as being entitled to 
fundamental rights and expectations that result in " a marked shift of emphasis 
from duties to rights" (Marshall, 1950: 9). Moreover, "there is a basic human 
equality associated with the concept of full membership of a community" (Marshall, 
1950: 8) that is contemporaneous to the nprms of current social policy. Effective 
operation of this mechanism should ensure that the individual can legitimately 
expect their reasonable expectations of welfare services, such as social security 
and education, and human rights, including the right to strike and freedom of 
information, are legitimately provided to every citizen (Marshall, 1981, 96-97). 
Thus, whether the individual consciously chooses, or is proscribed as a member of 
a specific community, they have entitlements that justify their opposition to the 
unfettered operation of the free market (Marshall, 1950: 68). This "goes beyond 
the sterile dichotomy of state versus individual...[by]...reconnecting the democratic 
and egalitarian project of progressive community work with the concrete realities of 
people in communities" (Shaw, 1996: 87). Such a challenge can be addressed 
through informal community education that promotes the liberating concept of 
humanisation. which connects community members to the necessity of confronting 
and working to permanently change the political, socio-economic and cultural 
contradictions that interact in a hegemonic way to limit their lives (Freire, 1996: 
21). This activity, at the micro level of community, becomes related to the macro 
level of society through its stimulation of "the formation of homogeneous, compact 
social blocs, which will give birth to their own intellectuals, their own commandos, 
their own vanguard" (Gramsci, 1971, 204-205). 
Thus, Popple (1994: 25 and 1995, 101-102) and Ledwith (1997: 61-94) offer a 
synthesis of pedagogy and reformist collective initiatives that recognise that "the 
people themselves are not a homogeneous cultural collectivity but present 
numerous and variously combined cultural stratification's which, in their pure fomn. 
cannot always be identified within specific historical popular collectivities" 
(Gramsci, 1985: 195). Therefore, if radical community work is committed to 
liberating people from oppression it must challenge the hegemonic power of the 
dominant elite in various spheres of civil society — such as political parties, trade 
unions, religious groupings and charitable and voluntary organisations. However, 
within this complex paradigm, communities of locality and interest can co-operate 
with each other in partnership agreements. They can provide and promote 
"empowering leadership" (Henderson, 2003: 179) that is committed to the 
development of knowledge and skills for all community members. 
Nurturing and developing the capacity of individuals to share ideas and 
experiences with other members of their community is the fundamental notion of 
community, participation that underpins Arnstein's ladder of power in the 
meaningful sharing of decision-making responsibilities that control the outcomes of 
public policy (1969, 176-182). This ladder moves, in eight rungs, from 
manipulation, at the bottom, to citizen control at the top. However, the important 
distinction here for community practitioners who embrace a radical agenda of 
social transformation is that community members should gradually become 
actively aware of oppressive forces which render them powerless. Therefore, 
community practitioners would facilitate a process of critical analysis by community 
members of alternative meanings for what dominant hegemonies euphemistically 
portray as common sense (Martin, 1988). Moreover, through the mechanisms of 
egalitarian community support these alternative meanings can begin to be 
evaluated in the micro democracies of everyday life and then critically applied to 
the macro democracy of political parties and everyday government (Siim. 1994) 
rather than be subsumed in a aggregate effect of top-down, supposedly good, 
democratic governance. 
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Therefore, the radical model .of community intervention promotes praxis based 
on permanent social change in marked contrast to the pluralist model that tends to 
support the maintenance of the status quo. 
The State and Community Participation 
The complex nature of community praxis, which can feature contradictory aims 
and objectives, needs to be contextualised within the contemporary delivery of 
social policy outputs and outcomes in the UK. 
The Provision of Public Services 
In seeking to resolve the increasingly constrained role of the state in direct 
public service provision, strategies have been employed that require a wide range 
of organisational models. Thus, there has been a movement from centralised to 
devolved (local and regional) mechanisms with an increasing emphasis on 
managerialised (corporatised and commercialised quasi-public) provision, 
communal (private non-profit) provision and market (private-for-profit) provision. 
This latter form of delivery assumes particular importance due to the dominance of 
contemporary neo-liberal economic policy agendas and encompasses the desire 
of policy makers to impose managerialist values and practices throughout the 
public sector. However, by introducing the disciplines of economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness into the pubic policy arena uncertainties have arisen over the 
articulation and measurement of objectives which are often difficult to quantify 
(Dixon and Hyde, 2003; Dixon et aL, 2004). Furthermore, the policy objectives 
envisaged by government and those outcomes expected by community members 
may be incompatible with the interests and motivations of the reformed public 
services. 
In this new public management environment policy makers perceive that the 
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involvement of community members in the implementation and evaluation of the 
provision of public services is critical to dealing with issues of fairness, 
distributional justice, equity, social stability and inclusiveness. However, whilst a 
number of studies consider how and why people can be encouraged to participate 
in community initiatives from both a pluralist and radical perspective (for example, 
Twelvetrees, 1991, Popple 1994, 1995; Ledwith, 1997. Hanley ef a/., 2000), there 
is little enthusiasm by commentators for the notion that community participation 
should replace ineffective public services "rather than complement them" (Taylor, 
1992: 18). 
In fact, the propensity to emphasise issues of economy and efficiency has 
prevailed since the 1980's (Barr, 1987, 1991) thereby placing pre-eminence on 
social continuity rather than social change. Thus, a fundamental contradiction 
seems to arise in community praxis as the community practitioner, employed by a 
local authority, struggles to reconcile the expectations of an environment driven by 
performance management targets, which might neglect the issue of equitable 
outcomes as they are difficult to quantify. Furthermore, this community practitioner 
is part of a larger team of local government officers that together form a local 
bureaucracy. It seems likely that this organisational structure would restrict 
individual initiative making the community practitioner's praxis subject to pre-
ordained, approved interventions that could be designated as token gestures by 
community members. 
Performance Management 
Community practitioners in the voluntary sector are also faced with increased 
accountability as "it has been shown that in recent years, the voluntary sector in 
the UK has relied increasingly on the public sector for its financial support" 
(Kendall, 2003: 39). Nevertheless, as Kendall notes, "relationships between state 
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and voluntary sector seem to defy any overall labelling or be animated by any 
single organising or 'institutional' principle (2003: 40). However, given enthusiastic 
ministerial rhetoric on the sector's functions as (1) a community-builder; (2) an 
innovator that can provide 'personalised' services and (3) a means to promote 
social inclusion (Kendall, 2003: 128). when respective roles and responsibilities 
are clarified it is likely that performance management targets will be a prominent 
feature. 
Collaborative Working 
Whether pursuing a pluralist or radical agenda those involved in community 
interventions are likely to have opinions about the effect of.their work on the 
perceived improvements necessary in the provision of social justice. As the first 
holder of a Chair in Social Justice in the UK. Craig (2001: 3) defines the essential 
elements of this construct as: 
• "the equal worth of all citizens" 
• '1he equal right to be able to meet their basic needs" 
• "the need to spread opportunities and life chances as widely as possible" 
• "The requirement that we reduce and where possible eliminate unjustified 
inequalities" 
In asserting these aims Craig places an emphasis on "the role of community 
development as the means by which the excluded and the marginalised can act on 
their own behalves" (2001:4) thus pro-actively stimulating the growth and 
expansion of their skills, attributes and knowledge in their search for improved well 
being. This proposal resonates with his earlier work carried out in partnership with 
Mayo on community empowerment (Craig and Mayo. 1995). Here they identified 
the importance of constructing alternative strategies to ameliorate the pre-
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dominance of global free market approaches. Thus, community participation 
needed to become a new orthodoxy that could give primacy to "democratic 
approaches to planning" that promoted the purposeful involvement of community 
members in the decision making process (Craig and Mayo, 1995: 11). 
In this paradigm, participation can be understood "as an active process in which 
the participants take initiatives and actions that are stimulated by their own 
thinking and by deliberations over which they exert effective control" (Kumar, 
2002: 24). In this context community groups coalesce around a consensus over 
issues arising from the economic and political policies that are being formulated 
and implemented in the wider society. Therefore, as Ledwith (2005) notes, local 
practices become situated in the imperatives of global social forces that stimulate' 
community members to adopt styles of community development with 
transformative potential. Moreover, the potential for what Ledwith terms "critical 
alliance" (2005: 107) emerges from individual's awareness of their own identities, 
which can result in the recognition of difference, whether from the perspective of 
ethnicity, gender, age or other particular human experience, as a strength that 
contributes to a fairer society. Thus, "collective action for sustainable change 
involves harnessing collective power beyond neighbourhoods to national and 
global levels. It is essential that we see our practice move beyond local issues to 
engage with wider movements for change" (Ledwith, 2005: 172). 
The Budapest Conference, organised by Craig in 2004, resulted in the Budapest 
Declaration (Budapest Declaration, 2004: 1-5), which recognised that 
communities should be regarded as "active and legitimate partners in the 
development of plans, structures and policies for local economic development" 
(clause 26). Furthermore, throughout the European Union, national governments 
should utilise research that has demonstrated the effectiveness of community 
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initiatives and create means whereby best practice can be shared through the 
continuous exchange of "research relevant to the needs of local communities" 
(clause 10). These assertions mirror Twelvetrees conclusion that "local community 
based action and its role in a just world should find a much more important place 
in social policy, social theory, social research and theories of effective governance 
(1996: 172). However, as research undertaken in Ireland indicates, the local 
strategic partnerships necessary for successful collaborative working at 
community level have, from the perspective of community development activists, 
"tended to re-inforce and extend the power of state officials'— whether of local 
authorities or partnership companies — to the detriment of both elected 
representatives and the community and voluntary sector (Powell and Geoghagan, 
2004: 239). Thus, the notion that state officials should "let go the reins: allow 
members the space to follow political agenda and to innovate to meet the 
particular needs of their communities" (Wilkinson and Craig, 2002: 40) should be, 
according to Mayo (2000), treated with a note of caution. This opinion is enshrined 
in the observation that bottom up participation can "be pursued for varying 
reasons, as part of alternative policy agendas, from the right as from the left of the 
political spectrum" (Mayo, 2000: 110). Thus, participation in community initiatives 
is not, by itself, sufficient to change the existing structures that implement policy 
instead the imperative arises that "partners adapt to residents' priorities and ways 
of working rather than always expecting community participants to adapt to them" 
(Taylor. 1998:176). 
Bums ef a/, identify four dimensions in assessing community participation: (1) the 
process of decision making; (2) whether or not the various interests in a 
community are all represented; (3) whether or not there are effective and inclusive 
channels of communication and (4) the extent and control over the resources that 
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have been made available to community members (2004: 7). Central to this 
paradigm is the necessity for the local community to analyse community power 
structures and test the way that influence is utilised by key actors and institutions. 
Therefore community members may need to become involved in a programme of 
Participatory Action Research (Mayo. 1997: 124) that recognises that "the life 
blood of communities flows through the capillaries of personal relationships and 
inter-organisational networks" (Gilchrist, 2003: 50). In this scenario those involved 
in community interventions need to choose how to optimise "opportunities for 
communication with local people, and the kind of communication that will help 
achieve greater understanding of the community and better rapport with its 
residents" (Henderson and Thomas. 2002: 132). 
The significance of the apparent complex and contradictory nature of 
community intervention, which can renders praxis ambivalent should not diminish 
the importance of the following themes which can be regarded as a fundamental 
framework for the activity of community building. 
The Principle Themes for Community and Community Praxis 
The following notions can be recognised as being fundamental to the concept 
of community and community praxis: 
• Individuals have a fundamental need to socialise with other human beings and 
can only achieve their full potential by working within collaborative groups that 
concur with a set of common aspirations. 
• Community members must discover their shared values, attitudes, and beliefs, 
thereby enabling the development of a strong moral code that is necessary to 
redress contemporary social deficits (such as poverty, increasing criminality 
and inadequate parenting). 
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• Communities should mediate between the individual and the state to facilitate 
local co-operative enquiries into the evaluation of local needs and the outcome 
of policies, to ensure neighbourhood influence over community-based service 
delivery. 
• Communities should extol the virtue of mutuality, thereby promoting the need 
for high levels of meaningful participation in community decision-making 
processes by community members. 
• Citizens should recognise the weaknesses inherent in individualism and 
authoritarianism, which have undermined social progress towards an 
egalitarian society. 
These beliefs should govern the attitudes of community practitioners as they apply 
their praxis to relational situations in community settings. Thus, they would 
proselytise to non-believers, exhorting, admonishing and appealing to their 
reasoned judgement in anticipation of their conversion to the following principles of 
community engagement. 
Desire to Engage in Community: It is only through engagement by the individual 
in their community of locality or communities of interest that he or she are able to 
realise his or her fundamental identity and thus their purpose in life. Therefore, the 
individual's desire to engage in community, although it may need sfimulation, is 
inherently pre-eminent in his or her personal aims and objectives. 
Capacity to Engage in Community: Every individual, as soon as he or she can 
effectively communicate with other community members, would have the capacity 
to engage fully in reaching community decisions that reflect a consensus of 
opinion amongst the group. 
Processes of Community Engagement: Every individual would voluntarily 
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engage with other community members (possibly aided by gentle persuasion) in 
an egalitarian and respectful way in order to develop a close and purposeful social 
bond. It would be expected that this bond would be underpinned by a code of 
values that emphasises the maintenance of social inclusion and the 
responsibilities held by every citizen to other community members. Thus, 
language would be laden with value judgements that reflect community members' 
mutually agreed norms of behaviour. 
Contending Perceptions of Community 
The claim that committed community activists, although subject to a complex 
and contradictory working environment, can offer all community members a vision 
that accords with their pre-dispositions about community engagement is a 
contested one. Indeed, this thesis explores contending perceptions of community, 
which may be held by community members, that may render any confident 
assertions about high levels of community participation and engagement as overly 
optimistic. Nevertheless, idealism about the efficacy of community based initiatives 
relate to community practitioners' beliefs. These beliefs are "somehow maximally 
secured against doubt" (Welbourne, 2001: 40) through the application of the 
individual's preferred formula for attaining their personal standard of truth. 
Therefore, when community practitioners proclaim the existence of a construct 
called "community" in the theoretical domain of being it acts as "a description or 
inventory of the things that are supposed to exist according to a particular theory 
which might but need not be true" (Jacquette, 2002: 3). 
However, when adherents to the concept of community seek to convert the 
sceptic to the principle themes of community and community activism the question 
arises over which personal principles this sceptic must compromise, and whether 
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such an action would fundamentally violate this sceptic's ideological convictions? 
There follows an analysis of three contending perspectives — all of which 
regards the concept of community and its capacity to enhance the lives of its 
members with a degree of scepticism. Furthermore, as has already been implied, 
by recognising their influence community praxis assumes greater complexity. 
The Hierarchical Model of Community 
Durkheim recognised that social structures can influence an individual's 
cognitive structures and therefore his or her social actions. On this basis his or her 
mental representations of the world arise from our social participation (Bergson. 
2004). Therefore, society creates social facts about social structures, institutions, 
norms and values that transcend the individual and constrains both that person's 
behaviour and social action through his or her social relationships. Thus, a 
community member is socialised into believing certain rules and nomris. the 
violation of which attracts penalties. This scenario (Pinker, 2002: 53): 
does not mean that benevolence and co-operation cannot evolve. It means 
only that benevolence, like flight, is a special state of affairs in need of an 
explanation, not something that just happens. It can evolve only in particular 
circumstances and has to be supported by a suite of cognitive and emotional 
faculties. 
Therefore, the creation of such a common bond for some community members 
may only evolve in the principles that enshrine the "common good" of society, 
which has priority over local community interests. Thus, their Utopia is a vision 
reminiscent of Plato's Republic, featuring a social order where everyone has, and 
is aware of, their pre-ordained position. In such a society, an elite would exercise 
knowledge-based power through a sophisticated legal system that has benefited 
from a tradition of tried and tested remedies. Thus, Socrates asserts that (Plato, 
[c410-347] 2000: 155-6): 
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if our rulers are to be worthy of the name, and their auxiliaries likewise, then I 
think the auxiliaries would be prepared to carry out orders, and the rulers 
would issue those orders either in obedience to the letter of the law, or, in 
places where we have left the interpretation of the law to them, in obedience 
to its spirit. 
Therefore, community members who embrace the hierarchical model of 
community take actions that can be posited as predictable as their rational 
decisions are taken based on prescribed rules, procedures and what strategy is 
best able to produce justice. Therefore, the notion of individual risk taking would 
create unease as competition between citizens might fragment the social 
framework by challenging the authority of the governing elite. Thus, social mobility 
is restricted although those possessing expert knowledge would be able to overtly 
climb the social ladder and join the oligarchy. 
The concept of community is recognised as a tool to further the traditional 
conservative imperative for the state to preserve its power over its subjects. This 
reaction is, to an extent, driven by the contemporary insurgence of neo-liberal 
thought and its emphasis on economic freedom and profit "that may pose a threat 
to traditional foniis of social life, to custom, religion and morality" (Scruton, 1996: 
11). So, communities should contribute towards the preservation of established 
hierarchical institutions and fear the infiltration of community organisations by 
radicals attempting to cause social unrest to further their aim of liberating the 
oppressed. 
Thus, the state and society combine together to form a nation in the tradition of 
Comte's ([1830-42] 1896) positivist^ project to identify the invariant laws governing 
the social world in acknowledgement of the interrelated nature of social 
institutions. This basic uniformity or regularity draws upon natural groupings rather 
than classifications imposed as a result of the feelings of individuals (Aristotle 
^ This term is not used here as a synonym for empiricism but instead represents the opposite to 
"negativist." 
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[c.335-322] 1976). This natural order underpins natural laws that govern 
relationships between institutional and cultural forms that make society an organic 
whole. Therefore, when community members adhere to deontological imperatives, 
based on the notion of duties or what is right, that underpins this synergism they 
have beliefs, not attitudes or opinions, that they interpret as the truth. Within their 
communities, the traditional values of the state would be expressed through 
secondary associations, such as the family, the institution of marriage, the church, 
and neighbourhoods. These values would have been formed by a shared 
language and history and therefore identify the cultural preferences of the 
populace in a code of normative morality that decrees what people ought to think 
(Dumont 1970. Hart [1961] 1994, Hetcher 2004, Raz 1975). Thus, any recognition 
of moral relativism would represent a self-defeating gesture by the §lite, as 
relativism is the result of a failure to provide robust moral leadership capable of 
evoking widespread adherence to certain rules of behaviour. 
For community members who believe in a .hierarchical social structure, society 
develops organically in a complex and subtle evolutionary pattern that should be 
devoid of the uncertainties inherent within the dynamics of radical change (Hurka 
1993). This means that reason has to struggle to regulate and resolve contrary 
and conflicting emotions. Therefore, it is acceptable, in the paradigm, that 
communities can heal the abrasive profiteering of the free market by offering the 
compromise of locally controlled, state-funded, community services. However, the 
extent that the community should act as a mediator between community members 
and the state is a matter for careful consideration. Although, it is acceptable that 
government should be conducted through a series of checks and balances, which 
ensures equilibrium by preventing a power imbalance between government 
institutions, there is a danger in extending such prerogatives to organised 
21 
collectives. For instance, if central government provided the resources for 
communities to evaluate and recommend changes to policy such an initiative risks 
being a precursor to community members collectively reflecting over wider social 
and cultural relations of power. Thus, hierarchists affirm their belief in the axiom 
"they decide what we shall do" (Mamadouh, 1999: 143). 
The structure of mutuality favoured by the followers of hierarchism 
fundamentally differs from the mutual obligations that feature in Tarn's community 
praxis (1998: 15). Using Goodin's (2002: 583-9) alternative models, for organising 
mutuality and reciprocity, expectations are founded on a conditionality of "mutually 
conditional obligations" that arises from an ethereal bond between the 6lite and 
their subservient fellow citizens. Within this uniting force, subjects are required to 
discharge their duties to the state only if the state discharges its duties to its own 
subjects, with this principle applying vice-versa (Seligman 1997: 43). Alternatively, 
the covenant expected by community practitioners' demands a higher level of 
conviction and sacrifice. This leads to community members having "mutually 
dependent but unconditional obligations" to each other. So, if one person fails to 
discharge their obligations to another the latter is not exonerated from their 
obligations to the former Admittedly, after a period of attempted persuasion, the 
unrepentant deviant, who fails to honour their community's dominant moral and 
social principles, would eventually be expelled from community membership; 
nevertheless this action is incidental rather than spontaneous. 
Welfare programmes are a fundamental element within the maintenance of the 
bond of trust between the citizen and the state so the transfer of these policies to 
local democratic forums, with the possibility that such groups may be 
parsimonious or discriminatory, is perceived as naive. 
Therefore, those community members who wish, above all to preserve the 
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status quo and who are anxious about uncertainty, inadequate resources, and the 
social fragmentation that may be the result of conflict between community 
members, place a reliance on the state sector to transfer assets to those on low 
incomes. Thus, the individual citizen's responsibility is to carryout their duties to 
the state rather than participate in the implementation of policies of localised social 
protection. 
Furthermore those who embrace hierarchism would feel vindicated by any 
research programme that cast doubts over the efficacy of voluntarism (see, for 
example, the UK Home Office Citizenship Survey conducted in 2001, which found 
that systems of organised formal volunteering, possibly encouraged by an 
acceptance of community orientated responsibilities, is more representative of the 
"culture of affluent than deprived wards" (Williams, 2003: 289)). In poorer 
neighbourhoods citizens have a preference for involvement in informal 
volunteering, which is understood as helping someone on a one-to-one basis who 
is not part of a volunteer's family, thereby raising the question as to whether such 
interaction forms mutually contingent obligations for reciprocation over time? 
Certainly there can be no doubt that that the affluent can afford to work without 
remuneration whilst the poor would find this scenario less acceptable. 
The Community Engagement Agenda 
Community members who embrace the hierarchical model of community would 
accept the following propositions about community engagement. 
Desire to Engage in Community: People conduct their affairs by assuming their 
pre-ordained position in a social order where everyone has, and is aware of, their 
place. Thus, an individual would desire community involvement if their pre-
ordained position and/or their special skills make the hierarchical social order 
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expect that they would so participate. 
Capacity to Engage in Community: The position an individual occupies in the 
community would be contingent on their place in the social order, which would 
determine acceptable community roles. Those who express apathy towards any 
comrtiunity involvement would be tolerated as they are deemed as implying their 
consent to community decisions made by those who are more capable and 
competent than them. 
Processes of Community Engagement: It would be expected that community 
members would be willing to make voluntary sacrifices for their community, as this 
social construct forms part of the hierarchical social order, which must be 
preserved by all citizens. Within community forums decision-making would reflect 
the will of the elite with others prepared to accept the decisions made by their 
superiors in the social order. 
The Market Model of Community 
Some community analysts (\A/allman 1984, Bulmer 1986) present a scenario at 
neighbourhood level that reflects a "rational/utilitarian sociological tradition" (Crow, 
1997: 19). Thus behaviour is explained in a framework reminiscent of research 
carried out by Homans (1951), which revealed that people would enter into 
exchanges with others in a similar position to themselves provided it was to their 
mutual benefit and they could avoid interaction with others who are not their 
equals. Such a style of interdependence, limited by self-interest, is exemplified in 
the observation that cultural and/or financial disadvantage may limit people's 
ability to participate in the affairs of their community (Lister 1990). This mode of 
making decisions about social engagement is based on a particular set of believed 
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or anticipated rewards. Implicit is satisfaction of the need to better understand 
social reality by the acquisition of infonnation from others (Festinger 1950, 1954; 
Schachter 1959; Wills 1981). Explicit is the expectation that rewards will exceed 
the believed or anticipated costs, whether monetary or material (Foa and Foa 
1971) or in time spent (Heider 1958). 
Freedom of choice and the capacity to change their own futures are the beliefs 
espoused by community members who embrace the market model. Thus, "the real 
bottom line is that there are individual actions, that there are outcomes of those 
actions, and that individuals choose actions in terms of their outcomes, using 
some decision rule or other" (Laver, 1997: 28; see also Bacon [1623] 1997, 
Machiavelli [1513] 1999). 
The ideologies underpinning the market model are liberalism, its offshoot neo-
liberalism and libertarlanism. This presents a quintessential challenge to 
community praxis, as they are founded on the principle of individual autonomy — a 
doctrine which community advocates can associate with the cause of social 
atomisation and fragmentation. Therefore, community proselytisers vyould try to 
influence self-interested utility maximisers with the exhortation "that free 
individuals require a community, which backs them up against encroachment by 
the state and sustains morality by drawing on the gentle prodding of kin, friends, 
neighbours, and other community members, rather than building on government 
controls or fear of authorities" (Etzioni, 1995a: 15). Hovyever, community praxis 
would have to recognise that the pursuit of an acceptable level of individual self-
interest is an inevitable feature of the capitalism that underpins, liberal 
democracies. This leaves the crucial maxim — that it is the individual's 
unencumbered self that is the only being that can decide an individual's social role 
— forgone in return for a hypothetical promise of protection from the possibility of 
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state interference in the arena of individual choice. 
In essence, adherents to the market model seek to achieve material success in 
order to be recognised as successful by other materially successful people. This 
emphasises the importance of satisfying esteem needs (Maslow 1970). and 
prestige needs (Riesman, 1950. Packard 1959). as much as physiological, safety 
(security) needs (Maslow, 1970). However, whilst these individual visions can. 
when aggregated, reflect the qualities of certain abstract principles, they can only 
be extended to a collective agreement about specific outcomes in particular 
situations when individuals are required to reveal their preferences. For instance, 
as each individual continually experiences new circumstances that provide 
previously undiscovered revealed preferences it is impossible for a collective to 
compose a set of precise opinions that exemplifies the fundamental shared 
understandings held by members of a community. Thus, defining issues of 
criminality through "a shared understanding of what we must guard against" (Tam, 
1998: 120-1) is an unrealistic objective. Instead, individuals should choose and 
then implement their own understandings. These individually knowable beliefs 
make extensive collective discourses about values redundant. 
Community members who are rational self-interested agents do not object to 
active citizenship, they would explain their agenda as taking "the view that if 
citizens of a democratic society are to preserve their basic rights and 
liberties...they must also have to a sufficient degree the political virtues...and be 
willing to take part in public life" (Rawls, 1988: 272). Thus, their priority would be 
to ensure that the relationships of spontaneous exchange created by self-
interested networks of individuals is not hindered or obstructed by local sanctions 
or boycotts instituted by overly zealous community members who are ideologically 
opposed to market mechanisms. 
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Leadbeater maintains that provided the business sector exercises the corporate 
responsibility of adopting a business code that ensures their virtuous ethical 
behaviour in the marketplace, then it would have little to fear from organised 
communities (1999; 162-164). Nevertheless, community practitioners would 
continue to recognise "civic pride as a key incentive" (Tarn. 1998: 156) for 
participating in community governance rather than financial gain. 
The rational self-interested agent is not opposed to mutuality. In maximising the 
efficiency of actions in pursuit of self-interest, he or she would find themselves 
asking the question: what would I gain from this action that would benefit others? 
Therefore, a degree of empathy would emerge with the ethos of Local Exchange 
and Trading Schemes, whereby individuals help each other based on reciprocal 
exchange. This type of structured reciprocity is also replicated in the notion of 
time banks, which "record, store and reward transactions where neighbours help 
neighbours" (Williams, 2003: 291) making any involvement in volunteering 
beneficial to the participant. Furthermore, mutualism founded on reciprocity 
develops informal one-to-one community involvement that emphasises the 
capacity of the individual to instigate an initiative rather than this being the 
prerogative of the collective. Moreover, this variation in volunteering may 
incorporate self-help schemes that directly increase an individual's material well 
being. 
Adherents to the market model of community, whilst perhaps sharing the 
concern of other community members about, for example, the proper upbringing of 
children, clearly distinguish between the public and the private spheres with family 
life belonging in the private sphere. This belief has been intensified by the 
emergence of the contemporary autonomous nuclear family where, freed from 
traditional cultural restraints, family life can result in both men and women 
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developing their careers whilst sharing the obligation of parenting. Such a 
situation has emerged through the establishment of individual rights, particularly 
those concerning equality of opportunity, which have changed the. often 
oppressive, nature of the traditional family unit. This assertion refutes Etzioni's 
claim that the extension of people's rights in the fomri of individual empowerment 
has become a fashionable and unresponsive alternative to the fundamentally 
satisfying notion of empowered community building (1995a: 142). Thus, the belief 
that parents would reward or discipline their child in accordance with a code of 
community norms that have been formulated through public discourse is rejected. 
Community members who are rational agents measure the worth of their 
actions by assessing whether the consequences have been personally favourable 
whilst either having been a benefit to others or. at worst, not having been to their 
detriment. The individual's temperament is perceived a sanguine (Burton [1621] 
2001) with life's meaning dependent on one's material well being. 
The Community Engagement Agenda 
Community members who embrace the market model of community would 
accept the following propositions about community engagement. 
Desire to Engage in Community: This notion would be irrelevant to the 
fundamental purpose in life — the making, and the preservation of, material wealth 
that can offer security, peace of mind and ultimately freedom for the individual. 
Capacity to Engage in Community: The notion of community would be 
considered a fictitious concept, as a community is composed of individuals who 
prefer to engage in contractual relationships where they would exercise their 
economic power in a self-interested and self-seeking manner. Therefore, the 
capacity for community engagement would usually follow a material cost-benefit 
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analysis, although community members may also choose to enter unsolicited 
altnjistic transactions because of the benefits that might be reaped for his or her 
psyche. 
Processes of Community Engagement: They would presume that people are 
unwilling to make voluntary sacrifices for a community so the processes of 
engagement are contingent upon the benefits from participation exceeding the 
costs of involvement. In this scenario, no community member has a pre-ordained 
position and their only loyalty is to the furtherance of their own well being. 
The Anarchical Model of Community 
Popple notes that "anarchism advocates the establishment and the operation of 
voluntary associations based on co-operative principles and mutual aid" (1995: 34) 
thus enabling its inclusion as a theoretical base informing radical community 
praxis. However, this model contributes to a distinct set of contending beliefs 
about community praxis that result in discrete opinions about the desire to. the 
capacity for and the processes of engaging with community. 
Community members create their own essence, in a process where they are 
subsumed by the compositional arrangements they encounter in their lives or they 
understand and utilise the potentialities of their own agency. During this lifelong 
journey of choice between the affirmation of individual will or acquiescence to the 
false constraints of determinism each person will be alone, confined within their 
own reality and unable to share their observations and conclusions with anyone 
else. Thus, Finch notes that "I do not know whether anyone else has what I have 
when I have a direct experience of the senses" (1995: 175, n. 4) which resonates 
with Wittgenstein's assertion that "I am my world" ([1922] 1961: 5.63). 
Adherents to the anarchical model of community can display apathetic attitudes 
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towards community initiatives as they experience alienation from their fellow 
citizens. Thus, to them, the acquisition of knowledge is limited to personal 
experience reflecting the Sartrerlan notion of existence proceeding essence 
(Sartre, [1938] 1964). For instance, only objects and animals — not human beings 
— possess universally recognisable characteristics that create an embedded 
network. Alternatively, individuals can be committed "outsiders" (Wilson, 1957) 
with highly sophisticated systems of philosophical, political and ethical beliefs. 
Therefore, it is important to emphasise the wide cultural diversity that manifests 
amongst these individuals, thereby avoiding the error of labelling them as a social 
sub-stratum or residuum, characterised as the Marxist "lumpenproletariat" (Marx 
and Engels, [1848] 1967: 93) or as the "underclass" (Murray, 1996). 
Anarchical community members accept the standpoint that denies the 
proposition that a social context can bring meaning to life. Therefore, they dispute 
essenfialist arguments that maintain there are some fixed essential properties that 
determine peoples' behaviour. Thus, they would oppose any attempt to exclude 
individuals from their communities after they had failed to comply with dominant 
values and attitudes, perceiving such action as the inevitable malevolent outcome 
of a collective informed by flawed objective philosophical preconceptions 
(Hankinson 1995. Montaigne [1563-92] 1957). Therefore, adherents to the 
anarchical model would be cautious about their involvement with community 
organisations. They would expect to receive benefits for any contribution made 
towards the work of the collective, whose actions would be considered 
unpredictable. Thus, axiomatically. community is just another instrument of 
potential or actual control engineered by individuals in an attempt to render people 
as determined automata with community members sensing "that their own 
abilities, as human beings, are taken over by other beings" (Giddens 2001: 683). 
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Moreover, they reason that the reification of a social construct is implausible in 
"that there are no principles that govern the social realm as a whole" (Schatzki, 
2002: 141) so any attempt to describe and analysis social reality is merely 
speculative ideation. Therefore, there is no acceptance of belonging to a 
community, making apathy an acceptable response to exhortations to "become an 
active citizens." 
The anarchical model requires its adherents to search for a moral code that 
entails a personal journey of discovery, leading the individual to choose how they 
would conduct their relationships with others, and the norms of behaviour that are 
contingent on these decisions. Thus, they reject the notion of a community 
consensus over what is right and what is wrong or what is good and what is bad. 
Instead, they maintain that people must individually confront or avoid their moral 
dilemmas by either making their own choices or denying their responsibilities. 
A common morality, initiated and supported by the influential members of a 
community, is anathema to the anarchist. Instead, the search for a moral code 
entails a personal journey of discovery that leads the individual to choose how 
they would conduct their relationships with others, and the norms of behaviour that 
are contingent on these decisions. Thus, moral beliefs are not absolutes, merely 
opinions; matters of personal taste leaving each community member to "devise his 
own virtue, his own categorical imperatives" (Nietzche [1888] 1969: 121). 
Therefore, the notion that a consensus can be reached in community forums over 
a set of principles, robust enough to be regarded as moral truths that can guide 
moral decisions about virtuous behaviour is rejected. Instead, it would be 
maintained that "there are no moral truths, that there is no moral knowledge, that 
in morals and politics all that we can ultimately do is to commit ourselves 
(Bambrough 1979: 14). One implication of this is that no one can be held 
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responsible to others, morally or othenwise, for their actions (Cicero [44 BC] 1971). 
When community practitioners gather information they accept contending 
values, attitudes and opinions as matters for group discussion, however, they do 
not maintain that this knowledge is the truth. Instead, they place an emphasis on 
the second phase of their decision-making process. This demands extensive, 
inclusive democratic discussion, through which community members can reach an 
informed consensus about any issue. Thus, the means justify the end product as 
the collective reaches an agreement on what is valid information and how it should 
be used. In stark contrast, anarchists would not accept any knowledge that claims 
to be true as they dismiss any infomiation that has not become manifest in their 
own reality. Therefore, forward planning is pointless in a world of unpredictability, 
where the best decisions should be based on inspiration and the minimising of 
risks, with lengthy procrastination over available options being an acceptable 
strategy. Moreover, making sense of any situation involves a rolling or serial 
hindsight that is driven by plausibility rather than accuracy (Weick 1995). 
However, community members who embrace the anarchical model may decide 
to join a group on the basis that this action would not compromise their striving for 
authenticity, in this scenario, the group members would pledge themselves to the 
achievement of some common purpose; thus, every individual would accept 
reciprocity of enforcement, which underpins each group member's view of himself 
or herself. As the group becomes.operational, the members would then develop 
reciprocity of dependency. "Thus, freedom, as common praxis, initially produced 
the bond of sociality in the form of the pledge; and now, it creates concrete forms 
of human relationship" (Sartre, [1960] 1976: 466). The pledged group, however, 
accepts that no experience can be fully shared by two people. 
Anarchists would also maintain that the unpredictability of human behaviour 
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renders mutuality based on mutual reciprocity as gullible. Nevertheless, whilst they 
presume that there can be no certainties in modes of reasoning they would 
nevertheless strive to make sense of their reality. Therefore, in this search for 
plausibility, they may accept some community responsibility, as it appears to be 
the right thing to do, that decision being the product of their own perceptions. 
The Community Engagement Agenda 
Community members who embrace the anarchical model of community would 
accept the following propositions about community engagement. 
Desire to Engage in Community: The anarchist would presume that all human 
actors behave in ways that are ultimately unpredictable. Thus, there cannot be 
any credibility in the notion of structural causation. Therefore, why engage in a 
collective that is incapable of understanding the causes and probable 
consequences of social action? 
Capacity to Engage in Community: As the concept of community would be 
perceived as a pointless attempt by community members to take control over a 
setting that is unknowable with virtually no capacity for personal transactions, then 
the statement "capacity to engage in community" is a contradiction in terms. 
Processes of Community Engagement: The anarchist would demand an 
authentic approach to joining a collective through a process of developing 
reciprocity of enforcement, that underpins each individual's pledge to a group. 
Thus, community groups might be coercive and manipulative as they presume that 
there are certainties that can inform their decision-making. 
33 
Inclusive Community Participation: Recognising a Quadripartite Reality 
It is apparent that community activists who proselytise the benefits of active 
social engagement and acceptance of the imposition of behaviour constraints 
imposed by others as a means to the "good life" for community members are 
challenged by the task of convincing community members with contending social 
reality perceptions to change their minds about their desire to engage in 
community, their capacity to engage in community and their understanding of the 
processes of community engagement. 
The community practitioner would recognise the following notions as being 
fundamental to community praxis, which give rise to the associative social 
engagement process that establishes egalitarian relationships amongst community 
members. 
a. Firstly, individuals have a fundamental need to socialise with other human 
beings and can only achieve their full potential by working within collaborative 
groups that concur with a set of common aspirations. 
However, from a hierarchical perspective: 
" Community members would have to recognise community as a dynamic 
social mechanism capable, in its own right rather than as an instrument of 
the state, of bringing measurable improvements to the lives of its 
members. 
Furthermore, from a market perception on community: 
" Community members would have to accept that the social construct of 
community has a causal capacity, which can protect the free market for 
goods and services from interference by the state. 
Moreover, from an anarchical perception on community: 
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" Community members would have to accept that community initiatives can 
be effectively planned then efficiently implemented, and that they will 
make a real difference to the individual well being of community members. 
b. Community members must discover their shared values, attitudes, and beliefs, 
thereby enabling the development of a strong moral code that is necessary to 
redress contemporary social deficits (such as increasing criminality and 
inadequate parenting). 
However, from a hierarchical perspective: 
° Community members would have to accept that the concept of 
community-based moral relativism should take precedence over the moral 
imperatives inculcated by the state. 
Furthermore, from a market perception on community: 
n Community members would have to accept the agreed moral code of 
their community despite restrictions this may impose on their individual 
search for material wealth. 
Moreover, from an anarchical perception on community: 
° Community niembers would have to agree that the accumulated 
experience and understanding possessed by community members can be 
communicated with a personal meaningfulness that leads to a consensus 
about a community's essential values, attitudes and norms of behaviour. 
c. Communities should mediate between the individual and the state to facilitate 
local co-operative enquiries into the evaluation of policies and to ensure 
neighbourhood influence over community-based service delivery. 
However, from a hierarchical perspective: 
» Community members would have to accept the notion that community 
has a critical role in mediating between the needs of community members 
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and available resources of the state. 
Furthermore, from a market perception on community: 
° Community members would have to accept that volunteering to work on 
community initiatives by joining an organised group is more praiseworthy 
than undertaking individual action to further their self-interest. 
Moreover, from an anarchical perception on community: 
» Community members would have to agree that community represents a 
means of liberation from the control of the state. 
d. Communities should extol the virtue of mutuality, thereby promoting the need 
for high levels of meaningful participation in community decision-making 
processes by community members. 
However, from a hierarchical perspective: 
" Community members would have to accept that they have mutually 
dependent, but unconditional, obligations to all the other members of their 
community or communities. 
Furthermore, from a market perception on community: 
» Community members would have to be willing to undertake work in their 
communities that does not offer them the chance of material gain. 
Moreover, from an anarchical perception of community: 
» Community members would have to agree that community members 
should make voluntary sacrifices to other community members on the 
understanding that this practice might not be reciprocated. 
e. Community members would have to accept that the human trait of altruism 
could be an efficient and effective inspiration for community members to 
participate in the formulation and implementation of social policies that would 
benefit their needy neighbours. 
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However, from a hierarchical perspective: 
• Community members would have to agree that negotiated community 
values are relevant to both the public and private spheres. 
Furthermore, from a market perception on community: 
• Community members would have to agree that community members 
should make voluntary sacrifices to other community members on the 
understanding that this practice might not be in their own self-interest. 
Moreover, from an anarchical perception on community: 
• Community members would have to agree that, in accepting community 
responsibilities, the needs of the individual could be accommodated by 
the community. 
Therefore, a complex community paradigm confronts the community practitioner 
in their efforts to facilitate inclusive community participation. They face the 
challenge of building a community consensus amongst community members 
whom: 
• have chosen to be socially passive and accept the imposition of behaviour 
restraints by others; 
• have chosen to be socially active and reject the imposition of behaviour 
restraints by others; 
• have chosen to be socially passive and reject the imposition of behaviour 
restraints by others. 
Conclusion 
Community practitioners apply community praxis in a formidable and sometimes 
ambiguous environment. Not only are they confronted by contending visions of the 
aims and objectives for community praxis but they may also face restraints 
37 
imposed by their tenns and conditions of employment. This chapter, after 
examining these issues, has analysed three contending, yet totally legitimate, 
dispositions that may exist amongst community members. Based on this premise it 
is asserted that the exclusion of these contending beliefs, values and attitudes will 
render community work praxis unrepresentative. 
The next chapter examines the epistemological and ontological underpinning of 
a set of contending social reality perspectives drawing upon a framework 
developed by Dixon and Dogan (2005). Moreover, this framework acts as an 
explanatory tool that facilitates further scrutiny of the issues identified in this 
Chapter. Axiomatically, the exploration incorporates the debatable contention that 
a philosophically coherent community member can choose a social reality 
paradigm that allows them to interpret a community engagement setting, as they 
would like it to be. Through this analysis, it is possible to adopt a suitable 
taxonomy of perspectives on social reality that can further inform community 
praxis. 
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The Nature of Society: 
How do we Explain or Understand Social Life? 
Two fundamental theoretical dilemmas confront social science in its mission to 
interpret and evaluate the web of beliefs about the nature of human activity and 
social institutions. The first is the epistemological issue relating to the continuing 
debate about the concept of knowledge, which includes the limits of application 
that should attach to the use of scientific methods in the description and evaluation 
of human affairs. The second is the ontological issue concerning human action 
and social structure. This demands that consideration be given over whether 
creative human actors can control the circumstances that shape their lives. Arising 
from their analyses of these issues, philosophers of the social sciences offer an 
opportunity for critical reflection over the systems of categorisation within rival 
epistemological belief systems and their resultant ontological clearings. 
In reaching a conclusion over their preferred ontological and epistemological 
marriage, individuals would choose to embrace the notion that they can explain 
social reality or the notion that they can understand social reality. This rudimentary 
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dichotomy leads to different methodological truth claims about epistemic 
properties. 
The truth-maker principle of explanation asserts that our social reality is 
objective and that a scientific method can be utilised to offer causal explanations 
that "makes truth true" (Psillos, 2002: 167). Therefore, this method is modelled on 
the natural sciences as contingent propositions are proffered as proved on the 
basis of a definite deducible logical relationship existing between the initial 
conditions governing an event and its combination with higher-order natural laws. 
The truth-maker principle of understanding assens that our social reality is 
subjective and that "the social world must be understood from within rather than 
explained from without" (Hollis, 1994: 16). So. actions originate in culture, 
language, practice and experience. These various meanings derive from both 
individual and community interpretations and can "range from what is consciously 
and individually intended to what is communally and often unintendedly significant" 
(Hollis, 1994: 17). 
Truths and Truth Propositions 
The proposition is that people can know a fact only if they hold a belief that a 
proposition (a knowledge claim) is true, thereby making it a true belief (or genuine 
knowledge) held by them. This conversion of a knowledge claim into genuine 
knowledge requires a criterion or standard by which judgements can be made 
about what is and is not genuine knowledge — what is knowable. Thus, what is 
required to prove that something is true? The concept of truth is fundamental to 
our very existence, as it determines what we can know and what we can learn 
about the social world. However, beyond this expansive supposition, lies the 
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uncomfortable realisation that those who have a predilection towards multifarious 
standards of evaluation can comfortably interpret truth. Therefore, to prevent the 
possibility of degeneration into mere rhetoric, at this point it becomes necessary to 
examine the various theories of truth and their associated truth criteria. 
Theories of Truth 
Answers to philosophical questions can be true or false but when that answer is 
given the proponent should give their reasons for their response (Scruton, 2002: 
6). Such reasons might be guided by the following theories: 
• The correspondence theory of truth that proposes truth as a knowledge claim 
that corresponds or agrees with some elements of reality in a way that 
validates a proposition. Thus, "a belief is true when there is a corresponding 
fact, and is false when there is no corresponding fact" (Russell, 1912: 129). 
Therefore, the substantiation of a truth occurs through the replication of reality. 
• The coherence theory of truth that proposes truth as a knowledge claim that is 
coherent with, and mutually supported by. other knowledge claims. Thus, a 
truth fits into a system or network of mutually coherent propositions however, 
on this basis, the perfect truth must be in accord with the whole of reality, which 
provides it with a status that is beyond judgement. (Bradley, [1893] 1930). 
Therefore, the substantiation of a truth occurs through other knowledge claims. 
• The consensus theory of truth proposes truth as something agreed upon by 
some specific group of experts even if it fails to describe reality. Charies 
Sanders Peirce (1932) developed this non-ontological theory. It maintains that 
a statement is true if those who have investigated it can agree to it. However, it 
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is implicit within the notion that not all statements can be assigned a truth-
value. 
o The social constructivism theory of truth proposes that truth is socially 
constructed and is thus contingent upon convention, human perception and 
social experience- In this scenario the individual rejects determinism as a factor 
in truth making and recognises that democratic discussion with members of 
their community is central to the process of ordering human activity. Thus, this 
paradigm makes personal and group enquiry paramount as a web of social 
relationships reveal the agent as embedded in a series of social systems. 
These systems must be thoroughly critiqued to enable a community to initiate 
plans for purposeful social development. 
• The pragmatism theory of truth is a variant of Peirce's consensus theory. This 
approach proposes that truth be judged by the success of its practical 
consequences. Thus, truth becomes something that is only true if it is useful to 
believe. This notion is encapsulated within the observation that "No concrete 
test of what is really true has ever been agreed upon" (James, 1897:15). 
Truth Criteria 
These theories, each of which offer equally legitimate understandings of what 
constitutes the truth, infonm individual truth-making through the selective 
application of various truth criteria. These criteria act as benchmarks that personify 
truth claims by enabling individuals to utilise their chosen standards of judgement 
to evaluate whether a theoretical proposition should be designated as true or false. 
Moreover, these various means, which warrant the legitimacy of a claim to 
knowledge, can be categorised as follows: 
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• Sensory experience (a posteriori^ inductive knowledge) or reasoning (a priorf 
deductive knowledge), both of which, to varying degrees, may provide criteria 
that validate or inform propositions that are advanced by all the truth theories. 
However, both the truth doctrines of social constructivism and pragmatism 
compartmentalise, and critique, scientific conclusions when they begin their 
analysis of what constitutes a truth in order that outcomes of human 
subjectivity takes precedence over factual objectivity. 
• Epistemological foundationalism recognises that self-justified knowledge 
claims, if they are raised upon robust and unambiguous foundations through a 
combination of experience and reason, constitute a set of beliefs that do not 
need further justification (Lewis, 1929, 1946). These criteria specifically accord 
with the consensus theory of truth but they refute coherentism as propositions 
may be know without a foundation in certainties. 
• Epistemological reliabilism can be understood as an externalist approach to 
truth. Here the observer experiences sufficiently good reasons that are 
grounded in the process of direct apprehension or of reasoning, that produces 
a high proportion of generally reliable true beliefs. So the subject follows a 
process that may be outside of their own awareness and thus, possibly 
unjustified (Sellars, 1975). These principles accord with the coherence theory 
of truth making. 
• Epistemological probabilism is the doctrine that if reasonable degrees of 
probability can be assigned to some area of social life, then the observer may 
^ A proposition is knowable a posteriori if it can only be known by inductive reasoning based on 
experience of the specific course of events that give rise to its occun-ence in the actual world. 
^ A proposition is known a priori if it can be known by deductive reasoning without experience of 
the specific course of events that gave rise to its occurrence in the natural world. 
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settle for such a hypotheses on the basis of their willingness to act in 
accordance with these axioms (Peirce, [1868] 1966, 36-8). These criteria can 
inform the consensus theory of truth making as part of a process of abduction.^ 
• Epistemic defeasibility accepts that a knowledge claim can be made defective 
by additional, previously unknown evidence (Popper, 1974). Such proof of 
falsification would render any truths substantiated by an incorrect fact in the 
application of the correspondence, coherence or consensus theories of truth 
making as disproved. However, under the doctrine of both the social 
constructivism and pragmatism theories new, previously unknown evidence 
may be rejected as irrelevant. 
• Consensual pragmatism would exist amongst a group of experts who can 
reach a unanimous agreement that a knowledge claim is true on the basis that 
each member of the group have enough expert experience to judge it. This 
field of professional expertise may draw on both naturalist'* and hermeneutic^ 
epistemological knowledge (Bhaskar, 1979). 
• Instrumental pragmatism is the doctrine that almost any belief might be true 
provided, after all matters are considered, that it works by offering beneficial 
results to its believers. This notion could form part of being an active participant 
in a knowing situation where "knowing is itself a mode of practical action and is 
the way of interaction by which other natural interactions become subject to 
direction" (Dewey, 1929: 106-7). 
^ Abduction is a creative process of using evidence to reach wider conclusions. However, some 
people deny that probability can inform abduction, a conclusion that is contested here. 
^ Social reality is objective and understandable only by the application of deductive logic and 
inductive inference. 
^ The method of interpretation of the whole social historical and psychological world. Thus, social 
reality is subjective, understandable only as a set of interpretations derived from culture, language, 
practice and experience. 
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These categories do not offer a precise division between criteria based on 
objectivity, and criteria based on subjectivity, however, whilst there appears to be 
no irreconcilable division between these tendencies some theories of truth are 
inclined to embrace the notion of explanation more than understanding and vice-
versa. For instance, the correspondence, coherence and consensus theories 
place an emphasis on objective criteria, whilst social constructivism and 
pragmatism comfortably espouse subjectivity. 
Thus, a subtle but discernible epistemological dichotomy about truth-making 
influences the standards of truth people choose to apply when endeavouring to 
gain knowledge about social phenomena. Of course, a fundamental issue 
becomes apparent — "you cannot search for X, whatever X may be, unless you 
are from the outset equipped with a good enough notion of what X is to provide 
you with criteria by which to judge whether you have found what you are looking 
for" (Welbourne, 2001: 14). However, this assertion presupposes that individuals 
would select a method of gathering knowledge that offers a suitable framework for 
analysis from a particular perspective of social reality. Here, it is proposed that 
people choose to accept information as knowledge starting from their standards of 
trust. Thus, when they answer the question of what constitutes legitimate 
knowledge this influences their explication and acceptance of particular fonms of 
social phenomena. 
The Epistemological Dichotomy: Naturalism or Hermeneutics 
The dichotomy between naturalism and hermeneutics reflects the different 
understandings in the philosophy of social sciences over how people can learn 
45 
about social phenomena. The dichotomy is clearly illustrated in Figure 2.1 
however further sub-divisions exist in both the main categorisations. 
Figure 2.1: The Contending Epistemological Perspectives 
Epistemology 
Naturalism Hermeneutlcs 
Presumes an objective social 
world, best knowable by the 
application of scientific methods, 
and embraces, inter alia, 
empiricism, verification ism, logical 
positivism, and fatsificationism. 
Presumes a subjective social world, best 
knowable only as it is socially 
constructed, and embraces, inter alia, 
epistemological existentialism, 
phenomenology and linguistic 
epistemology. 
Source: Dixon and Dogan. 2003a. 
Naturalism's Epistemological Dichotomy: Empiricism or Rationalism? 
Descartes concluded that individuails could accept that they should only concern 
themselves with knowledge achieved by their rational intellects ([1628] 1961: 149) 
where reason triumphs over instinctive passions. However, whilst passions may 
have been transcended the question still remained as to the value that could be 
placed on an analytical statement where the predicate is established within the 
concept of the subject, for example "all sisters are female". This resulted in Kant 
([1781-7] 1956) agreeing with the empiricists that knowledge should be a posteriori 
or empirically based on evidence from sensory experience. However, Kant also 
agreed with the rationalist's assertion that synthetic a pnoh propositions, where 
denial would not imply a logical contradiction, may be truths for another reason. 
Following this logic, and from a contemporary perspective, Nozick is wary of 
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placing too much faith in the supremacy of rationality and suggests that we should 
"track the truth" (1981: 172-8) and reach a conditional analysis of knowledge. 
Knowledge from Experience. Positivism, in a general sense, can be understood 
as a rejection of the theoretical philosophy of being and knowing known as 
metaphysics. The positivist adheres to the belief that observation and 
measurement, employed in a framework of scientific method, can reveal laws 
about cause and effect that can determine the limits of peoples' truth in relafion to 
phenomena. In drawing its sharp distinction between the realms of fact and value 
the movement embraces several differing shades of opinion so, in this section, 
British Empiricism will be compared to the contemporary British Logical Positivist, 
or Analytical, tradition. Subsequently the basis of rationalist thinking is critically 
analysed. This process leads to some Important contentions in theoretical 
reasoning that effect the possible reconciliation of the two schools of thought 
through a synthesised ratio-empiricism. 
Locke, Berkeley and Hume are the principle philosophers associated with 
British Empiricism. All three contributed to the establishment of an eighteenth 
century movement which refuted innate cognition, or the theory that the source of 
knowledge is inborn in humans, with our innate meanings deriving from 
intuitiveness developed by reason (Shand. 2002: 67-70). Therefore, the human 
intellect, in Locke's critique of innate ideas, when confronted with the challenge of 
explaining the relation between mind and object, is a tabula rasa awaiting 
inscription from aspects of experience. In this process, he maintains that "No 
man's knowledge here can go beyond his experience" (Locke, [1690] 2004: Bk.2, 
Ch.1, SecM9) 
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Locke classifies experiences as being of two kinds. External sensations, which 
awake sensible qualities in our minds, exist in external objects. These sensations 
are divided into primary objective qualities, such as size, movement and shape, 
and secondary subjective qualities such as colour, taste, sound and so on. Internal 
sensations can be termed reflection and are responsible for the ideas produced as 
a result of sensation data. In a similar manner, ideas are subdivided into simple 
and complex with the latter being compounds of a simple notion that cannot be 
reduced further, for instance, the idea of the colour green. Furthennore, an idea is 
understood as representing an epistemological relationship between two entities 
as it expresses the conception that the knower has of an object (Locke, [1690] 
2004; see also Shand, 2002: 111-3). In this relationship, "All men are liable to 
error, and most men are. in many points, by passion or interest, under temptation 
to it" (Locke, [1690] 2004: Bk. 4, Ch. 20. Sect. 17). 
However, Berkeley, in maintaining his opposition to materialism, rejects the 
notion of primary and secondary qualities in external objects and maintains that all 
ideas are of a subjective nature. Thus, he observes that "They are neither finite 
quantities, or quantities infinitely small, nor yet nothing. May we not call them the 
ghosts of departed quantities?" (Berkeley. [1734] 2004: Sect. 35). Therefore, 
Berkeley is committed to the notion that people's intelligible thought must refer to 
what they have comprehended through their personal experience. However, in this 
scenario, scepticism about the existence of God is dismissed as an affront to 
common sense as only those ideas, which we perceive through our senses, can. 
have any meaning. This subjective standpoint becomes extreme subjectivism in 
Hume's wori<, where the mind is not a tabula rasa, but is predisposed to instincts, 
which shape knowledge. So he concludes that "reason is and ought only to be the 
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slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and 
obey them" ([1739] 2004: Bk. 2. Pt. 3. Sect. 3, Para. 4). Furthermore, ideas or 
copies of sensory impressions are thought able to agglomerate amongst 
individuals leading to the associafion of ideas that produces a level of commonality 
in human perceptions (Scruton, 2002: 126). 
Evolving from eighteenth century theorising three fundamental suppositions are 
discernible, which together define contemporary empiricism (Scruton. 2002: 125-
6): 
• Proposifions that are advanced after scientific enquiry are only true by virtue of 
their inherent ideas. Reason is therefore, nothing but the relationship between 
different notions. 
• The only available framework of knowledge, other than observations, is matters 
of fact. However, they are unable to generate further necessary truths as they 
can only offer a summary of what is known to be true and, by implication, what 
is not true. 
• There cannot be a priori proof for any matter of fact as knowledge is contingent 
upon experience. Thus, the principle of induction, which proceeds from 
inference from, known events to the probability of the occurrence of the next 
event, is the only source of a factual proposition. Therefore, if observafion 
results in the perception that "all swans are white" this supposition remains a 
fact until a black swan appears. 
Hume, in developing empiricism to its preordained conclusions, denies the 
objective value of the concept of causafion arguing that an assertion, explaining 
one event in terms of another, is based on confused logic. Thus, two events, which 
exist at separate fimes, are discrete within human thought and one event can be 
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imagined without the other. On this basis, any proposition maintaining that it is a 
necessary truth that one event must automatically follow another is, no matter how 
clever, based on a fallacious argument (Hume, [1748] 1975: Sect. 12, Pt. 3). 
However, it is through a process of "habits of the mind" that people are influenced 
by previous observations into making connections between events independent of 
consistent external perception thus, "custom, then, is the great guide of human 
life" (Hume, [1748] 1975: Sect. 5, Pt.1). Therefore, it is axiomatic "how use doth 
breed a habit in a man!" (Shakespeare, The Two Gentlemen of Verona). 
The problem that dominates British Empiricism is whether an objective 
metaphysics is achievable through the explanation and modification of our sensory 
perceptions. Logical positivism, a school of thought pursued during the early part 
of the twentieth century in the work of the Vienna Circle of philosophers, 
mathematicians and natural scientists, aimed to connect positivism with 
empiricism. This task was to be carried out by "their making the impossibility of 
metaphysics depend not upon the nature of what could be known but upon the 
nature of what could be said" (Ayer. 1959: 11). Thus, synthetic a priori knowledge 
does not exist. Therefore, apart from analytic statements of logic, which includes 
mathematics and geometry, knowledge is restricted to empiricist experiences, 
which includes psychology, physics and biology, and is capable of building into 
scientific theories, which can become the basis of hypotheses that extend beyond 
human experience. Thus, a precise distinction between the analytic and the 
synthetic resolves the tension within Hume's philosophy, which regards a priori 
propositions as "matters of fact" and the stuff of real existence. So. logical 
positivists can designate Hume's statement that "It is not contrary to reason to 
prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger" ([1739] 
50 
2004: Bk. 2. Pt. 3) to triviality that precludes knowledge of the actual, or the 
contingent, from pure logical reasoning. 
Having established a separation between analytic and synthetic propositions 
logical positivism, in attempting to offer a general set of methodological rules that 
would be the same for natural and social sciences, found that it was axiomatic that 
"all metaphysical, ethical and theological doctrines are meaningless. This 
conclusion was inevitable, not because of any defect of logical thought, but 
because these strands of thought were unverifiable" (Scruton, 2002: 288). 
Therefore, all significant propositions that are not necessarily true, such as a 
tautology, must be observationally verifiable (Gordon, 1991: 594). This assertion, 
which has its origins in the thinking of Wittgenstein, leads to the necessity of 
distinguishing between observational and theoretical non-analytic statements. To 
resolve this dilemma Ayer (1959) proposed to limit the concept of verification to 
"verification in principle" and "weak or probabilistic verification". Thus, both the trap 
of denying the meaningful premises in empirical propositions, that cannot be 
verified due to the existing limits of experience, and the danger of conclusive 
verification or falsification when observation can only reach a conclusion which "is 
more or less probable" is avoided. Therefore, Ayer's thinking logically takes him to 
the conclusion that "all empirical obsen/ations are hypotheses because there is no 
way of absolutely confimiing or refuting such propositions (Shand, 2002: 248). 
However, this prescriptive rule returns logical positivism to the contradiction that is 
central to the uncertainties of induction as "if an induction is worth making, it may 
be wrong" (Russell. 1927: 83). Whilst knowledge is recognised as an explanation 
of observations which lead to scientific laws that state universal truths 
nevertheless, as these generalisations are only ratified through a positive 
51 
experience how can their truth be guaranteed? (Scmton. 2002: 128). For this 
reason, logical positivism adopted a deductive system of analysis that was 
informed by Popper's arguments (1974) about the proper growth of human 
knowledge. 
Popper (1974) characterised scientists as problem solvers who propose 
theories that go beyond existing knowledge, which are immersed in information 
and are exposed to falsification. In a deductive procedure first of all the 
consistency of the proposed theoretical system is established before, as a second 
stage, the analytical and synthetic elements are distinguished. Subsequently the 
new theory is compared to other theories to ensure that it advances existing 
knowledge, before, as the final element in Popper's falsificationalism, the new 
theory is subject to rigorous testing. If the new theory survives attempts to falsify it, 
and as it can explain all the content of the existing theory or theories, it is adopted 
as highly corroborated. However, this result not in the discovery of the truth but of 
the best-unfalsified theory offered. Therefore, Popper is a metaphysical realist in a 
regulatory sense although he acknowledges that theories can only be tested in the 
idiom of our current critical awareness of reality (Popper, [1934] 1977). 
Empiricism has the weakness of being unable to judge the truth or falsehood of 
analytical principles that are not grounded in observation. However, logical 
positivism's embrace of Popper's methods of scientific enquiry, in an attempt to 
unify empiricism and positivism, offers a means of reconsidering the contribution 
empiricism can make to the theory of knowledge. 
The fundamental tenets of rationalism will now be analysed. This examination 
reveals how philosophers, in the tradition of Plato. Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz 
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and Spinoza, have regarded the notion of explaining reality as fundamentally a 
product of human reason. 
Knowledge from the Intellect Rationalism can be understood through the axiom 
"placing trust in reason" (Bunge, 1996: 306). Like enipiricism. in its search for the 
truth about this world, it acknowledges that humans cannot be direct recipients of 
knowledge but instead, have to interpret phenomena. As already discussed, 
empiricists base their epistemology on observations made by the senses whilst 
rationalists place a reliance on the resources of logic and intellect. However, within 
the discipline of philosophy, rationalism appears in two strengths, moderate and 
radical. The former is an adaptable doctrine that can be combined with other 
epistemologies as, while it accepts that reason is necessary, nevertheless it 
acknowledges that, in particular relational situations, different individuals may 
interpret rationality in different ways to fully comprehend phenomena. Alternatively, 
radical rationalists considered here as primarily supporters of the thinking of 
Descartes. Spinoza and Leibniz, are apriorists, which, by implication, leads to their 
discomfort with both empirical data and positivism (Bunge, 1996: 306). 
The dogmatic assumption of radical rationalism — that there can be only one 
perception of reality that accords with reason — is readily apparent. However, this 
prescribed critique leaves as self-evident the opportunity for moderate rationalism 
to become a player in a synthesis of doctrines that may advance the positivist's 
cause. Such a possibility of synergy is a valuable asset in addressing the need, 
from a human perspective, of allowing our own theoretical powers to identify from 
experience the effects, if any, of social structures on our social arrangements. We 
are then able to subject these observations to reasoned reflection through 
application of our chosen criterion of verifiability (Ayer, [1936] 1975). 
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Descartes' philosophy attempts to allow explanations of nature to be free from a 
scepticism that leads to confusion and conflict. Human ideas can be determined 
through sensation, rooted in fractious and self-important notions, or, as in the idea 
of God, be innate and thus, sealed with validity. In this typology of theodicy, the 
individual is the ultimate arbitrator as each person reaches their own decisions 
about the validity of truths and knowledge (Descartes, [1641] 1964). 
Thus, whilst the human senses are not ignored they are regarded as inferior to 
explanations derived from reason. These explanations would, through a process of 
deductive reasoning, assert that their conclusions necessarily follow from the truth 
of their premises. On this basis deductive reasoning appears to produce 
contingent truths reliant on the validity of firstly, the a priori knowledge available 
from previously established premises and secondly ceteris paribus where "truths" 
or "laws" emerge in a closed system. However, despite this qualification, 
rationalism maintains that truths about the "really existing intelligible world that 
underlies the appearance of changing particulars that we experience" (Shand, 
2002: 69) can be discovered through the methodical application and findings from 
deductive reasoning. Ultimate reality becomes explainable through the Cartesian 
separation of the mind and the senses, with the former capable of indifference to 
sensory sensations, as it comprehends the natural order of reality. This dualist 
vision is rooted in Descartes' observation " that it is only the things that I conceive 
clearly and distinctly which have the power to convince me completely" ([1641] 
1964: 123). Thus, clarity of mind, divorced from the body, can perceive objects 
with certainty and truth. 
The world, from a rationalist perspective, is of necessity logical. As Spinoza 
observes this condition reflects the nature of God. so denial of the theorem that is 
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derived from the accepted axioms is an illogical contradiction implying God's 
imperfection ([1675] 1989; see also Shand, 2002: 87). Leibniz refined this principle 
to the acceptance of theorems after the application of sufficient reason by 
acknowledging that truths might be contingent because God is under no 
compulsion to actualise all truths. Accordingly, it is enough for every fact to find its 
justification in a previous fact to justify the necessary and logically rational process 
of causality. Thus, it is acknowledged that although the world is perceived through 
a variety of perspectives humanity can still obtain "as much perfection as possible" 
(Leibniz, [1714] 1973: 187-8). 
Therefore, rationalism addresses an imperative for both the natural and social 
sciences; cause and effect become explainable concepts offering declarations of 
greater value than a process of observation that is unable to move beyond mere 
correlation. Nevertheless, strong rationalism still seems insufficient to fully explain 
the world, whilst theories are the product of reason they still demand subsequent 
empirical observation for their validation. Similarly, the design of empirical 
research is informed by the content of theories making an irrefutable argument for 
the interdependence of both scientific methods. 
Examination of Popper's theoretical maxim of falsificationism has revealed a 
doctrine that contributed to the proponents of logical positivism rejecting the 
inductive approach. However, an alternative means of unifying rationalism and 
empiricism had been proposed by Kant in the late eighteenth century. Kant had 
found grounds to agree with empiricist thought noting that "intuitions are without 
exception sensuous, and therefore, no speculative knowledge is possible which 
reaches further than possible experience" ([1781-7] 1956: 46). Furthermore. Kant 
also maintained that a priori knowledge of objects is of importance but "is of only 
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practical application, since it has not the slightest effect in enlarging theoretical 
knowledge of these objects as insight into their nature by pure reason" ([1781-7] 
1956: 58). Thus, explanation through a priori knowledge is limited to immediate 
appearances resulting in Kant concluding, "the highest good is a synthesis of 
concepts" ([1781-7] 1956: 117) where perception and experience can be united 
into a single consciousness. Therefore, synthetic a priori propositions that cannot 
be refuted after experience present transcendental deductions that can lead to a 
priori truths. Furthermore, Kant, in his conclusion to the Critique of Pure Reason, 
recommends self-rieflection over, the effects of both rationalism and empiricism "on 
common sense" to "avoid the error of a crude and unpractised judgement" ([1781-
7] 1956: 167). Nevertheless, this assertion still leaves the dilemma that first 
principles, or a priori knowledge, cannot be proven and synthetic propositions can 
always be denied without contradiction making Kant's attempt to create a method 
of ratio-empiricism through synergy inconclusive. 
However, there is an alternative foundationalist theory of knowledge that can 
offer a secure underpinning for factual explanations of what we can aspire to know 
about the real world. This strand of thought was, largely, the work of perhaps the 
most seminal figure in nineteenth century American Pragmatism, Charles Peirce. 
His theorising offers an opportunity to re-appraise the notion of explaining the 
social world within a different theoretical framework. However, before we explore 
this theoretical re-framing, it is appropriate to examine the schools of thought that 
place an emphasis on the subjective understanding of the social reality. 
Hermeneutics: Social Constructivism, Phenomenology and Existentialism 
The epistemological techniques that rely on a process of explanation 
emphasise the notion of prediction. These are made on the assumption that a 
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situation is free from any influence other than that of the factors under 
consideration. However, in an alternative narrative, the word understanding 
replaces the notion of explanation and the complex variant of human subjectivity, 
although present in the broader interpretation of positivist thought, assumes a 
dominant role compared to the objective goals of "scientific" exploration. 
Understanding Social Life. Hermeneutics inevitably relies on human subjectivity. 
Therefore, in this context, it is necessary to examine the interpretation of the word 
"subjective." 
Freud ([1929] 1971); Knorr-Cetina (1981) and feminists®, such as Harding 
(1986; 1991) and Shepherd (1993), maintain that subjectivism cannot just be 
confined to recognition of the relevance of human feelings, beliefs and interests. 
These particular notions have already been incorporated into strands of 
empiricism, for instance, Berkeley ([1734] 2004) in taking an idealist stance, 
regards all objects of knowledge as mental objects or ideas. However, radical 
versions of subjectivism perceive the world as the creation of the knowing self, 
rather than existing independently from the mind. Thus, scientific facts are 
excluded from deliberations, the possible dichotomy between truth and reality is 
deemed an irrelevance and problems of objectivity do not arise (Bunge, 1996: 
330). 
Some feminist thought extols intuition over reason. This strategy is largely 
based on the imperative to further feminist values, centred on the individual's self-
identification with the outcomes from oppressive practices that have remained 
Feminist writers are concerned with epistemology — specifically how women learn about their 
reality — thus prominent commentators do not engage In the ontological debate that Is explored 
later in this Chapter. 
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hidden in a framework of dominant scientific study constructed around 
preponderantly male nonms and legislation (Harding, 1986, 1991; Shepherd, 
1993). However, the feminist imperative that requires the incorporation of feminist 
values into the design of research programmes is no longer such a distinctive 
standpoint, as the majority of contemporary natural and social scientists no longer 
approach their work as "value free" (May, 1993: 40). 
If the world is subject dependent then, by implication, one person's truth is just 
as valid as another's, and so each individual can create reality in a metaphysical 
domain that is incapable of being addressed by the methods of science. In this 
scenario, as Kant ([1781-7] 1956) reasoned, collectively we cannot know any 
ultimate reality. Alternatively, this assertion, with its affirmation of permanence, 
seems to lead us to an unacceptably restrictive position on "the scope of human 
reason" (Callinicos, 1999: 31). Therefore, possibly to avoid falling into a 
complicated predicament, moderate subjectivism restricts itself to an individualistic 
perspective. This constraint is reminiscent of Berkeley avoiding the challenge of 
explaining inter-subjective agreements by accepting the assumption "that God 
takes care of the uniqueness of the world" (Bunge, 1996: 332). Nevertheless, the 
contentions of moderate subjectivism do allow individuals to define the meaning of 
their subjectivity by comparing and contrasting their understanding with that held 
by others (Schleimiacher, [c.1835-^5] 1977; Dilthey [1883] 1988). 
Husserl, in the twentieth century, reinterpreted notions of subjectivism that may 
have relied on the omnipotence of a divine authority. He constructed the method of 
"phenomenological reduction" or "bracketing" that aimed to exclude reflexive and 
speculative thought from descriptions of mental conditions and thereby isolate 
pure consciousness (Husserl, [1929] 1981). Subsequently, Sartre, as the primary 
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modern exponent of existentialism was to reject both an objectivist and subjectivist 
philosophy in developing a position of human intentionality of consciousness 
(Sartre, [1960] 1976). However, before we proceed to examine both 
phenomenology and existentialism in more detail, the subjectivist viewpoint is 
combined with collectivism to produce the school of thought known as social 
constructivism (Bunge. 1996: 335). 
The Collective Interpretation of Understanding. Popper, in opposing 
totalitarianism, as exemplified in Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia, made a 
linkage between political philosophy and epistemology. In this relationship, 
methodological individualism was both the correct method of scientific 
investigation and a means of maintaining liberal democracy. However, advocates 
for a collectivist doctrine maintain that the greatest good for individuals is to serve 
the political economy during the duration of their lives on a basis determined by 
collectively agreed social ends and purposes (Popper, 1966; see also Gordon, 
1991:658-9). 
As it is understood that "science cannot attain objective, representational 
knowledge" (Bohman, 1991: 131), as the facts it offers are as relative and vague 
as any other singular elucidation, there is a reliance on communities to achieve 
consensus amongst their membership. However, there is a flaw in this rationale as 
the premises arising from scientific hypotheses may be indeterminate and the 
knowledge possessed by the researcher may far exceed that of other community 
members. Thus. Woolgar's sceptical strategy employed against what he described 
as "a false objectivist epistemology" (Woolgar cited by Bohman. 1991: 131) fails to 
offer an adequate logical analysis that can overturn traditional claims for scientific 
knowledge. 
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Woolgar. working with the philosopher-sociologist Latour, cremated an actor-
network theory, which, whilst maintaining a strong anti-realist stance, aimed to 
overcome the rigid dichotomy between the subject and the object of knowledge 
and unite society with nature. The theory was formulated after completion of an 
ethnographic study into scientific activity, which recognised that the practices of 
social science are deeply intertwined with scientific experimentation incorporating 
such matters as economies, dimensions of power and technologies into the totality 
of participants' belief systems. Thus, the statistics generated in the laboratory only 
assume the semblance of reality through the interaction of the researcher with 
other scientists. This process results in alliances that lead to further political 
struggles that extend the creditability of creative theorising to capital, the military, 
religious organisations and so on. A successful conclusion to this series of 
negotiations has the effect of legitimising the power to define reality through the 
now uncontested new scientific fact or facts (Latour and Woolgar, 1979). However, 
this assertion raises several contentious issues. The initial status of the objects 
created by science is unclear. Are they embryonic explanations resulting from the 
application of a particular scientific method or do they possess a different status? 
This lack of clarity is also apparent in the relativist, non-realist, categorisation of 
scientific findings both during the duration of the formation of scientific and non-
scientific alliances, and their transformation into the realm of realism after disputes 
have been resolved. So the question about the standards of specific criteria that 
should be satisfied other than the particular viewpoints of influential individuals and 
groups, remains unanswered. Finally, the entire approach seems hierarchical, 
almost totalitarian, as it ignores wider democratic debate about scientific 
discoveries. Whilst this might be an accurate reflection of the opinions of part of 
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the scientific community the analysis, as a model to unify nature and society, lacks 
certitude (Bohman, 1991: 206-11). 
Extreme theoretical notions have been inspired by some understandings 
perpetuated by the school of social constructivism, for example Fleck (cited by 
Bunge. 1998: 227) denied the existence of syphilis, labelling the disease as a 
social construct contrived by the medical community. Such an assertion, as it 
concerns an epidemic that has inflicted a painful death on its victims since the 
sixteenth century, seems somewhat absurd. However, it is rational to accept that 
an entire series of biological, psychological and social factors have shaped the 
public's perception about this disease resulting in puritanical reactions that are still 
prevalent in relation to contemporary understandings of the AIDS virus. Therefore, 
it is acknowledged that an objective condition may be confused with a social 
reaction, necessitating the application of a philosophical pragmatism that can 
accommodate scientific facts whilst dismissing the more extreme pressures of a 
community based thought collective. 
The philosophical method of analysing language, rather than what language 
ostensibly concerns, is the focus of linguistic epistemology. It is asserted that 
individuals learn the rules of language that govern the social meaning associated 
with any action. These language rules vary both simultaneously and continuously 
in different cultures as they act to shape the acquisition of knowledge. So, 
collective inter-subjectivity, which engenders a particular understanding of social 
reality, is part of the expressive function of language that, in its expression of 
thoughts and feelings, produces an aspect of interpretation that accords with 
others of a shared disposition (Wittgenstein, [1953] 1958). 
61 
Collective understanding of language patterns questions the possibility of a 
private language through which we can express our own awareness without 
modelling our words on the awareness of others. For instance, the individual 
experience's unique sensations but can they then use words that describe these 
personal metaphysical pictures or intuitions? Wittgenstein proposes that such a 
private language is not possible in asking the question "are my words for 
sensations tied up with my natural expressions of sensation? In that case, my 
language is not a 'private' one. Someone else might understand it as well as I. — 
But suppose I didn't have any natural expression for the sensation, but only had 
the sensation? And now I simply associate names with sensations and use these 
names in descriptions" ([1953] 1958: §256). Therefore, the use of language 
requires the individual to follow the language rules of their community, a notion 
incompatible with a private language. 
The nature of public language illustrates how the general acceptance of 
particular patterns of behaviour by a community assumes normative standards. 
Thus, a legal system is accepted by the majority of citizens not because it 
possesses threats and sanctions but instead, that the law affirms, in its language 
system, that its rules should be obeyed (Hart, 1961). 
Therefore, the doctrine of social constructivism might benefit from inquiry into 
language customs as such observations "on the natural history of human 
beings;...have escaped remark only because they are always before our eyes" 
(Wittgenstein, [1953] 1958: §415). 
Consciousness Restrained by Intentionality. An individual can understand the 
social world by recognising that it can only be interpreted through their own 
construction of reality. Such a reality may be formed through social interaction 
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where an individual's consciousness experiences a distinct and meaningful 
occurrence that influences their own future patterns of behaviour (Husserl, [1929] 
1981). Thus, social phenomenology investigates the relationship between the 
objective and subjective social realms. 
Arising from this investigation the advocates of phenomenology understand 
their social world as possessing a spiritual, rather than a material, dimension that 
offers meanings that can become part of a system of interpretation rather than 
provide a descriptive framework for social systems. For instance, the doctrine's 
affirmation of the value of abstract reasoning as a purposive outcome in its own 
right may offer a means of improving our understanding about the ways in which 
individual consciousness relates to social life. Furthermore, phenomenological 
concerns extend to the process of reciprocal interaction, whereby shared human 
awareness can detemnine our agency, the manner in which social life can become 
"structured" and the resultant, and sometimes negative, implications from these 
processes for the construction of reality. 
The empirical psychologist Bretano, working in the late nineteenth century, 
rejected all premises of idealism by maintaining that the human mind could only be 
understood from the viewpoint of the first person. Knowledge is provided by 
conscious perceptions, but these impressions are mediated by intentionality, which 
draws a distinction between material and intentional objects, or propositions and 
ideas about indeterminate and determinate phenomena, which means that 
knowledge may not correspond to material reality (Bretano [1874] 1973). Bretano's 
pupil, Husserl. developed phenomenology with the aim, similar to that of 
Descartes, of "establishing a unified certain foundation for alt knowledge" (Shand. 
2002: 218). Initially he pursued this goal by studying logic, which leads him to 
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reject positivist explanations as they relied on the mechanical application of 
reasons to logical consequences. Therefore, instead of universal naturalistic 
analysis, restricted to the appearance of phenomena, Husserl advocated that we 
should focus on the understanding of "essences" through conceptualisation and 
self-reflection (Husserl, [1929] 1981; see also Gordon, 1991: 612). 
The heart of phenomenology is located in its method of reduction. Therefore, 
Husserl can support the Cartesian position by maintaining a separation between 
the intrinsic elements of our mental states from extraneous encumbrances 
(Husserl, [1929] 1981). The presuppositions people possess concerning the 
designation of mental phenomena are to be bracketed off or suspended from their 
belief or judgement to allow them to deliberate on pure phenomena. Such an 
enhanced reflective awareness, which is facilitated by their own intuitive 
intellectual vision, excludes existing theories and assumptions to achieve a 
phenomenological attitude that can comprehend the essence of the reduced 
objects of consciousness (Shand. 2002: 223-4). Therefore, there is an assertion 
that all human behaviour can derive from individual intentionality, so the individual 
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is free to search for their own identity by following a process where they must 
struggle to achieve an authentic way of life. 
Freedom and Living an "Authentic" Life. The philosophical movement known 
as existentialism achieved popularity from the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth 
century although contemporary proponents such as Wilson (1956), an English 
existentialist, still advocate and develop its principles. However, a concise 
definition of the doctrine is problematic. For instance, two of the movement's 
notable philosophers, Heidegger and Sartre, considered that the question of 
existence is a matter for solitary meditation that should not become the subject of 
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discourse (Wahl. 1949: 2). Nevertheless amongst exponents of existentialism 
there are certain broad concerns and assumptions that symbolise this philosophy 
of life such as the emphasis on individual existence, that precedes the 
fundamental nature or inherent characteristics of the self, and which consequently 
values subjectivity, individual freedom and choice. Therefore, existence precedes 
essence in a process that recognises men and women as having jurisdiction over 
their own awareness of the purposeful possibilities of their actuality. 
Whilst this section primarily features the work of Sartre, from his rejection of 
some of Husserl's conclusions to the formulation of the notions of "bad faith" and 
authenticity, it will also mention some other eminent figures beginning with 
Kierkegaard. This Danish thinker is considered the "father of existentialism" in his 
mission to contradict the notion of totality or the progression of understanding that 
proceeds from the self to the entire human species and finally to the "absolute 
idea" (Wahl. 1949: 3). However, his insistence on the uniqueness of individuals, 
his complete adherence to subjectivity and the removal of ail structure leaves 
human beings contemplating the absurdity of a life of no reason where the self is 
just a contingent fact engulfed by the infinite. This bleak outlook was mitigated for 
Kierkegaard by his struggle to become a Christian, which the cynic may find a 
convenient means of avoiding the darker elements in his philosophy. In fact, a 
fatalistic pessimism pervades much of subsequent existentialist thought 
particularly in the gloominess of Sartre and Camus. So the question arises, is the 
belief that life consists of unending tragedies justified? Certainly Wilson (1956) 
does not think so. believing that the doctrine should inspire a sense of detached 
reality with the possibilities it holds, in a rigorous grounding of logic, for the 
realisation of human potential. He maintains that if individuals are free then they 
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are free to choose the cast of their minds in a setting devoid of unreality (1956: 
30). In this scenario, triviality can be designated to its proper place thus penmitting 
people to experience a sense of unencumbered self-realisation in a state of total 
awareness (Coniam, 2001: 20). 
The task of analysing the problem of self-knowledge arises from Heidegger 
conceiving the self in the everyday world as an entity, unconscious of its own 
existence, and inhabiting the "domain of Everyman" ([1927] 1996). Thus, it is only 
through a sense of anguish, or the dread of the "background of Nothingness" that 
being "detaches itself as a sort of rupture" (Wahl, 1949: 12-13). Those who exist, 
having experienced this forceful dislocation, must contemplate "being for death" 
(Wahl, 1949: 14) when all possibilities become possible. Again, a gloomy 
prognosis, mollified by the probability of redemption, and reflected in Heidegger's 
ontological understanding that maintains "that there are no principles that govern 
the social realm as a whole" with the social representing either "a clearing of being 
and intelligibility or inherently tied to one "(Schatzki, 2002: 141). 
Sartre can identify with the immediacy of stripping away the sentimental 
metaphysical and scientific speculations used to derive objective descriptions of a 
world dependent on necessary truths substantiated by disciplines such as 
mathematics and logic. Whilst existentialist thought does not reject scientific and 
abstract contingencies nevertheless the doctrine's conviction is that true or false 
descriptions can only be based on human projects and not founded on the basis of 
a detached viewpoint. Thus, Sartre rejects both objective and subjective 
speculation as his existentialism propounds the belief that only a reality divested of 
its various descriptions is accessible. In this space being is indefinable. 
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unknowable and unattainable thereby making metaphysical speculation 
misleading in our quest for genuine human engagement (Shand, 2002: 230-1). 
Sartre's goal is to study the voluntary purposeful activity in the praxis that arises 
from the projects of human organisation. In this frame of reference, the satisfaction 
of human needs, brought about through scarcity, constitutes "praxis, as the praxis 
of an organisation which reproduces its life by reorganising the environment is 
man — man making himself in remaking himself (Sartre, [1960] 1976: 329). This 
notion is contextualised through the assertion that "the whole of human 
development, at least up to now, has been a bitter struggle against scarcity" 
(Sartre. [1960] 1976: 123). This conflict has produced a pervading social 
atmosphere, which has encouraged individuals to construct institutions, and to 
enter into disagreements with each other, over a relationship originally rooted in 
nature but which is now the product of the relations of capital. Therefore, it is 
axiomatic that Husserl's creation, the transcendental ego, cannot form part of 
Sartre's philosophy as the subjectivism within the doctrine of intentionallty 
suggests that objects can be moved into a passive and pure realm of 
consciousness and in existentialist thought this realm cannot exist. Thus, Sartre 
considers that consciousness is not a thing at all but just an awareness that can 
accommodate human perceptions about objects, which, by implication cannot be 
modes of consciousness in themselves (Shand, 2002: 232). 
A distinction is necessary between what denotes reality within the familiar forms 
that make up our everyday perceptions, such as furniture, buildings and people, 
and another level of reality that refers to the real within the metaphysical domain. 
Predominately entry to the latter, which consists of two modes of existence: in-
itself (I'en-soi) and for-itself (le pour-soi), can only occur from the former. Being-in-
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itself applies to the being that has no consciousness of existence and so 
possesses the characteristics of non-human inert objects. Alternatively, being-for-
itself is the type of conscious existence that leads to the making of choices 
involving values and meanings, these selective outcomes arising from the 
constant movement of intentional awareness. Sartre also identifies a third 
ontological category to complete his types of being: being-for-others (le pour-
autrui) which involves the process of inter-subjective relations that provide 
individuals with fundamental understandings about their social reality (Sartre. 
[1943] 1958). 
Individuals would experience Sartre's reality of familiar forms, as structured in 
accordance with human meanings, but these perceptions are not part of the 
metaphysical real. Being in the metaphysical realm is the result of the relation, not 
the fusion, between the In-itself and the for-itself with the for-itself possessing the 
status of the imaginary, which can sustain a kind of reality (Perna. 2001: 16). 
Thus, "consciousness arises as a self-awareness of being not-the-objects-of-
awareness" (Shand, 2002: 238) and an appreciation that we need not be absorbed 
into these objects. However, in the creation of our own essence the real would be 
mixed-up with the imaginary necessitating philosophical reflection to act as a guide 
to action (Perna, 2001: 16). 
Sartre, in articulating his desire to liberate us from a false view of the world, 
differentiates between imagination and creativity. This dichotomy encapsulates the 
advent of the notion of "bad faith" through which "a person seeks to escape the 
responsible freedom of being-for-itself (Sartre, [1943] 1958: 629), An individual 
would apply a synthetic unity between the transcendental and facticity, or the for-
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itself s connection with the in-itself, which allows a person to proclaim that the for-
itself exists (Sartre, [1943] 1958: 631). 
The person who can validate their credibility through bad faith would conform to 
a serialised life style typified in Sartre's example of the group of people in the 
Place Saint-Germain waiting for a bus in front of the Church. These people, 
ostensibly differentiated by age, sex. status and so on, "in general, they do not 
look at one another; they exist side by side alongside a bus stop. At this level, it is 
worth noting that their isolation is not an inert statute (or the simple reciprocal 
exteriority of organisms); rather it is actually lived in everyone's project as its 
negative structure" (Sartre, [1960] 1976: 256). Thus, the arrangement is not 
disorganised but instead, there is a serial reality that demands a rigid prefabricated 
order or association of isolation. This is a united social ensemble, meeting outside 
of a Church that extols the virtue of individual responsibility. However, the arrival of 
the bus and the issue of bus tickets are the dominant inert foundation for a group 
rooted in isolation by adherence to the custom of not talking to strangers. Those in 
the bus queue are a collective but they react to each other through a pseudo 
reciprocity that is at the core of the thoughts and feelings of serial behaviour 
through which "the individual achieves practical and theoretical participation In 
common being" (Sartre, [1960] 1976: 266). The instrumental practice involved in 
the creation of an inert reality may be thought of as an ideology that "imposes itself 
as an exigency and destroys all opposition" (Sartre, [1960] 1976: 261). This 
dialectic relationship of association can become a philosophy for living as, where 
scarcity is at its most virulent the "struggle for life" (Sartre, [1960] 1976: 815) may 
produce antagonistic urges that suggest that it is impossible for two individuals 
with different serialised lifestyles to co-exist. Therefore, seriality can produce an 
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isolation and impotence that assists in the exploitation of individuals through their 
internalisation of dominant values and attitudes. 
The dominant norms of behaviour that are forced into an individual's 
consciousness would constitute the facticity that can be questioned by a person 
striving to live an authentic life. This process does not imply that humanity can be 
divided between those who have transcended to a higher level of consciousness 
and those who are confined to being-in-itself, as, instead, it recognises that every 
human being is incomplete. As the for-itself "is in no way an autonomous 
substance"(Sartre, [1943] 1958: 618) but an act of denying within the in-itself, such 
consciousness becomes possible through a revealing intuition that allows 
individuals to use the power to be free and make choices about their lives. People 
can then avoid suffering the imposition of adopting externally imposed identities. 
However, if people's awareness of their individual existence is to be meaningful 
they must work, until death, to overcome the pretence of seeing themselves as 
objects and denying that they can choose their characters. 
In being-for-others Sartre recognises that people cannot deny the existence of 
others as it would abandon the significance of their facticity. Therefore, Sartre 
describes the relations individuals have with others as a struggle to absorb each 
other's freedom. So "conflict is the original meaning of being-for-others" (Sartre. 
[1943] 1958: 364) as people begin their relationships with a look that determines 
others as identifiable objects. 
The existentialist.understanding of the world offered by Sartre provides a useful 
frame of reference to interpret and evaluate the situation of the individual in 
relation to contemporary events. For Instance, it facilitates an understanding of 
how the exploration of the potential of pure thought has been neglected, thus 
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rendering human consciousness a product of an unconscious mind. Alternatively, 
the rationalist approach has tended to ignore matters that cannot be comfortably 
accommodated by mathematical logic or empirical observation that are attributed 
with the capacity to control and shapes our lives. However, as was found through 
examining social constructivism and phenomenology, social knowledge that is the 
outcome of efforts to "understand" social life seems to suffer from an exclusive 
focus on humanism and a reliance on non-deterministic accounts of free will. 
Thus, changes in our established pattems of thought that can inspire a self-
perpetuating optimism requires a more demanding process of critical self-
reflexivity, so as to accommodate an individual's pure will and its relationship with 
power, meaning and purpose (Nietzsche, [1883] 1967). 
Truth and Reality Re-appraised 
In his philosophy the American Pragmatist Charies Pelrce made a distinction 
between truth, or the condition the worid must meet if a particular statement is to 
be generally accepted as true, and reality (Peirce. 1932; see also Mounce 1997: 
42). Whilst it is recognised that people's sensory perceptions are essential to 
explain their meanings of the worid, habits and dispositions are also created 
through socialisation with others that can re-enforce or amend the individual's 
rational patterns of behaviour (Williams and May, 1996:102). In such a scenario, a 
definite "subject-object dichotomy" can be rejected along with "an epistemology 
based solely on reason, or solely on experience" (Williams and May 1996: 102). 
As Foucault observes, neariy a century after Peirce, the notion of governmentallty 
has particular facets. Thus, the individual would tend to adopt, In the construction 
of their own self-identity, not only the way they identify themselves but also the 
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way that they are identified by others (Foucault, 1991). So, knowledge should be 
understood as inherently fragmented and tenuous in a social world that is 
constantly subject to change. 
However, Peirce (1932) did not advocate the total separation of truth and reality 
as. such an overly deterministic approach would, as Williams and May note "open 
up the whole question of the relationship between values and scientific practice" 
(1996: 105). The pragmatic alternative was to adopt a position that recognises 
individuals and groups as reaching common understandings of truth whilst also 
being part of reality and reality being part of them. Such a proposal avoids the 
paradox within relativism, or the idea that beliefs or judgements do not need to 
meet independent standards, by maintaining that, through the assiduous and 
continuous testing of theories, truth can gradually evolve towards reality. 
American Pragmatism proposes that, within the human conceptualisation of 
truth and reality, there can be an epistemology with more than a single source of 
knowledge and various scientific methods of enquiry. However, whilst the pursuit 
of scientific research might then become a form of free association or creative 
thinking, this approach should not be confused with Feyerabend's contemporary 
assertion that the limitations of all methodologies only leads to the one rule 
"anything goes" (1978). Instead, it is maintained that a complementary use of 
inductive and deductive techniques can lead to innovation and creativity within 
scientific enquiry, and further the cause of utilising both explanation and 
understanding in a flexible research paradigm. This aim can be purposefully 
pursued through placing an emphasis on the production of new imaginative 
theories beginning with a process of abduction, where inference contributes 
towards the construction of a provisional explanatory hypothesis. Subsequently, a 
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deductive process leads to information about anticipated observations that can 
corroborate the explanatory hypothesis whilst the inductive technique has now 
assumed the role of fundamentally underpinning the entire systematic framewori<. 
Whilst this process necessitates fallibilism it also encourages creativity in contrast 
to the reliance on the sterility of attempting to just disprove hypotheses or 
researching the objective observation of phenomena. 
Whilst Peircean philosophy assists in reconciling the dichotomy between 
objective reality and subjective observations of phenomena it is maintained that 
inductive strategies still remain unable to provide new ideas as the sensory data 
available can only result in superficial conclusions. However, as Hempel (cited by 
Blaikie, 1993: 142) notes "the transition from data to theory requires creative 
imagination...hypotheses and theories are not derived from observed facts." In this 
context, Peirce does confront the charge of superficiality as his epistemological 
position provides a basis to address the possible weaknesses in the progression 
of the inductive approach. Moreover, the fragility of progression from specific 
instances to a generalised law, and the matter of the strategy's apparent 
Imprecision concerning the need for numerous observations over what might be 
an indefinite period of time are both matters that demand clarification. So, in 
response, Peirce argues that a process cannot commence with complete doubt, 
just because there are many uncertainties the scientist can still know something 
(Mounce, 1997: 15). This assertion is not an encouragement to cease enquiries 
but rather an appreciation that knowledge can be gained about reality through the 
interplay of doubts and beliefs (Mounce, 1997: 16). In this nexus, the iridividual 
develops a feeling of self-consciousness. This feeling is defined as "a knowledge 
of ourselves. Not a mere feeling of subjective conditions of consciousness, but of 
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our personal selves. Pure apperception is the self-assertion of the ego; the self-
consciousness here meant is the recognition of my private self. I know that I (not 
merely the I) exist" (Pelrce, 1932: 5.225). Thus, placing reliance on inductive 
observations in the research process is elevated to the expression of the human 
attribute of informed intuition. 
The hypothetico-deductive^ strategy, like the inductive method of reasoning, is 
criticised for failing to produce new concepts or ideas. Popper defends this 
accusation by maintaining that the key to scientific progress is the falsification 
process that facilitates learning by mistakes (Popper, [1934] 1977; 1979). 
However, Peirce's insight questions the importance of the allegation that 
deductivism provides no rational basis for choosing between un-falsified theories 
in order to make a practical prediction. In stressing the continuity of knowledge 
Pelrce does not consider that It emerges from pure logic but is instead an historical 
and social product where "testimony gives the first dawning of self-consciousness" 
(Peirce, 1932: 5.233). 
Social scientists may observe the way that their beliefs are determined by the 
communities to which they belong and the process, as individuals, through which 
they expand explanations of social life by building on their existing framework of 
familiar community dispositions. On this basis, knowledge can be self-corrective 
as it accumulates over periods of time. Whether this leads to the continued 
acceptance of un-falslfied theories by reliance on inductively obtained data is 
dependent on the "point of view or perspective...of the observer, the absolute 
The consequences of a hypothesis are deduced and then tested against experience. If the 
hypothesis Is falsified then it is discarded. However, if it is not falsified then it is subject to other 
tests to ascertain whether it can survive. 
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understanding of explanation having been replaced with a...relative conception" 
that is regulated by moderate rationality (Mounce, 1997: 14). 
So, assisted by Peirce's pragmatism, a fusion has been established between 
the methods of rationalism and empiricism. This synergy gives rise to the 
conclusion that, in view of the deficiencies in both the inductive and deductive 
scientific methods of explanation, they may be relegated to the function of 
suggesting scenarios that might make the researcher aware of how reality may be 
explored. Furthermore, freed from the belief that each approach offers the best 
available scientific method, it becomes possible to envisage the strategies as 
complementary frameworks for research design. Therefore, the qualitative and 
quantitative techniques of data collection can be selectively utilised to reach a 
pragmatic solution over the issue of truth in relation to specific phenomena. 
This re-appraisal cannot replace the distinct explanatory naturalist epistemology 
provided by rationalism and empiricism or the epistemic hermeneutic 
understandings offered by social constructivism and existentialism as illustrated in 
Figure 2.1. Nevertheless, American Pragmatism does provide a foundation for 
consideration of how contending philosophical dispositions can acknowledge the 
fundamental legitimacy of alternative perspectives on reality. 
The Ontological Dichotomy: Agency or Structure 
The task of understanding ontological notions begins with the necessity of 
making a distinction between pure philosophical and applied scientific ontology. 
The former "is concerned with the meaning of the concept of being, with the 
question why there is something rather than nothing, and the modal ontological 
status of the actual world" (Jacquette, 2002: 3-4). This definition implies that pure 
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philosophical ontology is a prior foundational study that proceeds towards the 
assertion of the existence of certain preferred theoretical entities. In contrast, the 
second category of applied scientific ontology achieves a scientific status in the 
social sciences through its aim to determine the ontologicai questions and 
answers about "specific areas of thought and discourse whose meanings require 
the positing of a particular choice of entities" (Jacquette, 2002: 5). Having 
detennined this dichotomy the following section follows the logic of applied 
scientific ontology and proceeds to examine and contrast ontological commitments 
to agency and structure (see Figure 2.2). Thus, this analysis embraces the 
presumption that logic dictates that both the worid and the individual exists, as 
substantiated by Descartes In his maxim "I am. therefore. I exist" (Descartes, 
[1641] 1964: 82). 
Agency: The Free Individual 
The term agency has, as its central proposition, that "individuals have some 
control over their actions, enabled by their psychological and social psychological 
make-up" (Parker 2000: 125). Figure 2.2 represents these empowered individuals 
as employing a methodological disposition that can explain their social reality 
through patterns of predictable, unconstrained individual self-interest. This reduces 
the causal state of social structures to epiphenomena: "a mere aggregate 
consequence of individual activities, incapable of acting back to influence 
individual people" (Archer, 1995: 4), Thus, human beings would knowingly define 
or interpret their social reality then act to enhance their personal utility (Baert, 
1998: 3). However, both In historical and contemporary thought some philosophers 
have adopted and advocated a more radical individualism that would either deny 
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*the existence of social bonds and social systems or assert that these are fully 
reducible to Individuals and their actions" (Bunge, 1996: 243). 
Figure 2.2: The Contending Ontological Perspectives 
Ontology 
Structuralism 
Social structures exercise power over agency, 
so social reality is best explained or understood 
as a collective that exists independently of its 
members. 
People are agents of their actions, which makes 
Agency his or her social reality best explained or 
understood as a domain where only individuals 
exist 
Source: Dixon and Dogan, 2003a, 
The utilitarian thinkers Bentham ([1789] 1982). Mill ([1875] 1952) and Spencer 
(Peel, 1971) accept society as having a distinct existence as an aggregation of 
individuals but refute the notion that it has any causal capacity of its own. Thus. 
Spencer declares that "society exists for the benefit of its members; not its 
members for the benefit of society...the claims of the body politic are nothing in 
themselves, and become something only in so far as they embody the claims of its 
component Individuals" (cited in Peel, 1971; 187). This assertion sustains the 
supremacy of individual hedonism and egoism and thus can accord with Spinoza's 
conclusions about the attainment of individual freedom through actions, 
determined by reason. What brings meaning to this endeavour is the human 
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essence categorised as a conatus that, whilst characterising alt organic life, also 
generates a seif-conscious desire in people. Therefore, when needs are satisfied 
by the striving of the individual the process will benefit that person's well being 
(Spinoza [1675] 1989). 
Individualism is a popular philosophical standpoint,^ which, as Bunge (1996: 
244) maintains, can be explained by reference to the following factors: 
• It offers' an unwavering recognition of individuals as instigators of social 
relations. 
• It reflects the belief that humans act in a rational self-interested manner. 
• It can be applied within all the disciplines of human science. 
• It sits comfortably within the parameters of liberal democratic capitalism. 
• It promotes the utilltaVian principle of utility, the greatest happiness for the 
greatest number. 
Consistent ontological individualism regards institutions as no more than 
collections of conventions agreed by individuals that provide practicable criterion 
for human behaviour. Therefore, arising from this perspective, structures are 
unable to possess causal capacity, (Bunge, 1996: 244-5). These beliefs have lead 
Popper to designate social relations primarily to a theoretical realm dealing with 
ideas and problems (1974: 14), with society as being nothing more than the 
aggregate of the relations between its membership. This hypothesis hannonises 
with the medieval philosophy of William of Ockham whose nominallstic beliefs led 
Herbert Hoover. President of the USA 1928-1932 advocated T h e American system of rugged 
individualism" (campaign speech in New York. 22 October 1928). 
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him to accept the predication of common human natures or essences that cannot 
be ontologically separated from the characteristics of individuals. Thus, the notion 
of universality can exist in thought, but if this results in universal names for groups 
of individuals then such a commonality can only reflect the particular 
characteristics within the natures or features of those individuals (Ockham. 
[C1300-1347] 1990). 
However, further examination of the doctrines advanced by the advocates of 
agency occasionally reveals that they are not consistent in their arguments. For 
instance, Hayek resorts to the social construct of the market, with its causal 
capacity to initiate the trickle-down effect that allows the poor to improve their 
position as a result of the self-indulgence of the rich (Hayek. 1960)^. Additionally 
Homans (1974) writes about unanalysed social structures and Popper refers to the 
dangers of the totalitarian State in its possession of a will that is independent of 
the people within its boundaries (Popper, 1966). In fact, as Bunge concludes 
(1996: 249), whilst the renaissance of western democratic liberalism in the latter 
half of the twentieth century has lead to a harmonious methodological 
individualism (Homans, 1974; Becker, 1976 and Coleman, 1990) such a rigorous 
academic commitment has not been apparent in relation to ontological agency. 
However, despite this inattention, the following ontological positions are apparent: 
Agency Grounded in Rational Self-interest. This concept is grounded in the 
work of Hobbes ([1651] 1996), Manderville ([1714] 1988. Machiavelli ([1513] 1999) 
and Smith ([1776] 1976). Here the presumption is that the person is self-
determining, with the necessary hopes, beliefs and desires needed to take self-
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interested and self-seeking action. In this scenario, an individual will exercise their 
free will,^^ which permits the choice of what is best for him or her. Collective 
restraint will only be applied in the event that a particular action is likely to result in 
harm to others. Thus, social action is explained by reference to a person's own 
self-interest calculations (Rational Choice Theory—Arro\N (1984)) or to his or her 
self-interested responses, under conditions of uncertainty, to the decisions of 
others (Game Theory—von Neumann and Morganstern (1944)). 
Agency Grounded in the Search for Identity and an Authentic Way of Life. 
This concept is grounded in a person's search for his or her 'essence'— essential 
characteristics — or a sense of who he or she is, and for self-fulfilment, which is 
achievable by giving priority to his or her immediate personal experience of 
aloneness, death, and moral responsibility. Therefore, there is an emphasis on 
the individual's perception of alienation from both self and others. For example the 
existential notion that individuals simply exist — "Man simply is. Not that he is 
simply what he conceives himself to be, but he is what he wills, and as he 
conceives himself after already existing — as he wills to be after that leap toward 
existence. Man is nothing else but that which he makes of himself (Sartre [1946] 
1974: 28). Moreover, the existence-precedes-essence process recognises a 
^ It should be noted that neo-classical economists are of the opinion that the market is purely an 
aggregation of individuals with no causal capacity beyond that of the individuals conducting 
transactions within its parameters. This notion is disputed here. 
'° The extensive discourse about free-will is concerned v^th whether or not people are free agents 
who can be morally responsible for their actions. Hobbes ([1651] 1996) asserted that minds cannot 
exhibit free will because they operate in a deterministic manner (see also Dawkins 1976; Wilson 
1975. 1978). Opinions on this range from a those who argue that free will is compatible with 
determinism {compatibalists, such as Hume [1748] 1975), who conclude that people will always do 
what they are inclined and able to do in any situation; to those who argue that free will is not 
compatible with determinism {incompatibalists, such as Kant [1788] 1998), who conclude that, as a 
natural conviction, people are free and morally responsible, which means that determinism must be 
false, although it is acknowledged that people are not genuinely free agents, and thus cannot be 
tnjiy responsible for their actions, because they are not causa sui — self-caused — and thus 
responsible for the way they are (Kane 1996. Strawson 1986). 
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person as possessing jurisdiction over his or her own awareness of the purposeful 
possibilities of their actuality. 
Agency Grounded in Physiological Events. This concept is premised on ail 
mental states — including intentional ones — being identical with physical states 
(Armstrong 1968), making human behaviour a product of physiological events 
occuring in the brain. Therefore, social action can be explained by, and is 
constrained by, biological processes of genetics (Wilson 1975, 1978, Dawkins 
1976). Some advocates are known as epiphenomenalists, and they take this 
proposition to extremes. They argue that human behaviour is the product of 
cerebral processes in the nervous system, a bi-product of which is the human 
mind experiencing mental states (Caston 1997, Hyslop 1998, James 1890, Rivas, 
and van Dongen 2003). 
Implications. Agency's dilemma is that it can apparently explain the empirically 
strong correlation between individual behaviour and free choice, but It cannot 
explain outliers that are the product of a correlation between individual behaviour 
and a social cohort (Williams and May 1996)". 
Structuralism: The Constrained Individual 
The philosophical basis of holism negates all the suppositions of individualism 
and postulates that the study of society is impossible if it is broken down into 
component parts (Saussure, [1916] 1974). Thus, Figure 2.2 portrays structuralism 
as structures that may exercise constraint or offer specific opportunities in the 
shaping of agency. Therefore, in a nexus that restrains individual creativity, human 
" The problems of ontological conflation, or a bridging of the divide between agency and structure, 
are extensively discussed in Chapter seven. 
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behaviour becomes predictable. So, holism or collectivism can be equated with the 
notion of structure and its central proposition that "the ordered social 
• interrelationships, or the recurring patterns of social behaviour that determine the 
nature of human action" (Parker. 2000: 125) impose themselves and exercise 
power upon individuals. Thus, structure, which is difficult and perhaps impossible 
for an individual to change, constrains agency by determining people's actions 
(Baert. 1998: 11). 
Aristotle and Plato agreed that "knowledge is of invariant or unchanging 
universal necessary truths" and that these necessary truths must be married to 
"ontologically suitable objects" (Shand, 2002: 33). However, Aristotle developed 
the notion of real or natural kinds of groupings, which are posited by nature rather 
than arbitrary classifications imposed as a result of the subjective feelings of 
individuals (Aristotle, (c.335-322] 1996). This formulation was, centuries later, 
adopted and replicated by Comte in the tenets of the French tradition of positivism. 
He asserted that, apart from brief transitory periods, society reflects the order that 
is in nature. Thus, this same order fundamentally underpins the social laws that 
govern relationships between institutional and cultural forms, making society an 
organic whole with the individual "only comprehensible in relation to his or her 
social formation and existence" (Bryant, 1985: 19), which leaves the family to form 
the basic unit of society. 
The conceptualisation of society as an organism deeply impressed Durkheim. 
He wrote that "whenever certain elements combine, and thereby produce, by the 
fact of their combination, new phenomena, it is plain that these phenomena reside 
not in the original elements but in the totality formed by their union (Durkheim, 
[1895] 1962: xivii). Marx, too, maintained that action is determined by structure 
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with the individual subjected to powerful economic forces (Marx and Engels. 
[1848] 1967: 79-94). Therefore, those who undertake social study from this 
ontological position would adopt a process that proceeds from the position of the 
macro to the micro. 
By advocating this approach, some human characteristics, understood by Rand 
(1965) as the rational egotistical belief in self-determination that protects privileged 
individuals, can be set aside. Moreover, the method of explaining social reality that 
arises from this action need not produce a discontinuity between the human and 
natural sciences. Instead, as Levi-Strauss' anthropological studies (1968) lead him 
to believe, the complex constraints and diversities of human culture are, 
notwithstanding their disparity, part of nature itself and assume a homology with 
language. The human brain is recognised as a biological entity and complies with 
the "very same laws that govern natuiral objects like the brain governs human 
thought" (Anderson et a/.. 1986: 110) so these binary categories fit into the ways 
people observe norms of behaviour and communicate with each other. This notion 
is discernible in Parson's recognition of the mechanisms of socialisation where 
such institutions as the family and the school would teach children to internalise 
certain values and attitudes. Thus, social stability is created in a functionalist 
conception of a society which can be explained as a system "of action-elements 
relative to the persistence or ordered process of change of the interactive patterns 
of a plurality of individual actors" (Parsons, 1951: 24). 
Ontological structuralism regards society as acting on its members with the 
latter being left with little capacity to individually determine their lives. Therefore, 
the application of this principle means that social change is restricted to those 
particular times when collective agency can be mobilised with an outcome that 
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affects the individual. Thus, society is understood as surpassing its members in its 
capacity to initiate emergent properties that are irreducible to its component 
parts.^^ However, some of these propositions are contestable by individuality as, 
whilst agency may appear to be constrained by structure, in fact society's 
properties could be perceived as nothing more than the aggregation of individual 
activity thereby questioning its capacity for intentionality with respect to its 
members. Moreover, although social change seems to be driven by social 
movements nevertheless it is individuals who are responsible for the 
implementation of new ideological perceptions (Bunge. 1996: 261). In this 
scenario, people choose to collaborate to understand their social reality from the 
perspective of their community. 
Some Neo-Marxist theories of the state use an instrumental analysis, which 
identifies capitalism as shaping the structural relations of individual's everyday life. 
Thus, the State adapts "the 'civilisation* and the morality of the broadest popular 
masses to the necessities of the continuous development of the economic 
apparatus of production" (Gramsci, 1971: 242). However, these relations are still 
based on conflict between an exploitative class, with its imperative for profit, and 
workers' interests, which are focussed on improving their economic condition. The 
resultant conflict between these dispositions provides a theoretical approach that 
both "accommodates stmcture and the individual, and conflict and change" 
(Williams, 1989: 23) brought about by class struggle. Therefore a higher dialectic 
"consists not merely in producing and apprehending the determination as an 
opposite and limiting factor, but in producing and apprehending the positive 
"I do that which is my duty to do. Nothing else distracts me; for it would be either something that 
is inanimate and in-ational, or somebody who is misled and ignorant of the way" (Aurelius, [c.170-
180] 2004:64). 
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content and result which it contains; and it is this alone which makes it a 
development and imnfianent progression" (Hegel, [1821] 1991: 60). This analysis 
offers a framework that assists in the exploration of long-term historical 
transfomnation and social evaluation, which, as well as guiding work on classes 
and social groups can also benefit the appraisal of the notion of individual identity 
in collective consciousness (Hobsbawn, 1997: 83). However, some social 
scientists have rejected the opportunity to emulate this type of framing as critical 
analysis arising from this approach is restricted by the shadow of Marxist 
economic determinism. 
The following traditions are significant as forming part of structural analysis: 
Historical Materialism. The concept is premised on the primacy of material 
(socio-economic processes and relations) as determinant of, or at least as 
decisive influences on, how particular forms of society are responsible for 
observed social phenomena that come into existence. Thus, development and. 
change in human societies is attributable to the way in which people as workers — 
the proletariat — collectively engage in work, their behaviour and available 
resources. As Marx ([1859] 1999: i) observed: 
In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite 
relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production 
appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of 
production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the 
economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal 
and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social 
consciousness. 
Anthropological Structuralism. This tradition focuses on structural factors that 
pattern cultural expressions that makes them resonate with people albeit sub-
Luk^cs ((1923) 1971) saw Marx's proletariat as both the subject and object of history and as 
embodying class-consciousness as revolutionary subjectivity. 
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consciously. Grounded in the work of Levi-Strauss, N'eedham and Leach its prime 
proposition is that social structures mirror cognitive structures, this means that 
social intei-action patterns are manifestations of cognitive structures (Levi-Strauss 
1968). By reducing expressive objects like artwork or mythological stories to 
contrastive structures, an abstract picture of the social structure can be 
constructed. This would explain how people in a society relate to social 
organisations and societal structures. 
Structural Functionalism. Grounded in the work of Parsons, Radcliffe-Brown and 
Malinpwski, this concept is founded on societies being coherent, bounded and 
fundamentally relational constructs, functioning like organisms with people in 
various social institutions wor1<ing together to maintain and reproduce them. Thus, 
for Parsons (1951: 5-6), society is, as a social sytem, 
a plurality of individual actors interacting with each other in a situation which 
has at least a physical or environmental aspect, actors who are motivated in 
terms of a tendency to the "optimization of gratification" and whose relation to 
their situations, including each other, is defined and mediated in terms of a 
system of culturally structured and shared symbols. 
Therefore, he theorized that social systems overarch the integration of values-
oriented individual actions. 
Structural functionalism places particular emphasis on functions such as 
systemic adjustment, goal attainment, integration and pattern maintenance. These 
functions determine the interdependence, consensus, equilibrium, and 
evolutionary change within society. Thus, social order is considered to be the 
product of voluntary social co-operative action as "people act on the basis of their 
values...[and]...their actions are oriented and constrained by the values and 
norms of people around them (Knapp 1994: 191-2). Therefore, society consists of 
parts, each with its own functions, that work together to promote social stability. 
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Linguistic Structuralism. This tradition is grounded in the wori< of Saussaure, 
Boas and Bloomfield and is premised on language as a set of rules governing the 
combination of sounds that produce meaning. Submission to these rules is a 
prerequisite for any individual who wishes to speak a particular language. 
Moreover, as a group convention, these language rules enable a person within the 
group to take meaning about the social world from making sense of what others 
say. 
The focus of linguistic structuralism is on the underiying system of language 
(langue), namely, semiotics (how the elements of language — pre-verbal. vocal, 
rythmic and sign elements — relate to each other at particular points in time 
(synchronically) rather than throughout their historical development 
(diachronically)); and symbolism (how language related to social and culture 
influences is rule-governed), and their interplay. Saussure ([1916] 1974) argued 
that linguistic signs comprise the sound pattern of a word — the signifier — and 
the meaning of the word — the signified. Language is, thus, a social activity, a 
systematic structure that links thought and sound, a series of arbitrary but mutually 
intelligible linguistic signs, which means that content-elements (meaning) cannot 
be identified independently of expression-elements (sounds and words). 
Post-structuralism.''^ This tradition, developed In the wori< of Foucault, Derrida 
and Lacan, considers that' individuals are shaped by sociological, psychological 
and linguistic structures. In turn, these structures have been shaped by rule 
governed systems over which individuals have no control (Belsey 2002, Williams 
2005). Therefore, Foucault argued that the human condition could not be 
Here the term "post-structuralists" incorporates post-modernists as both reject the grand 
narratives of universal truth and meaning grounded in western science and philosophy. 
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explained by reference to underlying objective social structures, because no social 
environment can be investigated objectively, as it is impossible to step outside the 
discourse that gives meaning to those structures. Moreover, Derrida, influenced by 
Heidegger and Nietzsche, argued that any discourse has multiple interpretations, 
making the possibility of a final and complete interpretation impossible. For Lacan, 
these multiple interpretations resulted in the individual being the creation of 
language, which enables him or her to experience the world meaningfully (Dor 
2001). Thus, a person's understanding of his or her body and the world at large is 
grounded in the language he or she has acquired. This gives language a major 
role in the way each individual constructs meaning, and allows the Freudian 
unconscious, which Lacan considers to be structured like a language without 
grammar, to enter into that understanding and dissolve essential distinctions 
between the subjective and the objective: 
For Lacan, Freud's central insight was not... that the unconscious exists, but 
that it has structure, that this structure affects in innumerable ways what we 
say and do. and that in thus betraying itself it becomes accessible to analysis 
(Bowie 1979: 118). 
The self is considered by post-structuralists to be incoherent, disjointed, and 
decentered. It is merely a site in which various cultural constructs and discursive 
formations are created and sustained by the power structures within a given social 
environment. Thus, any meaning attached to social reality is derived from self-
reflexive discourses that acknowledge the inherently fragmented, diverse, 
tenuous, ambiguous and culture-specific nature of knowledge, which is always 
changing and contestable, so it can never have a finality and completeness. 
Therefore, the following ontological positions are apparent: 
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structure Grounded in Economic Participation. Marx maintained the 
supremacy of powerful economic pressures, which determine peoples social 
actions {economic detenminism) (Marx and Engels [1848] 1967: 79-94) because 
they are essentially productive beings whose interaction with the social world is 
focused on work. Thus, social reality can be explained by the prevailing mode of 
production, which is a creation of economic structures — capitalism, socialism and 
communisms (Cohen 1988. 2001, Dupre 1966). As Marx ([1859] 1999: i) 
observed: "The mode of production of material life conditions the general process 
of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that 
determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their 
consciousness." Thus, "man is not an abstract being squatting outside the 
world...[instead]...the real nature of man is the totality of social relations" (Marx 
[1845] 1989: 66) and "individuals are,.,embodiments of particular class-relations 
and class interests" ([1867] 1993: vol.1: 10). Moreover, Marx maintained that 
economic pressures that shape the structural relations in everyday life determine 
human action. 
Under capitalism, these relations are founded , on the conflict between an 
exploitative class, with its profit imperatives, and workers' interests that are 
focussed on improving their economic condition. 
Structure Grounded in Social Participation. For Durkheim social structures 
Influence a person's cognitive structures and, by implication, their social actions. 
He argued that basic categories of thought — representations of the world — arise 
from social participation {theory of the social origin of mind) (Bergson 2004). Thus, 
society creates social facts about social structures and institutions. These facts 
result in norms and values that transcend the individual as they arise from his or 
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her social relationships. Thus, these social facts places constraints on a person's 
behaviour and regulates that person's social action: 
When I fulfil my obligations as brother, husband, or citizen, when I execute 
my contracts, I perform duties which are defined, externally to myself and my 
acts, in law and in custom. Even if they conform to my own sentiments and I 
feel their reality subjectively, such reality is still objective, for I did not create 
them; I merely inherited them through my education (Durkheim [1895] 1962: 
1). 
The key to the transmission of social facts is socialisation, where social 
institutions, such as families and schools, teach children to internalise particular 
values and attitudes. This is a process of alignment that takes place when a 
person moves into social environments that have their own rules and norms, the 
violation of which attracts penalties. Thus, it is only by adopting collective values 
and attitudes that a person can integrate into any social group. 
Structure Grounded in Cultural Participation. This position is ensconced in 
Levi-Strauss's belief that underlying all human behaviour are fundamental 
universal mental structures that are culturally specific in their contents (1968). 
These deep structures produce and reproduce meaning within a culture by 
creating a system of symbolic communication expressed in a culture's practices, 
phenomena and activities such as as mythology, kinship and religious rites. Any 
attempt to understanding these deep structures can only succeed if the structures 
are reduced to their relevant constituent parts, thereby pemiitting the discovery of 
their operating principles (Levi-Strauss 1968). This constitutes the 'deep grammar' 
of a society, which originates in the human mind of its constituent members as 
language and is cultural practices are learnt, and operate unconsciously on them. 
90 
structure Grounded in Linguistic Participation. Harre (1983) developed this 
position from the perspective that human reality has a practical (physical) and an 
expressive (conversational) dimension. The latter tends to be dominant as in the 
assertion that "I take the array of persons as a primary human reality. I take the 
conversations in which those persons engage as completing the primary structure, 
bringing into being the social and psychological reality. Conversation is to be 
thought of as creating a social world just as causality generates a physical one" 
(Harre 1983: 65). 
Harre (1986: 42) advanced the proposition that "the private experience of a 
human being is shaped and ordered in learning to speak and write...That ordering 
is expressed in language and other intentional, nomn-gathering practices." 
Therefore, language is a dynamic activity that affects, and is effected by, cultural 
practices (Barthes 1977). This makes it a collectively derived objective cultural 
artefact. Thus, "one lives in a public world where one learns to use language in 
accordance with the prevailing social use of words. These practices instruct us in 
how to use terms applying to such things as tables, other people, astral bodies, 
and various institutions" (Stroll 2002: 119). This makes "[speech-acts or acts of 
communication (Austin 1962, Tsohatzidis 1994)] the primary entities in which 
minds become personalised, as private discourses" (Harre and Gillett 1994: 36). In 
addition, results in the minds of individuals become "privatised practices 
condensing like fog out of the public conversation into material nuclei, their bodies" 
(Harre 1986: 50). 
Implications. Structuralism's dilemma is that it might be able explain the 
empirically strong correlation between individual behaviour and social cohort, but it 
cannot unambiguously explain outliers derived from acts of choice by free 
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individuals unencumbered by social norms and practices (Williams and May 
1996). 
So, this brief review of the ontological classifications of agency and structure 
offers the following two principles: 
• That an ontological perspective based on either agency or structure could be 
overiy deterministic. 
• That social theory does not offer an immediate alternative to the 
agency/structure dichotomy and further analysis and synthesis is needed to 
address the issue of the agency-structure problematic. 
, Methodological Categories within a Quadripartite Social Reality 
This Chapter has provided an overview of the philosophical strands of thought 
that contribute to the methodological debates within the disciplines of social 
science. 
As illustrated in Figure 2.1 people are divided by their preferences in relational 
situations to contending epistemological perspectives. For instance, exponents of 
"the scientific methods" use these procedures to explain the social worid that is 
perceived to be objective and knowable only by the application of deductive logic 
or inductive Inference. Alternatively, believers In the unique capacity of human 
beings to construct and interpret their own reality maintain that society should be 
understood only as a set of interpretations derived from culture, language, practice 
and experience. 
Furthermore, as illustrated in Figure 2.2, a clear ontological dichotomy is 
apparent between those who dismiss structure as a false conceptualisation, as 
they believe that human behaviour derives from individual intention, human action 
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is voluntary and therefore..social actions taken by individuals are intentional and 
instrumental. Alternatively, advocates of approaches that embrace notions of rules 
and norms of behaviour, which both enable and constrain the actions of agents, 
believe that social structures, or ordered and recurrent patterns of social 
behaviour, detennlne the nature of human action as it moulds individuals' values, 
attitudes and opinions. 
Therefore, it is now appropriate to encapsulate this discussion through an 
amalgamation of Figures 2.1 and 2.2 in Figure 2.3. This framework illustrates the 
four contending ontological and epislemological marriages that collectively form a 
quadripartite perspective on social reality. It is conducive to the association of 
each of the investigative methods used to explain, understand and Interpret social 
life with the following methodological classifications: 
• naturalist agency, the adherents to which are self-interested (free-riding) homo 
economicus] 
• naturalist structuralism: the adherents to which are obligation-driven homo 
hierarchus] 
• hermeneutic structuralism: the adherents to which are conversation-saturated 
homo sociologicus', 
• hermeneutic agency, the adherents to which are homo existentialis. 
Conclusion 
This thesis is founded on the conviction that professional community wori^ers 
must critically examine their praxis if the notion of community is to be a viable 
means of implementing social policy. Therefore, they must understand that some 
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Figure 2.3: The Contending Social Reality Perspectives 
Naturalism Hermeneutics 
Ontology • 
Structuralism 
Naturalist Structuralism 
Sociar reality is best 
explained as an objective 
domain, where a 
collective exists 
independently of its 
members, and behaviour 
in It can best be 
explained and 
understood by reference. 
to material social 
practices or institutions in 
which people take part. 
Embracing, inter alia. 
anthropological 
structuralism, functional 
structuralism, historical 
materialism, and 
linguistic structuralism. 
Hermeneutic Structuralism 
Social reality is best 
understood as a socially 
constructed domain, 
where a collective exists 
independently of its 
members, and behaviour 
in it can best be 
understood by reference 
to people's shared 
interpretation of that 
reality. 
Embracing, inter alia, 
hermeneutic 
phenomenology, post-
modernism, post-
structuralism, and 
language games 
Agency 
Naturalist Agency 
Social reality is best 
explained as an objective 
domain, where only 
individuals exist, and 
behaviour in it can best be 
explained by reference to 
what they wish, desire, 
believe or will. 
Embraces, inter alia, 
rational choice theory, 
game theory, social 
phenomenology, 
dramaturgical analysis and 
ethnomethodology. 
Hermeneutic Agency 
Social reality is best 
understood as a 
subjective domain, where 
only self is known to exist, 
and behaviour in It can 
best be understood by 
reference to self s 
subjective perceptions of 
it. 
Embraces, inter alia. 
social phenomenology, 
symbolic interactionalism, 
dramaturgical analysis, 
and ethnomethodology. 
Source: Dixon and Dogan, 2003a. 
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community members may perceive their behaviour as the product of collective 
discussion, as derived from intentional acts of choice taken by a free individual, as 
derived from the influence of objective social structures (such as economic forces 
or the state), or as the outcome of what they believe to constitute social reality. 
Therefore, this Chapter has, through the use of deductive logic, established a 
taxonomy of perspectives on social reality that clearly identifies and classifies four 
discrete methods of describing, explaining, understanding and interpreting the 
social reality that might exist amongst community members. Each perspective can 
be associated with particular human attitudes^^ that manifest in personal values 
and behaviour. 
Thus, in pursuit of the endeavour to construct a managerial model that can 
inform the management of community, it is necessary to consider how these 
attitudes are formed and their durability. Therefore, the next Chapter addresses, in 
the context of the four contending perceptions on social reality, the fundamental 
facets of human nature that underpin certain attitudes, (1) free will and 
detenninism; (2) moral certainties and moral scepticism; (3) trust and distrust and 
(4) equality or inequality, which are integrated into a critical assessment over how 
different perceptions of community can be associated with different 
understandings of social reality. 
The French novelist and airman Antoine de Saint-Exup6ry shrewdly observed that "The meaning 
of things lies not in things themselves but in our attitudes to them." 
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Contending Facets of Human Nature 
How a person chooses to comprehend social reality in a particular relational 
situation determines the values, attitudes and behaviours they wish to exhibit (see 
Figure 2.3), in that situation. This makes possible the gaining of insights into the 
complex and intricate paradigm of human nature as individuals determine their 
own ways of understanding particular social realities. Therefore, an exploration of 
some fundamental facets of human nature in this context will illustrate the 
continuing dilemmas over conflicting justifications about the way community is, or 
should be understood, ordered and engaged with. So, this chapter begins by 
reviewing some relevant social psychology literature, and its synthesis with Olli's 
(1995 and 1999) three plausible models of the individual, which introduces the 
relationship between individuals, their meta-ethical commitments and their loyalty 
to a specific social reality perspective. 
After examining the manner that Individuals' attitudes are formed, and may 
change in a particular relational situation, the conundrum of what is found 
acceptable or unacceptable, admirable or contemptible is considered from the 
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perspective of each social reality perspective. Thus, attitudes to (1) free vvill and 
detemiinism; (2) moral certainties or moral agnosticism; (3) tnjst and distrust; and 
(4) equality or inequality are explored in relation to the four contending social 
reality perspectives. These meta-ethicaP principles inform personal preferences 
and elaborate on the attributes that can be associated with the self-interested 
(free-riding) homo economicus, the obligation driven homo hierarchus, the 
conversation-saturated homo sociologicus and the autonomous outsider, /7omo 
An Absence of Meaning and Purpose in the Quadripartite Reality 
All four social reality perspectives illustrated in Figure 2.3 constitute logically 
and cognitively consistent ways of comprehending a particular relational situation. 
However, these mutually exclusive and contending sets of perspectives inevitably 
lead to the conclusion that each is fundamentally flawed in its inability to 
accommodate alternative epistemological and ontological standpoints. Thus, 
Plato's question — "Can you see any difference between people who have a true 
opinion without understanding and people who, though blind, are going along the 
right road?" ([c410-347] 2000: 212) assumes a critical importance for community 
praxis and community practitioners. 
Moreover, in seeking to clarify the essential components that contribute towards 
the formation of each individual's system of cognition in relation to human nature 
' The focus of meta-ethics is on...'once the meaning of terms like 'good' and 'right' had been 
clarified,...[whether]...a science of ethics might be possible" (Stingl. 1997: 134). Thus, the validity 
of moral claims in general regarding correct or incorrect human behaviour is subject to critical 
evaluation. This discipline is used selectively in this thesis as it is concerned with the values, 
attitudes and behaviour human beings adopt in relational situations with other human beings. 
Thus, human relations with animals or deities are in-elevant to this text. Furthermore, there is no 
intent here to judge the value of a particular set of meta ethical principles but instead, to identify 
how such a set of principles can form part of a coherent and intellectually legitimate system of 
beliefs. 
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the quadripartite categorisation of social reality perspectives offers an ideal point 
of departure. For instance, the inclinations that underpin personal evaluations and 
specific preferences about such a matter as participation in local governance can 
be readily identified. However, arising from this pattern of configuration of social 
reality perspectives, the notion of the dualities between structure and agency and 
between the objective and the subjective, enters into the way individuals choose to 
interrogate their social domain, which is influenced by both rational and emotive 
feelings and predilections. Thus, social behaviour can include a high quotient of 
emotional drives and passions that, inspired by people's fears and concerns, may 
shift the individualistic self-centred utility maximiser towards a more hermeneutic 
perspective (Turiel, 1983: 7). For instance, the researcher on stem cells, whilst 
wholeheartedly accepting the genetic code, may also attend church every Sunday 
in his or her unwavering belief in a relational situation where each human being 
has an eternal soul. So, is the espousal of certain attitudes indicative of an 
individual's capacity to occupy two or more of the quadrants in Figure 2.3 
simultaneously or is there an alternative explanation for this ambivalence? 
Types of Relational Situations 
Individuals engage in a myriad number of face-to-face encounters with other 
individuals that lead to a sense of connectedness. Each of these encounters 
constitutes a relational situation that confronts a person in his or her social 
domain. Furthennore, each relational situation constitutes a particular social reality 
that provides the context within which a person consciously and sub-consciously 
internalises self-identity through the development of relationships with others 
(Bourdieu, 1976, 1990). Moreover, each relational situation is distinguished by a 
set of interpersonal (social) engagement circumstances — the total sum of 
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physical, psychological, socio-cultural and economic factors that act on human 
behaviour. This demarcates the social arena of that relational situation, which 
constitutes a bounded realm of activity, in which a person can engage with others 
in mutual transactions (such as the enactment of pre-conceived roles, the 
transmission of ideas or the attainment of knowledge). 
When encountering relational situations (such as talking about community 
issues with people in business, in government or as members of a community of 
locality or interest) the individual may also draw upon past experiences and might 
speculate over an array of possible futures. So, within this bounded arena a 
person brings a set of facts about themselves that are unchangeable by acts of will 
(such as age, gender and race) together with his or her perceptions about self, 
others and things — patterns of belief, behaviour and taste — that constitute his or 
her most basic understanding of that arena, and how he or she should behave in 
it. While these perceptions may, perhaps, be taken for granted and unquestioned, 
they are potentially changeable by acts of will. 
The product of an interpersonal interaction that that takes place in the arena of 
a relational situation is the existence of a state of association between those 
involved as they share the linkage of a mutually recognised relationship.^ This 
state describes their interaction, and its particular meaning-content for the 
subject's subjective worthiness; their dependence on each other; or their mutual 
interdependence. These emergent categorisations may become apparent within 
the mechanisms of interpersonal (social) co-operation, which can be. in nature, 
formal (such as families and kinship groups, communities and congregations, 
^ Pinker (2002: 65) observes that "social reality exists only within a group of people, but it depends 
on a cognitive ability present in each individual to understand a public agreement to confer power 
and status, and to honour it as long as others do." 
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organisations and their committees, and societies), or informal (such as, 
spontaneous mutual-transaction gatherings). 
Attitude as a Concept 
If, in a variety of relational situations homo economicus, homo hierarchus, homo 
sociologicus or homo existentialis each adopt similar behaviour patterns then they 
can be attributed with a discernible social attitude (Triandis, 1971: 2). 
Theorising by Rosenberg and Hovland (1960), which was subsequently 
validated by Breckler (1984), determined that three processes could be identified 
as contributing to the assumption of an attitude. Thus, adherents to each of the 
four social reality perspectives would experience affective arousal, behavioural 
stimulus and cognitive awareness, all of which contribute to making an attitude "an 
idea charged with emotion which predisposes a class of actions to a particular 
class of relational situations" (Triandis, 1971: 2). In fulfilling this function, an 
attitude would satisfy the various demands of five elements within an individual's 
personality (Smith et al., 1956; Katz, 1960; Shavitt, 1989). These elements are; 
• The knowledge function, which serves to let the individual either explain or 
understand what forms their reality, thus, it encompasses opinions about the 
predictability of objects and the outcome of events. 
• The ego-defensive function, which operates as a defence mechanism by 
allowing individuals to distance themselves from what they perceive as 
negative objects. Thus, the dutiful citizen could become part of the local 
"neighbourhood watch" thereby distancing their beliefs from that of the criminal 
fraternity. 
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• The value-expressive function, which \Nou\d encourage individuals to 
associate with that reference group whose aims reflected their own core 
values. Therefore, women who have defined themselves as feminists would 
search out others wjth identical alms and objectives. 
• The social adjustment function, which encourages people to adopt the values 
of a particular community so permitting them to become a fully integrated 
member of this group. 
• The adjustive-utilitarian function, which is rooted in self-interest. Hence, 
support would be forthcoming from an individual to another individual or 
organisation on the basis that monetary rewards will be provided. 
The five functions, whilst discrete, are also totally inter-related in that a strong 
adherence to a particular function may also result in a low adherence to another. 
For instance, Synder and DeBono (1987) found that people, motivated to carry out 
a high level of self-monitoring of their own behaviour to comply with the social 
expectations of others, would be more socially adjustive than individuals who 
disregard social conventions and favour value-expressive outcomes. This 
conclusion substantiates the proposition that homo hierarchus would be aware of 
their social obligations, and if necessary would adjust their behaviour, to observe 
and comply with a pre-defined hierarchical social structure. Alternatively, homo 
existentialis prioritise actions that accord with their own internal dispositions whilst 
homo sociologicus give primacy to their endeavours to be part of a "group" and 
homo economicus strive to maximise their adjustive-utilitarian aims. 
It is important to note that a combination of the ego-defensive and vajue-
expressive functions would motivate homo economicus, homo hierarchus, homo 
sociotogicus and homo existentialis to associate with other individuals who share 
their core values, attitudes and behaviours. 
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Following these propositions the following suppositions are offered in relation 
to the formulation of attitudes. Firstly, the knowledge function within attitudes 
places them as context dependent constnjcts. So. if attitudes are to change then 
the individual must question their ontological and epistemological beliefs after 
receiving information that initiates deep reflection. Secondly, the presence of 
affective, behavioural and cognitive processes within the construction of an 
attitude suggests that emotional reactions can over-rule unfavourable beliefs about 
an attitude object. Thus, attitudinal ambivalence towards a specific object can 
exist for a scientist, rooted in naturalist principles, with his or her dominant 
objective explanations conflicting with a religious observance that may ameliorate 
the fear of the unknown. Thirdly, whilst some level of attitudinal ambivalence is an 
accepted occurrence the balance theory of cognitive consistency (Heider, 1946, 
1958). the congruity model (Osgood, and Tannenbaum, 1955) and the dissonance 
theory (Festinger. 1957) all found that people would strive to achieve consistency 
within their cognitive awareness. Therefore, these research results render it 
unlikely that individuals would simultaneously occupy more than one of the 
quadrants in Figures 2.3 in any given relational situation. Fourthly, the presence 
of affective, behavioural and cognitive processes within the five essential elements 
as they manifest in each person's personality implies a complexity that can result 
in individuals occupying different positions along the continuums of adherence to 
each methodological family. Thus, whilst the reality perceptions within Figures 2.3 
remain intact, individuals would find that the strength of their beliefs are unique 
variables within their preferred vision of social reality. 
These four suppositions accord with the notion that the formulation of attitudes 
can be understood in the context of Figures 2.3. Therefore, an individual, whilst 
subject to a combination of objective explanation and subjective understanding in 
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a given relational situation would, nevertheless, find that their pre-eminent 
attitudinal preference would concur with only one of the four reality perspectives. 
This preference may have been subject to interrogation but uncertainties would 
have, even to a minimal extent, been over-ruled by the motivation to achieve 
consistency in a given set of social circumstances. 
However, the very existence of an enduring process of choice substantiates the 
notion that each of the four social reality perspectives remain unable to fully satisfy 
the demands of logic, thus leaving each culpable for providing an analysis that 
fails to fully address the complexities of ontological and epistemologlcal rationality. 
Therefore, the question arises as to whether there can be an answer to some of 
the conflicts between different value systems in a fifth reality perspective that 
offers a conflation of epistemological and ontotogical doctrines that is strong 
enough to provide an elegant and sustainable solution tp unite the four conflicting 
standpoints. Certainly, as noted by Bolton (1979: 234-6), the method of solving 
this problem would need to address the following issues: 
• The resolution of intractable differences, such as homo hierarchus's belief that 
inequality is natural and therefore, unquestionable. 
• The avoidance of opportunities to resolve conflict by adherence to dogma such 
as the belief of homo sociologicus in the over-riding altruistic nature of 
humanity or homo economicus's adherence to market-based solutions. 
• Homo existentialis maintaining the maxim that apathy can dominate an entire 
system of belief. 
• The use of manipulation by elite hegemonies of homo hierarchus to dominate 
others. 
• The belief that may be held by some advocates of each of the four reality 
perspectives, that some form of weak compromise, rather than a strong 
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consensus, can be achieved, which will settle differences about contending 
opinions and attitudes. 
In view of this series of antithetical assertions, it is difficult to affirm the notion of 
a fifth methodological position. Whilst objective decision making may synthesise 
with strands of subjective thought, and vice versa, nevertheless a feasible synergy 
between (1) the ontological belief in agency or that social action derives from 
individual intention; and (2) the ontological belief in structure or that social action 
derives from social stnjctures remains improbable. Alternatively, it is proposed 
that individuals would, in particular relational situations, exercise the values, 
attitudes and behaviours that accord with their own sense of security and self-
satisfaction. This preference for a personally reassuring pattern of attitudinal 
appropriation can be discerned in Olli's (1995 and 1999) three plausible models of 
the individual, which explores the relationship between people and the manner 
that they bring meaning to their social reality. 
Olli's Three Plausible Models of the Individual 
Olli's first model illustrates the coherent individual (1995: 60) who would adopt 
"consistent, solid and single-minded" opinions in all relational situations. Thus, the 
coherent individual's personal beliefs can be defined as an important element in 
their self-identity. Therefore, whether this single-minded individual either totally 
rejects the other three reality perspectives or is merely indifferent to them, 
changing attitudes in different relational situations would be regarded as 
undesirable. 
The second model illustrates the sequential individual who can "quickly adapt 
...[to particular relational situations]...by changing their biases to a new set of 
values and attitudes thereby still being internally coherent;,..[thus]...a rejection of 
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one bias follows the acceptance of another bias depending on the context" (Olli, 
1999: 60). Therefore, the sequential individual's personal beliefs are centred on 
the perceived net benefits that are to be gained from adopting a different set of 
attitudes in different relational situations. Moreover, this individual in prioritising 
their personal well being, would, subject to careful consideration, be prepared to 
change their perceptions of social reality to accommodate the perceptions of 
others. 
The third model illustrates the synthetic individual who can "almost turn into 
schemes or versatile jigsaw pieces of knowledge" (Olli. 1999: 60-61). Such an 
individual can freely adopt different status and role relationships in differing 
circumstances. Thus, this individual can justify re-configuration of their perceived 
choice of reality perceptions to accommodate the ambiguity and unpredictability 
that demands expansive personal boundaries in particular relational situations. 
Therefore, it is asserted here that these models offer a valuable insight into the 
following issues: 
• The discrete nature of each quadrant in Figure 2.3. 
• The variable strength of belief felt by individuals as they choose to adopt one of 
the configurations in Figures 2.3. 
• The inclination of individuals, subject to empirical investigation, to adopt a 
coherent, sequential or synthetic series of attitudes in different relational 
situations. 
• The inclination of individuals, subject to empirical investigation, to adopt 
particular attitudes towards the notion of community that are rooted in their 
ontological and epistemological interpretation of this social construct. 
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The Social Reality Dispositions and Human Nature 
The contemporary world is characterised by diversity and people strive to 
produce forms of unity within divergence. In this scenario, human nature may or 
may not be a table rasa or literally a "scraped tablet." However, whether ideas are 
innate, or are the product of socialisation, they do influence the way we 
understand cause and effect, attribution and result, and perhaps most decisively 
error and retribution. 
Free Will or Determinism? 
The Homo Hierarchus Perspective. Homo hierarchus adheres to the view that 
the first priorities for individuals are to obey social obligations, to conform to social 
norms and to protect social structures. These obligations are detemriined by the 
allegiances owed by each individual to "authority, which is to say power conceived 
as legitimate and so bound by responsibility" (Scruton, 2001: 25). Therefore, this 
moral tie is founded "in respect, honour, or (as the Romans called it) piety" 
(Scruton, 2001: 23). Whilst this doctrine does not prohibit an individual from 
making political criticisms nevertheless it would be unacceptable for the authority 
of the state to be limited by abstract rights granted to citizens (Barry. 2000: 77). 
Thus, homo hierarchus would preserve the stability of social structures by 
promoting the idea that it is natural for people to be prejudiced in favour of the 
superiority of their culture. 
Therefore, homo hierarchus would anticipate that individuals would subordinate 
his or her free will to comply with a robust notion of the common good as defined 
by the ruling elite. Moreover, self-determinism would be secondary to the 
acceptance of hierarchical imperatives that legitimise the status quo. 
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The Homo Economicus Perspective. The acceptance of arbitrary boundaries 
that restrict the application of free will would deny homo economicus the capacity 
to make their own decisions about the validity of their opinions. This state of 
affairs, which assumes the infallibility of a minority in, as Mill argues, the 
presumption "that their certainty is the same as absolute certainty"([1859] 1989: 
21) is perceived as wrong. 
Homo economicus would accept the desirability of diversity of opinion to curb 
both the potential for tyranny exercised by a minority and the oppression that can 
result from majority opinion (Mill, [1859] 1989: 8). Furthermore, provided homo 
economicus does not harm others, they should be free to act on the results of their 
own deliberations. Therefore, social rules would exist as commonly accepted 
devises but permitting, to the greatest extent possible, for homo economicus to 
exercise the customary practice of free will in the pursuit of their chosen goals. 
The Homo Sociologicus Perspective. Within a socially constructed world, 
conceived through the medium of group discourses, homo sociologicus would 
understand free will as being exercised by Individuals in the critical public debate 
that has. as its outcome, the particular shared meanings of the participants. This 
process of group involvement, underpinned by the encouragement of freedom of 
expression would be regarded as a means to Individual self-realisation as 
previously hidden human potential emerges in a cathartic process that forms part 
of a genuine manifestation of individual liberty. Therefore, homo sociologicus 
would not be coerced into accepting group decisions as an emphasis is placed on 
education and persuasion for the adoption of reasoned and virtuous action 
(Etzioni, 1998: xxxvi). 
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The Homo Existentialis Perspective, The opportunity to exercise friee will 
would be seen as a challenge for homo existentialis. The societal pressures 
exerted on human beings can result in the marginalisation of individuals' capacity 
to employ their unique perspective in analysing the essential elements, and the 
irrelevant trivia, of life. Thus, human relationships can be reduced to a seriality 
which inhibits the development of shared meanings with others by encouraging 
apathetic isolation as a creed for the individual (Gordon and Gordon. 1995: 145). 
To overcome this ever present danger to individual self-determination Neitzche 
implores humanity to realise its will to power, to discover one secret of life that is "I 
am that which must ever surpass itself ([1883] 1967: 166). Following Neitzche's 
exhortation to the courageous Sartre offers the notion of "the pledge" — or an oath 
backed by penalties for non-compliance, through which each member of a newly 
formed group promises to confront and overcome the external threat of seriality 
(Sartre. [1960] 1976: 430). 
Therefore, within the unity of the pledged group, homo existentialis would wish 
to exercise free will in a dialectical relationship of association. 
Moral Certainties or Moral Scepticism? 
The Homo Hierarchus Perspective. Homo hierarchus may be accused of 
being pessimistic about the essential morality of human beings. This charge is 
inspired by their belief that knowledge about morality is discernible in an objective 
sense and should be accepted by people as a set of moral imperatives. 
Therefore, the scientific method of reaching explanations is accepted as a suitable 
means of explaining the social world. However, this practice suggests that the 
imperfectability of human morality is inevitable, as nature itself has little 
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compassion with infanticide, rape and cannibalism common amongst animals as 
they strive towards "survival of the fittest" (Pinker, 2002: 163). 
Therefore, it is no surprise that, as adherents to elitism, homo hierarchus would 
prefer a deontological moral code built on a system of moral exemplars, which 
have been provided with enough stnjctural recognition and authority for their 
pronouncements to appeal to human reason (VValker et a/., 1995: 371). Thus, 
both religion and the traditional nuclear family founded on heterosexuality and 
marriage would provide useful vehicles to restrain individuals from slipping into 
degenerative behaviour patterns that may result In them questioning the existing 
social order. Obviously, as Scruton notes, subtle authoritarianism would always 
benefit from the notion that good conduct in this life would be rewarded in the next 
(2001: 170). In fact, this spiritual indemnity against damnation would be 
compieniented by temporal protection as the elite assumes a degree of 
responsibility for those who adhere to their proscribed duties and obligations. 
This pattern of behaviour produces moral certainties for those born and trained to 
lead but the docile majority who are destined to follow must rely on judgements 
made by their superiors. 
The Homo Economicus Perspective. When restraints are placed on individual 
freedom homo economicus regard such measures as a means to perpetuate a 
type of immorality, because, as Mill mused, "after the primary necessity of food 
and raiment, freedom is the first and strongest want of human nature" ([1869] 
1989: 212). So, as a result of the competition and subsequent rewards of the free 
market, Hayek maintains that release from the constraints of regulation would 
inspire the entrepreneur to be "led by the invisible hand to bring the succour of 
modern conveniences to the poorest homes he does not even know" (1976: 145). 
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In this scenario, individual egotism is of far greater importance than any altruistic 
urges, thus benevolent paternalism, through the notion of gratia gratiam parit could 
motivate successful capitalists to adopt a "caring" attitude towards the deserving 
poor. In these circumstances, despite the likelihood that the respectable poor will 
remain in relative poverty, the benevolence rendered by the enlightened affluent 
citizen can maintain a wider vision that renders the dependant citizen as compliant 
and obsequious. 
Therefore, a seductive consequentialist moral code can emerge that assumes a 
certainty and attractiveness for the successful who, by properly using the 
mechanisms of the free market, should consequentially gain material rewards. 
Alternatively, the failed entrepreneur may question the moral basis of a system 
that unflinchingly punishes errors of judgement without concern for the 
circumstances of failure or its consequences. 
The Homo Sociologicus Perspective. Homo sociofogicus would emphasise that 
a code of virtuous moral values and its application can be taught to the individual 
both in the education system and through the social interaction people experience 
when in groups of their peers. So, these principles would form an essentially 
optimistic point of view for homo sdciologicus, where moral certainties arise from 
people committed "to a set of shared values, norms and meanings" (Etzioni, 1996: 
5) encouraged by persuasion that appeals to their "better natures" (Etzioni, 1998: 
xxxvi). Furthermore, it is anticipated that numerous small groups, each functioning 
in a democratic and inclusive way. would interrelate with each other to achieve a 
common social bond that can accommodate human diversity such as gender, 
ethnicity, disablement and so on (Waltzer. 1992: 106). 
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In seeking to inspire a code of virtuous behaviour, homo sociologicus would 
believe in moral relativism^. This doctrine offers a vision that allows a community 
to achieve a morality that is certain and undisputed amongst all its members. 
However, such a code might not accommodate the dissenter who, in exercising 
his or her self-determination, cannot comply with the dominant nonns. 
The Homo Existentialis Perspective. The homo existentialis perspective on 
social reality rejects the knowabllity of moral facts and thus rejects the Imposition 
of any moral code. Therefore, its adherents would be unable to sanction the moral 
notions grounded in deontological. consequential or virtue ethics. Thus, the self is 
recognised as functioning in a world of moral scepticism. However, transformation, 
of a person with moral commitments, is possible in a process that begins with the 
emotional urge to follow "an organised pattern of means directed to an end" 
(Sartre, [1939] 1971: 41). This process of praxis is "a free productive dialectic" 
(Sartre, [1960] 1976: 235) founded in individual authenticity, which is achieved 
through expression and reflection over motivations, obligations and 
responsibilities. 
Therefore, the free dialectic facilitates insight that may lead to cognition and 
acceptance of virtues (such as truth and honesty) as homo existentialis pursue 
their praxis within group interaction. Nevertheless, human morality would remain 
uncertain alongside deontological, consequential or virtue moralities that have 
been advanced by adherents to alternative social reality perspectives. 
^ Moral relativism leaves the truth of moral doctrines as being relative to the opinions of the group 
of judging subjects (Lang. 2002:24). 
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Trust or Distrust 
The Homo Hierarchus Perspective. In pursuit of their aim to discover what 
can be accredited as true about the social world homo hierarchus would accept as 
true those perceptions that correspond with facts that are in agreement with their 
reality. Therefore, they would embrace the notion of replicating reality through the 
correspondence theory by using both a priori and a posteriori methods to evaluate 
knowledge. By employing this approach, epistemic defeasibility can render an 
existing truth claim redundant but it would be preferred, especially if the 
reinterpretation was socially contentious, that consensual pragmatism, achieved 
by experienced experts, determines the revision. Therefore, homo hierarchus 
would sustain their belief in the existing social status quo whilst acknowledging the 
power and right of experts to revise existing truths. 
In this scenario homo hierarchus would distrust the motives that underpin truth 
claims made by (1) homo economicus, which are based on their individual 
objective experience; (2) homo sociologicus, which are based on community-
orientated social construction and (3) the homo existentialis, which are based on 
individual pragmatism. 
The Homo Economicus Perspective. In pursuit of their aim to discover what 
can be accredited as true about the social world homo economicus, in their 
objective social reality, would accept the validity of their individual perceptions that 
fit into'their system of mutually coherent propositions. Thus, truth would be 
determined through the relationships individuals have with other individuals 
instead of how it relates to social reality. Therefore, homo economicus would 
employ epistemological reliabilism that is founded in a process of direct 
apprehension whilst accepting that epistemic defeasibility can cause existing 
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explanations that have achieved the status of truth claims to be overtumed. In 
this scenario, homo economicus sustain their belief in the primacy of the free 
market where individuals strive to maximise their utility through the mechanism of 
contractual relations. 
So, with their preferred approach to ascertaining truth, homo economicus would 
perceive an unacceptably high level of risk in the following truth claims, which they 
would be inclined to dismiss (1) the assertions made by homo hierarchus based 
on the replication of their objective reality; (2) the community-based social 
construction of truths favoured by homo sociologicus and (3) the homo 
existentialis particular preference for individual pragmatism. 
The Homo Sociologicus Perspective. In pursuit of their aim to discover what 
can be accredited as true about the social world homo sociologicus, in their 
subjective social reality, embrace the notion that democratic discussion with other 
members of their community, drawing on social conventions, social perceptions 
and social experiences would determine what is true about the social world. Thus, 
truth is socially constructed in a paradigm of personal and group enquiry that 
would utilise a priori and a posteriori methods to collect information before 
practising epistemological foundationalism to reach a group consensus based on 
the collective perceptions of community members. Following this process the 
community's socially constructed truths may not be discarded following falsification 
through epistemic defeasibility as any new evidence offered may be refuted. 
Therefore, by adhering to the notion that truth is contingent on collective 
agreement about meanings homo sociologicus would affirm their commitment to 
the concept of community as central to achieving the good life. 
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Thus, with their belief in socially constructed truths that attain the level of 
virtues, homo sociologicus would distrust the motives that underpin the truth 
claims made by (1) homo hierarchus based on the replication of their objective 
reality; (2) homo economicus based on their individual objective experience and 
(3) the homo existentialis, which would be based on individual pragmatism. 
The Homo Existentialis Perspective. In pursuit of their objective to discover 
what they can know about the social world the homo. existentialis, in their 
subjective social reality, regards all universal theories of truth as irrelevant. 
Instead, they embrace a deflationary understanding of the concept, which renders 
the individual's understanding of particular truths as a possible outcome arising 
from that individual's lonely and demanding journey in search of their own credible 
social reality. In this scenario, where all classical theories are redundant, some 
homo existentialis might be prepared to acknowledge the notion of instrumental 
pragmatism, or that any belief can assume the importance of a truth ascription if it 
offers beneficial results to its adherents. Therefore, in a spirit of individual 
pragmatism that draws on instrumental pragmatism, the homo existentialis may 
endorse a particular proposition as true if it enhances their own well being. 
Thus, with their belief in the irrelevance of universal concepts of truth, the homo 
existentialis would perceive as nonsense, and would therefore distrust the truth 
claims made by (1) homo hierarchus based on the replication of their objective 
reality; (2) homo economicus based on their individual objective experience and 
(3) homo sociologicus based on the social constructivism of the community. 
114 
Equality or Inequality? 
The Homo Hierarchus Perspective. When Rousseau wrote that "peoples 
once accustomed to masters are not in a condition to do without them" ([1755] 
1993: 33-4) he expressed how the notion of inequality can be justified through the 
reality perspective demarcated by naturalist structuralism, as the concept is made 
an essential everyday characteristic in the pursuit of purposeful social relations. 
So, adherents to naturalist structuralist perceptions on social reality accept the 
causal capacity of structure over agency combined with an epistemology premised 
on the innate abilities of individuals to exercise their capability of reason to gain 
knowledge about the world. Arising from this scenario, homo hierarchus would 
accept that humans are not born equal. Some are perceived as possessing 
particular talents, and different levels of intelligence, that have been acquired as a 
result of a socially stratified educational system and economic processes that 
favours an elite. This results in the necessity for this elite to make decisions for 
the majority who would be prepared to follow their instructions, in accordance with 
their sense of responsibility and obligation. This situation maintains the existing 
status quo as a system of selective succession limits access to power by 
controlling the knowledge, mastery of the political system and access to financial 
resources that together sustain hierarchy. Moreover, people need to be 
constrained by institutions, which can exercise disciplinary practices, as without 
these constraints the instinctive behaviour of the majority would lead to instability 
and uncertainty. Thus, homo hierarchus would emphasise the preference of the 
poor and the weak for the safety and predictability of subservience. And they 
would also acknowledge that "in all healthy societies it must be the needs and 
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values of the strong which should obsess the popular imagination and dominate 
the public mind" (Worsthorne. 1978: 154). 
The Homo Economicus Perspective. The philosophical perception of reality that 
is underpinned by the principles of naturalist agency is linked to a commitment to 
maximise freedom of choice for all. Whilst producing inevitable inequalities, this 
offers a system of natural selection where the most able citizens are allowed to 
maximise their material well being. Truth is found in Hayek's observation "that 
individuals believe that their well being depends primarily on their own efforts and 
decisions" (1976: 74). Thus, the special characteristics of humans that enable 
them to reach their full potential requires that they are unimpeded by the demands 
of structure, thus ensuring individual equality of opportunity to engage in markets 
largely unfettered by state rules and regulations. Therefore, the motivators that 
inspire individual action are located in the constant competitiveness of a group of 
people striving to maximise their personal well being in relation to other individual 
players. As a result the successful achieve high levels of self-esteem, pursuing 
self-centred materialistic goals, whilst those who fail in this market orientated 
meritocracy must gracefully accept their inferior abilities. 
The Horno Sociologicus Perspective. Homo sociologicus understand people as 
primarily social in their habits, needing, through a conscious process of "bonding 
together," to form "webs of social relations that encompass shared meanings and 
above all shared values" (Etzioni, 1995a: 24). Problems are defined collectively 
through tight local networks that draw on the institutions of family, religious 
associations and schools, or in communities of interest such as trade unions or 
political parties. In this framework Walter recognises the internalised reward of 
becoming an "office holder" with socially recognised responsibility for pursuing 
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collective aims and objectives that endows a person with a status that makes 
them equal with other non-professional community activists (1983: 132-3). This 
notion of equality is rooted in the conviction that humans can value each other's 
contribution to the common good without attributing a greater significance in the 
successful completion of community initiatives to a group of high profile individuals 
rather than the unrecognised, yet exemplary, efforts of others. Such an optimistic 
view of human nature leads Walter to revise Marx's axiom to a new rule of conduct 
"from each according to his ability (or his resources); to each according to his 
socially recognised needs" (1983: 91). In this pattern of inter-action homo 
sociologicus accepts that social meanings reign supreme over the less credible 
inclinations of those who wish to exercise individual choice. 
As people determine their reality by collective interpretation, the word equality 
seems to possess only a modicum of descriptive content. Instead, the 
perspicacious proclamations from homo sociologicus judge that the notion of 
equality should be primarily superficial, thus they support the development of an 
attractive ideal without identifying a fundamental justification for such properties 
within the human psyche (Barry, 2000: 171). 
The Homo Existentialis Perspective. The unique nature of homo existentialis 
lies in his or her belief that all humans only have access to knowledge that is found 
through inner personal experiences. Therefore, by implication, each individual can 
proclaim their own existence but can either reject or be uncertain about the 
existence of others. This attitude embraces solipsism^ with its principle that 
humans are condemned to live their lives with the conviction that they cannot 
know anything beyond themselves. Furthermore, the existentialist maxim, that 
* Solipsism is the view that the self is all that can exist or can be known. Within this doctrine 
scepticism can even extend to doubt about the validity of one's own past states. 
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individual existence precedes essence, Is also present in a scenario that renders 
social reality as unknowable; and debates about the structural equality or 
inequality of groups or classes irrelevant. Thus, individuals' character is shaped 
by the necessity of enduring the challenge of human existence, as best they can in 
a world purely comprised of their own representations. 
Homo existentialis would accept that each individual should create their own 
distinctive understanding about the value and purpose of personal relationships 
whilst maintaining that it is futile to attempt to share knowledge of personal 
experiences with others. So homo existentiatis would draw inspiration from 
Schopenhauer's supposition that "in what we do we recognise what we are" 
([1839] 1999: 87) thus, making it impossible to achieve new levels of 
consciousness of the self through ordinary social interaction. 
However, a genuine equality of humanity remains a feasible aim for those who 
associate with the perspective of hermeneutic agency through the proposition 
advanced by Sartre that "everyone comes to everyone, through the community, as 
a bearer of the same essentiality" ([1960] 1976: 599). This axiom is founded on 
the apparent self-reliance of individuals, in the pursuit of their needs, which results 
in shared praxis. Here we become inter-dependent in a world where people must 
recognise and overcome their own sense of isolation through reflection over their 
autonomous behaviour within organised groups. However, a notion of mutual 
respect can arise from an awareness of the capacity of others to contribute to 
some shared objectives. In time, this insight may transcend to a higher affirmation 
of shared equality, strengthened by its disregard for status, power and security 
and knowable through the stages of a dialectical development that affirms 
individual identity. 
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Sartre does recognise that human beings are a collection of isolated 
individuals who find it impossible to understand the motivation of others. But, 
what he calls the practico-inert, where individuals are held prisoner by their own 
creations, can be overcome by a critical self-awareness achieved through the 
shared objectives of an organised group ([1960] 1976: 556-7). For instance, homo 
existentialis can realise that they have become complicit in their own alienation by 
their neglect in affirming their own life. Moreover, whilst their belief in their own 
autonomous creation of reality remains intact they can still exert "a will to power" 
(Nietzche. [1883] 1967, [1887] 2003) that consolidates their influence over their 
own existence. Therefore, the homo existentialis would challenge a local 
authority's attempt to reorganisation a small community group into a bureaucratic 
structure thus rejecting apathy whilst maintaining adherence to his or her beliefs. 
Conclusion 
It is proposed that when some community members collectively address the 
issue of formulating, and then implementing a programme of community 
engagement, the commonalities amongst those who understand themselves as 
homo sociologicus might not be shared by community members who adhere to 
contending perspectives on social reality. Furthermore, these attitudes may 
influence community members' social preferences to the extent that holistic 
community participation in productive co-operative endeavours becomes 
increasingly difficult. 
The synthesis of Olli's three plausible models of the individual with the 
theoretical observations made by social psychologists in relation to the formulation 
of attitudes, offers a useful means of understanding how difficult it can be for some 
119 
individuals' to change their values, attitudes and beliefs. Furthermore, 
sometimes when change is possible, it is only inspired by self-interest. This 
crucial pronouncement, by implication, requires the completion of a deep and 
rigorous analysis of the four contending social reality perspectives as it is 
imperative to explore whether common ground can exist between the differing 
standpoints. 
In seeking to devise a research programme that can empirically validate, that 
individual community practitioners choose a particular social reality perspective in 
community engagement settings, the next chapter extends the examination of 
meta-ethics principles into the micro sphere of individual ethical perceptions 
concerning the concept of community. Thus, the different comprehensions of 
personal ethics is explored and associated with homo economicus, homo 
hierarchus, homo sociologicus and homo existentialis in the attitudes they adopt 
towards community and community engagement. 
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Contending Explanations of Personal Ethics 
The four contending ontological and epistemological perspectives on social 
reality assume the status of categories and, within these four categories, it is 
proposed that individuals' would realise or manifest particular dispositions in 
particular relational situations, such as a community engagement. These 
dispositions can act as individual self-knowledge, and can guide what ethical 
principles are embraced and what predicated moral truths are rejected. To 
facilitate this process, individuals use their practical reasoning to reach 
conclusions over what constitutes acceptable standards of "good." "right" or 
"virtuous" behaviour or conduct. Thus, the analysis shifts from the meta-ethical 
leveP (in Chapter 3) to the level of applied personal ethics. 
Standards of behaviour govern the lives of individuals — or, fashion their self-
identity — or. represent their actuality (Hegel. [1821] 1991: 190). Therefore, an 
individual's ethics can be regarded as a self-policing mechanism that can stimulate 
self-control, motivate adherence to matters of principle, accentuate feelings and 
give rise to particular lines of thought. However, such a pattern of idealistic 
^ An investigation into the concepts and methods of ethics, or the science of morals in human 
conduct, with the aim of addressing the validity of moral claims in general. 
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impulses may require each moral agent to confront, or to obfuscate over, 
inconsistencies in their behaviour that might be the outcome of a compromise 
arising from the imperatives of objective or subjective necessity, which give rise to 
particular lines of thought. Therefore, ethics can also be fashioned by pragmatism. 
This makes their fomnulation a fruitful area for analysis in compiling a review of the 
associated sets of theoretical propositions that can be attached to each of the four 
perspectives on social reality. Furthermore, the completion of this process will also 
result in a set of propositions that can inform the design of the empirical 
investigation that is described and analysed in Chapter 6. 
As this thesis will now be concerned with nonmative ethics or general theories 
about "what ought to be " (Taylor, 1975: 175), it is possible to achieve a better 
understanding of the ethical foundations that underpin the four contending 
perceptions of social reality (see Figure 4.1). These contending ethical principles 
give rise to four discrete ethical perspectives on community and community 
intervention. 
Homo Hierarchus and Deontologlcal Ethics 
The social reality perspective preferred by homo hierarchus requires a 
structuralist ontology and a naturalist epistemology. This configuration accords 
with deontological principles, with agency restrained by "the recurring patterns of 
social behaviour that determine the nature of human action" (Parker, 2000: 125). 
Thus, structure has a causal capacity with decreed duties becoming objectively 
knowable by agents. Therefore, deontological ethics are concerned with what 
individual duties are, who has rights, and what strategy is best able to produce 
justice. So, the fundamental precepts of this doctrine lead to a code that defines 
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Figure 4.1: The Ethical Foundations of the Contending Social Reality 
Perspectives 
Naturalism Henneneutlcs 
Ontology 
Structuralism 
Naturalist Structuralism: 
Presumes an objective social 
world, best knowable by the 
application, of the scientific 
method, in which structures 
exercise power over agency, 
which makes human 
behaviour predictable. 
Ethics: deontological 
Homo hierarchus 
concludes that what is 
right is found in obsen/ing 
duties and obligations 
deduced from structural 
considerations. 
Hermeneutic Structuralism: 
Presumes a subjective social 
world, best knowable only as it 
is socially constructed, with 
people's action being 
determined, and made 
predictable, by their collective 
interpretation of this reality. 
Ethics: virtue 
Homo sociologicus conclude 
that virtuous behaviour 
emerges from jointly affirmed 
social norms. 
Agency 
Naturalist Agency: 
Presumes an objective social 
world, best knpwable by the 
application of the scientific 
method, in which people are 
agents of their actions, with 
their behaviour made 
predictable by their 
unconstrained self-interest. 
Ethics: consequentialism 
Homo economicus 
concludes that the 
goodness of actions is 
judged on whether they 
create some good state of 
affairs. 
Hermeneutic Agency: 
Presumes a subjective social 
world that is best knowable as 
what people believe It to be, 
with agency constrained by 
their subjective perceptions of 
social reality, which makes 
human behaviour 
unpredictable. 
Ethics: scepticism 
Homo existentialis conclude 
that moral knowledge or 
moral reasoning is 
impossible. 
Source: Dixon and Dogan, 2003a. 
what actions are right and permissible, and thus what actions are wrong. As 
Blackburn observes, "they take us beyond what we admire, or regret, or prefer 
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or even what we want other people to prefer. They take us to thoughts about what 
is due. They take us to demands" (2001: 60). Therefore, this section addresses 
the leading deontological system of Kant ([1785a] 1998 and [1797] 1963) and then 
examines how the general principles produced by a Kantian system have been 
developed by reference to the wori< of Fried (1978). Subsequently, some 
alternative deontological doctrines are presented, which offer ethical proposition 
that comply with the reality perceptions of naturalist structuralism whilst 
incorporating the notion of power. 
The Nation State and the Categorical Imperative 
Kant made an important contribution to the field of ethics by formulating the 
principle that morality be derived a priori or from pure reason, instead of individual 
experience. He insisted that for people to accept moral laws, their construction 
must be "freed from everything which may be only empirical" (Kant, [1785a] 1998: 
289). Thus, individuals do not construct their morality by considering the 
consequences of their actions, but. instead, discover their inherent capacity to act 
morally or dutifully. This process of enlightenment lies at a deeper level than that 
of affectation, as individual behaviour should fully comply with the intent of a duty, 
rather than just observe its tenets, if a person is to achieve the particular 
postulates of Kantian "good will." From this process of subjective awareness there 
arises a code of objective ethics, which accords with the thinking of homo 
hierarchus in that impartial standards of behaviour are created, which can be 
subject to dispassionate judgement. As Kant maintains, judgement must be 
passed on what is right and what is wrong by the use of pure practical reason thus 
making morality absolute. 
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When a person acknowledges their moral obligations, they accept "the 
categorical imperative," or that moral rule that recognises that human 
characteristics — such as loyalty and duty — possess a discrete inherent value. 
This distinction is clarified by Kant in his statement that if an "action is good only 
as a means to something else, then the imperative is hypothetical; if it is conceived 
as good in itself and consequently as being necessarily the principle of a will which 
of itself conforms to reason, then it is categorical" ([1785b] 2003: 2). Following this 
assertion he proceeds to confimi the existence of "but one categorical imperative, 
namely this: Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that 
it should become a universal law" (Kant, [1785b] 2003: 6). This fundamental 
principle is often cast into the popular saying "do unto others as you expect them 
to do unto you" although this clich§ does not fully accommodate the extent of 
Kant's insight. 
Taylor (1975: 88) has identified the following three formulations within the 
categorical imperative. Firstly, "for a rule to be a moral rule, it must be consistently 
universaiizable." Secondly, "for a rule to be a moral rule, it must be such that, if all 
men were to follow it, they would treat each other as ends in themselves, never as 
nieans only." And thirdly, "for a rule to be a moral rule, it must be capable of being 
self-imposed by the will of each person when he is universally legislating." 
Through the first fonnulafion. it is envisaged that the imperatives of moral 
obligation, loyalty and duty, are consistently applied throughout the hierarchical 
nation state. Within this social structure, obligations and duties accompany the 
privileges granted to the individual. These values have as their aim the 
achievement of the common good and the maintenance of stable social order. 
The second formulation predicts the achievement of the common good if 
everyone accepts their duties and responsibilities — or what is right — instead, of 
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taking actions they deem necessary to achieve a chosen result. Thus, homo 
hierarchus can visualise the preservation of social order without the individual 
exercising choice about what action would produce a desirable, or good, outcome. 
Finally, the third fonnulation accommodates homo hierarchus's understanding 
of the ethical priorities of patriotism and allegiance to the state as principles that 
bind the social order together. These principles are absolute, and would be freely 
self-imposed by the will of each person, as that person perceives the state as 
providing the rights and legitimate expectations that ensure the maintenance of 
social order. 
The Categorical Imperative artd Absolute Morality 
If certain actions are considered right or wrong, whatever the circumstances, 
then people can be faced with moral dilemmas. Consider the issue of arranged 
marriages — following Kant's argument, if it is accepted that enforced arranged 
marriages are wrong but arranged marriages that take place with the voluntary 
agreement of all the parties are right then this principle should be applied 
universally. However, the word "voluntary" can be defined differently, resulting in 
the universal application of this notion being inappropriate to particular individual 
situations where coercion is present. Therefore, the uniqueness of a situation does 
expose the shortcomings of the Kantian deontological doctrine. 
Fried deals with the moral dilemma between absolutism and relativism by 
proposing a system of categorical norms "concerned with what we do, rather than 
with what we allow to happen" (1978: 20). Therefore, if a forbidden result comes 
about intentionally this is morally wrong but if a forbidden result is a concomitant 
arising from an action, even if this was foreseeable, then "it does not violate the 
categorical prohibition" (Fried, 1978: 21). Thus, in part, categorical norhis are 
absolute, in that "they point out certain acts we must not perfomri." However, they 
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also "do not state that a certain state of the world is of such supreme importance 
that the value of everything else must be judged by its tendency to produce that 
state" (Fried. 1978: 11). So, a complex relationship is proposed between the 
judgements of the deontological system and the agent's evaluative judgement on 
"producing good in the world, but without violating the absolute nonns of right and 
wrong" (Fried, 1978: 11). 
By introducing the intention of the agent into the gap that exists between 
judgements of right and wrong and the state of affairs in the world, Fried 
recognises that "we relate to the world as human beings as we pursue our 
purposes in the world" (1978: 27). In this process the theory of prima facie duties, 
compiled by Ross (1930), provides the reality perspective of naturalist 
structuralism with the means to corroborate that, in a particular set of 
circumstances, the individual would intuitively know whether an act is right or 
wrong thus making moral knovyledge accessible to everyone. Therefore, it is 
possible to refine Kant's universal maxim, provided the absolute element within the 
categorical norms is respected, as individuals may then fashion their intentions so 
that they do not contravene these absolutes. Thus, in the matter of arranged 
marriages, it is enough that the coercion of individuals into a marriage contract is 
never condoned and by this means we then fulfil our duty. 
However, the concept of premeditated action remains problematic in defining 
ethical obligations. For instance, during the Nuremburg Trials,^ a common defence 
made by the accused was that they were "only following orders," "doing their duty," 
and "unaware of any violation of human rights." Therefore, it seems inevitable that 
the homo hierarchus would be concerned to give regard to the presence of power 
within deontological ethical premises. 
^ The Nuremberg Trails took place in 1946 with the defendants, consisting of the captured Nazi 
Hierarchy, accused of brutal atrocities against Jews, Roma and other minority groups. 
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Power and Deontological Ethics 
Pure human reason, which inspires individuals to observe the categorical 
imperative, is now tempered with notions of political influence in an analysis of the 
"interest" ethics of Machiavelli, Hobbes and Burke. Although these philosophers 
reflect on individuals' manipulation of others to achieve favourable ends, this 
intention accords with the categorical imperative as the manipulator accepts their 
obligation to the manipulated, making the latter not a means but an end in the 
framing of the intent. In this scenario, homo hierarchus can recognise a sense of 
ethical purpose as an elite aims to maintain existing social arrangements and 
perpetuate existing social divisions and sectional interests in nation states through 
a system of obligations and duties that ensures a compliant and productive 
populace. 
Truth and Deceit 
Usually people associate Machiavelli with The Prince ([1513] 1999). thereby 
reducing his reputation to that of a philosopher who advocated the political 
juxtaposition between the concepts of truth and deceit. This labelling is 
unwarranted and unjust as his major project. The Discourses ([1518] 1969), 
represents "the attempt to accommodate interests and forces rather than to 
suppress or destroy them" (Gaede, 1983: 11). Nevertheless The Prince, written for 
a select group of rulers rather than the general populace, perhaps due to its 
accessibility, has moved into the mainstream of managerial discourse in Britain 
(Parry, 1972: 114) thus influencing the formulation and implementation of an 
important field in the ethics of naturalist structuralism. 
Machiavellianism consists of beliefs that supplement the thinking that inspired 
the categorical imperative as power is consistently linked with responsibilities. So, 
homo hierarchus would have come to accept as sacrosanct that the retention of 
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power is conditional upon a ruler or prince having the vision to acknowledge their 
duties to their subjects. In turn, this belief has lead some dominant hegemonies to 
be suspicious of commercial and social partnerships until they are satisfied that 
they share the common aim of maintaining social stability. In this paradigm, the 
label "irresponsible" would be allocated to those who have not learnt from previous 
experience that "there is nothing more difficult to handle, more doubtful of success 
and more dangerous to carry through than initiating changes in a state's 
consfitution" (Machiavelli, [1513] 1999: 19). Therefore, if such changes are to be 
avoided, those in control of a state must exercise the knowledge, skills and 
attributes that ensure the maintenance of stability, the certainty of order and the 
continuance of the status quo. Thus, for as long as citizens do not feel robbed of 
their property or honour through neglect of the obligations that power confers, 
"they remain content" (Machiavelli. [1513] 1999: 58). 
In achieving the sense of loyalty and patriotism that binds a state together, 
paradoxically the state must create a strong and feared bureaucracy. It should be 
miserly in spending state funds and so avoid any attempt to adopt humane 
"popularist" measures that distort the delicate balance between duties and 
obligations. Homo hierarchus, in associating with and furthering this policy, would 
consider that their fellow citizens, who are fickle and ungrateful to those in the 
elite, are uncertain in their intentions. Therefore, when the elite use their power, 
they would invoke the maxim that, "violence must be inflicted once and for all; 
people will then forget what it tastes like and so will be less resentful. Benefits 
must be conferred gradually; and in that way they will taste better" (Machiavelli. 
[1513] 1999: 31). 
When homo hierarchus accepts the Machiavellian doctrine, they are taking a 
pessimistic view of human nature, which necessitates a type of ethical cynicism. 
Thus, if it is recognised that a ruler is weak then that ruler will be despised 
129 
(Machiavelli, [1513] 1999: 47). However, if the general nature of the populace and 
their favoured customs can be understood, then the sovereign may easily 
manipulated them. Nevertheless, in this matrix, the deontologica) ethical base of 
obligation and duty remains intact as homo hierarchus would believe that rf 
citizens of a state escape their benevolent servitude they would become "the prey 
of the first comer who seeks to chain...[them]...up again" (Machiavelli. [1518] 
1969: 153). These circumstances would cause humanity to fall back Into a "state 
of nature" where the wise rule of the most able individuals might give way to 
tyrannical and exploitative regimes. 
The Responsibilities of Absolute Power 
Hobbes, like Machiavelli. developed his philosophy in turbulent times. The latter 
experienced the religious and secular tyranny of the Italian City States whilst 
Hobbes grew up in the aftermath of the Spanish Annada, lived through the English 
Civil War then experienced the Restoration in 1660. Thus, no doubt from personal 
experience, he concluded that without a Commonwealth, or "Leviathan", citizens 
would experience "no arts, no letters, no society, and which is worst of all. 
continual fear and danger of violent death, and the life of man solitary, poor, nasty, 
brutish and short" ([1651] 1996: 89). Therefore, he proposed the greater 
happiness of humanity through the promotion of individual self-interest as the 
ultimate principle of ethics thereby upgrading this notion from merely a means to a 
desirable end (Taylor, 1975: 47). So, whilst for those homo economicus who 
favour ethical egoism this proposition is consequential, homo hierarchus can 
embrace this concept as it is deontological in the public sphere but telelogical, or 
without commitment to a particular purpose, in the private sphere. Therefore, 
Hobbes proposes the greater happiness of humanity, through a reality where 
"people are purely and unavoidably egoistic which drives them to seek their own 
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preservation" (Gaede, 1983: 34). Thus, the sovereign should possess absolute 
power to ensure stability and prosperity with people choosing to give up their rights 
in the belief that "the power, so also the honour of the sovereign, ought to be 
greater than that of any, or all the subjects" (Hobbes, [1651] 1996: 128). 
Homo hierarchus would find this theorising politically creative as it facilitates a 
social order where ethical behaviour is determined by people seeking to establish 
realistic relationships in society. However, although the deontoiogical aspect to 
Hobbes ethical doctrine supports the naturalist structuralist perspective on social 
reality in emphasising every citizens' duty to obey the sovereign's wishes it does 
not influence private ethical behaviour, which should be solely established through 
the chosen style of interaction between people. Therefore, arising from the 
supreme authority of the sovereign whose laws create moral situations, homo 
hierarchus could develop consequentialist ethics in the private sphere of the 
family. 
The role of the Church, as the traditional arbiter of behaviour, is to offer a civil 
religion that supports the sovereign's right to rule. In this pattern of political 
absolutism, criticism of the sovereign is regarded as sedition as it breaches the 
social contract that has advanced humanity from the chaos of the natural laws of 
nature. 
The Supremacy of Good Order 
The tumultuous experiences of Machiavelli and Hobbes were mirrored in the life 
of Burke who witnessed the French Revolution (1789-1794) and the American 
War of Independence (1775-1783). These events inspired his belief in a code of 
order and stability that had evolved through the wisdom of ages. Naturalist 
structuralism would also embrace Burke's prosthetic of re-inspiring politics with a 
religious vision (Gaede, 1983: 110) to explain the unfair distribution of resources. 
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Thus, as religion is the grand prejudice, using the suffering experienced in this life 
as a portent of rewards in the next, Burke is able to dismiss his detractors with the 
assertion "you think you are combating prejudice, but you are at war with nature" 
([1790] 1993: 49). 
Hobbes views, about the inability of human nature to aspire to ethically sensitive 
"higher goals," were to an extent shared by Burke in his conclusions about human 
discernment: "I am convinced that we have a degree of delight, and that no small 
one, in the real misfortunes and pains of others" ([1756] 1987: 45). However, the 
well-ordered state, being a product of a slowly evolving and traditionally informed 
pattern of governance, would act as a moral mainstay as "custom reconciles us to 
everything" (Burke. [1756] 1987: 148). Therefore, homo hierarchus would 
envisage citizens entering into a special relationship with their society as "it is a 
partnership in all science; a partnership in all art; a partnership in every virtue and 
in all perfection (Burke, [1790] 1993: 96). 
Challenges Confronting Homo Hierarchus, 
Therefore, arising from this analysis of deontologlcal theories of ethical 
behaviour homo hierarchus are confronted with the challenges of addressing the 
following questions: 
• To what extent does the development of the categorical imperative, to exclude 
actions that are concomitant and foreseeable with particular practices, make 
this principle too flexible? 
• As the state must only observe its obligations to individuals in return for their 
adherence to their duties, might individual freedom of thought and conscience 
be eroded? 
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• Following Hobbes assertion that consequential ethics should be observed in 
the private sphere, does it mean that a deontological system is unable to 
inform individuals* everyday moral laws? 
Thus, homo hierarchus has a distinct perspective on community and how its affairs 
are conducted. 
Homo Hierarchus on Community 
To homo hierarchus, the individual is subordinate to the community and the 
community is subordinate to the state. The concept of community and the 
existence of community groups can thus be exploited to support the paradigm of 
individuals observing their duties in return for a set of obligations accepted by the 
state. 
The following set of practical imperatives provide a clear insight into homo 
hierarchus's understandirig of applied ethics in the context of the involvement of 
community members and community work professionals in community work 
initiatives. 
Human Essence. The following propositions arise from the belief that individuals 
are rational beings that recognise the need for a social order that encourages 
them in the habit of self-control. 
• The state should, as far as possible, control the supply of finance for 
community work initiatives thereby cementing the bond between the elite and 
community members. 
• Initiatives taken at community level should be inspired by professional wori<ers 
aiming to indoctrinate community members into a state-inspired identity. 
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Individual Authenticity. The following propositions arise from the belief that an 
authentic life is determined by the individual discovering their proper position in life 
then carrying out their duties. 
• The processes undertaken to fulfil community initiatives should develop 
strategies of incorporation designed to quell unrest amongst citizens caused by 
their conscious feelings of social exclusion. 
• Participation at community level should not result in community self 
governance but lead to community activities being incorporated into the 
structure of local government. 
Personal Responsibility. The following propositions arise from the belief that the 
individual can comprehend good conduct, loyalty and sincerity. 
• Individuals participation in community initiatives should be explained as rational 
behaviour in pursuit of fulfilling duties owed to the state. 
• Community members should be encouraged by the state to observe the 
activities of their neighbours and report any instances of anti-social behaviour. 
Homo Economicus and Consequentialist Ethics 
The social reality perspective preferred by homo economicus requires an 
agency ontology and a naturalist epistemology. As the individual has both a causal 
capacity to act and the discernment to objectively assess whether the likely results 
from their actions would have good or bad consequences, this configuration 
accords with consequentiaiist principles. Moreover, the individual would need to 
identify the beneficial ends from the means of their actions. Thus, "the moral value 
of any action always lies in its consequences, and it is by reference to these 
consequences that actions, and indeed such things as institutions, law and 
practices are to be justified if they can be justified at all" (Smart and Williams. 
1973: 79). 
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The principles of consequentialism can accommodate various types of 
hedonism, or the personal pursuit of pleasure^ as an end in itself. And the differing 
fomns of utilitarianism/ which all require moral choices to be made in terms of the 
maximising of happiness for the greatest number of people. Therefore, arising 
from this description of the parameters of ethical consequentialism it is contended 
that homo economicus can locate the position of their ethical reality along a 
continuum. 
The model in Figure 4.2 overleaf illustrates the spectrum of consequentiaiist 
attitudes, from ethical egoism, with its singular Intent to promote the selfish pursuit 
of personal interest, to preference utilitarianism (Singer, 1993 and 1997), with its 
concern for people to identify right behaviour through co-operating together in 
negotiations between equals. So, in seeking to propose an ethical community-
orientated perspective for homo hierarchus it could be argued that a degree of co-
operative behaviour can be achieved without compromising their ideology. 
Is Selfishness a Natural State of Affairs? 
Machiavelli declared "that in constituting and legislating for a commonwealth it 
must needs be taken for granted that all men are wicked and that they will always 
^ As there are different conceptions of pleasure there are varieties of hedonism thus, this school of 
philosophy, founded by Epicurus (341-271 BC) does not necessarily promote sensuality but rather 
detachment, serenity and freedom from fear. 
^ Act-utilitarianism makes moral judgements based on the likely consequences of particular acts, 
whilst rule-utilitarianism emphasises the importance of following rules which benefit society as a 
whole. Finally, preference-utilitarianism assesses the "good" arising from specific actions in terms 
of the judgements of all those involved. 
135 
Figure 4.2: The Continuum of Co-operation 
Ethical Egotism Act Utilitarianism Rule Utilitarianism Preference-Utilitarianism 
S E L F - C E N T R E D N E S S CO-OPERATION 
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give vent to the malignity that is in their minds when opportunity offers" ([1518] 
1969: 111-12). This political doctrine values poverty, as it is a desirable state of 
affairs that forces people to be industrious. Similarly, harsh disciplines are 
imposed through legislation with the expectation that this would cause citizens to 
behave in an orderly and productive fashion (Machiavelli. [1518] 1969: 112). 
However, this theorising, with its aim of ensuring a subservient population, 
acknowledges that people must also be able to envisage the possibility of fulfilling 
at least some of their desires. Such a perspective lies at the core of the political 
proclivities of the naturalist agency perspective of social reality, where the 
presence of economic freedom, achievable through a free market, can be 
regarded as guaranteeing adequate measures of personal liberty. However, this 
scenario might lead homo economicus to ponder whether ostensibly legitimate 
actions in the service of self-interest could have adverse consequences on society 
and, in the longer term, be unable to satisfy the demands of individual conscience. 
In condemning usury, Aristotle distinguished between two types of accumulation 
— "one is a part of household management, the other is retail trade: the former is 
necessary and honourable, while that which consists in exchange is justly 
censured; for it is unnatural, and a mode by which men gain from one another" 
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([C335-322] 1996: 25). Subsequently, Epicurus upheld the simple life, counselling 
that restraint rather than excess was the pathway to happiness in a style of living 
that benefits from being devoted to friendship, freedom and thought (de Botton. 
2000: 56-9). Whilst these observations concerning the moral implications arising 
from insatiable materialistic greed originate from Ancient Greece similar doubts 
were also expressed by Adam Smith in 1776. He described the endless pursuit of 
material possessions as a useful deception to stimulate the industrial revolution as 
it "rouses and keeps in continual motion the industry of mankind" ([1776] 1976: 
10). However, deceptions rooted in acquisitiveness can be short lived, suggesting 
that the art of "cultivating contentment is therefore, crucial to maintaining peaceful 
co-existence" (Gyatso, 2001: 171). Therefore, the notion that selfishness is a 
natural human trait is not an unchallenged proposition. Philosophically, this 
principle seems to condemn the human race to live within a divisive social order, 
where for many citizens social exclusion would be inevitable. Therefore, those who 
adhere to a naturalist agency perspective, as ethical consequentialists, are left to 
consider the extent to which greater self-fulfilment can be experienced by both 
taking responsibility for their personal well-being and also according "due weight to 
the well-being of others" when judging the morality of their actions (Lucas, 1995: 
152). 
The Ethical Neutrality of Market Outcomes 
In making the value judgement that an action that results in the greatest 
happiness for the greatest number of people is morally right the proposition 
expresses a value-predicate — happiness — that is applied to the subject — the 
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greatest number of people — so, homo economicus accepts that ethical 
statements should be articulated in the terms of social aggregation and expects 
the value-predicate of happiness to be analysed in objective denominations that 
measure the extent of material well being (Taylor, 1975: 176). The need for such 
an instrument of measurement becomes clearer with the practical application of 
the act-utilitarian doctrine. This states that "the only reason for performing an 
action A rather than an alternative action B is that doing A will make mankind (or, 
perhaps all sentient beings) happier than will doing B" (Smart and Williams. 1973: 
30). Thus, the naturalist agency perspective, in. embracing act-utilitarian ethics, 
require an objective means of assessing the anticipated consequences of actions, 
so as to be able to determine what would constitute the greatest aggregate or 
accumulative happiness: Therefore, as homo economicus would choose to 
negotiate the preferred constituents of their own well-being with others, they need 
a suitable instrument of evaluation of social activity so that they are able to judge 
ethical consequences. 
However, Plant (1999: 20-1) identifies three propositions that demonstrate the 
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unprincipled nature of the martlet. When these are combined, they offer a 
convincing case for the rejection of the market's capacity to convert the abstract 
notions of "right" or "happiness" into synthetic statements that can be measured in 
terms of each individual's transactions. 
The first proposition, made by Hayek (1960) and Acton (1971), maintains that a 
just martlet transaction is one devoid of coercion. As individuals enter into free 
exchanges, where inequalities of power are redressed through the freedom to 
negotiate and enter into binding contracts in the full awareness of their personal 
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rights and responsibilities and of the outcomes arising from their actions, such 
transactions cannot be deemed to be unjust. 
The second proposition is that premeditation is a necessary pre-requisite for an 
action to be deemed unjust, which means that outcomes from self-interested 
market transactions cannot be unjust. Instead, the . myriad number of daily 
transactions, which together constitute market activity, produce a spontaneous 
order amongst market participants that is not directed by pre-determined 
measures of income re-distribution (Hayek, 1978: 183). 
The third proposition is, as Nozick notes, that while players in the market can 
serve moral imperatives "the market mechanism does not especially reward us for 
satisfying those desires, rather than other desires that are neutral towards or even 
retard those people's development" (1981: 514). Thus, as no generally agreed 
principles for the distribution of goods exists, there can be no moral case for the 
free market to answer. 
Therefore, homo ecoriomicus, by endorsing the act-utilitarian ethical principle, 
are conceptualising their primary unit of social transaction — the market 
transaction — "as happenings outside one's moral self (Smart and Williams, 
1973: 104). By implication, then, homo economicus "should be willing to agree 
that...[act-utilitarianism's]...general aim of maximising happiness does not imply 
that what everyone is doing is just pursuing happiness" (Smart and Williams. 1973: 
113). Instead, ostensibly rational action to maximise probable benefit can 
sometimes be irrational. In this case, it can perpetuate a maleficent outcome, or 
one that, whilst not intended, could or should have been anticipated, on a 
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particular social group without offering any justification that such a situation is 
inevitable in bringing the best results for the majority. 
Therefore, if consequentialists wish to address the moral dilemma of 
foreseeable, adverse unintended outcomes arising from their actions they could 
consider the ethical consequentialism developed in Rawls theory of justice (1971). 
with its aim of ensuring the stability of the state. Rawls recognises that if citizens 
are to obey the state then a basic scheme for ordering society should include an 
agreement between those citizens and the state as to how that society would be 
conducted. These alms require a political consensus over the application of the 
concept of justice that extends to the details of how the principle can be morally 
justified. Therefore, to achieve such an understanding, Rawls proposes a 
hypothetical situation. In this scenario self-interested and rational citizens who are 
ignorant of the position they would occupy in a future society must choose the 
highest possible level of income and equality of opportunity for the poorest that is 
acceptable to all in that society. It is assumed that all participating citizens wish to 
pursue the greater good and would be prudent enough to realise the need for 
future social stability. Thus the outcome would establish not just fairness but the 
following principles of justice, stated in their order of priority, that underpin the 
structures of a just society (Raw)s^ 1971: 320): 
First principle: Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total 
system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. 
Second principle: Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that 
they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent 
with the just savings principle, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to 
all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. 
These Rawlsian principles are designed to govern the manner the basic political, 
economic and social institutions, mould and voluntarily constrain the agent. 
140 
Therefore, Rawls has constructed an artificial situation where citizens have co-
operated with the objective of advancing their self-interest by ensuring the fairness 
of social outcomes. Thus, this agreement is envisaged as the product of a wide 
reflective equilibrium that has successfully challenged citizens to confront their 
values and re-assess their priorities to ensure an effective and equitable 
meritocracy in their own self-interest. 
If homo hierarchus dismiss Rawl's theorising then they must face the apparent 
failure of market mechanisms to eradicate poverty. Although the trickle-down 
effect from wealth creation may lift some citizens from absolute deprivation they 
would continue to suffer relative imbalances in their property rights that leaves 
them dis-empowered relative to the affluent. This outcome reflects a desire in the 
marketplace to separate economic reality from social reality giving rise to the 
mechanical economic machine metaphor. So. instead of realising some 
individual's internalised desires for freedom, the mari<etplace presents a series of 
constraints that impel acquiescence to economic rationality (Bourdieu, 1998: 96). It 
• 
follows that "adaptation becomes the highest goal of character formation" (Beck, 
1998: 13) in the free market environment leaving those who adhere to the tenets 
of naturalist agency to ponder whether they should "rejoice in the market 
economy, but reject the market society" (Plant, 1999: 24). 
The Satisfaction of Desires through a Code of Rules 
Mill ([1859] 1989) was unequivocal in regarding utility, or engaging in the right . 
actions that produce the greater good, as the ultimate ethical principle. However, 
he applied the following condition (p-14): 
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it must be utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of 
man as a progressive being. Those interests I contend, authorise the subjection 
of individual spontaneity to external control, only in respect to those actions of 
each, which concern the interest of other people. 
Therefore, Mill has refined the doctrine of utilitarianism by recognising differences 
in the quality and quantity of particular anticipated pleasures. He follows the 
Epicurian tradition that living a good life is synonymous with maximising pleasure, 
but to him intellectual gratification is more important than physical sensations, and 
altruistic actions can satisfy individual desires. Thus. Mill's notion of rule, or 
restricted ufilitarianism. extends beyond the consequences of a single acfion as it 
reasons that "an act is right if it conforms to a valid rule of conduct and wrong if it 
violates such a rule" (Taylor, 1975: 64). In this paradigm, a valid rule is one that 
usually can be expected to provide the greatest benefit for the greatest number of 
people. Certain individuals, then, may be adversely effected by the imposition of 
unfair advantage, however, their self-sacrifice would fulfil their wish to contribute to 
the general project of maximising the total good. 
Therefore, rule-utilitarianism gives every indication of offering homo economicus 
a means of morally justifying individual engagement in market transactions that is 
precluded from the ethical doctrine of act-utilitarianism. The argument is 
constructed as follows. First, it is necessary for agreement amongst citizens of a 
country that a majority of their number benefit from the actions of individuals.in the 
free marketplace. Subsequently, it is deemed that this principle of utility is a 
practical mechanism, and as such exonerates each agent from their lack of 
specific knowledge about the results of their intended actions. However, the 
creation of a legitimate exception to an act-utilitarian moral judgement does not 
validate the presence of fundamental differences between the moral judgements 
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that result from the application of the two ethical systems. Instead, it has been 
argued that act-utilitarianism and rule-utilitarianism are "extensionally equivalent" 
(Taylor, 1975: 69) as the latter supplies higher moral rules to outweigh the 
problematic empirical foundations of the fonner. In view of this, albeit contrived, 
compatibility it seems possible that tyrannical rules, which neglect fairness and 
justice, can receive corroboration through the complementary use of the two 
theories. This conclusion implies that homo economicus might, when reflecting 
over their ethical values and attitudes, "do better by looking at the interrelations 
between states of affairs and actions" (Smart and Williams. 1973: 85). 
Homo economicus advocates the use of rational, self-interest-orientated 
instrumental decision-making in a social world that can be objectively described 
and analysed by the use of deductive and inductive reasoning. Therefore, homo 
hierarchus would be wary of any notions that suggest the formation of a social 
contract between citizens and the state where ethical behaviour is characterised 
as following predefined patterns of action that are independent from their 
consequences. Alternatively, what is good must be described independently from 
what is right, and what is right must maximise the level of aggregate goodness. 
Therefore, homo economicus would search out teleological theories of ethics 
eschewing deontological principles. On this basis, the ethical doctrines of act-
utilitarianism and rule-utilitarianism could be enhanced by being informed by the 
rationalist ethics of Genwith (1978), who formulated a consistent and universal 
principle of generic consistency. His thesis centres on each individual's right to 
assert their control over their own assets of freedom and well being. Without the 
predetermined allocation of these vital assets, agents are unable to undertake 
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actions that prepare the way for the achievement of relevant personal goals that 
they see as crucial to the attainment of their full potential. By recognising this 
condition, each person is motivated to commit to granting everyone else the same 
rights over their freedom and well-being. Any denial in approving these 
assignations to all citizens would be irrational, as every citizen is equally justified in 
demanding their bestowal. Thus, Gerwith has formulated an ethical doctrine that 
can accommodate the social reality perceptions of naturalist agency whilst 
negating the tendencies within utilitarianism to encourage inequitable outcomes in 
relation to minorities. He has recognised that it is in everyone's self-interest to give 
everyone the same rights that are needed to attain their full potential. This doctrine 
would outlaw discrimination between agents as they, or their group, may suffer the 
effects of prejudice, which cannot be in their self-interest. 
Making Moral Rules to Serve Everyone 
Singer (1997: 263) argues that "we can see that our own sufferings and 
pleasures are very like the sufferings and pleasures of others; and that there is no 
reason to give less consideration to the suffering of others, just because they are 
other" Therefore, this broad perspective asks homo economicus to empathise, in 
their own self-interest, with other individuals by reflection over their preferences. 
Thereby homo economicus is given a reason to focus on the effect that the 
unhappiness of others has on their own level of happiness. In this process, a 
judgement must be made about the loss of happiness that would follow from the 
adoption of principles that might bring personal benefit at the expense of the 
benefits of others. If the result is a net loss of happiness, then these must be 
discarded. This code is enshrined in an ideology that has becohie known as 
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preference utilitarianism, where rational moral rules substantiate the doctrine of 
self-interest through concern for the well-being of others on the basis that what is 
good for everyone is therefore, in the interests of all (Baler, 1958). 
Whilst adhering to naturalist agency principles, homo hierarchus^ is proffered a 
credible argument arising from research carried out by Axelrod (1984), who used 
game theory^ and decision theory® to hypothesise that it is irrational to ignore the 
interests of others by opting for self-interest. Axelrod's analysis of co-operation 
between individuals has a special relevance to homo economicus and the 
disposition they may adopt within a community setting as his quantitative research 
focuses on the ongoing personal interaction between subjects making preferred 
personal decisions (1984: 30-1). A total of 63 experts in game theory, drawn from 
countries around the world, made 120,000 single moves, or 240,000 separate 
choices, of whether to co-operate or defect in a game of iterated Prisoner's 
Dilemma^. Results were numerically graded producing an objective score 
reflecting the underiying strategy adopted by each participant. The winning design 
adopted a tactic of "tit for tat" with its clarity and comprehensibility to the other 
^ A mathematical theory of situations that analyses human interaction when two or more players 
can choose different strategies. The game rests on rational choice theory, which treats people as 
rational, self-interested individuals with outcomes dependant on how the players rank different 
preferences (Blackburn, 1994:153). 
^ This system of ideas is concerned with the choices associated with different options available in 
the process to a decision. The analysis pays particular attention to probability and to the 
cost/benefit outcomes from alternative decisions (Blackburn, 1994: 95). 
^ Two prisoners are jointly charged with a crime and are held apart Each is given the option of 
confessing or not confessing. The following rules apply (Blackbum, 1994: 302): 
• If neither prisoner confesses they would each serve two years on a lesser charge. 
• If both confess both would be convicted and they would both serve six years. 
• If prisoner X confesses and Y does not X would be released and Y serves ten years. 
• If, alternatively, Y confesses and X does not, Y would be released and X serves ten 
years. 
Thus both prisoners are faced with a dilemma — should they respond on the basis of co-operation 
or self-interest? 
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player. Thus, the first decision taken was to co-operate on the first move and 
confess to the crime, subsequently the strategy entailed copying whatever the 
other player decided to do on each of his or her moves. So this plan was not 
vindictive as immediately the other player co-operates previous wrongs are 
forgiven (Axelrod, 1984: 122-3). Therefore, a simple discriminatory tactic not only 
won the first round of Axelrod's experimental game but also won the second round 
" which included over sixty entries designed by people who were able to take the 
results of the first round into account" (Axelrod, 1984: 175). 
The success of "tit for tat" should inspire homo economicus to carefully consider 
the benefits of co-operation in relation to their own ethical position. The results of 
the experiment proved that pursuit of unbridled self-interest could be counter-
productive. This leaves homo economicus to ponder over the tenets of preference 
utilitarianism and its rudimentary adherence to balancing the interests of others 
with personal preferences. This doctrine is supported by Axelrod's research as the 
results suggest that an atmosphere of co-operation, especially when applied to the 
free market can hasten long-temi rewards that outweigh tactics of self-absorbed 
thoughtlessness. 
Gauthier (1986) extended Axelrod's theorising into a proposition that, through 
the use of decision and game theory, it would be possible to build models of 
human behaviour that demonstrate that individuals are prepared to accept self-
sacrifice. This would ensure that the happiness of others, which is as important as 
the happiness of the self, results from impartial moral rules. Such a vision takes 
utilitarian thought to the opposite end of the continuum from egotistical hedonism, 
(see figure 4.2), as it is now proposed that it is irrational not to accept some 
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restraint on individual action to ensure the maximisation of the sum total of 
happiness. In this context, "it seems that science does have something to say 
about optimal ethical ailes after all. And the emerging picture is one of fairness 
and co-operation — not egoism — as the smart choice to make" (Pigliucci. 2001: 
29). 
Challenges Confronting Homo Economicus 
Therefore, arising from this review of the utilitarian theories of ethical behaviour 
homo economicus are confronted with the challenges of addressing the following: 
• To what extent can greater happiness be experienced by taking responsibility 
for both personal well-being and that of others? 
• Is the market, as envisaged by act-utititarianism. fundamentally amoral, thus, 
requiring a supplementary social code of ethics? 
• Is generit consistency ethically preferable to permitting inequitable outcomes 
to effect minorities? 
• Can the empathetic basis of preference-utilitarianism render traditional 
utilitarianism defunct? 
Thus, homo economicus has a distinctive perspective on community and how its affairs 
are conducted. 
Homo Economicus on Community 
To homo economicus, the concept of community is irrelevant in a reality where 
the free market can satisfy all human needs. Therefore, community either has no 
place in their ontology or is regarded as denoting a superficial grouping that, whilst 
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perhaps offering a superficial sense of altruistic fulfilment to its membership, has 
no analytical validity. 
Nevertheless, whilst homo economicus might prefer to witness the demise of 
the term "community" from the social sciences their chosen perception of social 
reality contends with three alternative perceptions, each of which has a different 
opinion on this subject. Therefore, when confronted by systems of community 
management developed by adherents to other social reality perspectives homo 
economicus would adopt a particular rationale. These principles could be informed 
by Rawls theory of justice and Axelrod's research on co-operation. 
The following set of practical imperatives provide a clear insight into homo 
economicus's understanding of applied ethics in the context of the involvement of 
community members and community work professionals in community work 
initiatives. 
Human Essence. The following propositions arise from the belief that free beings 
can only be motivated by material reward. 
• The unemployed, in return for state benefits, should be expected to provide 
some of the essential labour needed for community projects. 
• The unemployed, in return for state benefits, should be educated into 
productive patterns of behaviour through their involvement as participating 
community members in community projects. 
Individual Authenticity. The following propositions arise from the belief that the 
market is a flawless mechanism that, through contractual relationships, offers 
every individual the opportunity to achieve their potential. 
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• The state should, as far as possible, refrain from funding community projects 
thereby leaving local communities to compete for finance from non-
governmental organisations. 
• Community projects should be solely concerned with the production of facilities 
and services not available through the operation of the marketplace. 
Personal Responsibility. The follovying propositions arise from the belief that 
individuals should be held accountable for measurable outcomes, 
o Funding for community projects should be linked to a measurable set of 
criteria. 
• In achieving measurable objectives, the end should justify the necessary 
means. 
Homo Sociologicus and Virtue Ethics 
The social reality perspective preferred by homo sociologicus requires a 
structural ontology and a hermeneutic epistemology. This configuration accords 
with virtuous actions being social rather than self-orientated, as they are 
understood as morally relative social constructs. Thus, homo sociologicus would 
reject the individual's attempts to-distinguish between good and bad actions or 
observe standards of right or wrong behaviour based on the notion of duty. Instead 
of these objective ethical principles, the subjective notions of virtue are primary 
rather than derivative with their observance leading to adherents experiencing 
feelings of well being as valued members of their communities. 
Tam (1998). in proposing an agenda for British Communitarianism, wrote of the 
influence exerted by Aristotle on contemporary discussions concerning moral 
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virtues. Aristotle's insight into human character lead him to conclude that every 
person's experiences were holistic, thus we all have the potential to access the 
sum total of available knowledge. Therefore, "all citizens can learn to behave 
morally and make political judgements. The virtues to cultivate and the duties to 
fulfil in any community...[need]...not be matters''to be left to a special minority" 
(Tam, 1998: 19). This declaration, with its emphasis on each person's character 
and their capacity to choose virtues and vices, provides henmeneutic structuralism 
with the rudimentary foundations of its ethical approach. However, when 
envisaging a contemporary framework, other virtues than those recognised by 
Aristotle may well be included. 
So, virtue ethics differs from both consequential and deontological systems, as 
the natural way to live is understood to be found in the dispositions that cause 
individuals to act in certain ways. Therefore, the concept of virtue is conceived as 
a means to happiness rather than just a derivative that motivates certain actions or 
duties. But, to nurture virtues in people requires a community to have the right 
laws so that certain practices can become habitual as they are re-enforced by 
training and education (Aristotle [c.335-322 BC] 1996: 3-4). Thus, the norms of 
community life act as essential mechanisms for ^omo sociologicus to promote 
virtue, or as Aristotle calls it "excellence." In this ethical paradigm every part of 
every family in a community "must have regard to the excellence of the whole" 
(Aristotle, [c.335-322 BC] 1996: 30) so that each person's civic function is 
reflected in, and benefits by, their virtuous behaviour. 
The Anatomy of Virtue 
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The virtues that people cultivate might differ in interpretation in different 
societies, nevertheless, notions such as integrity, honesty, kindness, 
courteousness would usually be valued as exemplary character traits whilst 
obedience to community norms would be habitual. However, the provision of a list 
of virtue concepts fails to address the unavoidable imperative of relating these 
concepts to other notions of morality. Moreover, the list does not offer guidance as 
to the dispositions that should be included in a catalogue of virtues. Finally, homo 
sociologicus have to comprehend how they can comply with the standards 
necessary to achieve a virtue without referring to the results of their actions 
(Maclntyre. 1985: 226). 
These deficiencies have lead Maclntyre to restate the original Aristotelian 
conception of virtue by introducing the role of "practices" into ethical theory. He 
defines a "practice" as "any coherent and complex form of socially established co-
operative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are 
realised" (Maclntyre. 1985: 187). So, practices are disciplines, recognised and 
analysed collectively by members of a community, which can relate to, amongst 
other things, politics, economics, religion, the family and the arts. Participants in 
these fields would strive to achieve "standards of excellence and obedience to 
rules as well as the achievement of goods" by analysing their practice as being 
both a process and the creation of a product (Maclntyre. 1985: 190). In this duality, 
process is the dominant ethical element as it is here that virtue becomes apparent 
and is acknowledged by other community members. 
When considering the anatomy of "practice" it is not possible to divorce this 
notion from the narrative that runs from the birth of a community member to his or 
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her death. This person would be identified and would have found his or her own 
self-identity in interaction with others belonging to the same community. Therefore, 
the narrative is, for Maclntyre, in a relationship of mutual presupposition with 
individual intelligibility and accountability. It follows that any attempt to explain the 
composition of personal identity without the notions of narrative, intelligibility and 
accountability would fail (Maclntyre, 1985: 218). Thus, a person's moral 
judgements can only be understood by reference to their experiences of 
community, where their actions were approved or condemned according to the 
interpretation of moral standards that were specific to tliat cultural demarcation. 
Therefore, Maclntyre's concept of "practices'^ recognises moral relativism as 
justifying the gap that exists between what a community member does and what 
others may consider they ought to have done. 
Whilst consequentialist and deontological doctrines provide procedures for 
decision making in whatever personal circumstances prevail, virtue ethics lack 
such specificity. Instead, individual conduct is understood as the outcome from a 
type of creative moral heroism inspired by community members expectations that 
the individual would act in what is perceived as an "admirable" fashion. So, in this 
tradition, it is not necessary to assess the worth of different virtues thereby leaving 
some questions — such as, whether prudence and temperance should always be 
part of wisdom? — unanswered. 
As homo sociologicus holds that the common good in a community lies within 
"human interaction which transcends private advantage" (Ryn, 1978: 85). 
community participants must rise above the divisive and disruptive elements in 
their characters. It is envisaged that people would work together, inspired by the 
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notion of an "ethical nobility" which has elevated their aspirations beyond self-
interest into the realm of working as part of a process dedicated to the 
achievement of societal aims and objectives agreed by their group. Just as 
community members discover their moral virtue in their practice, they would be 
taught in community settings to despise greed and admire disinterested altruism. 
Through steady encouragement, the apathetic community members become 
"virtuous" as "it enables them to join forces with others who are virtuous to mutual 
benefit" (Ridley, 1997: 147). However, the plan to realise this higher destiny seems 
to neglect the differing capabilities and desires of individuals. This state of affairs 
leads Maclntyre, once again, to acknowledge that people form their preferences in 
conjunction with their fellow citizens thus, in an autonomous consumer orientated 
society, it is a reasonable supposition to maintain that virtue ethics cannot be 
understood as a goal that can be completely attained. Such an aspiration "would 
presuppose the disappearance of selfish motives from the face of the earth" (Ryn, 
1978: 86). Therefore, homo sociologicus, must embody in their virtue ethics the 
acceptability of pursuing, within socially negotiated, if constrained limits, personal 
well-being and pleasure. Furthermore, by embracing moral diversity, homo 
sociologicus must address the pemnissiveness within this code that can accept 
practices such as female circumcision, "just as long as that code can be related 
back to a culture that sustains it" (Lang, 2002: 25). 
Human Essence and the Acquisition of Virtue 
Virtue ethics differ from other ethical doctrines in acknowledging the relevance 
social settings have to the construction of individual ethical attitudes. The 
importance homo sociologicus attaches to community members finding their 
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intrinsic good intentions through an effective process of self-realisation exemplifies 
this commitment. This belief resonates with Rousseau's proposition ([1755] 1993), 
that people might once have lived in a natural state, uncontaminated by the 
artificial nature of the enlightened society, where non-competitive sociability was 
the norm. So, in seeking to promulgate that community members are essentially of 
virtuous character, homo sociologicus could cite the myth of the "noble savage," 
perhaps tracing its development through the romantic movement, which featured 
the philosophy of Schelling and the poetry of Coleridge. Arising from this 
intellectual reaction against rational explanations of social reality, creative art and 
the wisdom of the great religions could act as an inspiration to free people's 
subjective feelings and so inspire a vision of idyllic pre-industrial communities 
bound together in a union of "blood and soil." However, in advancing this thesis, 
homo sociologicus cannot expect unconditional acceptance from all members of a 
community. Thus, the issue arises of how communities can accommodate the 
notion of moral freedom. 
Foot (1978: 202) presents the proposition that being for or against moral 
attitudes essentially presupposes a determinate social framework in which a 
community has actively created the availability of both positions. This assertion is 
given creditability by her description of a scenario that is devoid of any social 
regulation of actions. In this setting, nobody can speak out against murder, 
stealing or lying with any necessary authority, as nobody takes any notice of other 
people's acts unless they are personally affected (Foot, 1978: 204). Arising from 
this analysis Foot conclusion is that "moral approval and disapproval can exist only 
in a setting in which morality is taught and heeded" (1978: 206). Therefore, if homo 
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sociologicus are to make the acquisifion of virtues anything other than an 
involuntary act community structures must facilitate the means for individuals to 
disapprove and democratically debate settled and dominant virtuous dispositions 
within their communities. 
Challenges Confronting Homo Sociologicus 
Therefore, arising from this analysis of virtue ethics, homo sociologicus are 
confronted with the challenges of addressing the following questions. 
• How can people understand their obligation to redress an issue like relative or 
absolute poverty when virtue ethics offers no precise guidelines? 
• As virtue ethics does not give any guidance on dealing with the tragic 
circumstances that might have contributed to an act such as paedophilia is the 
only answer expulsion of the offender from the community? 
• As virtue ethics do not offer a list of acts that are prohibited, then acts such as 
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the circumcision of female children are acceptable if decreed by the 
community? 
Thus, homo sociologicus has a distinctive perspective on community and how its 
affairs are conducted. 
Homo sociologicus on Community 
This perspective requires a collective understanding that facilitates the social 
construction of virtuous principles. So. an ethical reality emerges that is distinct 
from both individualism and collectivism. Homo sociologicus regards both these 
contending ideologies as undermining progress towards an egalitarian society, as 
individualism promotes liberties at the expense of community values and their 
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associated outcomes, and collectivism requires acquiescence to a centralised 
state that suppresses any dissent through use of its absolute power. So. the 
concept of community is central to the ethical principles of hermeneutic 
structuralism as it is in this setting that community members would achieve their 
potential by working together in groups with democratically agreed aims. 
Thus, the hermeneutic structuralist perspective on social reality would reach the 
conclusion that the processes within programmes of community work are very 
important to the realisation of their ideological vision. 
The following list of practical imperatives provide a clear insight of the homo 
sociologicus understanding of applied ethics in the context of the involvement of 
community members and community work professionals in community work 
initiatives. 
Human Essence. The following propositions arise from the belief that individuals 
are blessed with a natural aptitude for virtuous action. 
• Communities should mediate between the individual community member and 
the state to facilitate both the co-operative enquiry and influence of every 
citizen in such matters as the fomiulation and implementation of social policy. 
• Citizens should readily recognise their moral obligation to participate in 
communities so that they can fulfil their responsibilities to other community 
members. 
• Whilst morality is relative across time, societies and individuals all good actions 
should be accompanied by good intentions, and the right emotions and 
feelings. 
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Individual Authenticity. The following propositions arise from the belief that it is 
only through involvement in community that community members achieve right 
knowledge, right speech and right conduct. 
• The financing of community projects is of less importance that the development 
of relationships between community members, thus community processes 
should be of more significance than achieving community outputs or outcomes. 
• The processes of work in a community setting should give a high priority to 
promoting egalitarianism, through initiatives like anti-discrimination and social 
inclusion strategies. 
Personal Responsibility. The following propositions arise from the belief that the 
individual can only come to know the social world through collective dialogue that 
reaches a consensus about subjective understandings. 
• Professional community workers should facilitate the involvement of community 
members in community matters, thus empowering them to enter into the 
collective construction of shared values and attitudes. 
• Those community members who, despite attempts at re-education, deliberately 
and continuously break community norms should be excluded from the group. 
Homo Existentialis and Ethical Scepticism 
The agency ontology of homo existentialis is constructed within each individual 
as an internal reality that is embodied in a subjective world of representation. 
Therefore, there can be no knowledge of causal capacity, as the sufficient and 
necessary conditions cannot exist without a perceptual world. Thus, it is axiomatic 
that the henneneutic agency social reality perspective accepts that moral facts are 
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unknowable and thus the validity of ethical or moral claims must be denied, 
leaving its adherents with no choice but to embrace ethical scepticism. 
The contemporary notion of moral scepticism can trace back its tradition to 
Pyrrho®, who lived according to the precepts of balancing opposing opinions, or 
suspending opinion, with the goal of achieving tranquillity. Thus, the individual is 
unable to decide on the truth about moral principles, as they become conscious of 
a gulf between appearance and social reality. Therefore, arising from this 
proposition, sceptics are in a state of ethical doubt, which distances them from 
both those who are certain they have found the moral truth and those who claim 
that there is no truth at all (Lorn, 1998: 8-9). This position accords with the 
presumptions held by homo existentialis, particularly the belief in the 
unpredictability of human behaviour, as each individual is constrained by their 
subjective experience of a unique social reality. Moreover, these philosophical 
assumptions also encompass the code of nihilism, or the belief in nothing, which 
results in all social purposes and allegiances being rejected. 
In the absence of any valued moral code homo existentialis must make their 
own ethical judgements, such as choosing to adopt certain responsibilities or 
refusing to accept any duty of care towards others. In this world of undifferentiated 
ethical options the individual may take recourse in the philosophy of 
Schopenhauer ([1819] 1995) and Nietzsche ([1886] 1966), who both offer the 
notion of "the will." together with the writings of Heidegger ([1927] 1996) and 
Sartre ([1960] 1976), who explore and analyse the concept of "authenticity." 
° Pyrrho of Elis (365-275 80) is the founder of Greek scepticism. However, he left no writings 
therefore, contemporary interpretation of his thought is reliant on other scholars. So this thesis 
has adopted the analysis provided in the writings of Montaigne (1533-92), with his interpretation 
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Personal Responsibility and the Moral Agent 
Schopenhauer understood human essence as "will", embodied in the life of 
individuals as a striving desire to exist in a worid of representation. However, "will" 
is also an idea that is a complete conception of a species. Thus, "will" in the 
individual is just a temporary aberration until the timeless "will" leaves the 
individual at their death. During the brief and useless struggle of life "a human 
being always does only what he wills, and yet he necessarily does it. This is owing 
to the fact that he already is what he wills; for from what he is all that he ever does 
follows of necessity" (Schopenhauer, [1839] 1999: 88). Therefore, individuals are 
condemned to live in a realm of desire, as human intellect is, in most respects, a 
slave of "will". This pessimistic vision may be alleviated through a process of 
renunciation, where the individual becomes reconciled to the eternal nothingness 
of death. Alternatively, the medium of great music and great art is recognised as 
being able to lift people beyond their limited individual perspective into an 
awareness of the universality of the "will". 
Schopenhauer does not associate "will" with a divine being but instead, sees it 
as the source of human suffering as individuals pursue their futile purposes in a 
worid of representation ([1819] 1995). Therefore, self-interest informs ethical 
behaviour with malice only restrained through individual compassion that is 
inspired by the suffering of the worid. Thus, homo existentialis may hold a negative 
impression of "will". 
However, Nietzsche offers a very different description that positively associates 
"will" with power. As Russell observes "both Nietzsche and Machiavelli have an 
of ancient scepticism as the distrust of the faculties and misapprehensions of humanity (Craig. 
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ethic which aims at power and is deliberately anti-Christian...What Caesar Borgia 
was to Machiavelli, Napoleon was to Nietzsche: a great man defeated by petty 
opponents" (1946: 729). Nietzsche indicted the herd-instinct as the deliberating 
source of power amongst humanity that renders individuals weak but the collective 
strong. The group engages in social compromise that encourages continual moral 
censure leading Nietzsche to answer his question — "How is man to be 
maintained?" — with the response — "How is man to be surpassed?" ([1883] 
1967: 326). Nihilism is the outcome of an indifference to creativity, encouraged by 
hypocrisy and the fear of condemnation encompassed in Zarathustra's ® statement 
— "sombre is human life, and as yet without meaning: a buffoon may be fateful to 
it." However, he then asserts, "I want to teach men the sense of their existence, 
which is the Supemian, the lightening out of the dark cloud — man" (Nietzsche. 
[1883] 1967: 75). The notion of the Superman is a challenge to the boldness of 
humanity. It is proposed that people should strive to suppress their desires for a 
timid virtuous confonnity in a safe and well ordered society. Through this process, 
each person can overcome the fallacy of the human condition: as Zarathrustra 
declares in the proclamation "my suffering and my fellow-suffering — what matter 
about them! Do I strive after happiness? I strive after my i/vorfc!" (Nietzsche. [1883] 
1967: 364). 
For those that adopt this single-minded pathway, Nietzsche, in the three essays 
that constitute the "Genealogy of Morals" ([1887] 2003). applauds their noble 
character in determining their own values after rejecting the ethics of duty, that 
2005: 864). 
® Zarathustra is the hero of Nietzsche's best-known work -Thus, Spake Zarathustra ([1883] 
1967). 
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parade as a disguise for obedience. They have left the herd, variously labelled as 
groups, communities or tribes, recognising it as the social unit that has become 
dominated by leaders that claim to represent a higher authority, such as the divine 
right of Kings. By this means, leaders of the herd have promulgated notions of 
good and evil rendering individuals weak, humble and slavish in their dependence 
on their masters. So, Nietzsche demands a denial of slave ethics with their 
inherent self-deception that causes individuals to identify the desirability of 
particular acts as they further the common good. Instead, people should re-
discover the Ancient Greek doctrine of noble ethics, which values pride, boldness 
and self-affirmation. By adhering to these notions, which are free of any moral 
system, the individual must search for the meaning of their existence even if that 
meaning leads to the repudiation of any possibility of human improvement. As 
"man will sooner will nothingness than not will" (Nietzsche. [1887] 2003: Pt 3, 28). 
Inherent in this rationale is Nietzsche recommendation, to those who embrace 
homo hierarchus and homo sociologicus beliefs, to evaluate their values and 
exercise their prerogatives of choice by discovering their "will to power" 
(Nietzsche, [1883] 1967: 164). This abstract construct can overthrow the language 
of obedience and fulfil Zarathrustra's proposition that "even in the will of the 
servant found I the will of the master" (Nietzsche. [1883] 1967: 165). If Vi l l " is 
exercised the notion of nihilism, in its traditional fonnat. may assume a category 
that describes a transitional stage of human awareness as logocentric beliefs in 
social distinctions, meanings and the dichotomy that distinguishes truth from falsity 
begin to fade. As individuals realise that their existing ethical frameworks of good 
and evil have maintained a system of domination of the majority, then new 
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meanings may emerge for the world-affirming human being. So, the social reality 
perspective of homo existentialis allows its adherents to choose to use the positive 
force of the will to inspire its ethical preferences thus overcoming preordained 
constraints imposed by conscience. Adherents might also consider the 
implications of Heidegger's concept of "vulgar" conscience, or the 
misrepresentation of this emotion through the attribution of guilt, that leads to the 
development of the concept of authenticity. 
Heidegger ([1927] 1996) provides a theory of self-consciousness where the 
notion of "being"^° or sein is distinguished from dasein^^ or the "being-in-the-world" 
that characterises human self-consciousness. As dasein is thrown into the world it 
"not only has the inclination to be ensnared in the world in which it is and to 
interpret itself in terms of that world by its reflected light; at the same time das/en is 
also ensnared in a tradition which it more or less explicitly grasps" (Heidegger, 
[1927] 1996: 65). Thus, pre-established norms of behaviour and social 
conventions in a world of representation distort the conscience that renders the 
individual resolute in their own responsibility by placing an assumed guilt on those 
that deviate from social values. Therefore, Heidegger rejects the guilt-laden 
notions of "vulgar" conscience and calls for individual authenticity, whereby 
conscience can reveal the true self to the individual. 
°^ The notion of "being" is separated by Heidegger into what constitutes an arena of human 
concerns and interests and the things that happen to be found in that setting. Thus, the concept 
of community personifies the concems of its members however its tools, such as applications 
for funding, personnel records and premises only become "meaningful" when they have a 
"being" in that community setting (Craig, 2005: 354). 
Heidegger distinguishes between the arena's of human meaning and the entities that inhabit 
these spaces. Hence, he differentiates between entities and human beings as the latter are 
dasein or "the place of meaning" in their capacity .to understand what is described as "the 
ontological difference" between entities and human concerns and interests (Craig, 2005: 354). 
162 
For Sartre ([1960] 1976). the notion of authenticity is fundamental to people's 
need to make choices throughout their lives in the full awareness that they can 
create all aspects of their characters. Sartre, in his description of the terms of 
association that guide the dynamics between individuals within a group, does offer 
the following rudimentary guidelines for a practical basis of ethical conduct: 
• When individuals pledge themselves to a group, this solemn agreement 
"should be defined as everyone's freedom guaranteeing the security of ail so 
that this security can return to everyone as his other-freedom" (Sartre, [1960] 
1976: 428). This implies that individuals' should internalise a primary concern 
— to ensure that the results of their actions do not diminish the free will of other 
individuals. 
• Sartre ([1960] 1976: 599-600) asserts that "everyone comes to everyone, 
through the community, as a bearer of the same essentiality. But, at the level of 
the degraded group, the individual, in his exteriorised terrorist negation of his 
own freedom, is constituted as inessential in relation to his function." Thus, 
when decisions are being made by the group each person's particular talents 
and right to express their will must be paramount in an inclusive structure that 
places an equal value on the opinion of all. 
• Sartre ([1960] 1976: 374) argues that individuals in a pledged group can 
facilitate the totality of reciprocities amongst other members. Therefore, they 
have a duty to ensure that each person has the maximum number of options 
available when they wish to express their free will. 
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These three imperatives all promote respect for the individual's viewpoint, vjhlch 
crystallises around the discipline of ensuring that there is freedom for every person 
to fully believe in, and express, their own opinions. 
Ethical Scepticism and its Consequences 
Homo existentialis would accept "that there are no moral truths; that there is no 
moral knowledge, that in morals and politics all that we can ultimately do is to 
commit ourselves" (Bambrough, 1979: 14). Thus, objective ethical reasoning 
propositions offered under the naturalist structuralism and the naturalist agency 
social reality perspectives are rejected. Emphatic differences of opinion would also 
occur between ethical sceptics and adherents to the doctrine of ethical virtue 
concerning the ethical embodiment of individualism with, the predominance it gives 
to utility and natural rights. However, these disagreements should not obscure the 
extent a level of ambiguity exists within the sceptical paradigm, which prevents the 
ideology from being pre-emptively dismissed for promoting indifference and 
inclinations of intolerance and selfishness. Whilst some sceptics may adhere to 
the passive philosophy of Pyrrho, possibly verging on the apathetic in their search 
for tranquillity, others would be pro-active in establishing their ethical code in the 
context of continual reflection prior to affirming their expressions of belief. The 
latter practitioners undertake an arduous task in pursuing the goat of achieving 
perfect personal authenticity, which can ensure that their scepticism is firmly 
placed jn the here and now. Such a positioning reflects homo existentialis 
discomfort with passive belief systems as "it is in the everyday world of space and 
time that moral decisions are made and moral struggles take place" (Walsh, 1972: 
29). 
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After contemporary ethical sceptics have divorced themselves from the search 
for tranquil docility, by implication they are now Intent on promoting each person's 
fundamental right to exercise their free will. Therefore, they would reject any notion 
that accepts indifference to social outcomes, as each person must accept total 
ownership of the consequences of their social behaviour in their constant striving 
to be authentic. This vision contrasts sharply with some of the principles adhered 
to by homo sociologicus, which might well encourage the traits of humility and 
modesty amongst members of a particular community. In recognising these 
dispositions as virtuous characteristics community leaders neglect to remember 
that if these "virtues" are attained then such a modification of behaviour might 
produce a compliant populace that can be exploited by a tyrant. In a similar 
fashion homo existentialis would find solace in obedience to the laws and customs 
of their society, however, such an unquestioning compliance may produce a 
scenario that encourages oppression and exploitation by an elite. Therefore, the 
proposition arises as to whether some degree of pro-active scepticism might be a 
necessary ingredient in both these ethical formulations. 
Ethical sceptics find themselves in "an inherently unstable category" (Lom, 
1998: 9), where personal responsibility to both others and to the self must act as a 
mediator against the notion that no behaviour is forbidden. So, for homo 
existentialis the process of exercising individual free will is an onerous, and 
lifelong, punishment. However, in adhering to this approach; that requires every 
situation to be analysed in depth, people can help themselves to avoid the danger 
of taking "a rosy view of our moral attainments,...[as]...the rosiness would 
gradually infect our view of the world" (Hughes, 1973: 110). Thus, homo 
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existentialis is able to evade the ethical complacency, motivated by self-
satisfaction, that can limit the extent of a person's compassion. Furthermore, in a 
similar fashion, "to unequivocally claim that scepticism naturally leads to illiberality 
fails to acknowledge that scepticism can as logically radically open possibilities of 
action as well as restrict them" (Lom, 1998: 10). 
Therefore, homo existentialis cannot claim to follow an ethical doctrine that 
offers a universal code for the redemption of humanity. But rather, through the 
mechanism of a strong defence of personal freedom, this code attempts to ensure 
that no individual acts in a manner that contravenes his or her underlying pre-
disposition. Thus, moral principles are understood as fluid, flexible, sometimes 
ambiguous and only effective after individual justification. 
Challenges Confronting Homo Existentiaiis 
Therefore, arising from this examination of ethical scepticism, homo existentialis 
are confronted with the challenges of addressing the following questions. 
• Whether the optimist's view of human nature is correct, and we can rely on the 
majority of ethical sceptics choosing to live in harmony with others rather than 
tyrannising them? 
• As sceptics would always exercise doubt about ethical behaviour, should each 
new situation they encounter be subject to an examination of their authenticity 
before action is taken? 
• As achieving the will to power involves ensuring the primacy of individual self-
interest at the expense of co-operation and compassion, does this unrestrained 
doctrine contradict the importance attached to the notion of respect for each 
individual? 
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• Is the longing for love an element within individual authenticity, and if so does 
this imply an individual's need for deep human relationships? 
Thus, homo existentialis has a distinctive perspective on community and how its 
affairs are conducted. 
Homo Existentialis on Community 
This perspective holds that the individual can only learn about their reality 
through introspection. Thus, the concept of community, and the work carried out to 
further this connection amongst individuals, "is qualitatively stronger and deeper 
than a mere association" (Craig, 2005: 132). Furthering community can only take 
place under the control of co-operative participants who have achieved free and 
unfettered association held together by mutual respect. Thus, in this fundamentally 
non-hierarchical way of thinking, acting and relating to other people, homo 
existentialis would adopt the following list of applied ethical imperatives regarding 
community matters. 
Human E s s e n c e . The following propositions arise from the belief that individuals 
are recognised as free, unique beings that choose who and what to make of 
themselves. 
• Professional community workers should seek to facilitate co-operative 
participation in community work initiatives but they should not attempt to 
impose an extemal agenda on individual community members. 
• Attempts to achieve a common purpose amongst community members should 
be regarded as eroding individual autonomy. 
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Individual Authenticity. The following propositions arise from the belief that 
moral truths are unknowable so individual's moral beliefs are just matters of 
personal taste. 
• The processes and outcomes from community work should be distanced from 
state and economic power to ensure that individual community members can 
maintain control over their own lives. 
• As each new community project should seek to satisfy individual needs, 
forward planning should be avoided. 
Personal Responsibility. The following propositions arise from the belief that 
human behaviour is unknowable and unpredictable. 
• The imposition by funding bodies of conditions attached to the financing of 
community projects is unacceptable. 
• The process of community work should be more important than the generation 
of outcomes. 
Conclusion 
The four ethical frameworks detailed in Figure 4.1 all provide guidance that 
leads to discrete ethical propositions applicable in particular relational situations. 
These propositions then become subject to an evaluation by people informed by 
their preferred interpretations of human essence, individual authenticity and 
personal responsibility. So, resulting from this process, an individual formulates 
the basis upon which he or she approves, disapproves or dismisses as irrelevant, 
any actions taken. The adherents to each of the four social reality perspectives 
each hold distinctive ethical positions in a particular relational situation: 
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• Homo hierarchus believe in the predominance of the causal efficacy of social 
structures that renders the individual powerless to contest unjust and harmful 
behaviour, insisting on loyalty and duty to what is the right action for the 
common good. 
• Homo economicus prefers a moral code that is the product of moral facts 
grounded in scientific explanation of the consequences of action taken,, which 
enables them to determine what is a good action. Thus, people who ignore 
these moral tenets when they enter into contractual arrangements would lose 
the trust of the market and diminish their utility. 
• Homo sociologicus prefer to discover their ethical principles through a process 
of shared democratic discussions within their community, with the social norms 
that emerge becoming valued virtuous character traits that, if continually 
repudiated by a community member, would result in his or her eventual 
expulsion from the group. 
• Homo existentialis deny the validity of abstract moral principles preferring to 
adopt ethical positions in particular relational situations that are fluid, flexible, 
sometimes ambiguous and only pertinent after individual justification, which 
means that all frameworks of rules and regulations devised to govern human 
action would be repudiated. 
Emerging from the contending ethical principles is a set of contending 
ideologies. Chapter 5 addresses these ideological perspectives. Therefore, it is 
concerned with the political convictions that fundamentally divide the opinions of 
citizens in western liberal democracies. 
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Contending Ideological Perspectives 
Just as there are fundamental divisions between the adherents to the four 
contending social reality perspectives there is fundamental disagreement over 
their human nature presumptions and their preferred ethical principles, and thus it 
is inevitable that there are contending ideological perspectives (see Figure 5.1). 
Each of the contending ideologies have either implied or categorical views 
about opposing political doctrines and it is by exploration of these specific 
doctrines that the foundations of suppositions about both grounds for agreement 
and difference can be developed. So, on this basis, rudiments of the contending 
ideological convictions, or the essence of their political commitment, are explored 
to facilitate discrete assessments of the contending roles of the state, the market 
and the community. In this context, it is acknowledged that there is a broad 
spectrum of ideologies globally that can be associated with social reality 
perspectives, but the focus here is the prevalent ideological preferences within 
western liberal democracies. 
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Figure 5.1: The Ideological Foundations of the Contending Social Reality 
Perspectives 
Naturalism 
Epistemology 
Hemieneutics 
Ontology 
structuralism 
Agency 
Naturalist Structuralism: 
Presumes an objective 
social world, best 
knowable by the 
application of the scientific 
method, in which 
structures exercise power 
over agency, which makes 
human behaviour 
predictable. 
Ideology, collectivism 
Homo hierarchus would 
favour collectivist 
ideologies, such as 
conservatism, corporatism 
or Marxism, all of which 
share inherent notions of 
hierarchy and the 
superiority of an elite. 
Hermeneutic Structuralism: 
Presumes a subjective social 
world, best knowable only as 
it is socially constructed, with 
people's action being 
determined, and made 
predictable, by their collective 
interpretation of this reality. 
Ideology, communitarianism 
Homo sociologicus would 
advocate the supremacy of 
the collective that is 
enshrined in the body of 
thought known as 
communitarianism that 
embraces the values of the 
Gemian Romantic Movement 
and British Idealism (see 
notes 1 and 2). 
Naturalist Agency: 
Presunies an objective 
social world, best 
knowable by the 
application of the scientific 
method, in which people 
are agents of their actions, 
with their behaviour made 
predictable by their 
unconstrained self-interest. 
Ideology, liberalism 
Homo economicus would 
favour liberal ideologies 
embodying the theories of 
classical liberalism and 
neo-liberalism. which reflect 
their imperatives of freedom 
of the individual to 
maximise their utility in a 
minimalist state free from 
unnecessary interference 
from structural impediments 
Hermeneutic Agency: 
Presumes a subjective social 
world that is best knowable 
as what people believe it to 
be, with agency constrained 
by their subjective 
perceptions of social reality, 
which makes human 
behaviour unpredictable. 
Ideology, anarchy and 
nihilism 
Homo existentialis would 
favour differing 
conceptualisations of 
anarchy and nihilism,, which 
can embody his or her 
internal struggle to determine 
a meaning and purpose for 
life. 
Source: Dixon and Dogan. 2003a 
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Notes: 1. The German Romantic Movement was a European phenomenon that also affected 
American culture between about 1775 and 1830. The movement rebelled against 
the "barren rationalism of John Locke and the "Age of Reason', partly...to discover 
some principles of unity (or 'oneness*), some common hidden truth perceived, 
cherished and guarded by... representatives of the Hermeneutic tradition through 
the ages (Newsome. 1997: 178-9). Thus the poetry of Coleridge, Wordsworth and 
Keats embraces "the belief in the higher perception afforded by imagination; the 
certainty that the ultimate truths belonged more to the heart than to the head 
(Newsome. 1997: 179). 
2. British Idealism's most famous and influential thinker was Francis Bradley (1846-
1924). Opposed to hedonism, or the belief that the goal of morality Is the 
maximisation of individual pleasure, he believed that reality could be interpreted 
through the collective experiences of individuals (Craig. 2005: 109). 
Homo Hierarchus: A Collectivist-Elitist Perspective 
The objective of the governing elite is to exercise control over community 
organisations so that they can achieve their maximum utility, through productive 
and reproductive capacities, to serve the state. As Pareto-observed, achieving this 
goal is a delicate matter thus, the "governing classes frequently merge a problem 
of maximum utility of with maximum utility for the community" ([1902] 1966: 254) 
as they attempt to ensure subservience and stability. If such a strategy succeeds 
then elite groups, and subservient classes, would fulfil the homo hierarchus vision 
of social life. 
Rationalisation of Community Organisations 
Scruton's opinion about the value of community initiatives would be shared by 
homo hierarchus namely, that without adequate control, the majority of community 
members would be afflicted with blatant "sanctity, intolerance, exclusion, and a 
sense that life's meaning depends on obedience, and also a vigilance against the 
enemy" (cited in Miller. 1999: 177). Therefore, community initiatives should, to the 
greatest extent possible, be based on authoritative edicts that can be understood 
as "the rational co-ordination of the activities of a number of people" (Schein, 
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1980: 15). In these plans of action, voluntarism would be used by the state as a 
source of cheap labour, facilitated by the unemployed accepting training places on 
community projects as part of their search for employment. Furthermore, funding 
would be rigorously monitored to ensure that paid workers focus on explicit 
objectives that have been systematically broken down into standardised and 
simplified tasks (Brooks, 1999: 113). So, the chosen style of community 
management would reflect the key features of a rational approach to work with 
functions divided and allocated before being re-combined "through a hierarchy of 
authority and responsibility" (Schein 1980: 15). Local government professionals, 
skilled in disciplines such as town planning, public health and social work, would 
use their technical and administrative expertise to instruct community members in 
the best way to achieve their objectives. Their role would be presented as having 
been constructed from logical or common sense legality (Thompson, 1990: 61). 
Furthermore, the professionals involved would welcome the opportunity to be 
involved in community initiatives as "an expansion of power means more office 
positions, more sinecures, and better opportunities for promotion" (Weber, 1968: 
911). 
In this bureaucratic regime, homo hierarchus would anticipate that the effects of 
Homans (1951) exchange theory would also further their cause. This model 
proposes that individual community members would only co-operate with their 
neighbours to the extent that they would mutually benefit from the interaction and 
they would avoid contact with people of different status who are unable to assist in 
the furtherance of their interests. 
By recognising the bureaucratic doctrine of organisation and methods for the 
formulation of community work initiatives, lead by professionals, homo hierarchus 
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would deliberately be willing to exclude, or pay little attention to, human emotions 
and values that have not been a product of expert deliberation (Etzioni, 1993: 
1068). Emotions are regarded as secondary to instrumental tasks in a process 
where it is assumed that groups of people are malleable, and sometimes the 
exclusion of minorities in a locality may be desirable. 
Alternatively, the wish of homo hierarchus to be seen to have achieved the full 
participation of ail sections of the community in their affairs seems to necessitate 
that working relationships should be regularly reviewed and re-negotiated to avoid 
entrapment in a dogmatic unresponsive framework. In this context homo 
hierarchus would be mindful of Schumpeter's observation that Van ts are nothing 
like.as definite and...[peoples]...actions upon these wants nothing like as rational 
and prompt" (1987: 257) as the demands for standardisation and regulation 
require. Thus, homo hierarchus would continue to maintain that good community 
management must focus on community members complying with imposed policies 
and practices. If this strategy were adopted then an appropriate espiht de corp 
would develop, fostering community loyalty and commitment (Dixon and Dogan. 
2003a: 465). 
Homo hierarchus would draw comfort from the notion that the outcomes that 
arise from "the analysis of political processes is largely not a genuine but a 
manufactured will" (Schumpeter, 1987: 263), which can be regarded as the 
product of the existing political state of affairs. Therefore, they would be 
unperturbed by exhortations demanding the adoption of democratic egalitarian 
processes made by A?omo sociologicus to individuals and groups. Although homo 
sociologicus proselytise the benefits of "the creation of an exclusively therapeutic 
experience" through local people defining their values, aims and objectives 
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(Hoggett and Miller, 2000: 361), homo hierarchus believes that community 
members would find that their predominant inclinations favour an imposed 
framework of scientific social regulation. 
Thus, homo hierarchus has an unwavering belief that collectives can be 
manipulated, although social entrepreneurs might attempt to harness liberating 
forces through collaborative activities that produce flat rather than hierarchical 
management structures. So, whilst the social entrepreneur's "language is caring, 
compassionate and moral" (Leadbeater, 2000: 213) those who support the existing 
centralised state bureaucracy consider that any contentious issues, included on 
community agendaSi can be controlled by financial regulation and monitoring. A 
notion made plausible by the precognition that community members would 
ultimately acquiesce to the wishes of the predominant social order. 
The naturalist structuralist social reality perspective is "premised on human 
behaviour being predictable on the basis of rational thought constrained by 
hierarchically determined values and beliefs" (Dixon and Dogan, 2003a: 465), 
which leads inexorably to reliance on the state's capacity to anticipate and control 
outcomes contrary to the elite-determined common good^ that are a result of the 
existence of the active and democratic political communities envisaged by homo 
sociologicus. However, homo hierarchus does not extend this degree of 
comfortable self-assurance towards the concept of spontaneous market order that 
is favoured by the self-interested homo economicus, as they expect to exercise 
their right of choice to belong to, or opt out from, community obligations. Moreover, 
this type of individualistic, autonomous behaviour is understood as presenting a 
^ This notion of the "common good" takes the view that those who are not members of an elite do 
not have "the expertise, nor the time, nor the inclination to be active participants in the policy 
subsystem" (Sabatier P.A. and Jenkins-Smith H.C.. 1993: 223). 
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danger to. social unity, or the common bond that each citizen has with society, 
which is sacred to the maintenance of law and order. 
Because the naturalist structuralist social reality perspective embraces rules 
and regulations that govern all aspects of an individual's life, the homo hierarchus 
vision of the social world is the antithesis of the homo existentialis struggle to be 
free from the trivial in the serious business of living. Thus, homo existentialis would 
recognise the need for freedom when freedom is defined as a "release from 
unreality" (Wilson, 1956: 30) through individual insights into personal self-
realisation. This arduous journey demands that the individual makes a critical 
analysis of all prevalent nonms of behaviour. It questions their being and purpose 
in a seemingly unreal world that denies the instincts and urges that can raise the 
consciousness of individuals beyond the superficial. For those who never 
undertake this journey, the hermeneutic agency social reality perspective entails 
the adoption of apathy towards what is understood as an unknowable social 
reality. Therefore, homo hierarchus would perceive homo existentialis as the 
purveyor of the unpredictable, pursuing a dangerous anarchist doctrine. 
The Maintenance of the Status Quo 
The existing social power structure is secure if its only challenge comes from 
pluralism particularly when social movements are in their initial stages of 
development, • as emerging issues can be ignored by policy makers (Parsons, 
1995: 136). However, even though the hermeneutic structuralist social reality 
perspective can be associated with a predominantly communitarian approach, 
which does not promote equal access to resources, it can also be affiliated to a 
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Figure 5.2: Paulo Freire's "Praxis" Cycle of Action-Reflection-Action 
3. problem posing and 
critical reflection 
4. Increasing self-esteem 
and desire for education 
7. economic/structural change 
5. awareness of oppression 
6. shared experience leading to empowerment 
and COMMUNITY ACTION 
2. pulhng in analysis 
1. Joming with others 
in a renewed cycle 
beginning with pressing needs 
or starting where the people are 
Source: Derived from Freire 1996: 64-7 
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radical alternative doctrine rooted in the tradition of community education and the 
Marxist analysis of class conflict. 
Homo hierarchus would be strongly opposed to the use of community action 
that is not endorsed by the elite to achieve permanent political and economic 
change, especially if the theoretical foundation of this process recognises and 
accommodates the complex nature of society. So, the synergy of Freire's 
pedagogy (1996) with Gramsci's cultural variation on Marxist economic 
detemiinism (1971), which describes how change can be initiated at the micro 
level in communities before it takes effect at the macro level of capitalist relations 
(Popple, 1995: 101-2), offers an unacceptable means of social engineering. 
The process proposed by Freire can be illustrated as a cycle (see Figure 5.2) 
where community members coalesce into groups to address common needs 
(1996: 64-7). In this scenario, the professional community worker "would work 
with but never on" (Freire, 1985: 40) people by offering generative themes for 
group reflection. These generative themes might consist of case studies, 
commentary, photographs, films or even plays. However, whatever the medium 
homo hierarchus would be strongly opposed to the use of community action that is 
not endorsed by the elite to achieve permanent political and economic change, 
especially if the theoretical foundation of this process, recognises and 
accommodates the complex nature of society. So, the synergy of Freire's 
pedagogy (1996) with Gramsci's cultural variation on Marxist economic 
determinism (1971), which describes how change can be initiated at the micro 
level in communities before it takes effect at the macro level of capitalist relations 
(Popple, 1995: 101-2). offers an unacceptable means of social engineering. 
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Figure 5.3: Gramsci's Theory of Hegemony 
RULING ELITE 
(Hegemonic Class) 
FORCE CONSENT 
POLICE 
ARMY 
JUSTICE 
THE MIDDLE STRATA 
(professionals paid to assist 
the ruling elite and ensure 
MEDIA 
TRADE UNIONS 
POLITICAL PARTIES 
subordinate groups compliance) COMMUNfTY GROUPS 
CHURCHES, MOSQUES, ETC. 
POPULAR DEMOCRATIC STRUGGLE 
SUBORDINATE GROUPS 
Source: Derived from Gramsci, 1971 
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Gramsci's theory of hegemony complements Freire's use of education as a 
weapon.for social change. As Gramsci observes, "collectivity must be understood 
as the product of a development of will and of collective thought attained through 
concrete individual effort and not through a process of destiny extraneous to 
individual people" (1985: 401). Thus, there is no revolutionary aspect to change 
but instead, it occurs as a gradual process achieved by individuals' active role in 
the fields of ideology and politics. In this struggle dominant groups rule 
subordinates by consent and coercion (Gramsci, 1971) as illustrated in Figure 5.3, 
where ideology is used to bind social structures, together. In this nexus it is 
impossible to precisely identify where power lies in society as "the people 
themselves are not a homogeneous cultural collectivity but present numerous and 
variously combined cultural categories which, in their pure form, cannot always be 
identified within specific historical popular collectivities" (Gramsci, 1985: 195). 
Thus, organic intellectuals, or those individuals that arise from their own class and 
become aware of the necessity to awaken it to its economic, social and political 
functions, would understand that there are opportunities to inspire change that 
would benefit their own subordinate group. Therefore, subordinate groups would 
challenge the status quo by mobilising collective action in an ideological struggle 
(Gramsci, 1971: 5-6). Moreover, newly fonned social movements would challenge 
the supremacy of dominant ideas and beliefs in all aspects of civil society. 
After digesting this sequence of events, homo hierarchus would have cause to 
feel some anxiety about their political aspirations being systematically undermined 
by the activities of a minority who embrace homo sociologicus. This is a serious 
matter as. although homo economicus and ^omo existentialis cause concern by 
advocating increased individual autonomy by promulgating libertarian notions, it is 
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apparent that the perspective of homo sociologicus might encourage pro-active 
involvement in devising community strategies for pemrianent social change. This 
action threatens to overturn the economic, social and political power of dominant 
hegemonies. Therefore, alleged errancy that could be inherent amongst society's 
beings creates anxieties about unstoppable and transformational social 
modifications. 
Homo Hterarchus on the Contending Views on Community 
Homo hierarchus would perceive fundamental flaws in propositions about 
community that are grounded in the other social reality perspectives, and would 
have difficulty in recognising any commonalties about community with the 
adherents to any alternative social reality perspective. This is because of their 
affinity with the fundamental roots of elitism. If the status and privileges arising 
from the existing order are explained as natural phenomena, then the existing 
status quo must be perceived as permanent. 
Homo Sociologicus: 
• The creation and bonding together of a group mentality within inefficient 
communities, where behaviour, unconstrained by hierarchically established 
social norms, is based on unrealistic idealism, which can result in the state 
having to keep dangerous ideas unacceptable to the ruling elite off the 
democratic agenda. 
• The commitment to relocation of power through a radical political strategy at 
the community level has the unacceptable intent of permanently changing the 
existing social order. 
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Homo Existentialis: 
• The acceptance of the notion of voluntary sociability and individual self-
determination that supposedly flourishes, thereby threatening the existing 
social order, if the state is precluded from intervening in community 
organisation and affairs. 
Homo Economicus: 
• Placing faith in a spontaneous social order, based on contractual relationships, 
threatens social unity and cohesion because it can lead to a competitive 
meritocracy. 
Homo Hierarchus on the Role of the State, Market and Community 
Homo hierarchus holds a discrete and coherent vision of the role of the state, 
the market and the community. 
On the Role of the State. Homo hierarchus would accept the following 
propositions about the role of the state: 
• The state should extend its capacity to control the lives of its citizens wherever 
and whenever possible, 
• The state should exercise extensive powers, as it is exercising a benevolent 
paternalism over the lives of its citizens. 
• The state should ensure that a rigorous code of law and order is imposed on its 
citizens, as it is the only body that can recognise and implement the means of 
achieving the common good. 
• The state should refrain from pemnitting its citizens the right to access 
information about its decisions and actions, as the complexity and nuances 
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contained within this material make informed analysis impossible to those who 
were not involved in the decision-making and action-taking processes. 
On the Role of the Market Homo hierarctius would accept the following 
propositions about the role of the marketplace: 
• The unbridled competitive pursuit of self-interest through the mechanisms of 
the free market should be constrained, as it presents a challenge to the 
common good and weakens traditional social bonds that help maintain the 
ruling §lite. 
• The state should intervene in the regulation of the market to ensure that 
citizens are protected from the outcome of market transactions that may be 
adverse or that they may not fully comprehend. 
• The market should not be trusted with the equitable delivery of essential public 
services, which are socially and politically necessary to sustain the common 
good. 
• The unbridled market can create a group of wealthy, self-motivated, individuals 
who have no allegiance to. and might even challenge the power of, the ruling 
elite. 
On the role of community. Homo tiierarctius would accept the following 
propositions about the role of community: 
• Community members should make collective decisions that preserve national 
social unity and cohesion. 
• The bond between the citizen and the state should be more important than 
community members* loyalty to their communities. 
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• Those who lead communities should be professionals who have the expertise, 
experience and judgement needed to ensure the preservation of the common 
good. 
• Community should be just another part of a nation's social order so if 
community members fulfil their duties to their communities the state will accept 
its obligations to these communities. 
• Community members should be willing to volunteer for unpaid work in their 
communities provided that this work sustains the social order. 
• Community decision-making should seek to avoid risks. 
• Management of community affairs should be about managing for rational 
process. 
Homo Economicus: An Individualistic Liberal Perspective 
Homo economicus, argues for the preservation of the competitive free market 
unfettered by unnecessary collective interference. 
Communities and the Imposition of Values 
When homo sociologicus promote the concept of community an emphasis is 
placed on the collective obligations and responsibilities of people within a 
community group to work for the achievement of collectively agreed.aims and 
objectives (Etzioni, 1995b: 9; Oaks, 1998: 97; Glendon. 1998: 113 and Conner, 
1998: 129). However, Reiman is concerned about this assertion as, he insists "to 
be real, community must be voluntary, it must be a free expression of shared 
commitment" (1994: 30). This proposition is also reflected in Hayek's contention 
that "common ends are imposed upon all that cannot be...more than the decision 
of particular wills" (1976: 32). So, the necessity for community values to form in a 
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space that facilitates expression free from coercion is paramount. In this context 
Hayek regards the threats and manipulations of unscrupulous parties as 
eliminating "an individual as a thinking and voluntary person...[making them]...a 
bare tool in the achievements of the ends of another" (1960: 20-1). Clearly, Hayek 
holds a reductionist perspective towards community, which renders it subservient 
to his agency ontology. Thus, community "must arise in just the space that 
liberalism protects" (Reiman, 1994: 30). And homo economicus understands good 
community management as being devoid of conformity, rooted in freedom of 
choice and acknowledging a spontaneity that rejects any belief in pre-planned 
organisational structures that undermine "the foundation of the moral and political 
in freedom" (Hayek. 1960: 72). So, "rather than being contrary to community, 
liberalism is its precondition" (Reiman, 1994: 30) as. in such a setting, by 
promoting individual freedom the autonomous construction of morality is possible. 
This process can then evolve into the individual possessing the capacity to select 
their freely chosen responsibilities. 
Whilst individualism may offend the collectivist, as the doctrine implies a 
diversification of interests that complicates the common good, nevertheless Hayek 
maintains his notion of reductionism by insisting that the "existing factual order of 
society exists only because people accept certain values" (1978: 21). This premise 
substantiates a particular notion of community by acknowledgirig that people 
would associate with each other, and that this outcome can be welcomed by homo 
economicus, provided it is what people are really inclined to do. Similarly, liberal 
ideologies reject any notion that a community should influence another community 
about its accepted values. Orthodoxy of any form is acceptable to its committed 
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acolytes but freedom to choose prevents this confomnity being forced on others 
(Reiman, 1994:31-2). 
In aiming to enhance the common good homo economicus would wish to 
improve "as much as possible the chances of any person chosen at random" 
(Hayek, 1976: 129-30). Such a precept is difficult for homo hierarchus to accept 
as they place an emphasis on stability and on hierarchy in taking actions; which 
would preserve the expediency of the few. So, Hayek warns of the inevitability 
"that freedom can be preserved only if it is treated as a supreme principle which 
must not be sacrificed for particular advantages" (1973: 57). Thus, for homo 
economicus, the liberty of the individual'must be maintained by constant vigilance 
against the erosion of choice through the devaluation of the capacity to choose 
and the resultant inhibition of freedom. 
Homo hierarchus would approve of dominant hegemonies imposing their will 
oyer what constitutes acceptable behaviour for the citizens of a nation state. This 
policy, which would result in community niatters being conducted through limited 
and delegated powers granted from a central authority, is attacked by Rand (1957, 
1965 and 1966). She has a vision of superior individuals, directed by a 
Nietzschean will to power, combating the opposing power of hegemonic 
oppression by exercising their own authenticity. Such an objective individual will 
reject all subjective beliefs by accepting reality as objectively knowable. Therefore, 
in seeking happiness, altruism is rejected in favour of rational judgements that 
demand obedience to a respected and honoured authority. Thus, service and 
subservience to the state, or some community project, is regarded as contravening 
the inalienable rights of rational beings. Therefore, participation in community 
schemes can only occur if the individual is adequately rewarded for their efforts. 
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Initiating the Necessary Legality for Community Interventions 
From a liberal perspective, Friedman concludes that "the consistent liberal is not 
an anarchist" (1962: 34). Thus, the self-interested liomo economicus can 
recognise a strand of commonality with tiomo hierarctius over a role for the state 
in maintaining a viable social order. Therefore, the making of laws — and this 
process is as relevant to community matters as is central directions from the state 
— must cohere with an established, albeit minimal, body of legal rules. This 
legislation would contain both implicit and explicit directives that underpin the 
imperative to maintain the objective of regulating human conduct so that it is 
conducive to sustaining law and order. This complex undertaking is not deemed to 
be the business of the citizen. Therefore. Hayek declares that the common will is 
irrelevant to such a task; the appropriate rules are discerned, not proclaimed, as a 
result of work to "improve a system of rules which are already observed" (1973: 
96). 
The belief in centralised decision-making, even restricted to regulations 
concerning standards of safety, differs from the principle that places the 
community in a position of subsidiarity in relation to the state, a fundamental article 
of belief for /?omo sociologicus. In this nexus, legality is determined by the 
participation of community members, through a democratic decision-making 
process that takes place in a community setting. These decisions are then 
incorporated into policies that are adopted by politicians. 
So, Hayek's exclusion of the common will in determining what he understands 
as necessary state operations, implies that the traditional morality of western 
civilisation should be binding on those who are intent on preserving constitutional 
government, while leaving no capacity for moral relativism between different 
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communities. In making this proposition Hayek's neo-liberal agenda requires him 
to reject a critical element that is central to the world view held by homo 
sociologicus. However, this rejection is inevitable as, to fulfil homo economicus's 
perception of reality the imposition of a specific national code is essential for the 
provision of a foundation for an advanced liberal order. Such a code would act to 
underpin free competitive "private initiatives and enterprise...[by using]...the whole 
aggregate of libertarian institutions of law" (Hayek, 1978: 190). Therefore, homo 
economicus would make the state subordinate to the requirements of the market 
system, but would find it unacceptable for the state to be subordinate to 
communities. 
Hayek's observation that social relationships are cemented together through the 
notion of contract that governs market transactions is axiomatic to homo 
economicus (1973: 35-54. 1976: 142 and 1979: 158). In this scenario unfettered 
competition becomes a procedure of discovery "where through the existence of a 
spontaneous order irrational and imperfect people can achieve a variety of 
"different individual purposes not known as a whole to any single person, or 
relatively small group of persons" (Hayek, 1978: 183). Thus, as the individual, 
unfettered by state regulations, arranges to buy or sell goods or services a model 
of desirable social arrangements is created where general opinions must give way 
to individual judgements. Here. Hayek seems to be resurrecting the work 
completed by John Stuart Mill, who argued that the general opinion reflected the 
views promulgated by a minority of highly influential members of the population. 
This state of affairs helped to perpetuate oppression by a tyranny of the majority, 
as people become reluctant to differ from what was widely accepted as the truth 
(Mill, [1859] 1989: 87-8). So the market, with its characteristics of individualism 
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and individual liberty, produces the circumstances that detennine that 
"individualism is a social theory" (Kukathas, 1989: 216). However, if the standards 
of ethical behaviour and accountability adopted by the market are to be changed, 
and then regulated by decision-making made in communities, there is a 
fundamental difference between homo economicus's position and the principle of 
overall community control advocated by homo sociologicus. This dichotomy is 
mirrored by the acceptance of the former of the contemporary preponderance of 
Tonnies gesellschaft, or an associational urban society where relationships are 
fleeting, instrumental and centred on self-interest. Alternatively, homo sociologicus 
would cling on to notions of community, described by Tonnies as geimeinschaff, 
as offering a continuing traditional and natural state of affairs unaffected by 
urbanisation (Popple, 1995: 2). r 
Hayek's recommendations for the organisation of community relationships, 
whilst promoting the free market, do not present an obvious challenge to homo 
hierarchus in view of their belief in dilatory capitalism. They would place their 
reliance on the actions of elite policy makers who would perpetuate business 
monopolies and the inefficient use of resources. Such inactivity would result in 
capitalism being "transformed into a political organisation which...[conceals]...its 
nature by speaking the language of business, competition, free enterprise and the 
like" (Lasswell, 1948: 214). However, homo existentialis can recognise the notion 
of spontaneous order as forming part of their commitment to "the maximum 
involvement of..[each citizen]...in political affairs (Cross, 2001: 3). This 
acknowledgement reflects the market's recognition of individual autonomy by 
providing a setting that can mediate for the needs and wants of the individual 
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within the collective whilst avoiding the erosion of personal freedom to external 
institutions. 
Libertarianism, with its emphasis on Individual rights, takes a laissez-faire view 
regarding the best legal framework for community matters and is suspicious of any 
role for the state beyond upholding rights to life, liberty and property (Friedman 
and Friedman, 1980: 55). Thus, it is accepted that "in a free society people may 
contract into various restrictions which the government may not legitimately 
impose upon them" (Nozick, 1974: 320). Here, Nozick is both maintaining, like 
Rand, the vision of minarchism, and its belief in a minimalist state whose only civic 
function is to protect property rights, whilst also addressing the matter of the 
formation of specific communities. He approaches this duality by contending that, 
provided a society is ideologically libertarian and laissez-faire "individual 
communities within it need not be" (1974: 320). Therefore, it is acceptable for 
community members to decide on their own preferred arrangements through 
discussions, which may even prevent dissenting parties from opting out of the 
collective. This apparent loss of freedom is not properly addressed by Nozick who, 
rather weakly, states that "he cannot see...his...way clearly through these issues" 
(1974: 323). However, homo sociologicus, would find this relaxed attitude to 
community bonding divisive and potentially destructive for their project. Their 
paramount concern is to create and maintain strong, cohesive community 
structures that possess purposeful social power that can be exercised to achieve 
social inclusion. Thus, homo sociologicus is not coerced into a commitment to the 
collective but instead, feels impelled, through notions of obligation and altruism, to 
contribute to community endeavours. So, in constructing his argument, Nozick fails 
to develop a credible space for homo economicus to conduct a dialogue with 
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homo sociologicus, concerning the matter of negotiating the autonomous 
developrhent of their own vision of community. Instead, it seems that this process 
would be fraught with disagreements over homo economicus's wish to make their 
own decisions about accepting community responsibilities, an acceptable code of 
morality, and to make altruism an adequate motivator for community action. 
Perhaps the best elaboration on the libertarian principle, which envisages 
different structures for the state and community based endeavours, is provided by 
Friedman and Friedman in their description of the Israeli system of kibbutz famris. 
The critical element within these communities is that "everyone is free to join or 
leave" (1980: 175). This makes the intentional wish to contact into or depart from 
the collective an essential feature of the organisation, and in so doing, also affimris 
a general precept that can be applied to other examples. Quite simply, whilst state 
powers must be restricted community matters can be left to individual choice but 
the individual must never be deprived of that right to choose. 
Community and its Operational Aims 
Generally, homo economicus supports a distinction being drawn between the 
public and private spheres of life, with communities conducting their political 
discourses in the public realm and private beliefs (such as religious and ethical 
preferences) disembodied from state practices. For instance, Locke writes about 
the result of giving up an absolute arbitrary power to a governing body as placing 
people "into a worse condition than the state of Nature" ([1688] 1988: 359). Central 
to this principle is the recognition that as long as "minorities accept and become 
assimilated into the political culture of the community, they should remain free to 
live the way they like" (Parekh, 1999: 110). This premise was supported by Rawls, 
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in his analysis of liberal constitutionalism, by his assertion that it could offer "the 
possibility of a reasonably harmonious and stable society" (1993: xxiv-xxv). 
However, such a bifurcationlst approach is unacceptable to homo hierarchus, who 
hold the view that the elite should be driven by the need to attain favourable power 
balances within communities by employing strategies devised for "winning over or 
neutralising the indifferent or hostile" (Lasswell. 1948: 38). So, from their 
perspective, the division of public and private realms becomes part of an opposing 
strategy that can be circumvented by superior knowledge and planning. The 
rejection of this division is shared, albeit for another reason, by homo sociologicus, 
who are convinced of the necessity to subsume individual self-identity into a 
comprehensive set of community principles that can result in a collective 
consensus about the common good. This leaves homo economicus looking for 
common ground with homo existentialis. But homo economicus's conviction that 
potentially disruptive elements of identity should be designated to a private arena, 
whilst individuals' rational economic choices should be promoted in the public 
sphere, contradicts the concern felt by homo existentialis about the denial of 
Individual authenticity. As, if this emotional imperative is ignored, then the 
opportunity for the development of a holistic individualised, ethical sensibility that 
can secure high standards of individual ethical conduct would be lost (Widder, 
1995: 29). 
Homo economicus can agree with homo hierarchus and homo sociologicus, 
that the everyday operations of community organisations can, by the means of the 
self-reflection they inspire, "maintain or restore patriotism and morality among the 
people " (Rousseau. [1755] 1993: 150). So citizens can become more moral 
through social interaction with other community members, but these moralistic 
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outcomes would vary in accordance with the perception of reality embraced by 
each individual social actor. However, this still leaves homo economicus and homo 
existentialis in a fundamental disagreement over the notion of individuals learning 
their values from each other, as homo existentialis would insist that each individual 
should make their own values for themselves. 
Homo Ecqnomicus on the Contending Views on Community 
Homo economicus would perceive fundamental flaws in propositions about 
community that are grounded in the other social reality perspectives. 
Homo Hierarchus: 
• Communities must maintain the status quo because this can help sustain a 
stable law-abiding society that is conducive to market transactions, but this 
policy might not stimulate market activity. 
• The effects of the market can be mitigated by collective regulation, so as to 
achieve desired outcomes, but at the expense of economic efficiency. 
• The state continues to maximise control over citizens' values, attitudes and 
behaviour because it does not acknowledge the separation of the public and 
private spheres. 
Homo Sociologicus: 
• People become the victims of moral coercion as they conform to the dominant 
values of their community because they are manipulated into agreeing with 
community leaders. 
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• Community members wrongly reject rational self-interested judgements in 
favour of altruism because they believe that the pursuit of self-interest can only 
fulfil their own aspiration rather than those of their community. 
• The emphasis on cultivating moral relativism in communities erodes 
commitment to a centrally imposed legal framework designed to facilitate the 
state's subordination to the requirements of the market. 
• Community is intolerant of the alternative ideology of the market because it 
must be inclusive and cannot tolerate dissenters who renounce community 
membership. 
• The private sphere is rejected as it impedes the assimilation of differing 
ideological and cultural self-identities into communities, vyhich means that 
individuals are constantly indoctrinated with the predominant values and 
attitudes of community norms. 
Homo Existentialis: 
• Their affirmation that there can be no benefit in, or capacity for. learning any 
code of praxis or morality from others threatens the conduct of market 
transactions. 
Homo economicus would, however, also recognise commonalities about 
community with adherents to the other social reality perspectives. 
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Homo Hierarchus: 
• The maintenance of a framework for law and order should be the responsibility 
of a professional 6lite, because citizens do not have the expertise to construct 
such a code.^ 
• Education from others can stimulate self-reflection that may maintain and 
enhance morality because individuals can learn about themselves as the 
interact with others.^ 
Homo Sociologicus: 
• Education from others can stimulate self-reflection that may maintain and 
enhance morality because individuals can learn about themselves as they 
interact with others. 
Homo Existentialis: 
• The belief that the spontaneous order created by the market and its 
rejection of the tyranny of the majority provides a sound system that offers 
freedom of choice unfettered by state restrictions. 
• The spontaneous order of the market favoured by anarcho-capitalists, 
provides an opportunity for maximum involvement in a process of 
egalitarian wealth creation. 
• Individuals can contract into or out of community, or ignore it altogether, as 
they wish, which means that the individual detemiines their behaviour 
through intentional acts. 
Whilst there may be agreement over the need for a framework of law and order constructed by 
an elite nevertheless homo economicus would expect this code to be minimalist whilst homo 
hierarchus would extend the framework to ensure preservation of the status-quo. 
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Homo Economicus on the Role of the State, Market and Community 
Homo economicus holds a discrete and coherent vision of the role of the state, 
the market and the community. 
On the Role of the State. Homo economicus would accept the following 
propositions about the role for the state: 
• The state should refrain from interfering in the private lives of citizens as they 
pursue their interest in maximising their own pleasures. 
• The state should only impose a legal code on citizens that is restricted to 
ensuring that individuals do not harm other individuals, thus stimulating citizens 
to embrace the primacy of individual contractual relationships. 
• The state should ensure that, as a fundamental tenet of its operation, it does 
not interfere in the mechanisms of the free market. 
• The state should minimise the cost of government administration by 
endeavouring to use the mechanisms of the free market, which are more 
effective and efficient than centralised bureaucracies. 
On the Role of the Market. Homo economicus would accept the following 
propositions about the role of the marketplace: 
• The market should provide knowledge that allows individuals to know whether 
their actions produce beneficial results for themselves and no harm to others. 
• The market should facilitate the creation of individual wealth through 
stimulating individual self-motivation. 
^ For homo hierarchus the processes of self-reflection should result in adherence to the existing 
social order whilst homo economicus are concerned with the development of the individual's 
capacity to exercise informed choice. 
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• The market should facilitate buyers and sellers to negotiate in a setting where 
individual ability and motivation are the only criteria for success. 
• The market should offer a better set of outcomes for individual citizens than 
other means of distributing scarce resources, because it does not tolerate 
inefficiency or ineffectiveness. 
On the Role of Community. Homo economicus would accept the following 
propositions about the role of community: 
• Community projects should be managed to enhance individual well being. 
• Community should be considered as a collection of self-interested individuals. 
• If self-interested individuals agree to form themselves into the fictitious notion 
of "community" then any sacrifices they make should result in their individual 
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benefit exceeding the cost incurred. 
• 
• Community decisions should be about managing risks based on individual 
rational self-interest. 
• Management of community affairs should be about managing for outcomes. 
Homo Sociologicus: A Communitarian Perspective 
This perspective utilises, as its primary tool of analysis, the concept of 
community and how this setting inspires and develops a particular understanding 
of the nature of community members and their human identity. Thus, they are 
concerned with maximising concentration of power in community institutions and 
voluntary regulatory frameworks so as to empower community members. 
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The Encumbered Self 
Whereas homo sociologicus recognise the need to permit the development of 
individuality in their vision of social unity, homo economicus accept that people 
would, in their own self-interest, commit to a set of common values. However, this 
apparent synthesis between the two perspectives should not obscure the deep 
differences that exist. Thus, homo economicus comfortably affiliates with the neo-
liberal notion of the minimalist state, as it is the right of people, as far as possible, 
to be unencumbered by values that are associated with specific social roles. 
Alternatively, this belief can be contrasted with the communitarian commitment to 
"deep community" where individuals live a good life by enacting out what is 
commonly accepted as the good in the roles they inhabit (Delaney, 1994: viii-ix). 
Homo sociologicus thus argue that people are encumbered selves, aware of the 
structural constraints and opportunities that they have inherited from their cultural 
experiences and cannot, even when exercising their full capacity for self-
determination, divorce this awareness from their deliberations over their aims. 
Sandel (1992) gives support to this proposition by maintaining that people can only 
be unencumbered by personal attachments and commitments if such a 
consciousness harmonises with their moments of deepest self-understanding. At 
this level of awareness, it is questionable whether existing aspirations can be 
freely substituted for different aims as this implies that no particular aim is 
constitutive of the self. Furthemiore, self-identities would be formed without the 
presence of strong convictions giving each person the capacity to substitute 
revised values and attitudes thoughtlessly (Sandel, 1992: 23). Therefore, if people 
are to focus on what they are to become, perceiving themselves with different 
aims, this would, as Sandel concludes, result in the "liberal self...[being]...left to 
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lurch between detachment on one hand, and entanglement on the other" (1992: 
24), Thus, the unencumbered self is an unsustainable entity, struggling with 
conflicting reasoning over the recognition of whom to become against the social 
meanings of who they are. Thus, each person would find it necessary to 
continually question their social roles but, as no values are attached to these roles, 
such an evaluation is problematic. Alternatively, as homo economicus continues to 
maintain that freedom to choose is the only value of importance, so, social roles 
should be judged on the benefits they bring. But, for homo existentialis this seems 
an empty argument as it falsely portrays our motivations — free choice is not an 
end in itself. 
The argument for an encumbered self accords with the homo hierarchus 
perspective that community members should be told what their aims should be in 
fulfilling their obligations to the hierarchical social order. Furthermore, homo 
existentialis, albeit in a subtle manner, accept the self as encumbered with the 
powerful arid persuasive notion of individuality. For instance, Godwin describes 
individuality as consisting primarily of "exercising the powers of ...understanding... 
which is the key to the application of reason and co-operation" (cited by Ritter, 
1980:35). 
The Common Good 
The homo sociologicus vision of the common good is altogether more intricate 
than the contending dispositions. They would stand united in their support of the 
rudimentary communitarian opinion that a society, where individuals maintain a 
constant discourse about their rights whilst neglecting their collective 
responsibilities and obligations, would encourage social exclusion and discord 
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(Tam, 1998: 121, Etzioni, 1995b: 9, Parsons. 1995: 53 and Hughes. 1996: 17). In 
contradistinction the means of determining the common good, or the public 
interest, is a relatively straightfonward task for homo economicus, homo hierarchus 
and homo existentialis. The former would embrace the principles of utilitarianism, 
which requires the formulation of public policy to be underpinned by the 
proposition that morals and legislation should be based on achieving the greatest 
happiness for the greatest number (Bentham, [1789] 1982). Achieving this aim 
necessitates individuals monitoring their actions to ensure that they augment their 
utility or their greater happiness. Thus, the market provides the perfect setting for 
the maximisation of personal utility that results in homo economicus's 
understanding of the common good. Homo hierarchus would find an accord with 
the civic republican notion of the common good being the subordination of all 
sectional interests in society to the interests of the majority. Of course, the ruling 
elite are the only group capable of interpreting the interests of the majority so 
those interests can only be pursued if the hierarchical order remains in place. 
Finally, homo existentialis would have no opinion about the common good. The 
notion, at its best, is a trivial, irrelevant and inauthentic construct and. at its worst, 
an attempt to coerce individuals to subjugate their will to an incomprehensible 
delusion. 
Homo sociologicus would reject the traditional method of positioning political 
ideologies along a left to right wing continuum. Instead, a new figuration (see 
Figure 5.4) has been created with a vertical instead of a horizontal axis. Theories 
that promulgate individualism are placed at the centre of the line below which a 
scale of regression exists that can accommodate increasing levels of 
authoritarianism. This scale, measuring the control exercised by dominant 
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hegemonies, finally moves to the. notion of anomie, or a state where some 
apathetic homo existentialis would feel disengaged from the social and political 
processes. 
The progressive axis in Figure 5.4 is drawn above the central point and reveals 
the extent that the concept of citizen participation in civic affairs is promoted by the 
theory of the state preferred by homo sociologicus (Tam, 1998: 40-1). 
Figure 5.4: Rights and Responsibilities 
Progressive (participatory axis) 
Individualism: Theories of Individualism (Rav /^ls / Nozick) 
Authoritarian (passivity axis) 
t 
Anomie 
Source: Derived from Tam, 1998 
Thus, theories of justice that refect homo economicus principles, as exemplified 
by Rawls (1971) and Nozick (1974), would be rebuffed by homo sociologicus due 
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to their emphasis on individual liberty, the necessity for the state to "provide a 
framework for members to choose their own values and ends" (Arthur, 1998: 356) 
and the universalistic claims for certain values. For Tam, the combination of these 
three notions produces an anarchic power distribution that leads to a lack of social 
cohesiveness as individual self-interest takes precedence over the common good 
through a disintegration of the spirit of community (1998: 48). 
The question that arises for homo sociologicus, is what direction has this 
theorising taken their ideological commitments? They have rejected the post-
Enlightenment, post-Romantic self that subscribes to a autonomous subjective 
self, in favour of accepting the individual as a unequivocal social being. In this 
paradigm, the self exists as an accumulation of the various interactions it 
experiences with others. Thus, who a person is becomes determined by who a 
person knows and the communities to whom a person has allegiances. This visible 
web of relationships, that can be mapped and evaluated, identifies an individual's 
status and prospects in an environment where the person is public and so the 
public is personal. Thus, homo sociologicus would dismiss any suppositions that 
individuals are asocial creatures and, instead, would believe that people are 
shaped by their relationships and social experiences (Driver and Martell, 1997: 
29). These interactions, which contibute to the common good, take place in 
community settings so the conception of community, defined by Etzioni (1995b: 
119-22), as including all types of social groups, is fundamental to this strand of 
thought. Although, for some commentators, Etzioni's definition neglects the 
necessary evaluative meaning and ideological determinism that is necessary to 
provide a testable academic construct, nevertheless homo sociologicus would 
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generally regard this notion as significant as it promotes the importance of group 
fonnation and maintenance. 
In this scenario, homo sociologicus would not be disheartened by Tonnies 
conclusion that modern urban society creates selfish individuals who conduct their 
affairs by fleeting instrumental interpersonal relationships (cited in Popple, 1995: 
2). Instead, they would quote the alternative viewpoint expressed by Durkheim and 
Hobhouse (cited in Tam, 1998: 220-1) that independent thought, essential for 
individuals to commit to community action, is more likely in a modern technological 
society. Provided restrictions are not placed on the evolvement of human 
autonomy there would be a neutral, gradual movement towards greater social 
cohesion. Therefore, for homo sociologicus, individuals are naturally communal, 
and collaborative, reaching a fuller understanding of themselves as essential 
components in the creation of the common good only in the context of community 
involvement. 
As illustrated by Figure 5.4, homo sociologicus, as adherents to the reality 
perspective of hermeneutic structuralism, would actively criticise adherents to the 
other social reality perspectives for their failure to understand that normal human 
relationships can only be achieved through a process of identification and 
association that takes place in the community. The good life is a product of the 
common good and thus unattainable for homo economicus as they prioritise rights 
rather than responsibilities. Furthermore, those community members who choose 
passivity instead of participation, would be enveloped by the authoritarianism 
favoured by homo hierarchus, whilst homo existentialis, in searching for 
authenticity achievable through their individual free will, are regarded as having 
consigned themselves to meaningless social exclusion. 
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The Social Contention 
Etzioni is uncompromising in his belief that the primary objective for any 
community is for its members to commit "to a set of shared values, norms and 
meanings" (1996: 155). This translates into an emphasis on values that accord 
with the hemieneutic staicturalist social reality perspective. Whilst coercion is 
rejected as a means of achieving the expected standards of morality, nevertheless 
it is anticipated that education and persuasion in the development of reasoned and 
virtuous action would appeal to the better natures of community members (Etzioni, 
1998: xxxvi). However, there is no admission here of a majoritarian plaform. In 
fact, universality is denied in the declared aim, which is "to avoid tight networks 
that suppress pluralism and dissent" (Etzioni, 1995b: 122). Thus, Waltzer (1992) 
envisages this goal being reached through the involvement of numerous different 
communities, each functioning in a democratic and socially inclusive manner, and, 
as a consequence of interrelations with each other, preserving a common social 
bond that can accommodate aspects of diversity such as ethnicity, gender, age 
and so on, 
Taylor (1991) also defines the shape of a better society in terms of a 
configuration of community units, each with a particular identity. This proposition 
champions multiculturalism and moral relativism in a paradigm that can develop 
and exercise each community member's capacity for self-determination. Hence, 
the circumscribed political sphere preferred by homo economicus, which is 
confined to issues such as defence and the maintenance of law and order, is 
regarded as heralding "a fragmented society...where...members find it harder and 
harder to identify with their political society as a community" (Taylor, 1991: 117). 
The result of this situation would be a diminution of personal freedom as 
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community members are deprived of their involvement in exercising the 
"instruments of common decision" (Taylor, 1985: 208). Thus, Taylor perceives 
that, as freedom arises within a society manifesting in its culture its members can 
collectively express a fuller freedom as they contibute to the determination of the 
future shape of their society (Taylor, 1985: 208). 
Homo sociologicus understand that community members' beliefs originate at 
the micro level, and relate to distinct groups. This conviction directly challenges 
the commitment, held by both homo hierarchus and homo economicus, that 
universal priority can be given to a particular set of values (Driver and Martell. 
1997: 29). 
However, if these relative ethical principles are to be discovered, a shared 
forum is necessary and a method of communication needs to be established 
through which differing options can be evaluated. This level of organisation would 
require one or more people to express their dominance by leading others in 
organising a meeting, fonnulating its agenda and making use of its outcomes. 
Thus, as dominant community members take charge, homo existentialis, who wish 
to exercise their dominance purely to explore their own being, remove themselves 
from a situation that does not relate to their perceptions of the world (Wilson, 1956: 
298). 
It is also probable that homo hierarchus would distance themselves from the 
position adopted by homo sociologicus as the instigator of a mode of critical public 
debate amongst free and equal human beings that transcends the inequalities of 
power as this might present an uncomfortable challenge to the existing social 
order. For instance, communicative rationality as described by Habermas (1968, 
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1971)^ * fits the homo sociologicus specification but, as the model regards public 
opinion as its ultimate source of reality, there is scope here for a community 
consensus to be subverted to the wishes of dominant hegemonies. 
The difficulty in achieving a decentralised state is not underestimated by homo 
sociologicus, particularly the desireability of the growth in new fomns of economic 
organisation (Waltzer, 1992: 106). As illustrated in Figure 5.5. the homo 
economicus vision of extending the free market cannot be part of the answer as it 
is condemned by Tam as having a detrimental effect "on the economically weak" 
(1998: 153). Instead, new forms of associational democracy are championed that 
can promote "self-government through voluntary associations" (Hirst, 1997: 32). 
The principle of government through subsidiarity is central to this notion with 
community activists operating "non-profit financial institutions and co-operative 
fimis" (Hirst, 1997: 32). Such a structure would legitimise the homo sociologicus 
political agenda by placing the concept of community in a central role in the 
formulation and implementation of social policy. But this framework cannot be 
reconciled with the homo economicus imperative of unfettered free market 
capitalism. 
Homo Sociologicus on the Contending Views on Community 
Society's being would perceive fundamental flaws in propositions about 
community that are grounded in the other social reality perspectives. 
Homo Existentialis: 
^ Habermas contends that it is through discussion in an ideal speech situation, which has as its 
objective the achievement of a consensus, that the contested status of truths, rightness and 
sincerity can be resolved. 
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Figure 5.5: Herrmeneutic Structuralism's Paradigm for Policy Making 
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• Because their notion of the encumbered self is restricted to the selfs own 
authenticity and because the responsibilities and : obligations to other 
community members is denied, community members would not experience the 
deep and purposeful contentrnent that comes from accepting their 
accountability and duties to other community members. 
• By treating individual free will as paramount, whilst dismissing the matter of 
social interaction as irrelevant, the individual is consigned to senseless 
exclusion from community and thus is deprived of the fulfillment that is made 
possible through meaningful community engagement 
• Whilst anarchic community acknowledges the interdependency of its members 
in a world of scarcity, it denies the importance of community groups in the 
effective delivery of local governance, which means that community members 
are deprived of the empowerment that results from effective control over their 
own affairs. 
Homo Economicus: 
• Because homo economicus advocate the unencumbered self, which is 
understood as an empty confused entity suffering from a lack of clear social 
aims, values and beliefs, community members are encouraged to deny the 
value of their responsibilities to others. 
• Because homo economicus places an emphasis on rights, whilst neglecting 
responsibilities, they deny community members who are naturally social and 
collaborative the opportunity to reach their potential. 
• Because a resticted circumscription of the issues concerning the political 
sphere would fragment society then community members would be deprived of 
the sense of identity that comes with collective decision-making. 
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• Complete reliance on the negative freedom of the market would disempower 
individuals particularly as new forms of stakeholder achieved by such 
organisational types as mutual societies, and co-operatives, can offer 
individuals more positive^ freedom. 
Homo Hierarchus: 
• Because the self, encumbered by the self-centred aims of the dominant 
hegemonies, has been denied the necessary autonomy for growth into a 
complete, empowered organism, then individuals will never experience the 
contentment of true fulfillment. 
• As community organisations must comply with universal values, then 
community members would neglect the importance of recognising ethnic 
diversity and moral relativism. 
• The opinions of dominant hegemonies would assume a tyrannical dimension 
because community members would be denied the provision of democratic 
forums for egalitarian community debates. 
Homo sociotogicus would however, also recognise the commonalities about 
community with adherents to the other social reality perspectives. 
Homo Existentialis: 
• The liberty of individuals and their communities, free from state coercion, is of 
mutual importance, although the proposed strategies for delivering this 
outcome differ. 
^ Positive freedom is the freedom of thought to act on your own behalf, therefore, its advocates 
perceive it as achievable if people are freed from such impediments as the tyranny of poverty or 
ignorance. Alternatively, achieving negative freedom is to be liberated from the intentional 
coercion of social and cultural forces that impede individual action (Berlin, 1969). 
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Homo Economicus: 
• Human autonomy is an important shared aim even though progress towards its 
achievement, and its eventual outcome, is viewed differently. 
Homo Hierarchus: 
• The pluralist notion of policy making, as the outcome between competing 
propositions, is mutually accepted.® 
Homo Sociologicus on the Role of the State, Market and Community 
Homo sociologicus hold a discrete and coherent vision of the role of the state, 
the market and the community. 
On the role of the state. Homo sociologicus would accept the following 
propositions about the role of the state: 
• The state should devolve its authority to the level of community thus, through 
thie principle of subsidiahty, community members would play an essential role 
/ in the formulation of public policy. 
• The state should deliver public services to communities in partnership with 
community members. 
• The state should embrace the diverse values and beliefs that are developed by 
community members at the community level. 
• The state should promote the notion of social inclusion by ensuring that its 
social policies offer all individuals a stake in society. 
In this context it is important to note that homo hierarchus, with their imperative to preserve the 
status-quo, would endeavour to control and manipulate the issues that appear on the 
democratic agenda. 
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• The state should not display overly authoritarian tendencies as these would be 
unwelcome because they constrain community members from fully 
participating in their communities. 
On the role of the market Homo sociologicus would accept the following 
propositions about the role of the marketplace: 
• The outcome of transactions that result from the unfettered free market are 
perceived as inherently unfair, as they favour those who have the expertise 
and resouces to exploit such transactions. 
• Only a regulated market is able to address potential risks to the well-being of 
community members, as preventative action is precluded by the need to 
maintain profitability. 
• The operation of the unfettered market represses the economically weak by re-
inforcing the power of economic elites thus increasing social exclusion. 
• The market should be regulated by the state in partnership with communities 
so that it can bring the benefits of market transactions without the risks of 
economic exploitation. 
On the role of community. Homo sociologicus would accept the following 
propositions about the role of community: 
• Community members should make collective decisions based on a group 
consensus that avoids individual personal risk. 
• Community members should invite opportunities to make voluntary sacrifices 
that contribute to progression towards their community's shared aims. 
• The notion of "community" is the rudimentary underpinning of society and it 
should provide a social entity that can offer the "good life" to its members. 
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• The individual community member should find a profound satisfaction in 
reaching a consensus with other community members over their shared 
values, attitudes and opinions. 
• Community decision-making should be about minimising agreed risks. 
• Management of community affairs should be about managing for inclusion. 
Homo Existentialis: An Existentialist Perspective 
The pervasive pressures exerted both by social structures and by the 
competitive, and sometimes exploitative, nature of the market on homo 
existentialis can leave him or her in a state of anomie, although, they do have 
alternative responses to the challenges wrought from their preferred values, 
opinions and attitudes that make them stand outside the social order. 
Mystical and Intellectual Outsiders 
If an individual concludes that knowledge can only be gained through personal 
experience, it is axiomatic that this experience and any knowledge so gained 
cannot be fully shared with others. Therefore, such individuals behave in ways that 
are ultimately unpredictable as they each define their own reality. Thus, homo 
existentialis would reject structural causation together with the possibility of 
identifying definitive causes and the likely consequences of social action. 
However, this condemns them to either accepting that life has no point or 
undertaking the stuggle to bring meaning to their existence. Those inclined to the 
former position would reject alt ideologies as exploitative and coercive as they 
understand that people are unable to take control of their own lives. But those 
accepting the latter position would pursue their ultimate reality, whether that is 
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along a hermitical path of mysticism or the adoption of an intellectual doctine of 
commitment to the search for authenticity. 
Nietzsche was a mystic and a prophet to the extent that what he "wanted to do 
was start a new religion" (Wilson, 1956: 145). He wrote that the hardest knowledge 
to acquire is self-knowledge as people make value judgements about what is good 
and evil (Nietzsche. [1887] 2003). However, as they begin to understand the 
factitious nature of morality, recognising it as the herd instinct in the individual, 
they can begin to sense-a will to life as our consciouness becomes more acute, 
more aware that goodness is not inherent in particular actions. For Nietzsche the 
moments of awakening, when his consciouness was expanded by an experience 
offering "the sudden intuition of pure Will, free of the troubles and perplexities of 
intellect: an intuition which was a release from the 'thought-riddled' nature" 
(Wilson, 1956: 126) became his motivation to search for his fundamental goal — 
even beyond the will to power; the will to love life. 
The extension of the individual's consciousness into an authentic domain also 
pre-occupied Heidegger, Thus, dasein, or the human entity in all its ways of being, 
readily accepts an inauthentic existence as it takes up a secure "home" In this 
world. However, if authenticity is to arise from this condition then the individual 
must assume a state of anxiety. Here dasein has no home just a disturbing 
awareness of the need to search for meaning (Heidegger, [1927] 1996). 
However, the issue that confronts the existential outsider is why they should 
forsake the comfortable doctrine of apathy to start an unpredictable, and possibly 
purposeless, journey of discovery based on relatively ethereal concepts of 
mystical revelation. There is no systematic critique of politics and social life In this 
pilgrimage, just the proposition that the human mind has capacities that 
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inauthentic existence renders unknowable. However, whilst the social reality 
perspective of homo existentialis might be associated with the notions of the 
mystical hemiit consideration is now given to the potential commitments that might 
be embraced by the intellectual existential outsider. 
Sartre's conceptualisation of existentialism can be used to provide a framework 
that can re-constitute the apathetic individual as a purposeful entity who becomes 
able, to identify with the political ideology of anarchism. Thus, this theoretical 
construct is rooted in a practical praxis that reflects contemporary considerations. 
This relevance to people's lives has been accomplished by effecting the removal 
of anarchy's traditional optimism about the innate goodness within human nature 
and leaving the emphasis on what individuals can make of themselves. This 
means embracing existentialism. Thus, the shortcomings and commonalities /7omo 
existentialis detect in the other contending reality dispositions can be critically 
explored under the headings of liberty and solidarity. However, the distinction 
between anarchists, who believe that an anarchist society should reduce, or even 
abandon, rights to private property (Kropotkin, 1987 and 1995; Bakunin. 1990; 
Chomsky, 1989); and anarcho-capitalists, who accept inequalities of wealth as an 
inevitable consequence of individual freedom (Rothbard, 1973; Friedman, 1973) is 
maintained. 
Liberty 
Homo existentialis has the distinctive characteristic of being fundamentally anti-
authoritarian, an attitude that is best understood as an abhorrence of the threats 
and coercion that represent an inherent part of state domination. It is only .through 
the creation of a non-authoritarian society that it becomes possible for each 
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individual to be treated with proper dignity and respect. As this higher level of inter-
personal relations sociability would be encouraged to flourish, thereby creating 
circumstances where free co-operation between individuals can be realised in the 
absence of dehumanising exploitation. Therefore, "society must become, like 
nature itself, an organic, integrated community. Human beings can only realise 
their personhood, their individuality in the fullest sense, through non-dominating 
interaction" (Clark. 1984: 28). But this vision of freedom demands distinct social 
arrangements, such as the decentralisation of policy making, concensual decision-
taking, the elimination of discrimination and the capacity of citizens to exercise 
complete freedom of thought and expression (Claris. 1984: 130). So homo 
existentialis choose to advocate a rigorously reflexive form of self-governance 
where "the individual integrates himself into the group and the group has its 
practical limit in the individual" (Sartre, [1960] 1976: 524). This maxim goes to the 
heart of a position, which rejects the concept of democracy, as the people in a 
community cannot be "as an entity distinct from the individuals that compose i f 
(Woodcock, 1986: 30). Thus, the majority cannot suppress the minority in a social 
structure where the aim is to make "aristocracy universalised and purified" 
(Woodcock, 1986: 31), through a robust declaration of the nobility of each free 
citizen. 
The notion of direct participatory democracy, with its emphasis on inclusive 
egalitarian debate, is rudimentary to the understanding of community from the 
perspective of homo existentialis. This unconditional endorsement might 
sometimes entail the necessity for community members to compromise on their 
opinions after education and persuasion. However, ^omo existentialis would 
consider that a consensus of opinion is necessary, arising from what Sartre calls 
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"an agreement of minds" ([1960] 1976: 531). with unity that is achieved by mutual 
concession dismissed as representing a subtle but persuasive form of 
manipulation that erodes liberty. Furthermore, it is apparent that there can be little 
common ground between homo existentialis, with their strongly held views on anti-
authoritarianism and centralised control, and homo hierarchus. This antipathy is 
exemplified by the former's distrust of the type of social order that homo 
hierarchus create, which they conclude inevitably encourages human 
imperfections, as those elevated above others are pre-destined to abuse their 
power (Mortand. 1997: 12-3). Moreover, whilst anarchists are encouraged by 
homo economicus's attitude towards restricting the power of the state, they 
nevertheless disagree with, their supposition that a society without a minimalist 
government that can enforce contractual relationships would collapse into chaos. 
Whilst the particular type of organised groups recognised by Sartre offer a 
pattern of complex interdependence to the authentic individual ([1960] 1976: 584) 
nevertheless these units can still provide homo existentialis with a political platform 
that rejects structural causality and preserves the capacity of the individual to 
define their own reality. Therefore, they can be adopted as a central tenet to the 
homo existentialis political articles of faith. Thus, the diametrically opposite notions 
of "authority and autonomy are reconciled and incorporated in a acephalous co-
operative" (Edwards, 1997: 65) that can ensure individual freedom from harm. 
Therefore, absolute liberty must be defined as being conditional upon a minimum 
set of communally agreed behavoural norms. However, this belief in the essential 
nature of association, and its expected outcomes, does not reconcile homo 
existentialis with what they would regard as the intrusive paternalistic enclave 
inhabited by homo sociologicus. In this group, homo existentialis would feel that a 
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comprehensive, morally prescriptive, code of values and attitudes would, by 
necessity, be imposed on community members. 
Homo hierarchus chooses the vehicle of the state to impose moral standards on 
citizens. Anarchists understand this action, whilst disguised under the pretence of 
preserving social unity, to be the imposition of oppressive manipulative power 
motivated by the wish to preserve existing social relations, therefore, they would 
vehemently oppose such a strategy. However, there is an accord between 
anarchists and neo-liberals over the necessity for maximising negative social 
freedoms, although this unanimity ceases with the homo economicus reliance on 
the power of democratic government to enact these measures. 
Solidarity 
The anarchical purist has, throughout the twentieth century, been prepared to 
adopt a pragmatic attitude towards working with mass movements. For instance, 
anarcho-syndicalism played a part in both the Spanish Civil War and Italian 
politics, prior to the advent of the Italian fascist state, through the International 
Workingmen's Association. Whilst this organisation included many people who 
were only interested in improving their economic and social conditions the 
structure was underpinned by libertarian ideals (Woodcock. 1986: 223-5), Thus. 
homo existentialis would envisage the paradox of a demarcated concept of 
solidarity, where respect for the sancity of individual opinions and the individual's 
right to determine their own values is fundamental in the linkage of the individual to 
the unknowable and unpredictable "structures of society" (Ritter, 1980: 29-30). 
Furthermore, this incongruous linkage assumes a particular significance in the 
task of preparing and acting on strategies that ensure a challenge is mounted on 
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the power of elites by organisations based on the principles of voluntarism, 
equality and subsidiarity. Therefore, homo existentialis can support the contention, 
made by homo economicus, that mutual aid is a voluntary, and so desireable, 
expression of personal responsibility. Thus, it is the way that jointly consumed 
goods should be distributed, in a worthy, but nevertheless unpredictable, form of 
service delivery. However, as the importance of initiating, and maintaining, 
compliant community groups committed to their state-approved virtuous outcomes 
is a central theme in the doctrine of horrio sociologicus. there can be little common 
ground with adherents to the other social reality perspectives on this matter. 
The notion of solidarity is closely interlinked with equality. However, the latter 
concept does not receive universal approval with homo existentialis as those who 
can associate with the ideology of anarcho-capitalism envisage very different 
social outcomes from those anarchists that oppose property rights. Bakunin for 
example, regarded equality as a necessary state of affairs for the achievement of 
freedom. Furthermore, he states that "political equality can be based only on an 
economic and social equality" (1953: 156-7). Therefore, the logical conclusion is 
that "people must rid themselves of the sourge of work which benefits capital and 
big business" (Bowen, 1997: 168) and instead, develop business propositions, 
founded on mutual, cooperative and voluntary models, whereby citizens would 
work together with their rewards benefitting both the community and themselves. 
Thus, solidarity strengthens liberty by avoiding capitalist exploitation, where 
workers become "mere inert things who relate to other workers through 
competitive antagonism and to themselves through the 'free' possibility of selling 
that other thing, their labour power" (Sartre, [1960] 1976: 156). In this world vision, 
scarcity would not exist and so hegemonies would be deprived of their means of 
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domination. This aim, where a change in social relations would be enduring, 
accords with homo sociologicus who aspire to confront and change oppressive 
hierarchies through the flows of cultural reality that wash through society. 
Therefore, libertarianism may be united with democratic socialism in a struggle 
that recognises the capacities of both agency and structure. 
Alternatively, anarcho-capitalists would accept the defence of the free market 
offered by Hayek and Freidman, but they would be critical of what they perceive as 
a compromise with hierarchy whereby the police, the judicial system and the 
armed forces all remain under the control of a democratically elected government. 
Instead, their "preferred vision of acephalous society" (Edwards, 1997: 31) 
provides the following mechanisms: 
• Legal judgements are made in a system where all actions relate to property 
rights. 
• Recognition that there can be no crimes without victims or no defendant 
withoijt a specific plaintiff. 
• Judgements must always take the form of financial restitution substantiated by 
possible consumer boycotts. 
In this system, a private police force would enjoy financial benefits that would 
encourage the proper performance of their duties, and a comprehensive legal 
code could be developed in much the same manner as the evolution of English 
Common Law. Furthermore, with the removal of the machinery of the traditional 
nation state, wars would cease to be viable propositions. Thus, homo existentialis 
who adopt the anarcho-capitalist perspective would refute charges from both 
homo economicus and homo hierarchus that their society would be enveloped in 
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violent chaos and instead, they criticise both these social reality perspectives for 
letting the state retain the means to initiate violence. 
Homo Existentialis on the Contending Views on Community 
Homo existentialis would perceive fundamental flaws in propositions about 
community that are grounded in the other social reality perspectives. 
Homo Economicus: 
• Their unnecessary reliance on a minimal state or small government, to stop 
society descending into a state of chaos deprives individuals of the liberty that 
is their inalienable right. 
Homo Hierarchus: 
• The use of threats and coercion (including state-sponsored violence) is an 
undeslreable constraint on individual free will. 
• The proposition that some people are born to rule and others to follow denies 
many citizens the right to determine their own destiny. 
• By the use of the machinery of government to achieve artificial compromises 
between the state and its citizens, individuals are impeded in their wish to 
develop their own will and determine their own future. 
Homo Sociologicus: 
• Their belief in participative democratic mechanisms that act as a means of 
achieving social equality, through a process of what would inevitably be weak 
compromises between citizens, is a delusion that denigrates the unique nature 
and purpose of every individual. 
220 
• The notion that community can collectively decide on the group's values and 
attitudes is paternalistic and denies the individual their right to non-
participation. 
Homo existentialis would however, also recognise commonalities about 
community with adherents to other social reality perspectives. 
Homo Economicus: 
• Communities should accept the necessity for a minimal set of positive 
freedoms to uphold the concept of "freedom from harm." 
Homo Sociologicus: 
• The desire, held by some radical adherents to the reality perspective of 
hermeneutic-structuralism, to bring capitalist scarcity to an end, thi-ough 
realising a pemianent change in the inequitable distribution of goods, would be 
approved by anarchic existential outsiders who wish to reduce property rights. 
Homo Existentialis on the Role of the State, Market and Community 
Homo existentialis holds a discrete and coherent view of the role of the state, 
the market and the community. 
On the Role of the State. Homo existentialis would accept the following 
propositions about the role of the state: 
• The state should not seek to promote the common good as it is unknowable, 
which means it will have to use illegitimate authority to exercise sometimes 
benign but often manipulative and cocercive power to constrain the liberties of 
the individual. 
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• The state should ensure that delivery of public services take place at the local 
level of community, where voluntary expressions of personal responsibility, 
which are the result of individual reflection, can provide a system of mutual aid. 
• The state should not offer its citizens any ideological vision, as this can only 
consist of unknowable pre-suppositions and unworkable collective aims and 
objectives. 
• The state should not presume that individuals want a stake in its society. 
• The state is not the only means of providing an enforceable legal framework for 
contractual relationships. 
On the the role of the market Homo existentialis would accept the following 
propositions about the role of the marketplace: 
• The market, which may appear inhospitable and exploitative, should offer the 
individual the opportunity to enter into an unfettered contractual relationship 
with another individual, premised on the right of either party to withdraw from 
the transaction. 
• The martlet should not demand that participants In transactions conform to 
social nomris of behaviour, for its only caveat should be that players accept the 
discipline of contractual regulation. 
• The market should riot be subject to human manipulation, which may result in 
devious, disrespecful transactional behaviour. 
On the role of the community. Homo existentialis would accept the following 
propositions about the role of community: 
• Community members should not seek to improve collective agreements, as it is 
not possible to understand how other people think. 
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• Community members should not deny the validity of apathy, because 
individuals who cannot influence the outcomes of community are justified in 
being apathetic. 
• Community, which represents another unavoidable mechanism of contol over 
individual liberty, should not demand individual sacrifices unless it can offer 
reciprocal benefits. 
• Community decision-making should be incremental so as to minimise risk. 
• Management of community affairs is just about managing for survival. 
Conclusion 
This Chapter has analysed the ideological values and attitudes of homo 
hierarchus, homo economicus, homo sociologicus and homo existentialis and 
found that each of these perspectives has a discrete and coherent set of beliefs in 
respect of the role of the state, the role of the market and the role of community. 
Nevertheless, each of the actors adhere to perceptions of social reality that are 
flawed as they are unable to accommodate contending dispositions. 
Thus, homo hierarchus would be convinced that only an unchallenged elite can 
determine the best course for society. Alternatively, homo economicus have 
complete faith in the mechanism of the market and its ability to offer improved 
social conditions to all. However, homo sociologicus has a fundamentally different 
vision, rooted in the setting of community, where human altruism can flourish and 
inspire the individual to accept responsibility for the well-being of the collective. 
Finally, homo existentialis is wary of any fomi of organisational engagement. They 
perceive the state as ultimately malevolent and community as a notion that should 
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be treated with caution. Furthenmore, the market, although it offers unfettered 
contractual relationships, can be subject to human manipulation and exploitation. 
As this thesis is concerned with the management of community the next 
Chapter describes and analyses an empirical investigation into the cognitive 
congruence of a small cohort of community practitioners. 
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The Cognitive Consistency of Community Practitioners 
An Empirical Investigation 
This Chapter explores the way a small cohort of community practitioners think 
about community and community engagement. Their preferred socialisation, as 
community practitioners, encourages them to understand community as a social 
construct. Therefore, their premise is that people have the desire and capacity to 
engage with their communities. Moreover, they understand community as an 
aggregation of the desire and capacity of people to participate in community 
discussions, from which shared meanings emerge, through the processes of group 
engagement. This conception of community engagement also accords with the 
core principles of those community practitioners who have renounced 
communitarianism as offering a consensual or pluralist agenda that fails to bring 
about permanent social change. However, whilst they may express a preference 
for the radicalism — within the theorising of Freire (1985, 1996) and Gramsci 
(1971, 1985) — this allegiance still leaves unchallenged their fundamental 
henmeneutic-structuralist social reality disposition in a community setting. 
The objective of this chapter is to ascertain whether this cohort of community 
practitioners is cognitively consistent, holding a set of compatible cognitions about 
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community, when they comprehend social reality in a community setting. This 
investigation into the cognitive consistency^ of these practitioners arises as a result 
of the affect of cognitive dissonance^. This experience may begin with surprise at 
an unexpected outcome of events then can create an emotional state that results 
in high levels of stress and anxiety that may encourage absenteeism and possibly 
resignation. 
The research programme is designed with the individual community practitioner 
as its unit of analysis making any generalisations an inappropriate research 
objective. Thus, this approach offers a better understanding of how, rather than 
why, individuals form values, attitudes and opinions in the relational setting of 
community. 
The quadripartite divide on social reality perspectives, identified and 
conceptualised in chapters 2 to 5, sustains an intellectual divergence concerning 
the concept of community and the purpose of community engagement. This 
suggests that an attitudinal investigation can demarcate a community practitioner's 
particular view of the social world in which he or she conducts his or her 
professional affairs. Moreover, it is through acknowledging, understanding and 
challenging the profession's current interpretation of its mission that community 
workers can begin to address the issue . of accommodating contending 
perspectives on community reality for the purpose of enhancing community 
engagement. 
But. as Festinger (1957) found, the evidence that disproves existing beliefs may, counter 
intuitively, initially reinforce an individual's faith in those beliefs making them embrace a "rhetoric of 
intransigence" (Hirschman, 1991:168). 
^ An individual may experience disillusionment where the cumulative effect of belief dis-confirming 
evidence serves to dis-confirm or disprove beliefs so initiating a state of cognitive dissonance 
(Festinger 1957). Thus, this can be understood as "the emotional state set up when two 
simultaneously held attitudes or cognitions are inconsistent or when there is a conflict between 
belief and overt behaviour" (Reber. 1995:134). 
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Research Methodology 
Methodology can be understood as including the researcher's decision about 
what to research and the perspective that is adopted towards the creation and 
testing of theories. It also addresses the criteria that determine the method for 
collection and interpretation of data (Brunskell, 1998: 37). 
Scientific empirical research is concerned with describing, explaining and 
predicting objective or material phenomena guided by evidence obtained through 
systematic and controlled observations (Punch, 1998: 28). However, whilst the 
social sciences adopt the same approach as the natural sciences the complexity 
of the human condition makes it more difficult to achieve an inter-subjective 
agreement about the subject of study (May, 1993: 4). For instance, different 
perspectives towards social enquiry occupy various positions along a continuum. 
These positions ranges from the absolutist understanding that any approach which 
fails to achieve both objectivity and truth is to be rejected to a relativist^ position 
that doubts whether there is absolute truth at all (Blaikie, 1993: 212). This polarity 
is manifest through an analysis of the scientific components of the three traditions 
of the approaches known as positivism, interpretivism and critical theory. 
Positivism 
A positivist approach upholds the supremacy of scientific knowledge in the 
belief that through dispassionate observation of specific material social facts 
researchers are able to offer true explanations provided that their evidence 
includes no logical or empirical contradiction (Neuman, 1994: 60). However, an 
^ The concept of empirical research is defined as the observation of something or the impact of 
something (Punch, 1998: 28). The tenn is often used interchangeably by commentators with the 
term "data." 
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explanation must be repeatedly replicated^ to ascertain whether the findings can 
be falsified. In its purest form, positivism maintains that research should be 
completely objective and value free thereby occupying a position at the extreme of 
absolutist understanding (Neuman, 1994: 61). However, many contemporary 
adherents to the positivist model would not defend this extremely deterministic 
position (Punch, 1998: 50) although still recognising that the strategy produces 
covering laws about the way humans behave (May, 1993: 5). 
Positivists embrace quantitative® research as part of a statistical methodology 
that has the objective of offering an explanation of the differences that have been 
observed in values acquired from various units of analysis. The reasoning 
employed requires a search for regularities within the available statistics, which 
may reveal how the values of different variables relate to each other (Alsuutari, 
1998: 58). In this context critics note that positivist approaches ignore "the 
differences between the natural and social world by failing to understand the 
meanings that are brought to social life",(Silverman. 1998: 82). However, most 
researchers using quantitative techniques, whilst considering that they undertake 
scientific exploration, do not accept this assertion as they are not aiming to 
produce scientific laws but, instead, sets of cumulative generalisations through the 
analysis of data (Silverman, 1998: 82). 
^ Relativism, in relation to the research findings from a particular study, is the notion that "the 
representativeness is unknovi/n and probably unknowable, so that the generalizability of such 
findings is also unknown" (Bryman, 1988: 100). 
^ The hypothetico-deductive approach is used to try to refute hypotheses by continued attempts at 
falsification. This is known as demarcation criterion, as the more a theory is quoted the more 
falsifiable it becomes. Testing should be as demanding as possible to ensure that only the best 
explanations will survive (Blaikie, 1993:144-45). 
^ Quantitative research can be defined as "a methodology that uses numerical data to reach its 
findings. Thus any statistical techniques for the collection and analysis of material; any 
transformation of human behaviour into the forni of numbers' (Silverman, 1998: 94-95) achieves 
this classification. 
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The quantitative research process begins with the construction of a 
hypothesis^ that is the result of a strategy of logical deduction from a prior 
theoretical scheme (Bryman. 1988: 21). This statement is then operationalised® 
then data collected by such methods as a survey, structured observation on 
predetennined schedules and analysis of the content of discourse (Silverman, 
1988: 81). Measurements from the variables will then be used to produce 
statements of correlation before induction is employed leading to findings that 
either confirm the initial hypothesis or require its rejection or modification (Layder, 
1993: 19). 
Outputs from this research strategy tend to exceed descriptive generalisations 
about the available data. Nevertheless, researchers may be reluctant to comment 
beyond the specific determinable relationships that seem to exist between certain 
variables resulting in possible causal relationships about phenomena being 
omitted from research reports. (Layder, 1993: 28). Furthermore, within quantitative 
research, all subjects belong to a distinct group within the population and the 
geographic boundaries selected for a study determines the extent that generalised 
findings apply (Aiasuutari. 1998: 58). Therefore a subset of potential evidence is 
needed from the available data to validate that the sample is representative 
(Ragin, 1994:27). 
Thus, the positivist research paradigm examines a limited range of material or 
objective variables over a restricted time-period thereby conveying "a view of 
' A hypothesis can be defined a s " an untested statement of the relationship between concepts in a 
theory...or simply that part of a theory subject to empirical test" (Williams and May. 1996: 198). 
^ Operationalisation is "deciding how to translate the abstract...into something more concrete and 
directly observable" (de Vaus. 1996: 19). For instance the notion of deprivation has a social 
dimension that converts into a sub-dimension of social isolation, which then has operational 
definitions in such measures as (1) number of friends; (2) contact with family; and (3) contact with 
neighbours. 
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social reality which is static in that it tends to neglect the impact and role of 
change in social life" (Bryman, 1998: 101). Furthermore, (Bryman, 1998: 102): 
there is a tendency for quantitative researchers to view social reality as 
external to actors and as a constraint on them, which can be attributed to the 
preference for treating the social order as though it were the same as the 
objects of the natural scientist. 
Therefore, this research paradigm places the burden of explanation on 
individual-level characteristics that are statistically associated with various forms of 
group behaviour and not on any unobservable processes related to the interaction 
of individuals within groups. This position accords with the homo hierarchus 
assumption that the social engagement circumstances are objectively knowable by 
the application of deductive and inductive reason, and that he or she has little 
capacity to determine how he or she conducts these relationships, because of the 
necessary impact of structural influences on his or her wishes, desires, beliefs, or 
will power. Alternatively, homo economicus would only embrace a weak form of 
positivism as whilst they presume that he or she conducts his or her interpersonal 
relations in a set of social engagement circumstances that are objectively 
knowable by the application of deductive and inductive reason, he or she has the 
capacity to determine how he or she conducts these relationships. This is because 
his or her interpersonal relationships are the product of his or her wishes, desires 
and beliefs, or will that is enabled or constrained by his or her physiological, 
neurological and psychological make-up. 
Interpretivism 
Interpretivism is founded in idealism,^ which gives priority to the meanings 
arrived at by human agents through their own experiences and in their interaction 
® Idealism is a doctrine that, although taking many forms, has the common theme that reality is 
fundamentally mental in nature and what we call the external world is a creation of the mind. Thus 
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with others (Williams and May, 1996: 59). Some versions of this approach place it 
at an extreme relativist position as "it is not possible for a researcher to stand 
outside history or become detached from culture" (Blaikie, 1993: 212). However 
this does not imply that the world is unreal but rather that there is not an 
immediate relationship between reality and our perceptions. Therefore, sensory 
data is interpreted through each person*s mind (Williams and May. 1996: 60). 
Moreover, multiple interpretations of human experience leads to interpretative 
theory that may include "Informal nonns, rules or conventions used by people in 
everyday life'' (Neuman, 1994: 64). in contrast to positivism, values are recognised 
as central to the research process, so they should be made explicit and each 
treated with equal Importance (Neuman, 1994: 66). 
Interpretivists embrace qualitative^^ research with its origins in hermeneutlcs, 
relativism and Idealism that result in the approach sometimes being referred to as 
an interprevist paradigm. Thus, the perspective focuses on "subjective meanings, 
definitions, metaphors, symbols and descriptions of specific cases" (Neuman, 
1994: 318). Therefore, data will be narrative, verbal or textual employing research 
traditions such as ethnography^^ or grounded theory^^. This scenario enables 
social theory to accord with our everyday experiences (May, 1993: 29), as the 
researcher interprets the shared meanings individuals create together in a process 
it is opposed to the naturalistic belief that mind itself is exhaustively understood as a product of 
natural processes, "this does not mean that idealists claim that there is no real world but that we 
can never directly perceive the reai worid" (Williams and May. 1996:198). 
'° Qualitative research can be defined as "a methodology that privileges materia! drawn from non-
quantitative sources. Thus any wori< in the social sciences that collects and analyses its material in 
the form of conversations; written .or recorded responses to questions; sections of books, reports or 
newspapers; attitude tests; focus group discussion and so on. A methodology that focuses on the 
texture and the value qualities of its data" (Silverman. 1998:11). 
" Ethnography can be defined as "describing a culture and understanding another way of life from 
the native point of view" (Neuman, 1994; 333). 
" Grounded theory recognises that theory construction begins with a set of observations 
(descriptive) and moves on to develop theories of these observations. It is also called grounded 
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of socialisation that brings understanding to their reality. Thus, the imperative of 
appreciating social context is a critical characteristic of the qualitative approach 
(Neuman, 1994: 319). permitting tentative understandings, sometimes called 
hypotheses to be formulated then possibly explored in relation to other data. 
Therefore, the qualitative process employs deductive reasoning but it is 
sometimes criticised as being a-theoretical in view of qualitative researchers' 
distaste for comparing findings from one context with another and thereby 
discouraging the development of theory (Bryman. 1988: 86). However, such critics 
seem committed to the belief that we can find generalities in social life that makes 
the study of individual's values and attitudes of lesser importance than the 
identification of explicit propositions about group preferences and norms of 
behaviour. 
Therefore, this research paradigm recognises that the social worid must contain 
a multitude of subjective truths, which render the notion of objective truth 
paradoxical, and thereby problematic (Warnock. 1979: 8-9). This position accords 
with the homo existentialist assumption that he or she conducts his or her 
interpersonal relations in a set of social engagement circumstances the meaning 
of which he or she individually constructs in the process of his or her search for 
self-identity and self-fulfilment. Furthermore, he or she has the potential to 
determine how he or she conducts these relationships because he or she can 
draw the power of will from immediate personal experience. If the struggle for this 
authenticity proves too much personal relationships can be afflicted with a 
tendency towards fatalistic self-referentiality. Alternatively, ^omo sociologicus 
would only embrace a weak form of interpretivism as he or she conducts his or her 
theory because it is based on observations — not simply armchair speculation (de Vaus, 1996: 11-
12). 
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interpersonal relations in a set of social engagement circumstances that are 
socially constructed by a process of discourse. During this process, he or she has 
some capacity to determine how he or she conducts these relationships. However, 
this autonomy becomes subordinate to the outputs and outcomes of the discourse 
as it socially constructs meaning about and collectively interprets the social roles 
of self and others in a collective reality. 
Critical Theory 
This approach also rejects any attempt to separate facts and values for critical 
theory, unlike positivism; reality cannot be uncovered by the stringent application 
of scientific techniques of enquiry to detenmine the objective truth (May, 1993: 28). 
Instead social reality is understood as mis-leading, hiding oppression and requiring 
the assiduous researcher to attempt to uncover conflict possibly through 
intentionally motivating participants in a research project to reflect on issues of 
power and domination (Neuman, 1994: 67). On the absolutist/relativist continuum 
critical theory can fall between the two perceptions of reality with truth "not a 
matter of evidence from observation...[but achieved through consensus]...founded 
on reason...[inspired by]...open and equitable critical discussion (Blaikie, 1993: 
213). Alternatively, a pragmatic view of truth in relation to reality has begun to 
feature in the reasoning of some critical theorists, who accept as true theoretical 
propositions that axiomatically require action to address an issue of oppression 
(May. 1993:45). 
Therefore, this research paradigm recognises that social relationships are 
conducted in a set of social engagement circumstances that are socially 
constructed by a process of discourse. However, unlike the strong fomi of 
interpretivism. it is recognised that these engagement would lead, following 
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discussion, to a group consensus about the social roles of self and others in a 
collectively understood reality. Thus, homo sociologicus can fully embrace the 
tenets of this research approach. 
Adopted Methodology 
When writing about the effects of governmentality Foucault (1991) observed 
that an individual become the way he or she is identified and the way he or she 
identify themselves. No dominant potency dwells within this paradigm — instead a 
variety of powerful, sometimes discrete and sometimes mutually dependent, 
influences play on the psyche with singular intensities. So, each individual's 
knowledge and the meaning he or she give to his or her lives is the consequence 
of strategies of power that lead to the notion of power and knowledge being 
replaced by "power-knowledge" (Sheridan, 1980: 162). Within this scenario, the 
pragmatism of Charles Peirce offers an epistemological and ontological foundation 
that provides a distinction between truth and reality (Mounce. 1997: 42). Here, the 
meanings that a subject attaches to his or her social world are, to an extent, 
sanctioned through the discourses that result from the interaction with people that 
surround them. Moreover, by adopting suitable research techniques, this truth can 
be explored however ultimate reality remains an existence independent of human 
inquiry. 
Therefore, adoption of a pragmatic standpoint leaves the notion of quantitative 
and qualitative approaches, as separate scientific methods for particular types of 
investigation, open to question. Instead, the methodological challenge undergoes 
a fundamental metamorphosis into the question of how to apply an appropriate 
mix of techniques in a manner that can appropriately address the theoretical 
underpinnings of the research question, where the individual is the unit of analysis. 
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In this context, there is an imperative to focus on the exploration of existing data, 
which can be the result of deductive reasoning, to develop hypotheses that relate 
to a person's experience instead of attempting a process with a limited aim like the 
falsification of existing knowledge. Furthermore, this observation can be 
substantiated through the commonalities between the epistemological approaches 
of quantitative and qualitative methods. Both methods recognise that there is more 
than one way to approach reality and, in view of the fallible nature of all inquiry, 
conclusions drawn can only be tentative. Whilst qualitative research relies on 
language and quantitative research on statistical computations to break down data 
neither seems able to offer a pattern which supplies a complete picture of the 
subject. Arising from the conundrum this thesis endeavours to incorporate some of 
the benefits of quantitative analysis with the meanings that people attribute to their 
experiences so that the research findings are infomned by the particular 
connotations selected by the respondents. 
Investigating a Community Practitioner's Perceptions 
It is necessary to begin by emphasising the associational nature of the four 
perceptions of social reality. Each one constitutes a prism through which the 
social world can be described, understood and judged. Therefore, all that can be 
established is whether a person who adopts a particular social reality perspective 
does so consistently in particular relational situations so as not to be in a state of 
cognitive dissonance. Thus, the proposition that can be tested is: 
Whether the epistemological and ontological premises that underpin 
community praxis, which give rise to a set of values and attitudes that are 
compatible with the principles of community praxis, are adhered to 
consistently by community practitioners in a community setting. 
235 
A small sample of community practitioners was chosen to participate in this 
project, for the purpose of ascertaining their cognitive consistency in relation to 
community matters. This opens the opportunity of possible future research into the 
implications of cognitive dissonance for community practitioners and their 
employers, which is beyond the scope of this project. It should be pointed out that 
the results of this investigation neither validate or invalidate the logical foundations 
of the four contending social reality perspectives, which are grounded in the 
deductive logic of the epistemologtcal and ontological dichotomies evident in the 
philosophy of social sciences. 
Causality When designing a small survey the possible causal relationships 
between variables.^^ can be stated in a hypothesis. In a complex model, this 
would include an independent variable,^'* a dependent var iab le ,and a control 
variable. ®^ with the former being the cause and the dependent variable the effect. 
In this detection of cause and effect, the research design can also include a 
control variable that is suspected of having an influence on the relationship 
between the independent and dependent variables (David and Sutton, 2004: 143). 
In a search for causes or consequences the researcher needs to ask the 
following questions (de Vaus. 1996: 31): 
• What am I trying to explain? 
• What are the possible causes? ' 
A variable is "a concept, often but not alw/ays quantitatively measured, that contains two or more 
values or categories that can vary over time or over a given sample (for example age. gender), in 
contrast to a constant, the value of which remains fixed and never varies" (Bailey, 1987: 474). 
In an asymmetrical relationship the independent variable that can effect changes in the 
dependent variable "but cannot itself be affected by changes in the dependent variable" (Bailey. 
1987: 465). 
"A variable in an asymmetrical relationship that is affected by the independent variable, but 
cannot in turn affect it" (Bailey, 1987: 462). 
A variable which is held constant to see whether it has an affect on the relationship between two 
variables (Bailey. 1987: 462). 
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o Which causes will I explore? 
o What are the possible mechanisms? 
However, the research proposition in this thesis does not extend to an 
explanation of the cause of community practitioners' values and attitudes in a 
community setting. Instead, its focus is on the specific issue of whether 
community practitioners are cognitively consistent in a community setting. Thus, in 
what is best described as a research nexus rather than a research paradigm, the 
four ontologlcal and epistemological perspectives are explored as categories that 
have implications for the individual community worker. 
Empiricists might still object to the omission of variables such as age, gender 
and education from any questionnaire. They could assert that these measures and 
categories could, through a process of correlation, offer an explanation of why 
subjects might adopt specific attitudes in particular circumstances. 
The goal for this thesis however, is not to provide causal explanations but to 
produce a better understanding of community members' attitudes towards 
community engagement. Whilst it is acknowledged that personal characteristics of 
individuals are integral to these relational settings the intent arising from this small 
exploratory study is to tease out the implications that arise from the consistency or 
inconsistency of community practitioners. The claim for the resultant data is that it 
contextualised the dynamics of community engagement and underpins future 
ideographic explanations that practitioners may wish to pursue in their own 
particular localities. 
Measuring a Community Practitioner's Cognitive Coherence 
Questionnaires are "undoubtedly the most widely used form of data collection 
in social-psychological research" (Manstead and Semin, 2001: 100). By 
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incorporating the psychometric response scale developed by Likert (1932) 
respondents can identify their chosen level of agreement in relation to a particular 
statement. Through this medium self-reporting measures can be employed that 
facilitate the collection of data that can effectively identify individuals' attitudinal 
perceptions in specific relational situations. However, these responses tend to be 
highly context dependent so, respondents will draw on their own experience and 
inferences about the notion of "community", based on the most accessible, 
cognisable perceptions in their consciousness at the time they complete the 
questionnaire (Schwarz and Sudman, 1992; Sudman. Bradburn and Schwarz. 
1996; Tourangeau and Rasinski, 1988). 
However, this impediment to effective measurement is mediated by restricting 
membership of the sample to experienced community workers — so respondents 
should be able to access information from their memories about the particular 
relational situation of community. All the participants, through the nature of their 
employment, are steeped in community rhetoric and practice, so alternative and 
inappropriate infomiation that might be called upon if these questions were posed 
to the uninitiated, does not present a potential problem. In a similar vein, an 
irresolute judgement, made as a result of ambivalence to one question, which then 
has an affect on the answers to subsequent questions, should be avoided (Stapel 
and Schwarz, 1998). 
Some of the potential respondents might, however, not engage in a systematic 
consideration of their previous experiences about community matters as they 
prefer to base their answers to questions on the way they perceive they should 
behave in certain specific conditions (Jones. 1979). In these circumstances, the 
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logic of triangulation^^ suggests that apparent inconsistencies in an individual's 
adherence towards the values, attitudes and beliefs underpinned by a particular 
perspective on social reality should be treated with caution unless they assume a 
commonality in the aggregated responses made by the total sample. 
Community practitioners responding to this survey could exercise a third option 
as a means of making an evaluation about a community issue. They could 
examine their feelings and arrive at an answer to a question based on their 
emotional reactions (Schwarz and Clore, 1988). Thus, they might dismiss some 
communitarian ideological themes as naVve in that they perpetuate a social reality 
based on altruism. Therefore, it is again apparent that it is preferable for an 
analysis of these research findings to concentrate on computing the number of 
consistent and inconsistent answers instead of focussing on the particular reality 
dispositions favoured by each respondent. 
Limitations of Likert Scales 
Likert Scales invite some criticism, specifically from the assumed perceptions of 
the respondent. There is concern that this person is (1) asked to abandon all 
notions of what the researcher seems to want to find; and (2) asked to accept that 
the divisions between the points on the scale of agreement to dis-agreement is 
psychometrically equal. 
As regards bias, if individual community practitioners in the sample deem it 
socially desirable to respond to a question in a particulai- way then that attitude is 
part of that person's cognitive consistency towards community issues. However, a 
more serious issue concerns non-response to the questionnaire, which might 
Triangulation usually demands more than one method of investigation, and thus, more than one 
type of data. However, its logic also applies to the problem of respondents making inconsistent 
answers in questionnaires (May, 1993; 130). 
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suggest that a significant number of community practitioners, with differing 
attitudes, have consciously chosen to abstain from involvement in the programme 
(deVaus, 1996:73). 
The results from Likert Scales are treated as ordinal data, which involve some 
kind of ranking but no basis for measuring the amount of difference between the 
ranks (Rose and Sullivan, 1996: 18). Therefore, there is a danger that respondents 
may not allocate a unifonr) extent of agreement or disagreement between the 
categories. This will then be exacerbated when arithmetic values are allocated to 
each category as the summative totals can lose some of their discriminatory 
power. 
Therefore, when measuring community workers' cognitive coherence with a 
questionnaire that employs Likert Scales it is important that only suitably 
experienced community workers are included In the sample population. Thus, they 
would have had time to reflect over their role and its aims and objectives. 
However, whilst Likert Scales in the context of this Inquiry can accommodate a 
respondent's wish to provide a socially desirable answer nevertheless the bias of 
some community workers, who do not return a completed questionnaire, is a 
significant limitation within this methodological approach. Furthermore, the 
summative totals attached to the various categories might be imprecise due to 
differing values being apportioned by participants. 
Selecting a Suitable Sample 
The process began with the selection of six community organisations based in 
different locations throughout Cornwall. These chosen organisations all have a 
mission to implement community based programmes, financed through substantial 
public funding, and therefore employ experienced staff who are tasked to deliver 
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specific community-orientated outputs and outcomes. They can be categorised as 
follows: 
• Two community development organisations, both registered as charities, with 
community workers, all on contracts between one and three years, engaged in 
various projects including community enterprise, community transport, mental 
health, social inclusion, village halls, voluntary sector forum and research. 
• A housing association, registered as a charity, that provides supported housing 
to the homeless, women escaping domestic violence, people who have been in 
prison, people with mental health problems and young people leaving care. The 
association employs community workers on a full-time basis through a mixture 
of central government and statutory agency funding. Their role is focused on 
issues of client empowerment and partnership working. 
• A housing association committed to encouraging members of minority groups 
in communities to play a role in the management and development of their 
homes and neighbourhoods. This association employs its community workers 
on a full-time basis. 
• Two community regeneration teams within district/borough councils. Members 
of these teams are on short temn contracts (some only a year in duration) and 
have the task of developing partnerships between communities, public 
agencies and the private sector that can undertake projects funded by the 
European Union and the UK Government. 
With differing agendas, these organisations provide an opportunity for the 
sample to include community workers with differing aims and objectives, and 
differing conditions of employment. 
A letter was sent to each organisation requesting participation in a survey of 
community practitioner's values, attitudes and moral principles in relation to 
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community matters. Subsequently, tentative agreements were received, from all 
the parties although concern was expressed about the time it would take for hard 
working members of staff to be involved in any protracted research activity. 
Therefore, a discussion took place with a senior manager in each organisation 
concerning the proposed course of action. It emerged that these managers 
preferred the blank questionnaires to be sent to them for distribution to their staff. 
On this basis, they agreed that only their experienced community practitioners 
would complete these questionnaires. 
The preparatory arrangements for the programme substantiate the assertion 
that each respondent would be familiar with the rhetoric and theoretical 
underpinnings of community issues and capable of exercising their choice in a 
process where they need to comprehend and respond to a series of community 
orientated evaluations. Axiomaticaliy, it was then possible for the wording in the 
questionnaire to be devised for knowledgeable respondents. 
No information was requested about such matters as the age. gender and 
previous experience of the participants. Moreover, in keeping within the 
parameters of the proposition that is to be tested, concerning the philosophical 
consistency of community workers, completed questionnaires were not sorted into 
their organisation of origin. 
Justifying the Sampling Procedure In accordance with the particular 
requirements of the research proposal a homogenous sample was selected for 
this research. This non-probability sampling technique was appropriate as the 
target population all had to be experienced community workers and some 
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managers of the community projects that supplied subjects for the research^® 
were unwilling to provide, a list of all their members of staff that complied with the 
required participant profile. Thus, it was not possible to adopt a process of 
stratified random sampling^^ as a list of the complete sampling frame was 
unavailable. In this scenario it was necessary to accept that a "quota sample." 
which was representative only in number, was the best possible method in the 
circumstances that the research was undertaken. 
Questionnaire Design 
In designing a questionnaire, the researcher needs to consider a number of 
issues. These matters extend from practical considerations to the more 
demanding process of operationalisation. 
It was decided to limit the questionnaire to five pages (see Appendix 1) as 
anything longer could become demoralising to the respondent. Nevertheless, even 
with this restriction on space, thirty expresses of an attitude or opinion is 
necessary to complete the form thus providing enough data for some meaningful 
conclusions. 
Obviously, it is important for the researcher to consider if the chosen sample are 
likely to possess the knowledge and experience to have an opinion on the matters 
addressed in the questionnaire. (Moserand Kalton, 1971: 310). This consideration 
is closely linked with the way the questions are worded, their specificity; whether 
Only eight organisations were identified as employing community workers in Cornwall as the time 
the research was undertaken in January to April 2004. Thus, it was necessary to reach agreements 
with the participants on their terms or risk a sizeable reduction in the available sample. 
This procedure would involve the compilation of a list of a "strata" which shares a particular 
characteristic of the population as a whole (professional community workers). Then a 
proportionate sampling in that strata is undertaken where the people selected for the sample 
"reflects the relative numbers in the population as a whole - for instance if there are an equal 
number of males and females in the community of community woricers then there should be equal 
numbers in the sample chosen to.be participants in the research project ( Robson. 1993: 138). 
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the language used is ambiguous or vague. Thus, axiomatically, the question 
arises as to what extent are the statements that confront the participants are 
sufficiently concrete In their constituent elements s o as to qualify as 
operational statements? 
Real World Research^** 
If operationalism features as a key component in the design of a research 
progranime then the theoretical and empirical levels of the research proposition 
and hypothesis are merged leaving the conceptual level of the programme as an 
outgro\Arth of the empirical level" (Bailey, 1987: 56). The advantage of this 
approach is that it reduces the possibility of measurement error through a process 
of development, called by De Vaus (2001) "the ladder of abstraction." in this 
process, the concepts central to this thesis, naturalist structuralism, naturalist 
agency, hermeneutic structuralism and hermeneutic agency need to be carefully 
defined. These definitions should be underpinned by a clearly stated rationale. 
This can sometimes draw upon existing analysis but. in the nature of this thesis 
where existing research is not available, will require development by the 
researcher. 
Thus, statements and questions that are used in the questionnaire are derived 
from the conclusions drawn in Chapters 2 to 5. However, in a departure from De 
Vaus's "ladder of abstraction," the dimensions for measuring the definitions of the 
concepts were selected as a means of reaching a set of descriptions for each of 
the four concepts based on rigorous deductive logic. Therefore, strands of thought 
that synergistically combine to produce a unified set of philosophical, political and 
°^ The notion of "Real World Research" was coined by Professor Colin Robson to describe a study, 
often undertaken by a practitioner-researcher, that is practical and designed to provide a better 
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ethical principles associated with either naturalist structuralism, naturalist agency, 
hermeneutic structuralism or henneneutic agency have been clearly and precisely 
applied to a series of issues relating to community. For instance, question 6 in 
Section one of the questionnaire asks the respondent to select their preferred 
statement about ethical conduct. Therefore, the nominal definition of the concept is 
"ethics" and in Chapter 4, the dimensions of this concept have been examined 
through the processes of deontological. virtue, consequential and sceptical ethical 
frameworks. This examination results in sub dimensions about what each 
framework regards as good, or bad, right or wrong. Subsequently it became 
possible to produce operational definitions that clearly describe differing beliefs 
about moral activity. However, it is acknowledged that these indicators, used in 
the innovative context of this thesis, cannot be compared to other research 
findings. Therefore, the assumption that should be made about this study is that it 
is not based on "the usual scientific task to the solution of a problem or resolution 
of an issue" (Robson, 1993: 452) but rather the introduction of some flexibility into 
specialised techniques for an enquiry that seeks to provide an understanding 
rather than an explanation of some particular dynamics that affect the notion of 
community. 
In embracing the rather grandiosely entitled concept of "real worid research" it is 
recognised that its premises are viewed as methodologically flawed by those who 
champion what might be called "proper research." For instance Boehm notes that 
"much 'real world' research is messy - uncontrolled variables abound, predictor 
and criterion measures interact, alternative hypotheses cannot be njled out; 
standard statistical measures cannot be applied without massive violation of 
understanding of a problem in a specific context It is based on the premise that it may help solve a 
problem or throw light on a particular issue. (1993: 450). 
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assumptions (1980: 498). This highlights difficulties that may be encountered by 
secondary analysts who view the issue of community practitioners' cognitive 
consistency "from different perspectives and With different philosophies and 
ideologies, so the secondary analyst may sometimes be dissatisfied with the 
original investigator's questions (Weisberg etal., 1996: 180). 
Therefore, in recognition of reliance on deductive logic in the operationalisation 
of the statements in the questionnaire this research programme needs to be 
regarded as ideographic and able to inform the development of a theory of 
community participation rather than nomothetic with the power to generalise 
(Bryman, 1988: 100). 
Arising from this critical discussion of the process of operationalisation adopted 
for the research a second question needs to be addressed. This concerns the 
extent that the statements used in the questionnaire and their constituent 
elements unambiguously reflect the abstractions they are intended to 
reflect? 
Heuristic^^ Rules of Inference 
Concern over whether respondents would find that statements in the 
questionnaire were ambiguous lead to consideration of heuristic rules of inference. 
These assert that a person's desire to make sound judgements will motivate him 
or her to adopt a systematic heuristic process (Chen and Chaiken 1999, Chaiken 
et a/. 1989). This is facilitated by each of the four social reality paradigms providing 
a logical basis that enables a person to make sound judgements about the 
meaning of what other people say and do when he or she reflects on the activities 
'^ Derived from the same Greek root as Eureka its meaning is to discover "knowledge or solve 
problems "using rules which involve essentially a process of trial and error. An Item of information 
or a rule in the process is sometimes known as a heuristic for that problem." (Gregory, 1987: 312). 
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taking place in a particular relational situation — premised on all the actors 
involved thinking and acting as if they are cognitively consistent in the way they 
comprehend a relational situation. In the process of formulating such judgements, 
a person under the heuristic-systematic model of persuasion (Bohner et a/. 1995. 
Chen and Chaiken 1999, Chaiken et a/. 1989), seeks to balance the conscious, 
systematic processing of social information (the scrutinising and integration of all 
potentially relevant information in the forming of a particular judgement) (Chaiken 
ef a/. 1989) with the effortless processing of social information. Thus, heuristic 
clues, being infomiation in a relational situation — whether linguistic or 
behavioural (non-verbal) (Eagly and Chaiken 1993) — enable the latter. 
Generally, a person's desire to make sound judgements motivates him or her to 
adopt systematic processing, but as a set of heuristic rules of inference — 
decision making rules-of-thumb or the heuristic — begins to crystallise and are 
then validated and internalised, then the heuristic process becomes more 
dominant, which can enable judgements to be quickly and effortlessly formed from 
available heuristic clues in the social arena (Eagiy and Chaiken 1993). Therefore, 
the judgement maker becomes cognisant of the available heuristic clues as he or 
she has reflected over the values, attitudes and opinions in the formulation of 
attitudinal judgements that inform or guide his or her action. However, whether the 
decision making capacity of the individual are sufficient for making sound 
judgements depends on the capacity of that individual to garner the heuristic clues 
accurately and comprehensively, to bring the heuristic readily and accurately to 
mind in response to the perception of those heuristic clues and to know when 
enough information has been collected and processed. This will give that 
individual confidence in the soundness of his or her judgement dependent on (1) 
the personal importance and relevance of the judgement made and (2) the 
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personal accountability of the judgement made (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993; 
Tversky and Kahneman 1973 and 1974). 
Of course, in following this line of thought to its conclusion, the danger of 
reification (Whitehead. 1925) exists as a social reality perspective such as 
naturalist structuralism becomes concrete. Thus, an adherent to that perspective 
becomes personified and thereby more than a role-playing actor in a particular 
situation. This, may result in individual intentions, or determinations to act, 
becoming confused with "a prediction on the part of the respondent" (Sapsford, 
19.99: 105). 
Heuristic rules of inference underpin the rationale that lies behind the 
construction of the statements in the questionnaire. It is proposed that the sample 
of community practitioners, who have extensive knowledge and experience of 
community issues, can make sound judgements based on the heuristic clues 
provided. On this basis this discussion now turns to an examination of the way the 
heuristic clues were constructed. It also, whilst considering the matter of possible 
ambiguities in the construction of statements, addresses a third, related question, 
concerning the design of the questionnaire. This involves the extent that the 
abstractions embedded in each statement were discrete and thus able to 
discriminate between respondents' distinctive social reality perspective. 
Utilising the theory of heuristic inference each of the 48 variables in the 
questionnaire contains heuristic clues that are associated with one of the four 
perceptions of social reality. This scenario permits each of the social reality 
perceptions to be fully addressed through the inclusion of four distinct sets of 
indicative propositions on the questionnaire, each set containing six questions and 
six statements. Thus the eventual construction of a single index of perceptual 
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consistencies, which can be attributed to each perspective on social reality, Is 
facilitated in the design of the programme. 
The questions containing the 24 statements are included in Section two of the 
questionnaire with, as a prelude, respondents being asked to select the 
proposition that best characterises their attitude from a number of listed 
alternatives in Section one. These multiple choice questions are designed to 
reveal the respondent's chosen social reality disposition in relation to human 
nature, facts, the social world, community, decision-making and ethics. Therefore, 
they offer an opportunity to analyse whether the respondents have chosen to 
adhere to the logic of a consistent perspective on social reality or whether a 
repeated and regular pattern of inconsistency is apparent. However, following best 
practice here by making the statements as short, simple and specific as possible 
proved challenging (Hague, 1993: 66-67) particularly when devising statements in 
Section one concerning human nature, facts and the social world. These are 
abstractions with complex dimensions, for instance they need to contain distinct 
heuristic clues that distinguish an association with either the causal capacity of 
structure or agency (see Appendix 1). The following example clarifies the manner 
of their construction: 
• Statement l b requires the individual to "constantly strive for the right 
knowledge, the right speech and the right conduct." Therefore, the clue is 
compliance with a social structure that shapes and constrains the individual. 
• Statement 1c requires the individual to follow "conformity to norms, imposed 
by a social order, that determines both how they should live and encourages 
them in the habit of self-control." Therefore, the clue is conformity that is 
imposed by structure through the mechanisms of the social order. 
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Moreover, implicit within these two philosophical positions more clues are 
necessary to act as heuristic devices for respondents to distinguish between the 
process of objective explanation or subjective understanding: 
• Statement 1c begins with the assertion that "individuals are rational" and 
can "rise above their feelings and passions.** Therefore, the clue is the 
demotion of feelings as secondary to a factual code of behaviour — "good 
conduct, loyalty and sincerity." Thus, as the objective is conjoined with the 
structure then statement 1c is associated with the social reality perspective 
of naturalist structuralism. 
• Statement 1b begins with the assertion that "individuals have a natural 
aptitude for virtuous actions." Therefore, the clue is promotion of a feeling. 
virtue, as a fundamental element in human nature. Thus, as the subjective • 
is conjoined with structure then statement 1b is associated with the social 
reality perspective of henmeneutic structuralism. 
Alternatively, statements l a and I d offer the following heuristic clues: 
• Statement l a affirms individuals as "essentially free beings" who 
"continuously pursue their own pleasure." Therefore, the clue is freedom as 
the individual is born unconstrained by any structural restraints. 
• Statement I d affirms the individual as "essentially unique beings, free, 
through acts of their own will." Therefore, the clue is the attainment of 
freedom through an individuaVs pro-active attempts to rise above 
inauthentic restraints. 
Furthermore, implicit within these two philosophical positions are clues that 
distinguish those who associate with the process of objective explanation or 
subjective understanding: 
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o statement l a asserts that individuals "seek liberation from the interference 
of others." Therefore, the clue is that the behaviour of others follows a 
rational basis (their own self-interest). Thus, as the objective is conjoined 
with agency, then the statement 1a is associated with the social reality 
perspective of naturalist agency, 
o statement I d asserts that individuals "through acts of their own 
will...choose who and what to make of themselves." Therefore, the clue is 
the autonomous outsider — alienated from others and unable to accept 
objective rules for developing successful relationships — destined for a 
lonely search for meaning throughout life. Thus, as the subjective is 
conjoined with agency, then statement 1d is associated with the social 
reality perspective of hermeneutic agency. 
Thus, informed by the theoretical concept of heuristic devices, all statements in 
the questionnaire were constructed with the aim of providing respondents with 
indicators that discriminate between differing social reality perspectives. 
Moreover, by pursuing this aim, it is considered that ambiguity, within the 
constituent elements that form the abstractions portrayed for the respondents, has 
been, as far as possible, addressed. In part, this aspiration has been supported by 
the decision to avoid statements with a negative in them as they are more difficult 
to fully comprehend (Hague, 1993: 67). 
The multiple-choice questions are listed below, with sets of variables grouped 
under the headings of each of the four perspectives on social reality. All of these 
questions are established on the fundamental ontological and epistemological 
premises that constitute the philosophy of social science and offer appropriate 
indicators to respondents. Thus, it is contended that a cognitively consistent 
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respondent would respond identically when completing the questionnaire on more 
than one occasion. 
The Questionnaire: Section One 
Multiple choice questions that reflect the homo hierarchus associational 
relationship with the principles of naturalist structuralism. To recapitulate, in 
choosing this disposition, homo hierarchus are presupposing an objective social 
worid, explained through the use of deductive and the inductive scientific methods, 
with social structures exercising causal capacities over human agency thus 
making human behaviour predictable. In this social reality perspective, an elite 
with a socio-political will govern compliant citizens with both groups bound 
together in an established pattern of duties and obligations. Thus, a consistent 
homo hierarchus would agree with the following statements: 
1 . Human Nature 
b) "Individuals are rational and recognise that they can rise above their feelings 
and passions by striving for good conduct, loyalty and sincerity. This can only 
be made possible through conformity to nonns, imposed by a social order, that 
detemiines both how they should live and encourages them in the habit of self-
control." 
2. Facts 
b) "A fact is a statement that has been verified by experts using reason and the 
scientific method." 
3. The Social World 
a) "I consider the social worid to be objective and knowable, and one in which 
social forces mould human behaviour." 
4. Community 
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a) "Community is just another constituent of the hierarchical social order." 
5. Decisions 
d) "I make personal decisions on the basis that they decide what we should think." 
6. Ethics 
d) "The end of moral activity lies in an individual finding her or his station or 
position in life and then carrying out its duties." 
Multiple choice questions that reflect the homo economicus associational 
relationship with the principles of naturalist agency. To recapitulate, when 
cho9sing this disposition, homo economicus presupposes an objective social 
worid, explained by the inductive and to a lesser extent the deductive, scientific 
methods. Here structure is reduced to nothing more than collections of 
autonomous individuals as agents are in control of their own behaviour, which is 
made predictable through its unconstrained self-interest. In this social reality 
perspective, the free mari<et is the predominant mechanism of government with 
the state having as small a role as possible. Thus, a consistent homo economicus 
would agree with the following statements: 
1. Human Nature 
a) "Individuals are essentially free beings who seek liberation from the 
interference of others as they continuously pursue their own pleasure." 
2. Facts 
a) "A fact is a staterrient that I believe because it helps riie \Nork out how to 
produce beneficial results for myself, after all matters are considered." 
3. The Social World 
c) "I consider the social world to be objective and knowable, and one in which 
individual intentions mould human behaviour." 
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4- Community 
b) "Community is a fictifious body of self-interested individuals." 
5. Decisions 
a) "I make personal decisions on the basis that I decide what I will think." 
6. Ethics 
a) "The moral Tightness of an action can best be judged by the goodness of its 
consequence, hence the end justifies the means, which makes such an action 
intrinsically good." 
Multiple choice questions that reflect the homo sociologicus associational 
relationship with the principles of hermeneutic structuralism. To recapitulate, 
in choosing this disposition homo sociologicus presupposes a subjective social 
world understood as it is socially constructed, with human behaviour being 
determined, and thus made predictable, through the collective interpretation of 
social reality. In this social reality perspective communities are the primary unit of 
a system of governance that places a premium on individual participation and 
cultural relativism that can achieve shared attitudes and values. Thus, a 
consistent ^omo sociologicus would agree with the following statements: 
1. Human Nature 
b) "Individuals have a natural aptitude for virtuous actions as they constantly 
strive for the right knowledge, the right speech and the right conduct." 
2. Facts 
d) "A fact can only be validated through discussion with others, because only then 
can there be the appropriate mutual understanding of what is meant by a 
factual statement." 
3. The Social World 
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c) "I consider the social worid to be subjective and knowable through 
understandings that result from discussions with others, thus, individual 
behaviour is determined by how people collectively interpret reality." 
4, Community 
d) "Community is a collective committed to engaging in discourses that build 
shared values and attitudes amongst its membership." 
5, Decisions 
b) "I make my personal decisions on the basis that I have, with other community 
members, collectively decided what I will think." 
6, Ethics 
b) "As there is no single true morality across time, societies and individuals a 
moral act is one where a good action is accompanied by good intentions, and 
the right emotions and feelings." 
Multiple choice questions that reflect the homo existentialis associational 
relationship with the principles of hermeneutic agency. To recapitulate, in 
choosing this disposition the homo existentialis presupposes a contested social 
worid, understandable only as what people believe it to be. Thus, human 
behaviour is unpredictable, as human agency is constrained by individuals' 
subjective perceptions of social reality. In this social reality perspective the 
individual must constantly guard against coercion and manipulative from 
untrustworthy collectives. Thus, a consistent homo existentiatis would agree with 
the following statements: 
1, Human Nature 
d) "Individuals are essentially unique beings, free, through acts of their own will, to 
choose who and what to make of themselves." 
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2. Facts 
c) "There is no such thing as a fact, for nothing is knowable with absolute 
certainty." 
3. The Social Worid 
b) "I consider the social world to be unknowable, thus, human behaviour is 
unknowable and therefore, unpredictable." 
4. Community 
c) "Community is another instrument of potential or actual external control." 
5. Decisions 
d) "I make personal decisions on the basis that they decide what I must think." 
6. Ethics 
c) "Moral beliefs are just matters of personal taste because moral truths are 
simply unknowable." 
The Questionnaire: Section Two 
The multiple choice questions are followed by 24 propositions that invite the 
respondent to indicate whether he or she strongly agrees, agrees, disagrees or 
strongly disagrees with each statement by use of the Likert Scale illustrated in 
Figure 6.1. 
Figure 6.1: The Likert Scale used in the Questionnaire 
Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree 
Ratings -2 -1 +1 +2 
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By emulating the process used for Section one operational definitions of the 
dimensions and sub dimensions of the deductive enquiry in Chapters 2 to 5 enable 
each question to be fundamentally associated with one of the four perspectives on 
social reality. For instance, the first proposition states that "Communities should 
make decisions that preserve national social unity." The underpinnings of this 
notion are well documented in Chapter 5 as the concept of naturalist structuralism 
is examined through the dimension of hierarchy. This leads to a sub-dimension of 
the ethereal bond that exists between the 6lite and the citizen that assumes an 
operational definition in the heuristic clue of "preserving national social unity." 
The second statement in Section two refers to communities making decisions 
based on group consensus avoiding individual risk. The heuristic clue is the 
rejection the causal capacity of agency and the subjective notion of group 
consensus. Thus, this statement can be associated with the social reality 
perspective of hermeneutic structuralism. 
The fifth statement in Section two refers to collective understandings being 
impossible amongst community members, as nobody can know another person's 
thoughts. The heuristic clue is the rejection of structure and the rejection of all 
objective thought, as there can be know no explanation for another person's 
actions. Thus, this statement can be associated with the social reality perspective 
of hemneneutic agency. 
The seventh statement in Section two refers to understanding of members of a 
community only being possible is they are regarded as "a collection of self-
interested individuals." The heuristic clue is again the rejection of structure but 
here this is tempered by an acceptance of objectivity as the notion and parameters 
of self-interest can be explained and accepted amongst like-minded individuals. 
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The use of Likert Scales in the Questionnaire The process of developing a 
series of Likert Scales usually begins with the selection of a large number of items, 
each relating to a set of specific circumstances that inspire an attitude ranging 
from strong agreement to strong disagreement. These items are then tested to 
determine patterns of agreement and disagreement. After the results from this 
system of selection have been analysed, by using a rating scale such as that 
illustrated in Figure 6.1, the extent that the score for each given item correlates 
with the total score is assessed. At this point, those items that correlate weakly 
with the total score are disregarded, leaving the final questionnaire to offer a 
smaller set of highly relevant variables for testing to ascertain the underlying 
attitude. 
As this research is underpinned by an ontological and epistemological 
framework that is logically irrefutable, as epistemologically. knowledge can only be 
objective or subjective and ontologically structures have causal capacity (of some 
degree) or they do not, preliminary testing to exclude Irrelevant variables is 
unnecessary. Furthermore, it was decided to exclude the option of "undecided" 
from the Likert Scales, as this programme is designed for a sophisticated sample 
that, in their chosen role of employees capable of achieving the expectations of 
their employers, would have reflected on and reached individual conclusions about 
the questions posed in this research. 
The 24 propositions in the second part of the questionnaire are each listed 
below the rubric of their designated perspective on social reality. Thus, each of 
the four headings determines and exemplifies the principles that are reflected in its 
nominated propositions. 
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statements that reflect adherence to naturalist structuralism. This 
disposition accepts that the concept of community is just another constituent within 
the hierarchical social order. 
1. Communities should make decisions that preserve national social unity. 
4. National loyalty is more important than loyalty to your local community. 
10. Communities should be lead by community members with proven expertise 
and experience. 
13. Community is just another part of the nation's social order. 
17. If community members observe their duties to their communities then the state 
should accept its obligations to these communities. 
20. If community plays its part in maintaining the social order then community 
members should be willing to make voluntary sacrifices on its behalf. 
Statements that reflect adherence to hermeneutic structuralism. This 
disposition accepts that community is a collective that can renew a sense of moral 
authority and thus, bring well being to its members as they share their ideas and 
values. 
2. Communities should make decisions based on a group consensus that avoids 
individual personal risk. 
6. Making voluntary contributions and sacrifices to the shared aims of our 
community is desirable. 
9. Community is a social entity that can empower activists in community matters 
to achieve the "good life" for all community members. 
14. A personal commitment to discussing ideas and values with other community 
members should be valued. 
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16. Individual community members will benefit from being involved in collectively 
making group decisions. 
23. Community members can understand their community or a community through 
consultation with other community members. 
Statements that reflect adherence to hermeneutic agency. This disposition 
perceives community as just another instrument of potential or action control over 
human autonomy. 
5- Collective agreements amongst community members are impossible, as we 
cannot know how other people think. 
8. As individuals cannot' influence community outcomes apathy towards 
community is justified. 
12. Community just represents another unavoidable mechanism of potential or 
actual control over the individual. 
15, No individual sacrifices should be made for the community unless benefits can 
be expected in return. 
19, As the social world cannot be known and understood then community 
decisions can only be based on risk minimisation aspirations. 
21. Management of community affairs is just about management for individual 
survival. 
Statements that reflect adherence to naturalist agency. This disposition 
perceives community as an unthreatening. but purposeless, fictitious group of 
individuals. 
3. All community projects should be managed to achieve measurable 
improvements to individual well being. 
260 
7. A community can only be understood as a collection of self-interested 
individuals. 
11. Community members only make voluntary sacrifices to their community if their 
personal potential benefit exceeds any costs incurred. 
18.Community organisations are fictitious as they only exist as a network of 
relationships amongst self-interested individuals. 
22, Community members should be only interested in maximising their material 
well being when making decisions in community settings. 
24. Community decision taking should be concerned with supporting people in the 
pursuit of their rational self-interest. 
Results from the Questionnaire 
Sixteen completed questionnaires where returned from six different community 
organisations in Cornwall representing a 32% response rate. The results from the 
questionnaire were analysed based on highlighting the philosophical consistencies 
and inconsistencies of the responding community practitioners. The use of the 
statistical computations of the arithmetic mean^^ and the standard deviation^^ 
helped in attaining this objective as it became possible to make meaningful 
comparisons between aggregated individual scores. 
Observations are made by reference to the Figures and Tables that feature in 
this Chapter and Appendix 6.1. Each of these Figures reflects the extent that each 
respondent agrees or disagrees with the reality perception of a particular 
methodological family. This has been achieved by aggregating the scores on the 
Likert scale for each respondent then graphically representing the totals in a 
" A familiar measure of central tendency the mean is the sum of atl values of each observation of a 
variable divided by the total number of observations. 
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histogram. Thus in Figures 6.2 overleaf, and Figures 6,1.1. 6.1.2, 6.1.3 the total 
score is shown on the horizontal axis and the number of individual respondents 
who have attained that score is shown on the vertical axis. 
The statistics in Table 6.2 on page 264 provide the number and percentage of 
individual respondents who adhere to a particular reality perspective in relation to 
human nature, facts, the social world, community, decision making and ethics. 
When interpreting the results it is recognised that the limitations of Likert 
Scales, the small sample and the relatively low response rate for a sun/ey of this 
design must influence the credibility afforded to the results. 
Philosophical Consistencies 
When community practitioners adhere to the social reality perspective of 
hermeneutic structuralism they embrace a social world where the concept of 
community assumes a critical importance in all aspects of social life, a scenario in 
stark contrast to the vision of community associated with the three alternative 
social reality perspectives. Therefore, it could be expected that community 
practitioners would maintain a consistent preference for the values, attitudes and 
opinions that underpin the statements and questions associated with hermeneutic 
structuralism. On this basis the results from Section one revealed the following 
consistencies (see Table 6.2): 
^ Standard deviation measures the dispersion of scores around the mean. Thus, a distribution, by 
computing the square root of its variance, can be compared to another set of scores. 
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Categorical Preferences for Contending Social Reality Perceptions 
Figure 6.2 Aggregated scores for responses to all statements that adhere to the 
hermeneutic structuralist perspective on social reality 
Std Dev = 1 96 
Mean = 5 6 
N = 16 00 
2 0 3 0 4 0 5 0 6,0 
Total H.Structuralism 
7.0 8 0 90 
Table 6.1 The responses made to each statement that adheres to the hermeneutic 
structuralist perspective on social reality^ 
(2) strongly agree (1) Agree (-1) Disagree 
tion No. Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
2 11 69% 5 31% 
6 14 88% 2 12% 
9 15 94% 1 6% 
14 4 25% 12 75% 
16 4 25% 11 69% 1 6% 
23 5 31% 11 69% 
Mean Std Dev. 
2 0.38 0.96 
6 0.75 0.68 
9 0.87 0.5 
14 1.25 0.45 
16 1.13 0.72 
23 1.31 0.48 
(-2) Strongly 
disagree 
Number Percen 
All percentages in Table 6 1 have been either rounded up or down as appropriate. 
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Table 6.2 Preferred adherence {homo s6c/o/og/cus, homo hierarchus, homo econo/n/cus, 
and homo existentialis) to a certain perspective on social reality in relation to human 
nature, facts, the social world, community, decision making and ethics 
Options 
Homo Homo Homo Homo 
Sociologicus Hierarchus Economicus Existentialis 
Human 
Nature 1 6% 15 94% 
Facts 7 44% 1 6% 6 37% 
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The 
Social 1 6% 3 19% 11 69% 1 6% 
World 
Comm- 15 94% 1 6% 
unity 
Decision 15 94% 1 6% 
Making 
Ethics 4 25% 10 62% 1 6% 1 6% 
• Fifteen respondents (94%) chose the philosophical definition of community 
that is the preferred choice of homo sociologicus (Section one: 4d). This 
statement recognises the concept of community as a collective that is 
committed to building shared values and attitudes amongst its membership 
through the medium of discourse. Fifteen respondents (94%), chose the 
understanding of decision-making embraced by homo sociologicus (Section 
one; 5b). This notion is encompassed in the realisation that collective 
decisions, made by a consensus of community members, will be the basis of 
individual's personal choices concerning their decisions about community. 
An identical rationale has been applied to the results from Section two of the 
questionnaire, thus consistency, in adherence to the social reality perspective of 
hermeneutic structuralism, is apparent as follows: 
• Table 6.1, measures responses to statements that reflect the principles of 
hermeneutic structuralism. Here all individuals in the sample either strongly 
agreed or agreed with propositions 14 and 23. Both these statements concern 
the necessity for consultation and discussion amongst community members 
and with community groups. Therefore, they contain the sample's 
endorsement of the conversation-saturated nature of the community 
environment. 
• The theme of consultation and discussion also features in proposition number 
sixteen and Table 6.1 shows that, with only one exception, the sample either 
strongly agree or agree that community members benefit from involvement in 
group decision-making. 
• Table 6.1.1. that reflects attitudes towards the principles of naturalist 
structuralism, has the sample either in disagreement or strong disagreement 
over the notion expressed in Question 4 that national loyalty is more important 
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than loyalty to your local community. There is also a strong majority (over 
80%), that reject the propositions (1) that communities should endeavour to 
preserve national social unity; (2) that communities should be lead by those 
members who are qualified to do so and (3) that the concept of community is 
just another part of nation's social order. 
• Table 6.1.2 measures responses made to statements that reflect the principles 
of naturalist agency. Here there is total disagreement with the notion that 
community members should only be interested in maximising their own 
material well being when making decisions in community settings. 
Furthermore, apart for one positive response, fifteen respondents rejected the 
proposition that community organisations are fictitious as they only exist as a 
network of relationships amongst self-interested individuals. 
• Table 6.1.2 also reveals that fourteen respondents (88%). are in disagreement 
with the notion that voluntary sacrifices for communities only occur when 
personal potential benefit exceeds any cost incurred. 
• Table 6.1.3 measures responses made to statements that reflect the principles 
of hermeneutic agency. Here there is a unanimous rejection of proposition 
numbers 5, 8 and 12 with the statements 15, 19 and 21 only receiving sparse 
support. Thus, our community workers ovenwhelmingly reject homo 
existentialis suspicion over the dynamics of community involvement. 
• The histogram that features in Figure 6.2 reflects a positive mean of 5.6 
compared to the negative means of -2.5 (naturalist structuralism), -3.8 
(naturalist agency) and -5.5 (hermeneutic agency). Therefore, this statistically 
justifies the general perception of an aggregated score that favours the social 
reality perspective of hermeneutic structuralism. 
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Philosophical Inconsistencies 
Unexpected responses from participants cause inconsistencies in the pattern of 
results. However, in emulating the parameters applied in relation to philosophical 
consistencies, minor statistical aberrations are treated with caution. Moreover, 
data is only used to substantiate assertions when the results are conclusive. 
Thus, the following observations relate to the values, attitudes and opinions of the 
sample of community workers when they expressed a pronounced adherence to a 
reality perception other than that of hermeneutic structuralism. On this basis the 
results from Section two reveal the following incohsistencies (see Table 6.2): 
• Fifteen of the respondents (94%) chose the definition of human nature that 
accords with homo economicus*s preferred social reality. This option 
recognises individuals as autonomous beings actively seeking their freedom 
from others in order that they can pursue and maximise their own pleasures. 
This left only one respondent embracing the proposition that human beings 
have an essential aptitude for virtuous action, which accords with hermeneutic 
structuralist principles. 
• Eleven respondents (69%), of the sample, considered that the social world was 
objective and knowable. and one where individual intentions would mould 
human behaviour facilitating individual autonomy and individual self-
determination, neither of which accord with hermeneutic structuralist principles. 
An identical rationale has been applied to the results from Section two of the 
questionnaire, thus inconsistency, in adherence to the social reality perspective of 
hermeneutic-structuralism is apparent as follows: 
• Table 6.1.1 shows thirteen respondents (81%), in agreement, and two (12%), 
in strong agreement with the deontological proposition that if citizens observe 
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their duty to their community then the state should accept its obligations to this 
community. Thus, only one respondent rejected this naturalist structuralist 
statement. 
• Table 6.1.2 has ten respondents (62%), in agreement with the naturalist 
agency principle that community projects should be managed to achieve 
measurable improvements in individual well being. 
Reflections over the Design of the Research Programme 
Before analysing the implications arising from the research data, it is necessary 
to reflect on some specific aspects in the design of the programme. This 
evaluation of the judgements made during the construction of the programme 
begins with the reflexive conversation, which underlies the chosen method of 
sampling. 
Sampling. Not collecting data on the personal characteristics of individual 
respondents might seem negligent when personal characteristics of individuals 
may play a part in the construction of the values, attitudes and opinions that they^ 
may adopt in a particular relational situation. Certainly, it would be interesting to 
correlate such variables as age, gender and locality with how individuals felt about 
community reality. However, any research programme is relevant to its 
contextualisation in what can loosely be termed "the real world." If a project is 
innovative and attempts to address issues that have been neglected (and it is the 
function of this thesis to do exactly that) then the exploration of the conundrum will 
demand an exploratory piece of research that paves the way for more elaborate 
and intricate studies. Quite simply the researcher must begin somewhere and if 
this neglects issues of age, gender and income then, nevertheless, some progress 
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has been made on establishing some broad principles that can act as stimulants 
for further investigation. 
Obviously, with limited time and a very limited budget, practicality rather than 
preference drove the chosen sampling procedure; the alternative strategy of 
stratified random sampling is certainly preferable when conditions prevail that 
permits its execution. The researcher could then have embraced a process, which 
would also have allowed the possibility of scientific proportionate selection in 
relation to gender, age? and income. However, the gatekeepers prevented this 
strategy. Thus, as is often the case in social research programmes pragmatism 
supersedes notions of academic experimentation. 
Selection of Variables. Undoubtedly the results from the study suggest that 
further research may need to accommodate additional variables such as age, 
gender and education. However, it is contended that this should not result in a 
methodology that explains individual's associating with particular social reality 
perspectives. This distaste for generalities, drawn from causal explanations, is 
recognition of the complexity of human nature and the dangers of attributing too 
great a significance to the Dixon and Dogan typology. 
Operationalisation of the Abstractions. It is accepted that the concept of "real 
worid research" may lack academic purity but this thesis is intended to offer 
practitioners a set of tools that can enable a better understanding of community 
member's social reality perspectives rather than an inflexible set of techniques that 
offer a lirhited generalisation. about community dynamics. Nevertheless, the 
apparent departure from De Vaus's "ladder of abstraction" is significant in that the 
recognised techniques for social research have been circumvented and therefore, 
any implications drawn from the data must be treated with some degree of caution. 
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Statements in the Questionnaire - Ambiguity and Distinctiveness. This 
investigation into the cognitive consistency of community practitioners involves the 
application of heuristic theory, whereby word cues are used to identify social 
reality dispositions. Of course, heuristic judgements are conditional upon the 
importance and relevance of decisions and the degree of personal accountability 
they engender. Thus, they too must be regarded with some degree of caution. 
Nevertheless they offer a means of measuring attitudes rooted in academic 
theories that recognises the process of heuristic inference as a valuable 
detenninate in assessing individual choice. 
Obviously; whilst heuristics may aid the respondent, the statements must offer 
the necessary clues. This is, by necessity, a process open to the subjectivity of the 
researcher as he or she constructs statements that they think will be specific, 
meaningful and concise thus enabling the respondent to easily reach a concrete 
decision about its acceptance or rejection. Therefore, in acknowledgement of this 
scenario it is recognised that a degree of ambiguity may enter the questionnaire 
and some statements may not be as discriminate between social reality 
perspectives as necessary. 
Finally, after reflection, the research would have benefited from a number of 
follow-up unstructured interviews where results could have examined by 
respondents to ascertain how they felt about the possibility of experiencing a state 
of cognitive dissonance. Would they: (1) Accept or deny the possibility of cognitive 
dissonance? (2) Assume a "rhetoric of intransigence"? (3) Acknowledge that belief 
dis-confirming evidence might adversely affect their effectiveness as a community 
practitioner. Similariy, the research programme would have benefited from the 
triangulation available through employment of the alternative approach of 
ethnomethodology. This would have facilitated careful observation of individual's 
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behaviour, in a community setting, over a period of time considered adequate to 
deliver uncontrolled responses. Unfortunately, such a strategy was beyond the 
financial resources available for this project. 
Implications Arising 
A community practitioner who perceives human relations from the reality 
perspective of naturalist agency understands the social world as an objective 
domain that can only be explained by reference to the rational choices made by 
individuals in pursuit of what they wish, desire, believe or will. Apart from one 
respondent, each participant holds this position which is incompatible with the 
socially constructed domain of henmeneutic structuralism where social reality can 
only be understood by reference to people's shared interpretation of that reality. 
Yet, contemporaneously, each community practitioner sees the concept of 
community as a construct collectively committed to a discourse that promulgates 
shared values and attitudes. 
Thus, in this scenario, each respondent to the survey vigorously subscribes to 
the supposition that collective discourse should lead to consensual decision-
making but also agrees with the proposition that people see the social world 
objectively as naturalist knowledge retains supremacy over any notions that rely 
on the social construction of knowledge. Therefore, decisions must be made by 
the collective but ethically the results of these agreements are judged by 
deontological premises of duty and obligation between the elite and the governed, 
thereby recognising that compliant communities should be looked after by the 
state. 
If a community practitioner accepts the premise that people are self-interested 
then community might becomes a vehicle for that practitioner to influence the 
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decisions of others through sometimes protracted sessions of discourse. These 
exchanges may be justified by the individual community practitioner, as, in 
furthering his or her own utility, he or she would wish to maintain the concept of 
community as having a pre-eminent political importance. This degree of 
significance is corroborated by community members voluntarily offering their time 
and resources to the collective without any regard to their own material well being. 
Therefore, the individual community practitioner will judge the ethical merits of his 
or her community by the degree of community loyalty and obligation that he or she 
can engender for his or her specific community projects. 
Individuals completing the questionnaire would seem inclined to manipulate 
community outcomes to ensure that they adhere to state policies. In this scenario, 
inclusive community discourse might be welcomed but the community practitioner 
renders any opinion peripheral if it deviates from the intentions of the state 
hierarchy that have been clearly enunciated in a series of knowable objective 
outputs and outcomes. This inclination, that causes an individual community 
practitioner to digress from the principles of henneneutic structuralism, might have 
its origins in the tensions between his or her personal ideological preferences and 
the ethos that is inherent in his or her contract of employment. Thus, the pursuit of 
individual personal well being features as the metaphorical foundation that 
supports the results of the survey. 
As a small sample dictates that the survey can only be exploratory, and the 
results indicative, it is recommended that further research be undertaken to 
investigate the proposition that professional community practitioners may be 
inclined to adopt what they perceive as the expected values, attitudes and 
behaviours of their chosen career whilst they retain strong personal preferences 
for the principles of naturalist structuralism or naturalist agency. 
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So that individual community practitioners are offered an improved 
understanding of the curious and demanding dynamics that affect their daily 
encounters with community members, where the challenge of opting for advocacy 
or facilitation is a enduring issue, it is useful to return to the fundamental precepts 
that describe the way that attitudes are constructed and may change in differing 
relational situations. This re-framing of the survey results utilises the notion that 
citizens will adhere, in any particular relational situation, to one of the four 
contending perceptions of social reality and thus clearly illustrates what may be 
understood as the community practitioner's dilemma. 
Drawing on Dili's three conceivable models of the individuals (1995 and 1999), 
described in Chapter 3, it is proposed that the community practifioners who 
responded to the questionnaire share a set of resolute meanings about the 
discursive nature and purpose of community work. Whilst the wide ranging 
questions about social reality included in the questionnaire provide contradictory 
results in relation to both ontological and epistemological distinctions, 
examinations of the options chosen in the statements concerning community 
reveals a common understanding of its communicative nature. Nevertheless, the 
results, within the parameters of the relational situations that occur within each 
community practitioner's professional experiences, does not validate the 
proposition that each member of the sample of community practitioners is a 
predominately coherent. For instance, a single-minded homo sociologicus would 
not accommodate the strong homo hierarchus belief that, through the 
maintenance of the existing social order, it is expected that the ethereal bond 
between the state and its citizens can be sustained by the maintenance of a 
reciprocal commitment to certain responsibilities. Thus, the state should observe 
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its obligations to its unlimited number of communities if those community 
members both accept and fulfil their community duties. 
A fundamental inconsistency became apparent when the principle of 
maximising individual utility, which is embraced by homo economicus as an 
essential tool in the achievement of individual well being, was largely accepted by 
each respondent community practitioner as a creative force that would offer some 
benefits to the community group in its search to find solutions to improve its social 
relationships. 
So, guided by these results, it is necessary to move beyond the confined and 
determined circumstanceis that would feature a coherent community practitioner, 
who can comfortably associate with the principles of henneneutlc structuralism 
and is confident in expressing either rejection or indifference towards the other 
three contending philosophical perceptions of reality. Alternatively, it seems more 
relevant to. consider whether individual practitioners have already accepted and 
employed a sequential series of attitudes towards the community work nexus. 
From this standpoint a practitioner would choose hybrid notions that selectively, in 
specific relational situations, exact specific principles from the social reality 
perspectives of naturalist structuralism, naturalist agency or hermeneutic agency 
to further his or her logically self-justified pursuit of his or her cause (Olli, 1999: 
60). Thus, each practitioner adapts to a new set of values and attitudes on the 
basis that these revised status and role relationships can further the benefits he or 
she can gain in a particular situation. Without doubt, the metamorphosis of each 
individual is given more credence by his or her wish to implement plans of action 
that will achieve the objectives and move towards the aims that form part of his or 
her contract of employment. 
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However, if an individual community practitioner can re-evaluate his or her 
beliefs to maximise the potential returns possible from a specific situation and 
temper his or her concerns over job security, then he or she may be empowered to 
undertake a process of positive reflection. So, it can be argued, that far from a 
sequential shared meaning system sufficing the demands of contemporary 
community, the community practitioner should consider adopting the role of the 
synthetic individual who can accept profoundly different ways of describing, 
analysing and judging his or her social world. This scenario might offer the 
expansive boundaries that can provide the elusive goal of inclusive participatory 
communities. Community development rhetoric can then embrace the four 
contending social reality dispositions that are at the centre of this project. 
Therefore, informed by the findings from this empirical research, the proposition is 
advanced that the individual community practitioner, in fonmulating his or her core 
beliefs, values and attitudes, should give serious consideration to adopting the 
disposition of a synthetic social realist. If individual community practitioners can 
accept the challenge of this transformation then it is likely that they will achieve 
better results when handling the ambiguities and the inevitable conflicts and 
misunderstandings that arise from community engagement. However, the type of 
reflexive skills needed for the individual to embrace the synthetic model have been 
omitted from the agenda for training that forms part of the latest European 
Declaration on the development of a thriving civil society through the mechanisms 
of community development. 
This Declaration requires further examination as, in its language, it presents a 
certain set of ideas as typifications and thus, objectlvates, through the taken-for-
granted reality of its authors, a natural order for communities throughout the 
European Union (Berger and Luckmann, 1966). 
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The Budapest Declaration^'^ 
A group of 130 community practitioners, researchers, policy-makers, and 
representatives from government, civil society organisations and community 
groups from 33 countries across the European Union and beyond met in March 
2004 to consider the challenge of building civil society in Europe through 
community development. In the preamble to the published declaration 
(International Association for Community Development, Combined European 
Bureau for Social Development and Hungarian Association for Community 
Development, 2004) they requested that "the EU, national, regional and local 
governments — as appropriate — to commit themselves actively to build a socially 
and economically inclusive, diverse, environmentally sustainable and socially just 
society". 
This precursor sets the style of the Budapest Declaration and its assumption 
that there is a broad consensus across Europe about the manner that community 
development initiatives can be organised, and that their anticipated success will 
inevitably benefit civil society. Indeed, as the prospect of social benefits is a 
certainty, the second clause in the document suggests that "ail national 
governments should consider the appointment of a Minister with specific 
responsibility for creating and implementing community development policy, by 
2006." Furthermore, "that Minister should have a cross-departmental remit." 
To achieve successful community development thirty recommendations were 
included in the text of the agreed statement. These endorsements have been 
examined to gauge the extent that they address the following four imperatives. 
The full text of the Budapest Declaration can be found on website 
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(1) Developing the responsibility of the community for local initiatives: 
Proposition 5 requires that learning and training needs for each community should 
be "developed from the 'bottom up'." However, this should reflect a core 
curriculum of lifelong learning about active citizenship and critical reflection. 
Additionally, training should build on "local skills, resources, strengths and needs, 
and recognising issues of gender, cultural diversity, sustainable development and 
inclusion; in short, offering 'access to diversity and diversity of access'." Arising 
from this training process, Proposition 14 requires that the "EU and national 
policies should provide incentives to rural communities to mobilise their members 
and their resources to address local problems, strengthening their capacities to do 
so. Furthermore, Proposition 26 states that "Local communities should be 
recognised as active and legitimate partners in the development of plans, 
structures and policies for local economic development." 
(2) Improve "partnership working" to ensure better delivery of welfare 
services: 
This issue is dealt with in Proposition number 8: "To promote ownership and 
mutual commitment, an active dialogue should be fostered between research and 
practice involving all stakeholders; this wilt require a greater degree of 
reflectiveness on the part of researchers as to how their skills can be made 
available to local communities." 
(3) Improve participation in consultation about and management of 
community initiatives: 
www.adata. hu/_kozossegi_Adat 
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The declaration directly mentions the issue of participation on three occasions 
and indirectly once. Proposition 3 asks regional and local authorities to publish 
and implement "annual action plans which outline the relevant special measures 
including investments, monitoring and evaluation of community development In 
facilitating effective citizen participation." Then, under the heading of "Research", 
Proposition 7 states that the process of research should become "a vehicle for 
participation." Subsequently. Proposition 16 states that "all people in areas 
subject to regeneration should have the right to participate at every stage in its 
regeneration and future." Finally, Proposition 29 states "that community 
development has a critical role to play in engaging people in increasingly diverse 
communities through inclusive methods." 
(4) Mobilising community involvement in local economic development: 
Proposition 24 states that "Every national action plan — including plans to combat 
poverty and social inclusion — should be required to include a section, which 
addresses the role of the social economy and local community economic 
development." 
Whilst it would be churlish to suggest that the Budapest Declaration was agreed 
in anything other than good faith, its superficiality can encourage the "myopic" 
practitioner. Such a practitioner might well consider that, provided local 
organisational structures are In place and messages of support issued by central 
and local government, high levels of pro-active participation amongst community 
members would be the inevitable result. 
The emphasis on a consensual approach to community development, based on 
questionable assumptions, is adopted by the declaration, and this raises some 
obvious concerns. The typification of "community," by both government and 
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practitioners, as a collective unit of social analysis fails to recognise the 
importance of the individual in the cultural reconstruction that is being driven on by 
the rolling back of the welfare state throughout western liberal democracies. Thus, 
the expected dynamic within communities, created by the wholehearted 
involvement of its members, neglects the increasing prevalence for individuals to 
exercise their own preferences that are in contradistinction to collectivist solutions. 
The dilemma that results from a failure to accommodate differing perspectives 
on social reality that exist in a community setting is well illustrated by Baldock and 
Ungerson's (1996) study into peoples'attitudes to the provision of care. This 
research identifies a typology of values and attitudes, or cultural "habits of the 
heart" (Baidock and Ungerson, 1996: 28) that can be associated with people's 
social reality dispositions (see Figure 6.3). 
Welfarism. This is the approach to welfare delivery that would attract homo 
sociologicus, as it is collectivist and accommodates high levels of participation by 
stakeholders in its policy formulation and implementation. Community 
practitioners, whether they adopt a consensual, pluralist or radical approach to 
their work would aim to coalesce community members around what they perceive 
as shared needs being satisfied through the maximisation of benefits. To achieve 
this end, community practitioners would assist in building the capacity for 
educational awareness and activism within community groups. 
Partnerships of statutory and voluntary agencies would also be promoted 
through a strategy of collaborative community development that is working 
towards the objective of pemianent social change by increased social inclusion 
and improved social justice. Those community practitioners and community 
members whp take the view that social change is only possible through conflict 
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may also advocate non-violent direct acfion as a means of furthering the common 
cause of a community or communities. 
Figure 6.3: A Typology of Modes of Welfare Delivery 
High 
Participation 
Individualist 
CONSUMERISM WELFARISM 
PRIVATISM CLIENTALISM 
Collectivist 
Low 
Participation 
Source: Baldock and Ungerson 1996: 29 
Partnerships of statutory and voluntary agencies would also be promoted 
through a strategy of collaborative community development that is working 
towards the objective of pennanent social change by increased social inclusion 
and improved social justice. Those community practitioners and community 
members who take the view that social change is only possible through confiict 
may also advocate non-violent direct action as a means of furthering the common 
cause of a community or communities. 
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Therefore, paradoxically, welfarism lies at the core of the Budapest 
Declaration. However, its reliance on a consensual approach by government 
bodies and community organisations seems misguided, given the problems 
government would encounter if it supports a sequence of social interactions that, 
as pointed out by Baldock and Ungerson (1996: 32) will, if enacted by a large 
number of different groups, rapidly overwhelm the available resources of the public 
sector. 
Clientalism. This approach would attract the hierarchical homo hierarchus and 
the apathetic homo existentialis whose pre-disposition is to accept whatever 
seems inevitable. Thus, welfare is distributed on a traditional basis favouring the 
deserving working class. A safety net would be offered to those who suffer 
unexpected loss of employment. However, pressure would be exerted to ensure 
their return to the workplace as quickly as possible. Similarly, medical care would 
be dispensed by a hierarchy of professionals who are understood to know best, 
and social workers can apply considerable legislative powers against any citizen 
who is deemed to have broken acceptable nonns of conduct. 
The results from this mode of welfare delivery are reflected in the problems 
haunting contemporary public services. For instance, citizens suffer long waiting 
lists for essential hospital operations, entitlement to services is both difficult to 
ascertain and may require considerable persistence before it is forthcoming. 
Furthermore, there is uniformity in provision that labels individual priorities as 
unimportant. 
It is inevitable that welfarism will find few friends amongst those socially 
competent enough to join with others to negotiate' better outcomes or those who 
can take full responsibility for their own well-being. Nevertheless, community 
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members who believe that the state is obliged to take care of its respectable duty 
bound citizens, and ensure that the lumpenproletariat are disinclined to challenge 
the established social order, will recognise welfarism as offering a stability and 
security that is lacking in alternative methods of delivery. 
Privatism. This is an unconditional acceptance of the efficacy of the marketplace 
and its contractual relationships between buyers and sellers. This would be 
attractive to the self-interested homo economicus. However, Baldock and 
Ungerson (1996) dismiss this approach to welfare delivery as inapplicable for the 
distribution of scarce resources. They maintain that, as service availability 
becomes restricted to the attainment of bottom-line profit, social exclusion and 
dissatisfaction can become endemic. Nevertheless, those who have the capacity 
to subscribe for private health care plans or private education for their children fully 
embrace the market mechanism as offering recognition of their financial acumen. 
Baldock and Ungerson (1996: 31) describe people who encounter privatised 
welfare provision as confused, annoyed and often frightened by their experiences. 
However, it may be argued that, although even if many experience negative 
feelings about this mode of service delivery, some might be empowered by its lack 
of ambiguity, condescension and the freedom of choice offered. 
Consumerism. This approach to the delivery of welfare services places an 
emphasis on active consumer engagement, an active rather than passive 
response from stakeholders to the quality and quantity of service provided. This 
would be attractive to. self-interested homo economicus and to homo existentialis 
with anarcho-capitalist inclinafions. Community practitioners could facilitate this 
mode of delivery by introducing mechanisms Into the community paradigm that 
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encourages the involvement of individuals who have previously dismissed 
community as an irrelevant or insignificant concept. 
To achieve this type of welfare delivery there must be a workable community-
based social framework that is robust enough to adapt to identifiable individual and 
group preferences. In this scenario, the community practitioner must accept the 
notion that their community's cultural properties are reflected in the various strands 
of situational logic employed by its members towards a certain set of 
circumstances. These properties can also be a tangible outcome from socially 
restraining or liberating influences that can possibly trace their inception to a 
combination of the consistencies and incompatibilities of life within a specific area. 
Therefore, as recognised by Baldock and Ungerson (1996: 17). the attainment of a 
consumerist approach that can cater for both individual and group preferences 
alongside the various objective and subjective demands of consumers is a cultural 
rather than financial obstacle. 
Conclusion 
In this Chapter, the results from empirical research reveal a significant gap 
between the holistic rhetoric of community proselytisers and the social reality 
perspectives chosen by a small cohort of community workers in a community 
setting. Participants have revealed inconsistencies in their attitudes towards the 
relational situation of community that suggests that their commitment to the 
values, attitudes and beliefs embraced by hermeneutic structuralism is, in part, a 
fa9ade. Behind this screen a community practitioner might choose to maximise his 
or her personal utility, possibly through compliance with , hierarchical decision 
making. Thus, the practitioner faces a community dilemma that can lead to 
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cognitive dissonance, which may in certain cases result in voluntary withdrawal 
from a community setting. 
Furthermore, the extent that the notion of inclusive community participation is 
challenged by the four contending social reality perceptions that adopt particular 
ideological expectations in relation to a differing modes of welfare delivery is 
apparent from Baldock and Ungerson's typology. Therefore, arising from this 
scenario, it is proposed that community practitioners should change direction and 
focus on accommodating contending perspectives on community reality. 
Pursuit of the aim of achieving inclusive communities could profitably begin 
with Proposition 7 in the Budapest Declaration, which states that "research should 
be as much a tool for communities as for policy makers." This pertinent 
observation challenges the myopic practitioner to re-evaluate the methodology 
employed in researching the needs of a community so that they can be 
understood as expressing an "essential unity as seen from a diversity of 
perspectives" (Ravn. 1991: 98). This reflexive process must consider how sujtably 
robust and durable symbiotic relationships can be developed with adherents to 
contending social reality dispositions so that inclusive communities with high levels 
of community participation become possible. 
Therefore, in the next chapter a new logic is offered. This is, in part, inspired by 
innovative ontological and epistemological conflation constructed with the 
assistance of the seminal work of Bhaskar (1978 and 1979) on transcendental and 
critical realism; and of Archer (1989, 1995, 2000 and 2003) on analytic dualism 
and morphogenesis, but fundamentally the result of the fresh theoretical insights 
provided by the Dixon and Dogan framework of contending perspectives on social 
reality. In this context, confidence in the capacity of the framework as a holistic 
devise capable of explanation and prediction of human behaviour is enhanced if 
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the presumption of cognitive consistency is maintained. This, however, does not 
deny the validity of the framework and its capacity to elicit a re-conceptualisation 
of the community paradigm. Such a re-conceptuaiisation can offer a means of 
reconciling the ontological and epistemological dichotomies through an infomned 
strategy for the management of community. 
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Appendix 6.1 
Categorical Preferences for Contending Social Reality Perceptions 
Figure 6.1.1 Aggregated scores for responses to all statements that adhere to the naturalist 
structuralist perspective on social reality 
Sld Dev = 2,50 
Mean = -2 5 
_ ! N = 16 00 
-6 0 -4 0 -2 0 0 0 2 0 4 0 
Total N.Structuralism 
Table 6.1.1 The responses made to each statement that adheres to the naturalist 
structuralist perspective on social reality ^ 
(2) strongly agree (1) Agree (-1) Disagree (-2) Strongly 
disagree 
Question No. Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percen 
1 2 12% 12 75% 2 12% 
4 . 14 88% 2 12% 
10 ' 1 e% 2 12% 12 75% 1 6% 
13 1 6% 13 81% 2 12% 
17 2 12% 13 81% 1 6% 
20 9 56% 7 44% 
Mean Std Dev. 
1 -0.87 0.81 
4 -1.13 0.34 
10 -0.63 1.03 
13 -1 0.63 
17 1 0.63 
20 0.13 1.03 
' AN percentages in Tables 6,1.1. 6.1.2 and 6.1.3 have been either rounded up or down as 
appropriate. 
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Appendix 6.1 (cont 'd) 
Figure 6.1.2 Aggregated scores for responses to alt statements that adhere to the naturalist 
agency perspective on social reality 
Std Dev= 1.91 
Mean = -3 8 
N= 16 00 
-60 -4.0 
Total N Agency 
Table 6.1.2 The responses made to each statement that adheres to the naturalist agency 
perspective on social reality 
(2) Strongly agree (1) Agree (-1) Disagree (-2) Strongly 
Question No. Number Percent 
disagree 
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percen 
3 10 62% 6 37% 
7 3 19% 13 81% 
11 1 6% 13 81% 1 6% 
18 1 6% 15 94% 
22 10 62% 6 37% 
24 5 31% 11 69% 
3 
7 
11 
18 
22 
24 
Mean 
0.25 
-0.63 
-0.81 
-0.87 
-1.38 
-0.38 
Std Dev. 
1 
0.81 
0.75 
0.5 
0.5 
0.96 
287 
Appendix 6.1 (cont 'd) 
Figure 6.1.3 Aggregated scores for responses to all statements that adhere to the 
hermeneutic agency perspective on social reality 
Std Dev = 1 75 
Mean = -5,5 
N = 16 00 
•100 -e 0 - 60 -4 0 
Total H Agency 
Figure 6.1.3 The responses made to each statements that adheres to the hermeneutic 
agency perspective on social reality 
(2) Strongly agree (1) Agree (-1) Disagree 
Question No. Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
5 14 88% 
8 10 62% 
12 16 100% 
15 1 6% 15 94% 
19 4 25% 11 69% 
21 
Mean 
3 
std Dev. 
19% 11 69% 
5 -1 0.63 
8 -1.38 0.5 
12 -1 0 
15 -0.87 0.5 
19 -0.56 0.96 
21 -0.75 0.93 
(-2) strongly 
disagree 
Number Percen 
2 12% 
6 37% 
6% 
12% 
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Accommodating Four Contending 
Perspectives on Community Reality 
Society is only like itself and the basic task is to conceptualise how ordered 
social forms have their genesis in human nature, just as social beings have their 
genesis in social forms (Archer, 1995: 167). 
As the four contending perspectives on community reality are based on 
mutually incompatible premises, if a style of community management exclusively 
operates informed by only one perspective on social reality then it is inevitable that 
some community members would feel isolated and alienated from community 
initiatives. Thus, adherents to communitarianism. in seeking to proselytise their 
doctrine, face emerging ethical antagonisms over what human actions are.good or 
bad. right or wrong, or virtuous or shameful (Dixon, a/., 2006). In this scenario 
communitarianism. as an operational strategy for managing the human aspects of 
community, denies the validity of classical, evolutionary and processual strategies 
as part of a policy of management that can lead to enhanced community and 
individual outcomes. 
Figure 7.1 depicts Whittington's typology of operational strategy that offers the 
choice of a fourfold methodological division between the differing means of 
289 
managing resources in a dynamic community setting with the aim of fulfilling the 
expectations of community members. These competing means of achieving goals 
can be understood as strategic benchmarks in the demarcation of approaches to^ 
human resource management (Marchington and Wilkinson, 2002: 213). The four 
strategic models correspond with Dixon and Dogan's typology of perspectives on 
social reality. 
The Classical Operational Strategy: This is based on the premeditated 
endeavours of senior managers who are committed to ensuring the survival of the 
community organisation. These professionals remain aloof from the everyday 
skirmishes that characterise the interaction between lower-order players in the 
hierarchy. And, the concepts of discipline and obedience are portrayed as 
essential features in this elitist approach to achieving goals through rational 
decision-making, made on the basis of skill and experience (Whittington, 1993: 
15-17). This approach is consistent with the principles of naturalist structuralism. 
The Evolutionary Operational Strategy: This is based on the notions of 
efficiency and effectiveness, as the competent community organisations are able 
to deliver on their aims and objectives, and thus survive, whilst the poor 
performers cease to exist. Thus, in response to emergent factors, the issue to be 
confronted is how should a community organisation adapt to the changing 
demands of the external environment, whilst retaining its viability to achieve given 
outputs and outcomes and also enhancing its entrepreneurial profile to improve its 
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Figure 7.1: Whittington*s Typology of Operational Strategy 
Deliberate Processes 
CLASSICAL SYSTEMIC 
Profit-maximising 
Outcomes 
Pluralistic 
Outcomes 
EVOLUTIONARY PROCESSUAL 
Emergent Processes 
Source: Derived from Whittington, 1993 
chances of further adaptation. This approach is consistent with the principles of 
naturalist agency. 
The Processual Operational Strategy: This is based on the notion that 
community members are "too limited in their understanding, wandering in their 
attention, and careless in their actions to unite around and then carry through a 
perfectly calculated plan" (Whittington, 1993: 4). Thus, the community organisation 
employs a strategy of incrementalism in a pattern of small changes that are 
reactive to emergent factors, rather than proactive to the external environment 
(Lindblom, 1979). In this paradigm, intuition would be paramount as a means of 
decision-taking as community organisations are recognised as existing in a climate 
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of tensions and contradictions. This approach is consistent with the principles of 
hermeneutic agency. 
The Systemic Operational Strategy: This approach encompasses the 
communitarian perspective under which operational strategy is based on the 
prevalent cultural and institutional interests that are discerned from the dominant 
norms of society. Thus, a strategy would be legitimised by a group consensus that 
offers management a culturally acceptable means of authenticating their decisions 
and actions. This approach is consistent with the principles of hermeneutic 
structuralism. 
The Dixon and Dogan typology, with its four perspectives on social reality, is 
thus clearly reflected in the categorisations used in Whittington's typology of 
operational strategies. This demonstrates that, although there has been an 
understanding of a quadripartite approach to human resource management, this 
understanding has manifested in the four operational strategy styles being 
regarded as discrete rather than fundamentally inter-related approaches that, 
together, provide a holistic approach. Thus, it is proposed that the promotion of the 
communitarian code of community morality that underpins the systemic 
operational strategy cannot be easily reconciled with other legitimate beliefs that 
underpin alternative operational strategies. 
Distrust Arising from Alternative Codes of Community Morality 
Communitarians, as adherents to homo sociologicus, are imbued with the moral 
necessity of engaging with other members of their community. So. through 
univocal and transparent discourse, all participating citizens can jointly affirm their 
shared social norms that designate certain hurnan actions as either virtuous or 
shameful. So. by this process, there is a discernible commitment to an agreed set 
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of principles about what is in the best interest of those who have embraced a 
communitarian's understanding of social reality. This course of action leads to an 
ordered, recun-ent pattern of social behaviour that can be understood as 
originating from a set of interpretations derived from shared culture, language and 
practices that create primary principles rather than a moral code that is derived 
from the exploration of consequences or a set of categorical lmperatives. 
When proselytising their ethical beliefs, communitarians would be particularly 
concerned about the moral code adopted by homo economicus. This is because 
these community members advocate the concept of the unencumbered self, which 
communitarians perceive as an empty confused entity that suffers from a lack of 
clear social aims, values and beliefs, they actively deny the fundamental moral 
underpinning of human responsibility towards others. 
Communitarians also distrust what they understand as the arrogant and 
absolute denial by homo hierarchus of community members' capacity to make an 
informed and practical choice concerning their own moral code. Because of this 
blind obstinacy, the self becomes encumbered by the selfish and authoritarian 
aims of dominant hegemonies and is thereby denied the capacity for growth into a 
complete, empowered organism. 
Finally, communitarians are suspicious of the paramount concern of homo 
existentialis for their ethical and ideological authenticity that, they feel, verges on 
the self-indulgent. As homo existentialis have treated community organisations 
and'institutions as irrelevant endeavours, communitarians have come to distrust 
their motives that seem centred on the senseless exclusion of their adherents from 
meaningful and righteous community engagement. 
Thus, there are communitarian misgivings concerning the moral and ideological 
attitudes of homo hierarchus, homo existentialis and homo economicus. However, 
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these misgivings are comprehensively mutual and flourish as a quid pro quo 
between those human actors who, in maintaining their particular and alternative 
perspective on social reality, contribute to the formation of a complex paradigm of 
distrust that totally encompasses alt four quadrants of social reality perception. 
Therefore, in this on-going configuration of distrust, it is imperative that those 
participating in community initiatives should accept that their function is to listen to, 
acknowledge and reconcile this quadripartite community discourse. However, the 
question arises as to the formulation and possible application of a theoretical 
framework that can inform community praxis in this challenging setting. 
Holistic Management 
The notion of holism is the focus for this Chapter, as the ontological dichotomy 
of structure and agency is revisited. This is on the basis that, firstly, the reduction 
of the agent to an entity who is constrained and moulded by structural forces, is a 
disputed explanation of social reality; and secondly the recognition that structure is 
nothing more than the outcome of actions taken by individuals, precludes the 
axiomatic belief that the social world can be interpreted through the one-
dimensional activities of agency intention (Archer, 2000: 87). Therefore, the 
potential for the predominance of either structure or agency seems to have been 
circumscribed through the reliance of their advocates on simplistic unilateral 
narratives that fail to adequately address the widely held perceptions about the 
complexity of social stability or social change. 
Downward and upward conflation\ based on either the predominance of 
structure or the ascendancy of agency, make it impossible to unravel the 
^ Archer describes upwards conflation as social theorising "where the 'solution' to the problem of 
stnjclure and agency consists in rendering the latter epiphenomenal. Individuals are held to be 
'indetenninate material', which is unilaterally moulded by society, whose holistic properties have 
complete monopoly over causation, and which therefore operate in a unilateral and downward 
manner" (1995: 3). The contrary standpoint is known as downwards conflation. 
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constitutive interplay of structure and agency, which assumes a subtle 
interdependence that renders analysis of the influence they exert on each other 
inconclusive. Therefore, if any progress is to be achieved in the aim of providing 
community workers with an explanatory framework that can enhance their 
understanding of the complex dynamics of community reality, it becomes clear that 
a methodology Is required that can provide greater delineation. Thus, in the search 
to, comprehend and address community problems, the argument must proceed 
beyond conflationary theorising to notions of critical realism^ and analytical 
dualism^. 
This Chapter highlights the important aspects of Bhaskar's (1978 and 1979) 
work on critical realism that inspired Archer (1989. 1995, 2000 and 2003) to 
develop the notions of morphogenesis'* and morphostatis^, which lie at the heart of 
analytical dualism. The concepts of structural and cultural emergent properties, 
which are the primary distinguishing features in this theoretical approach, are 
identified and their purpose clarified. Then, the essential aspects of Archer's work 
act as a metaphorical foundation that can guide a programme of community 
research towards an innovative interpretation of the interaction between 
2 
3 
Critical realism developed from Bhaskar's writings and has become a movement that claims 
"that causal laws state the tendencies of things grounded in their structures, not invariable 
conjunctions, v^ich are rare outside experiments. Therefore, positivist accounts of science are 
wrong, but so is the refusal to explain the human wortd causally. Critical realism holds that 
there is more to 'what is' than 'what is known', more to powers than their use, and more to 
society than the individuals composing it It rejects the widespread view that explanation is 
always neutral — to explain can be to criticise" (Craig: 157). 
Archer describes analytical dualism as "the guiding methodological principle underpinning non-
conflationary theorising." Thus, in this methodology, "explanation of why things social are so 
and not otherwise depends upon an account of how the properties and powers of the 'people' 
causally intertwine with those of the 'parts' as linkages between different strata are examined for 
their interplay (Archer, 1995:15). " 
Archer (1995: 75), citing Walter Buckley, Sociology and Modem Systems Theory (New Jersey: 
Prentice Hall, 1967) describes morphogenesis as referring to "those processes which tend to 
elaborate or change a system's given form, structure or state" (p. 58). 
Archer describes morphostatis as processes, in a complex system that tend to preserve a 
system's form, structure or state (1995: 75). Thus, it is directly opposed in its nature to 
morphogenesis. 
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community members with contending reality dispositions. The utility of these 
constructs is enhanced by the employment of the social reality perspectives of 
naturalist structuralism, hemieneutic structuralism, hemieneutic agency and 
naturalist agency, which can each assume a direct associational relationship with 
agents at the micro level of community. In this complex interaction it is recognised 
that the individual's view of the world can be better understood by applying Olli's 
(1995 and 1999) three models of individual interpretative freedom. 
The problem of objectivism and subjectivism — caused by its division into 
explanation or understanding — is also addressed in this Chapter in 
acknowledgement of the synergistic interaction between these arbiters of 
knowledge being essentially a psychological rather than philosophical issue. This 
has particular ramifications for the community worker who needs to confront other 
people*s ideas and practices in the right way. 
Finally, following this theoretical exposition, a framework is constructed that can 
help the community worker to conduct a reflexive research programme, in 
partnership with community members, that may create a degree of unity in a 
community through the recognition and accommodation of the diversity of 
perspectives towards social reality. This model has been placed in an existing 
programme of empirical research that can offer examples on how the empirical 
knowledge about a community can be augmented and enhanced through the 
application of the principles of emergent properties, which facilitate an improved 
understanding of community realities. Because of this enhanced awareness, 
community workers can employ techniques of mediation that could achieve 
improved community outcomes. 
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The Problems of Ontological Conflation 
Pelrce's Pragmatism 
The ontological dichotomy between structure and agency may be summarised 
by reference to comments made by Charles Sanders Peirce. His re-appraisal of 
tnjth and reality lie at the heart of the observation "that what is more wholesome 
than any particular belief is integrity of belief, and that to avoid looking into the 
support of any belief from a fear that it may turn out rotten is quite as immoral as it 
is disadvantageous" (Peirce, [1877] 2005). This assertion accords with Peirce's 
rejection of the exclusivity of empiricism or rationalism and his case for the 
complementary use of both the inductive and deductive methods of reasoning. In 
this paradigm there is an absolute belief in the essentiality of individual cognitive 
processes coupled with the necessity to subject the results of these endeavours to 
systematic rigorous testing that, whilst not producing truths, can offer the best 
possible interpretation of reality. Thus, the deductive processes that are a pivotal 
element in the a priori knowledge that contributes to the acceptance of structural 
forces are held by Peirce to owe their elaboration to a posteriori reasoning. As the 
latter moves from effect to cause, it is readily identifiable with the capacity of 
agents to exercise their autonomy. Therefore, Peirce's pragmatic maxim 
constructs conceptualisations in a framework of understandable practical action. 
Compliance with Peirce's stipulation causes problems for both upward and 
downward conflationists. Thus. Machiavelli ([1513] 1999 and (1518] 1969), from 
the structuralist position of an upward conflationist, consistently links power with 
responsibilities. However, how citizens would interpret the bond of duties and 
obligations between themselves and the state may differ from the real conditions 
in which they live. For instance, in pursuit of the imperative of maintaining stability 
and cohesion, deontological ethical principles might be disregarded in favour of 
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expedient solutions to social problems. This gap between reality and abstract 
theorising was emphasised by Althusser (2001) who, whilst recognising structural 
causality as a particular synergistic combination of a society's political, ideological 
and economic systems, nevertheless insisted that this structural modelling was 
theoretical and could only be understood in the terms of theoretical analysis. Thus, 
structure becomes an ideation that reflects the plans and aspirations that have 
originated in individuals' thoughts and behaviour over a period of time. If these 
abstract forces are to enter the realm of realism then they require the intentional or 
unintentional mediation of agency. Thus, the concept of conflation denies its 
fundamental precept, as it becomes dependent on action taken by agents in a 
complex two-dimensional process. 
Hayek, from the agency position of a downward conflationist, recognises the 
supreme importance of rational actors maximising their utility in a setting where 
individual freedom has its own justification. Indeed he proceeds further than other 
neo-liberals by rejecting any notion of agents voluntarily joining a group to further 
their individual self-interest ([1966] 1984). Therefore, he questions Adam Smith's 
concept of the mari<et's invisible hand that legitimises transactions through the 
maintenance of codes of integrity and honesty. This leaves autonomous a-social 
agents to identify their own morality through a process of personal self-discovery. 
For Hayek, this journey is not fraught with the danger of corruption, instead he is 
confident that people would voluntarily accept rules of engagement that ensure the 
continuation of effective market mechanisms. Thus, all state interference is 
regarded with suspicion, as outcomes are inevitably unpredictable and interfere 
with the delicate balance of the market mechanism. 
Archer (1995: 200), however, challenges the contentions of the downward 
conflationist pointing out that "because of the pre-existence of those structures 
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which shape the situations in which we find ourselves, they impinge upon us 
without our compliance, consent or complicity." This is clear in our birth, as people 
are born through the auspices of a medical organisation; the way we learn a 
language, not out of choice but out of necessity; and our stock of cultural capital, 
which can bring either the benefits or drawbacks of rich or poor parentage. On this 
basis. Hayek's rational agent has assumed a wide range of values, attitudes and 
patterns of behaviour prior to their recognition of their own autonomy. Therefore, 
upward conflationists. in a similar fashion to downward conflationists, are faced 
with a two-dimensional scenario that restricts the freedom of the individual. 
Giddens's Structuration Theory 
In following a path of central conflation Giddens perceives structure as being 
founde;d on "systems of generative rules and resources" (1976: 127) that belongs 
to a virtual order that is subsequently reproduced by human agents across space 
and time in the actual order or social system. In this duality between structure and 
agency (Giddens. 1977: 132-3 and 1984; 29) individuals are, first, confronted with 
signification, or the different types of communication or interaction in a situation. 
Secondly, they encounter domination that arises from the power exercised by 
certain actors over other people and resources. Thirdly, levels of legitimation are 
experienced. These reflect the values and attitudes adopted by communities that 
may have resulted in moral and evaluative rules. In interaction with these three 
elements, individual agency may be limited through a person's modality or the 
extent of their knowledge and reflexivity. 
Structuration theory yields some interesting relationships between concepts but 
lacks the semantics to offer meaningful empirical knowledge. It may assist the 
community worker to recognise the restraints felt by certain community members 
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but offers no deeper understanding of the origins of their perceptions about 
community structures. 
Bourdieu's Site Ontology 
Bourdieu*s (1976 and 1990) theoretical concepts of field— a bounded realm of 
activity, for instance education, politics and the family — habitus — the practical 
awareness of people in a field of activity that generates actions and bestows 
meanings — and the doxa — an experience that often produces unquestioning 
acceptances of objective structures as though they were natural — offers a site 
ontology that is instructive but is limited in its ability to clarify the conditions for 
social transformation. 
Bourdieu's notion of field leads to a series of site ontologies where a 
differentiation can be applied to the variable social contexts in which individual's 
consciously and subconsciously internalise their self-identity through their 
relationships with others. The material or ethereal assets that are at stake in a field 
can be designated as possessing various types of capital. Thus, Bourdieu (1984: 
64-80) refers to a person's cultural capital that facilitates aesthetic judgements 
between types of music and literature. 
A link is made between a field of individual practices and the concept of habitus. 
This is a complex notion that reflects Bourdieu's rejection of both downward and 
upward conflation and his concern to focus on agent's practices of self-
domestication. Jenkins (1992: 76) provides a succinct description of the concept 
as composed of a set of dispositions "which include a spectrum of cognitive and 
affective factors" that induce people to act and behave in particular ways in 
specific situations. The emphasis here is on social mediation, or the practices that 
take place between agents rather than those initiated by agents. This leads 
Bourdieu to introduce "the doxic experience" (1990: 20). This construct is not 
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regarded as having a permanent unanimity but it seems that an individual must 
experience a reflexive process, most likely as a result of specific historical 
circumstances, before they would alter their internalised practices. 
Bourdieu's complex array of social phenomena does lack specificity so this 
model of social reality results in an incomplete methodology to guide empirical 
investigation. Therefore, there is a need for ah approach that can disaggregate the 
complexity of central conflation. 
Systemism 
Systemism asserts "that overall social change is the effect of a myriad of 
individual actions occurring within systems (structures) and that social (structural) 
change can be triggered by environmental, biological, economic, political or 
cultural factors — or a combination of either" (Bunge, 1998: 274). So, social 
systems are explained in the context of individual actions and the positioning of 
those actions in a social frame of reference that analyses such notions as 
cohesiveness, stability and progress that can be accepted as systemic. The 
biological metaphor of society as an organic whole is regarded as neglecting the 
issue of power within and around social networks but a systemic approach is 
capable of accommodating the idea of a set of human interrelationships bound 
together by a complex variety of power systems. Therefore, systemism. when 
accepted as an ontological element, can also accommodate the inevitable 
manifestation of social conflict and change by providing a definitive description of 
social facts, and thereby revealing how social reality can provide restraints and 
opportunities for individuals (Bunge, 1996: 264-5). 
The relevance of adopting a realistic approach towards the complexity of 
interests in the social system is well illustrated by government's failure to formulate 
and implement appropriate social policies for multidimensional fields of human 
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activity. The environmental is inviolably linked to the bio-psychological and this 
impenetrable association is replicated in the relations these fields have with the 
cultural, economic and political. 
So the ontology of systemism. whilst accepting that the agency of individuals is 
mediated by social factors that are irreducible to the individual level, nevertheless 
avoids a prescriptive framework for social research that ordains precepts that 
become a definitive map of social facts. Thus, the standpoint of generating a 
programme of social investigation that is governed by the necessity to fit either an 
ontology of structure or agency is avoided by resorting to a perception of the 
nature of society that can guide rather than determine research. This position has 
been substantiated through a process that identifies and defines the essence of 
natural reality in the terms of emergent properties. It is then argued that the caix of 
this analysis can be replicated in relation to the social sciences thereby 
detemiining that its disciplines centre on objects of study that possess identical 
properties to those of the natural sciences (Bhaskar. 1978). In this paradigm, 
social emergent properties are the product of actions of individuals but become 
structural entities that can, in turn, exert causality on agency although these 
agents still retain the power to alter structural influences. This fundamental 
assertion has been advocated by the school of critical realism (Bhaskar 1978, 
Archer 1989; 1995) as representing a methodological configuration that fully 
recognises the capacities of agency and structure in a complex interplay of social 
reproduction and transformation. As Archer observes, "one of greatest of human 
powers is that we can subjectively conceive of re-making society and ourselves. 
To accomplish this entails objective work in the worid by the self and with others" 
(2000:315). 
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Social Science and Emergent Properties 
To pass beyond the restrictive boundaries that encircle the various guises of 
conflationary theorising, "it is necessary for those working in a community setting to 
question their basic philosophical assumptions. Therefore, perhaps only through a 
period of personal reflection over the shortcomings of conflationary theory, can the 
community worker accept a new social scenario. 
This new setting would embrace the benefits of experiential models of 
community engagement, including a dialogical and participatory agenda that 
requires a high level of flexibility and intellectual competence from community 
wori^ers. 
Bhaskar's Transcendental Realism and Critical Naturalism 
Bhaskar demands acceptance of a new ontological understanding of science. 
He refutes claims made by empiricists that scientists can only observe correlations 
between variables and instead advances the philosophy of science known as 
transcendental realism. This recognises that objects of investigation possess 
mechanisms which may only be understood as they produce perceivable, and 
possibly unexpected, outcomes (Bhaskar, 1978). So, this scientific paradigm 
recognises that experimentation "proceeds by a dialectic of 'applied rationalism' 
and 'technical materialism': a historical process of mutual adjustment between 
theory and experiment" (Bhaskar. 1979: 43). Bhaskar (1978) also argued that 
transcendental realism was applicable to the social worid and developed the 
concept of critical naturalism, which recognises that stnjctures make possible 
human agency and structures in turn are reproduced by human agency. The tenri 
critical realism is an elision of Bhaskar's terminology and denotes a movement, 
founded on his work, that aims to unite scientific experimentation and social 
practices by acknowledging, as suggested in the wori< of Latour and Woolgar 
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(1979), that scientific knowledge is a social product, whilst also recognising the 
autonomous existence of the objects of scientific "truths". Therefore, this paradigm 
can provide an anti-positivist description of the nature of the natural sciences but 
still maintain a realist stance. This philosophical approach to the natural sciences 
originated in the work of Harr6 (1970. 1972, 1986) and Hesse (1966) with Bhaskar 
(1978, 1979) providing the most influential version of this method in relation to 
social structures. 
For realists, epistemological understanding holds that a real worid exists as an 
entity totally independent from any human knowledge or beliefs about its actuality. 
The observable phenomena in this worid can be explained by the discovery of 
underiying and unobservable processes, which after further investigation may be 
changed depending on the extent of our knowledge. However critical realism can 
be distinguished from this theoretical framework as illustrated in the following 
propositions (Benton and Craib, 2001: 120-1): 
• It is considei'ed that all the sciences are responsible for pronouncing on the 
truth about the independent existence of phenomena. Arising from this 
evaluation knowledge can increase, on the assumption that scientific claims 
are accurate. 
• Social processes are regarded as offering the possibility for the creation of 
various forms of representation beyond thought or language. 
• It is accepted that the appearance of some things may be misleading, as the 
true character of some phenomena can only be discovered through a "critical" 
in-depth process. 
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o Critical realism is fallibilist®, like Peirce's pragmatism, and accepts, with 
repeated cognition, the incorporation of new research, interpretation, and 
dialogue as necessary to ensure the discovery of the "truth." 
Therefore, if social constructivism incorporates critical realism into its tenet then 
it avoids the central problem of relativism located in the fundamental incoherence 
of its formulation. By accepting a knowable, independent reality critical realists 
acknowledge that independent standards must be met in the formulation of ideas 
of belief and discernment, whilst relativists have no such means of exercising this 
essential judgement. 
This process has the effect, as noted by Maturana (1991: 48), of rendering "all 
that makes scientific explanations operationally effective in our human practice of 
living is that they arise as operations in it that give rise to further operations in it 
and not an impossible reference to anything like an independent objective domain 
of reality." Thus, as individuals' experience repeated recursion to knowledge, a 
"generative mechanism" refonnulates their praxis causing the creation pf new 
dialogues and courses of action. Bhaskar, (1978: 113) recognises that this 
generative mechanism "is capable of producing a physical effect...[which is 
a]...real and a proper object of scientific study." Therefore, he identifies natural 
reality as having emergent properties that are "an irreducible^ feature of our world" 
(Bhaskar, 1978: 113). 
^ The doctrine of fallibilism maintains "that our scientific knowledge claims are invariably 
vulnerable and may turn out to be false. Scientific theories cannot.be asserted as true 
categorically, but only as having some probability of being true." Axiom'atically the doctrine 
"does not insist on the falsity of our scientific claims but rather on their tentatively as inevitable 
estimates: it does not hold that knowledge is unavailable here but rather that it is always 
provisional. 
^ A reductionist is prepared to dispense with knowledge about an entity claiming that it can be 
explained by another set of facts. In asserting that emergent properties are irreducible to 
people Bhaskar is maintaining their distinction as ^'objects of experimental investigation" (1979: 
12). 
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The Nature of Emergent Properties 
Turning to the discipline of social science, Bhaskar (1979: 26) identifies the 
"distinct structures that mesh together in the field of social life" but he maintains 
that these "social objects are in-educible to (and are really emergent from) natural 
objects" so. although they can be studied scientifically, they possess properties 
that require a unique method of study. This is characterised by the objects of 
social science inquiry only appearing in open systems "where invariant empirical 
regularities do not obtain" (Bhaskar, 1979: 57). Therefore, Bhaskar (1979: 58) 
restricts the development of theories of social science to explanatory and non-
predictive theorising. 
Archer, when constructing her case for analytical dualism, elaborates on 
Bhaskar's ontological proposition that causal laws are independent from patterns 
of events. She recognises that "society is only like itself and the basic task is to 
conceptualise how ordered social forms have their genesis in human agency, just 
as social beings have their genesis in social forms" (1995: 167). Therefore, social 
forms or structures are created by agents, but these social forms then mould and 
constrain agents, although these agents still retain the capacity to have their own 
causal influence on social forms. This complex pattern of power ranges from 
individual opportunity to individual constraint. It is conceptualised in the concept of 
morphogenesis, which signals the agent's capacity to shape social relations over 
the transitive notion of space and time. Alternatively, morphostatis refers to the 
reproduction of structure, through the maintenance of the shape of a social form, 
again over space and time. 
Bhaskar's notion of emergent properties assume a particular significance as 
they represent recognisable entities whose properties, following Bhaskar's 
analysis "are relative endurance, natural necessity and the possession of causal 
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powers" (Archer, 1995: 167). Thus, for example, the education system has 
necessary internal logical relationships between its component parts instead of 
undetermined influences that are of an unknown duration (Archer, 1995: 173). 
These relations allow the education system to exercise its unique ability to exert 
causal influences on its constituents rather than just combine or aggregate their 
powers. 
Archer distinguishes between (1) structural emergent properties (SEPs) , such 
as the emergent characteristics of the education system; (2) cultural emergent 
properties (CEPs) , such as the doctrines of different religious and ethnic 
groupings; and (3) peoples' emergent properties (PEPs), which mediate the 
generic emergent properties through organised networks of agents, thereby 
reproducing or changing social fomis (1995: 303). 
S E P s have a "primary dependence upon material resources, both physical and 
human" (Archer, 1995: 175), whereas, C E P s operate in the world of ideas, which 
is similar to Popper's World Three (Popper, 1979). which is created from the 
contents of libraries. However, moving beyond this differentiation, Archer 
maintains that culture should be analysed in the same manner as structure as the 
"pre-existence, autonomy and durability of the constituents of the Cultural System 
enables their identification as entities distinct from the meanings held by agents at 
any given time" (1995: 179). Thus, the brilliant colours of Michelangelo's fresco, 
painted on the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel, or Beethoven's innovative Ninth 
Symphony might be re-evaluated by each generation yet they remain part of a 
continuing common European identity. This cultural uniformity even persists 
despite some individuals deeming these works of art as irrelevant to their 
experiences in the contemporary world. However, this longevity is not immune 
from change as causal relationships would exist between groups at the socio-
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cultural level, or the point of integration between culture and the people, that over 
time, can modify existing logical relationships and introduce new ones (Archer, 
1989: 143). Therefore, it is apparent that the cultural system and socio-cultural life 
are totally intertwined and it is through applying "the utility of analytical dualism" 
that their interplay can be explored (Archer, 1995: 180). With this analysis, the 
focus of research is on logical relationships within an emergent property "which 
are totally independent of what people know, feel or believe about them" (Archer, 
1995: 182). Cultural conditioning moves beyond Granisci's influential hegemonies 
into a realm of "p/ura/ generative powers and their reciprocal mfluerice" (Archer, 
1995: 192). Thus, the use of analytical dualism assumes what Bhaskar calls the 
role of an underlabourer guiding empirical research but not becoming its subject 
(Bhaskar, 1979: 24). 
P E P s feature three different categories: Primary Agents, Corporate Agents and 
Social Actors. Primary Agents lack "a say in structural or cultural modelling" 
(Archer. 1995: 259). Every Agent, at birth, enters a world with pre-existing 
structures and immediately becomes a Primary Agent by acquiring the social 
stratification that can reflect a privileged or underprivileged background. "Hence 
Primary Agents are defined as collectivities sharing the same life chances" 
(Archer. 2000: 263). Therefore, these Agents would be part of specific groups that 
share a particular social situation but do not collectively organise themselves to 
achieve certain goals. However, it is important to avoid classifying them as 
"passive" as they may, at any time, form themselves into a new social movement 
(Archer. 1995: 260). In contrast. Corporate Agents have "capacities for articulating 
shared interests, organising for collective action, generating social movements and 
exercising corporate influence in decision-making" (Archer. 2000: 266). Corporate 
Agents consciously constitute a group with aims and objectives that extend 
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beyond the summation of each person's self-interest, thereby shaping the 
environment for all Agents. This action may result in morphogenesis or 
morphostatis in a confluence between the generative powers of S E P s , C E P S and 
PEPs . The outcomes from this process of interlocking would also reflect the 
interplay between Corporate and Primary Agents in the matter of sustaining or 
transforming the social system (Archer, 2000: 267). Finally, there are Social 
Actors, who "properly exist in the singular and...do meet the strict criteria for 
possessing a unique social identity" (Archer, 2003: 118). Thus, after reflexive 
deliberation about their own unique values, attitudes and behaviour, the Social 
Actor assumes a role that reflects their singularity. However, whilst everyone, is a 
Primary Agent, many people are precluded from using their agency as a 
springboard to achieve the status of a Social Actor. For instance, these Primary 
Agents may discover that their employers are flouting their ethical principles but, 
because of financial restraints, they are unable to resign their jobs. Furthermore, 
whilst the parentage and social context experienced by infant Agents does not 
determine "the particular Social Actor an individual chooses to become...they 
strongly condition what type of Social Actor the vast majority can and do become" 
(Archer. 2000: 285). 
Archer emphasises the importance of recognising that Corporate Agents and 
Social Actors are not necessarily different people (2000: 287). Whilst the 
Corporate Agent can be distinguished by their intention to address collectively 
interest-related problems, and the Social Actor in preserving the integrity of their 
identity by observing rule requirements, the Social Actor enjoys the luxury of 
choosing whether to belong to both groups. However, the complex dynamics at 
work in such a situation suggest the possibility of potential conflict between the 
Social Actor within a Corporate Agency Collective and other Corporate Agents. 
309 
This assertion correlates with the potential series of disagreements that have been 
identified as afflicting relationships between homo hierarchus, homo econom/cus, 
homo sociologicus and homo existentialis. 
Therefore, as people interact, they create emergent networks that are founded 
on the logic of vested interest. This interest may change in differing relational 
situations. Thus, the elaboration of a community is dependent on the exchange 
transactions and power relations that exist, partly based on formal organisational 
roles and partly on infonnal relationships, as some agents/actors mediate 
structural and cultural outcomes. 
The Epistemological Dichotomy 
The concept of analytical dualism provides a research methodology that can 
guide the researcher "through examining the interplay of the distinctive sets of 
causal powers (SEPs , C E P s and PEPs)" (Archer. 2000: 308). However, any 
consideration of the ontologica! dichotomy must also properly address the 
epistemological dichotomy of the objective rational elements within human 
consciousness and their subjective or critical counterparts. 
Bhaskar rejects the designation of the "interpretation," rather than the "objective 
scientific explanation," of the social world to a different and solitary realm on the 
basis "that knowledge, irrespective of object, must be viewed as a social process 
irreducible to a purely individual acquisition" (1979: 145). Thus, if the choice is 
made to suppress hermeneutic interpretative understanding, the value of P E P s 
would be eroded as agents or actors have derived their subjectivity through their 
engagement with the social world. Therefore, the researcher should employ the 
epistemological synthesis of critical realism that embraces peoples' constructive 
dialogue, which is, to some extent, informed by empirical findings that are the 
result of social constructs. This approach recognises "that there are causal laws, 
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generalities, at work in social life"...(but it is wrong to accept]..."the reduction of 
these laws to empirical generalities" (Bhaskar. 1979: 27). Instead, a fundamental 
principle of critical realism applies in that "the objects of our knowledge exist and 
act independently of the knowledge of which they are objects" (Bhaskar, 1979: 
14). This assertion rejects the notion of human reason as a mechanistic means of 
accumulating knowledge and instead turns to the Kantian apprehension of a 
process that creates "the constant stimulation of fresh discovery" (Scruton. 2002: 
149). Therefore, in this uncertain environment people must employ their 
subjectivity, which may well be socially constmcted, to supplement available 
empirical data about objects and phenomena. Thus, knowledge about social 
reality can only progress through a scientific process that requires the construction 
and rigorous testing of hemieneutic-based hypotheses. So, there is an opportunity 
here for the reconciliation of the divide that has arisen between naturalism and 
hermeneutics (Dixon ef a/.. 2002; 2003a, b, c. d; 2004), 
This unification of the epistemological dichotomy can be enshrined in 
Welbourne's notion that "the concept of knowledge enters our repertoire of 
concepts on the back of testimony" (2001: 125). Therefore, as each person 
reflects on the testimony of other community members, it becomes apparent that 
the community is perceived in differing ways and a singular appreciation might 
only be a partial and imperfect interpretation of what an individual can erroneously 
refer to as knowledge (Welbourne, 2001: 125). Thus, critical realism presents a 
case for the synergism of objectivity and subjectivity and recognises that the 
presence of these perceptions in the agent or actor is a psychological issue that 
cannot be reduced to a philosophical precept. 
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Managing Community: Analytical Dualism and Praxis 
The extent that pro-active participation flourishes amongst community members 
in response to community work initiatives offers an ideal yardstick to judge 
whether a community is a thriving or dormant entity. That a community is thriving 
may reflect that community workers have facilitated a process that has resulted in 
community members accepting the presence of differing values, attitudes and 
behaviour in their community. In becoming aware of the legitimacy of different 
perspectives, community members have recognised the necessity of reaching 
consensual decisions about the aims and objectives that dictate their community's 
agenda. Therefore, it is proposed that community workers would achieve improved 
outcomes by adopting analytical dualism as an underlabourer that can guide a 
programme of community research. 
The resolution of the ontological and epistemological dichotomies, through 
analysis of S E P s . C E P s and P E P s , permits a closer and more meaningful scrutiny 
of the realities of community life from the diverse perspective of community 
members. However, if community workers are to aspire to a deeper understanding 
of the values, attitudes and beliefs of community members then they would also 
need the means to develop informed suppositions about the probable relational 
attitudes that individuals would adopt towards different community strategies. It is 
through a process of reflexive interpretation of these complex contending 
perspectives on social reality that progress can be made towards the goal of 
inclusive community participation. 
Analytical Dualism and Reality Perspectives 
Dixon and Dogan's typology of social reality perspectives is complementary to 
the conceptualisations offered in the domain of critical realism. The four reality 
perspectives do not assume any causal capacity but instead, provide powerful 
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associational models with enough analytical depth to adequately identify an 
individual's chosen ontological and epistemological preferences in any given 
situation. The notion of structural and cultural emergent properties, with their 
particular internal relationships and causal powers that pre-date any action on the 
part of Corporate Agents and Social Actors to transform this reality, are accepted 
as a social ontology that addresses the problem of the ontoiogtcal dichotomy. 
In a similar fashion, critical realism's understanding of the epistemological 
dichotomy is accepted as a simple but clear and unambiguous interpretation of 
epistemological reality. Therefore, in according this status to a synergistic 
relationship between objectivism and subjectivism the necessity of treating the 
philosophical dividing line between naturalism and hermeneutics as non-
negotiable is alleviated. Thus, it is made possible for the Dixon and Dogan 
taxonomy to embrace a process that clarifies the circumstances in which 
community members place their experiences thereby sanctioning an opening for 
mediation to enter into an arena that determines choices and actions. 
Having placed the Dixon and Dogan taxonomy within analytical dualism it is 
now necessary to combine this theorising with a managerial framework that has 
the capacity to conjoin the mystical notion of unity-in-diversity, within community, 
with and the humanism of homo hierarchus, homo economicus, homo sociologicus 
and homo existentialis. 
Shared Meaning Systems and Unity-in-Diversity 
The notion of unity-in-diversity is used here to describe the optimal mode of 
community development where community members construct a model of social 
reality, modulated by the wish to construct an inclusive collective that accepts the 
legitimacy of contending perspectives on the social world (Ravn, 1991: 102-3). 
This modulation would be the result of a reconstruction of community members' 
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expectations about community relationships, stimulated by an educational 
programme focussed on understanding why community members would anticipate 
different outcomes from their community based on their past experiences. Such a 
mystical notion can be related to Olii's work (1995 and 1999), where the 
conceptualisation of coherent, sequential and synthetic individuals provides a 
means of exploring the relationship between people and their preferred system of 
bringing meaning to particular situations. Olli argues that the coherent individual 
would consistently support one shared meaning system in any specific set of 
circumstances thereby embracing an absolutism that is indifferent to contending 
social reality perspectives. Alternatively, sequential individuals adjust their shared 
meaning system in any given circumstance if there are perceived net benefits to 
be gained from this action. Finally, the synthetic individual would freely adopt 
differing ways of understanding social reality, moving freely from one shared 
meaning system to another by embracing relativism. Therefore, if community 
workers wish to facilitate community members in working towards the aim of 
achieving the concept of unity-in-diversity then they should consider adopting the 
position of a synthetic social realist. Through this role, there would be opportunities 
to empathise with contending perceptions, and these experiences can be 
translated into exploratory hypotheses concerning community members' 
exigencies. 
The four social reality perspectives — naturalist structuralism, naturalist agency, 
hermeneutic structuralism and hermeneutic agency — offer four distinct 
methodological configurations, vi^ich can bring an enhanced awareness so that 
the community worker: 
will be committed to one or a few particular causes, will have found a special 
path in life that gives her a sense of unity and meaning, while fully 
appreciating and respecting that others may follow paths that are equally 
important. She takes her chosen tasks seriously and pays attention to detail; 
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she is attached to the task while at the same time realising that the way she 
does things may not be the only right way; in other words, she shows 
detachment as well, is ready to resign and change course if need be (Ravn. 
1991: 103). 
Thus, the unity and diversity principles, that are enshrined in unity-in-diversity, 
become mutually inclusive complementary experiences that are fundamental 
precepts to enjoying the good life. In this scenario, as community workers 
embrace the role of synthetic social realists, the concept of shared meaning 
systems undergo a rudimentary revision as they start to experience a new holistic 
meaning system that offers a comprehensive means to improve community 
relations. 
Community Elaboration 
Homo sociologicus expects community structures to be elaborated through the 
process of deliberative and participatory democracy® that enables the achievement 
of consensual decision-making amongst community members. As the presence of 
four contending social reality perspectives over-shadows such a proposition, the 
notion of consensual decision-making is replaced with one of modulated decision-
making. This categorisation is underpinned by two theoretical assertions. The first 
is derived from personal construction theory (Kelly, 1955). This supposes that 
everyone tries to anticipate events in a way that confirms their own constructs, 
opting to use subjectivity to substantiate objective truths and bring about the 
meaning that is preferred or liked. Therefore, the individual has the freedom to 
choose whichever meaning they prefer in their own domain, where alternative 
constructivism can be applied to previous, contemporaneous or future events. So 
a series of organised constructs can be built into a system and one or more 
Deliberative democracy is imbricated with participatory democracy. Both concepts place an 
emphasis on deliberation, inclusiveness and egalitarianism (Hendricks and Zouridis, 1999:126; 
Sanderson, 1999) and so resonate with the communitarian perspective of a social order thai 
values communal bonds. 
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systems used to make predictions that can subsequently be evaluated for 
accuracy. 
Olli's plausible models of the individual correspond to Kelly's framework, 
especially the notion that individual's social reality perspectives would be the result 
of tight and loose constructs. Thus, the coherent individual has a regularly used 
set of super-ordinate constructs, whilst the sequenfial individual, for the purposes 
of gain, and the synthetic individual, for the purposes of communality, base their 
constructs around the construction processes of others. However, personal 
construct theory avoids becoming a tautology of Olli's models through its 
emphasis on the necessity for collective social reality and individual's personal 
reality to be considered together. Consequently, individuals are more than just 
observers of an independent universe, as the realities within their meaning system 
becomes inseparably linked to the realifies of others. 
The second theoretical assertion is established in Rickman's notion that 
experience is not inscribed on an empty slate but absorbed into interlocking and 
expanding contexts. So, problems and failures arise not merely from lack of 
intelligence or the absence of current information but from ignorance of the context 
(Rickman. 2005: 29). 
Therefore, all three of Olli's plausible models, as they sit within Kelly's 
framework, need to absorb the crucial notion of context, into which they are then 
able to place their prior values, attitudes and opinions. This stage of deliberafion is 
crucial in the attainment of modulated decision-making as, through its logical 
precepts, it quesfions the concept of impermeable constructs, thereby creating a 
space for reconsiderafion and reconciliation. So. the stage is set for the community 
worker to positively utilise the Dixon and Dogan typology in a process that can 
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lead to a recognition of the value and legitimacy of alternative perceptions of social 
reality. 
Integrating Contending Social Reality Perspectives, Critical Realism and 
Analytical Dualism: A Community Research Case Study 
This design for a research programme is based on a model that features the 
theoretical underpinnings of community elaboration, so it is important that the 
anticipated outcomes create their own particular paradigm and thus avoid the 
danger of the researcher placing these issues in preconceived categories that 
have arisen from deductive reasoning. A tautology would result from the mistake 
of employing preconceived categories, with the research only capable of verifying 
that certain uncontested general principles exist. Therefore, the envisaged 
programme supplements existing empirical research, which is either quantitative, 
qualitative or an amalgam of both methods. But, it is a prerequisite that existing 
investigations would have reached some unambiguous conclusions about the 
dynamics that exist in the Town that is the object of the research. 
The Wadebridge Town Plan® will be used as an example of how this project's 
theoretical base can inform and enhance community practice. The results of the 
public consultation that shaped the issues and solutions in the Plan enables the 
identification of the community's generic and specific structural and cultural 
emergent properties. Following this process of classification the roles of Corporate 
Agents and Social Actors are recognisable and conditions of their interaction with 
cultural emergent properties understood enabling the tendencies towards 
morphogenesis (transformation) or morphostatis (reproduction) to be explored. 
® A full report of the findings in Wadebridge Town Plan can be obtained from Wadebridge Library 
or viewed on the North Cornwall District Council website -
www.ncdc.qov.uk/index.cfm?articleid=1267 
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Wadebridge is a small market town in North Cornwall with a population of 
approximately 6,000 people. The surrounding area is a popular holiday 
destinafion. so Wadebridge suffers from the tensions of a declining rural economy 
that is dependent on the vagaries of seasonal trade. Moreover, due to recent 
escalafing house prices, the cost of local housing accommodation is increasingly 
beyond the financial capacity of local people resulting in resentment towards 
wealthy "incomers" who are often investing in second homes. 
The process of consulting the community took place in 2002 when 3,500 
houses and businesses in the locality received a copy of a questionnaire. 
Subsequently 1.066 completed survey fomis were returned, r e j D r e s e n t i n g a 
response rate of 30%. After analysis, the results were presented at an open 
exhibition in Wadebridge Town Hall, and community members were invited to 
review the issues identified and comment further on priorities for the town. The 
final town plan was drawn up to reflect the outcomes from this process. 
Generic and Specific Emergent Properties 
The generic structural emergent property (SEP), which emerged from the plan 
was the development of the rural economy. This lead to four discernible specific 
structural emergent properties that draw upon individual and group social 
opportunifies, bargaining and negotiating power: employment opportunifies; 
accommodation issues; retail services and, finally, public transport services. So, 
each possesses logical relationships within its component parts that can constrain 
or enable the activifies of agents. 
The generic cultural emergent property (CEP), which featured in the plan was 
the fijture identity of community members as citizens of a small town in Cornwall. 
This draws upon past experiences of interacting with others, which has then 
influenced future expectations. In turn, this generic property leads to three specific 
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C E P s that can enable or restrain agents: attitudes towards tourism; attitudes 
towards issues of community safety and, attitudes towards the adequacy of 
healthcare facilities. 
Whether, over time, morphogenesis or morphostatis take place In relation to the 
specific structural emergent properties would depend on the relationships between 
Corporate Agents and Social Actors that can change cultural and structural forms. 
Agents and Actors 
All citizens who live in Wadebridge are its Primary Agents but some, through 
their conscious commitment to community groups, other voluntary groups, private 
business or government are also Corporate Agents. In a similar fashion, all Social 
Actors are Primary Agents and some may also be Corporate Agents. In this 
scenario, the interaction between Social Actors and Corporate Agents is 
particularly informative as the Social Actor's vested interests may place that 
person In a position of conflict with some Corporate Agents. This can arise when a 
local entrepreneur seeks to increase the number of holiday "lets" in the town 
thereby increasing the tourist trade and reducing the amount of available 
accommodation for local people. Not only does this cause a sense of 
hopelessness amongst young people who cannot find a place to live, but also the 
general cultural resentment against all "outsiders" increases. Furthermore, Social 
Actors may exercise choice through use of economic power that is beyond less 
wealthy agents. Therefore, the interaction of Social Actors and Corporate Agents 
in relation to specific cultural and structural emergent properties can result in a 
host of sometimes conflicting values and attitudes. This situation might also be 
repeated in the networks of social relations that exist between primary and 
corporate agents where the believer in the status quo or the apathetic citizen may 
dismiss the corporate activist as naVve. 
319 
Whilst the application of Archer's theory of analytical dualism is informative 
nevertheless, in isolation, it does not offer community wori<ers insights into how 
they can improve their praxis. Therefore, to address this omission, the Dixon and 
Dogan philosophical framework is combined with analytical dualism to create a 
synthesis that clearly demonstrates how these separate elements can combine 
into a community management model for improved community outcomes. 
Figure 7.2 begins its cycle by contemplating the beliefs of the individual 
community hiember about what is true and what has the capacity to give 
causation. Thus, as contending reality perspectives are understood their 
adherents as — homo hierarchus, home economicus, homo sociologicus or homo 
existentialis — can be recognised as having a particular viewpoint when they are 
in a relational situation involving community matters. So. community members, as 
either Primary or Corporate Agents and, in some cases Social Actors, decide (1) 
whether they can have any effect on any emergent properties; (2) whether they 
wish to re-enforce structural and/or cultural emergent properties; or (3) whether 
they want to change structure and/or cultural emergent properties. Therefore, in 
accordance with Archer's theorising, causal capacity can exist in the essence of 
agency, structure and culture, and this complex and subtle effect is mediated by 
agency as Corporate Agents and Social Actors choose to interact with structural 
and cultural forms. In this scenario, mediation can illuminate the specific 
community context by providing community members with differing types of 
knowledge that give validity to alternative community perspectives thus 
encouraging a modulated style of decision-making that can accommodate new 
ideas. 
The social outcomes that arise from the action taken by community members 
will lead to actual ethical results. These results may produce cognitive dissonance 
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Figure 7.2: Analytical Dualism, Social Reality Perspectives and 
Community Members 
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and thereby create circumstances where individuals reflect over the outcomes 
from the mediation process. Follovi/ing this introspection community members 
might, once again, consider their values, attitudes and opinions and either engage 
with the means of social change (morphogenesis) or support the status quo 
(morphostatis). The cycle recommences when new community initiatives cause 
community members to again consider their preferred perception of community. 
A Case Study of the Model for Managing Community 
The Wadebridge Tov^n Plan, used here as an example, concluded its process 
of consultation with the presentation of the results of the survey to members of the 
community. At this point, as people expressed their views about the results, and 
informed by the interaction taking place between particular networks of Corporate 
Agents and Social Actors, the community worker can invite differing proponents to 
take part in a supplementary research programme. These invitations would be 
extended on the basis that every community member's opinions and constraints 
have total legitimacy. Thus, the views of the duty-bound homo-hierarchus, the self-
interested homo-economicus, the conversation saturated homo sociologicus and 
the possibly apathetic and perhaps suspicious homo existentialis are all treated 
with identical respect as "the particulars of exactly what is to be accepted and 
embraced" in the envisaged inclusive community remain to be decided (Ravn. 
1991: 106). It is likely that distrust will deter some, particularly the apathetic, from 
engagement however for some adherents to all four social reality perspectives 
discussion about their personal social interpretations in a supportive and respectful 
setting would be meaningful. 
The research programme would feature the following three stages. 
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stage 1: The participants would be asked to consider a theory for an improved 
community. This could be called a "transfomnative theory," as it would contain the 
idealisations of community members (Ravn. 1991: 107). This exercise could be 
addressed through unstructured interviews with the data recorded on qualitative 
software like N5, which facilitates the dissemination of text to the extent where 
similarities and differences are apparent. 
By ascertaining the commonalities between selected idealisations the 
community worker can then allocate community members to groups that share 
particular values and attitudes. These groups should be flexible enough to pemiit 
individual ideational movement but would also have a clear understanding about 
the use and capacity of the notion of community to achieve well being. 
Stage 2: The community worker would then contextualise the community's reality 
from each of the four social reality perspectives, thus highlighting the necessity of 
reconciliation between the differences in idealised community visions. As a first 
step, community members would be made aware that this consensus building 
requires communication and understanding between groups, so proponents of 
differing viewpoints would need to recognise that it may be advantageous to 
change their ways of interacting with others. This is important as the differing 
community idealisations can leave participants doubting whether there can be a 
solution to the contending perceptions of reality. As illustrated In Figure 7.3, this 
level of community conflict creates a triangle that, at its extreme, produces a wide 
gap between community members and the processes that guide interaction with 
others. However, as the diagram suggests, reconciliation lies in the "common 
ground" at the apex of the triangle. All the contending community groups and 
individuals have their point or position so it is necessary for community workers to 
delve beneath these obvious elements of contention. Thus, Archer's analytical 
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Figure 7.3: The Conflict Triangle 
COMMON GROUND 
past historyy 
values and meanings^ 
relationships; 
emotions 
behaviour^ 
abilities 
personalities 
^how people communicate 
structure and agency 
behavioural norms 
^decision-making 
roles and jobs 
COMMUNITY MEMBERS PROCESS 
PROBLEM 
social reality perspectives on community reality 
Source: Derived from Beer and Stief, 1997: 14 
324 
dualism, when synthesised with the Dixon and Dogan typology of social reality 
perspectives, helps to reveal how. through an educational process, both those 
committed to structure, and those committed to agency, can recognise collective 
concern about general community well being. Similarly differences of emphasis 
over objective and subjective knowledge can be interpreted as individual 
psychological preferences, which must be accepted as an inevitable facet of 
humanity rather than a source of conflict. 
Stage 3: The pattern of a structured mediation session between two conflicting 
community groups divides into four discrete, but inter-linked sections. 
o Opening Statement: The community worker sets out the purpose of the 
mediation between the two conflicting groups. Then the community worker 
must explain his or her role as a facilitator in the process of the participants 
resolving their own conflict. In this context he or she would be informed by 
Whittington's typology. Figure 7.1, that recommends a processual or intuitive 
style of behaviour that can enable opposing factions to incrementally agree on 
small changes to their position. In this context, it is also necessary to confirm 
that the four contending social reality perspectives will be used to help 
comprehend the dynamics that develop between the participants. So, in this 
paradigm, the community worker adopts a position of neutrality and impartiality 
by providing a process that allows community members to consider their intent 
towards the aim of creating unity-in-diversity in their community. 
o Statements of Idealisation: Both groups need to relate their version of 
idealised community outcomes with the community worker acting to encourage 
detailed comment by building empathy with all the participants. 
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• Open Discussion: This part of the mediation process has the objective of re-
defining the differences between the two groups. In this process, the 
community worker, drawing on the detailed operationalisation of each of the 
four perspectives on community reality, summarises the values, attitudes and 
opinions held by each set of protagonists. Then, as the opposing parties offer 
further information about their interests and needs, the common ground that 
exists between their positions will become clear. The existence of this common 
ground then stimulates modulated decision-making as the community worker 
re-frames and summarises each step that takes the process forward. 
• Constructing an Agreement: As commonalities become apparent the 
incremental process of enlarging the common ground between the two parties 
requires increased reliance on modulated decision-making. Thus, it is 
inevitable that a point will be reached where the opposing groups are 
impemeable to further creative thinking. At this juncture, the community worker 
should accept that some level of conflict may continue but. at this stage, it 
cannot be resolved through mediation. Therefore, the worker would then 
formally summarise what has been agreed between the conflicting parties and 
how these agreements can be incorporated into community strategies. 
Completion of the stages of mediation precludes social action, the resultant 
social outcomes and the actual ethical results from those outcomes. Thus, 
community members might experience cognitive dissonance as they consider 
unintended ethical outcomes and. after reflection, could change their reality 
perspective on community before the cycle in Figure 7.2 commences again. 
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Conclusion 
Community workers must acknowledge that low levels of participation in 
community initiatives are, at least in part, due to their failure to accommodate the 
contending perspectives on community reality that exist amongst community 
members derived from contending perspectives on social reality. The model for 
managing community offered here, with its use of the techniques of mediation and 
reflexivity, does not claim to be a design that inevitably lead to community utopia. 
Indeed, there is no correct means of formulating and implementing community 
strategies that would ensure the wholehearted commitment and involvement of all 
community members. Instead, professional community workers and members of 
communities need to face their community realities and endeavour to collectively 
produce suppositions that will require further reflexive interpretation. 
In the community work paradigm conflict is endemic so it should be openly 
addressed as it is only through the toleration of acceptable levels of disagreement 
that all community members can fee! that they play a meaningful part in their 
community's development. Therefore, there can be no justification for avoiding 
constructive discourse that advocates principles that might challenge the 
collective. Instead, this style of engagement should be encouraged, as it is only 
through directly addressing contending values, beliefs and attitudes that 
modulated decision-making can lead to more inclusive communities. 
John Stuart Mill, in his landmark essay On liberty recognised that any 
organisation is only as good as the value that is placed on the diverse individuals 
that compose it. The risks inherent in neglecting the notion of unity-in-diversity are 
captured by Mill: 
327 
a State which dwarfs its men, in order that they may be more docile 
instruments in its hands even for beneficial purposes - would find that with 
small men no great thihg can really be accomplished (Mill. [1859] 1989: 115). 
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8 
Conclusion: Managing Community through a 
Multifaceted Model 
The world is a looking-glass, and gives back to every man the reflection of his 
own face." 
W.M.Thakery, Vanity Fair 
Throughout this Thesis it has been argued that professional community 
practitioners need to critically reflect on their praxis if they aspire to facilitate 
community initiatives that are "a liberating and progressive force" (Popple, 1994: 
24). Underlying this assertion is the apparent neglect in much of the mainstream 
community work literature of the effects of individual's differing and contending 
perspectives on social reality that lead to particular values, attitudes and beliefs in 
relation to their membership of a community. Therefore. Chapter 1 provides an 
extensive critical discussion about the complex and sometimes contradictory 
nature of working in communities with the active participation of community 
members. This discussion, which draws on key writers and explores the dynamics 
of community engagement, provides the context for subsequent discussion and 
analysis. This utilises the Dixon and Dogan typology of social reality perspectives 
as a tool to assist practitioners in examining both their own practice and that of 
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community members. Through this framework it is possible to explore the 
everyday consequences of individuals adopting one of four contending 
epistemological and ontological dispositions. 
Bertrand Russell described philosophy, in the very wide sense, as "something 
intermediate between theology and science" ([1946] 2000: 13). Thus, the 
discipline permits speculation over matters where knowledge is unascertainable, 
whilst also appealing to human reason rather than the pronouncements of an elite 
authority (Russell, [1946] 2000: 13). However, when this wide understanding of 
philosophy's subject matter is replaced by the confines of the philosophy of social 
science then the reflexive practitioner can focus on a logical epistemological 
division between naturalism and hermeneutics and a logical ontological division 
between structure and agency. These dichotomies, founded on differing 
understandings of the notion of truth, are substantiated in Chapter 2 as being 
underpinned by philosophical thought that extends back to Ancient Greece. 
Moreover, following this analysis, it is then possible to categorise the assertions 
and conclusions of some notable philosophers as belonging to either a school of 
(1) rationalism; (2) empiricism; (3) social constructivism or (4) existentialism. For 
example, thinkers such as Machiavelli, whose Prince is concerned with being 
powerful, not good, and Hobbes, who believed that political power could be 
legitimately acquired by force as well as consent, affirm the social reality 
perspective of naturalist structuralism and its adherent, the duty bound homo 
hierarchus. Alternatively the philosophy of Locke, in its belief that people must 
consent to the powers of government, and John Stuart Mill, who was concerned to 
preserve the liberty of the individual from the tyranny of the majority, affirm the 
social reality perspective of naturalist agency and its adherent, the self-interested 
homo economicus. In contradistinction to these schools of thought, social 
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constmctivism enters into the later work of Wittgenstein, as he is concerned with 
the language games played by people during discourse. Here. Individual 
subjectivity elicits responses that do not depend on explicit rules but instead 
construct a variety of meanings inspired by individual creativity. Moreover, Latour 
argues that the outcomes of scientific experiments cannot be separated from the 
social interaction of scientists and other actors involved in a research project. 
These observations affirm the social reality perspective of hermeneutic 
structuralism and its adherent, the conversation saturated homo sociologicus. 
Finally, existentialists such as Sartre and Heidegger can unite around the 
proclamation that existence proceeds essence in a worid where anxiety, terror and 
loneliness are people's natural emotions and it is the manifestation of individual 
bad faith that causes evasion from this inevitable circumstance. Therefore, this 
affirms the social reality perspective of henneneutic agency and its adherent homo 
existentialis. 
The seeds of this Thesis germinate in Chapter 2, then flower in the following 
three Chapters as the extent of the principles underpinning the Dixon and Dogan 
typology of social perspectives become apparent. Thus, as people form attitudes, 
developmental psychology identifies five elements in an individual's personality, 
each are discrete yet totally inter-related, which, subject to their pre-dominance 
would motivate individuals to associate with one of the four social reality 
perspectives. This notion is then synthesised with Olli's useful and perceptive 
theorising on the provision of three plausible models of the individual. These 
models offer an insight into the degree that some people may adhere to a 
particular social reality perspective whilst others may change their epistemological 
and ontological beliefs in different relational situations. Moreover, whilst a 
person's disposition, whether coherent, sequential or synthetic, is not a permanent 
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characteristic it is likely that only an event of considerable personal significance 
would initiate change through a process of deep personal reflection. 
The subject of ethics is considered from what is perceived as good and what is 
perceived as bad, what determines acceptable and unacceptable behaviour and 
how individuals should relate to their fellow citizens, their community and the state. 
The consequences of contending perspectives on social reality are four distinct 
ethical frameworks, each of which has total ethical legitimacy other than an 
inability to accommodate contending ethical beliefs. Therefore, individual 
adherence to an ethical code may even assume the quintessence of a pre-
ordained proclamation, as personal moral imperatives are preferred to moral 
alternatives. Moreover, as an extension of this paradigm, the contending ethical 
standards of homo hierarchus, homo economicus, homo sociologicus and homo 
existentialis are then associated with four discrete sets of ideological values and 
attitudes. Thus, each of the four perspectives on social reality reveal a coherent 
and discrete set of beliefs in relation to the role of the state, the role of the market 
and the role of community. 
At this point the theoretical analysis and synthesis undertaken in this Thesis has 
resulted in the construction of four contending, unambiguous perspectives on 
social reality. Furthermore, it has been asserted that, as individuals encounter 
relational situations, they would either consciously or sub-consciously choose a 
particular social reality perspective to guide what attitudes they adopt in these 
circumstances. However, the indicative, exploratory empirical research conducted 
with a group of community workers in Chapter 6 found that instead of embracing, 
as expected, the social reality perspective of hermeneutic structuralism the 
majority of these professionals perceive human relations as existing within the 
terms of the naturalist agency perspective on social reality, perhaps reflecting their 
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own pecuniary interest in the preservation and enhancement of their contracts of 
employment. Furthermore, whilst the proposition that community should be an 
arena of democratic discourse that results in shared values and attitudes was fully 
supported nevertheless it was also recognised that deontological premises of duty 
and obligation should exist between community members and the state thereby 
establishing that compliant communities should be looked after by the state. 
Therefore, a paradox is posed by the participants in the research — they.advocate 
a fundamental tenet of communitarianism but believe in rational choices made in a 
social reality where individuals choose to believe facts because these facts result 
in their benefit. Moreover, .well meaning community orientated pronouncements 
such as the Budapest Declaration may fail in not only neglecting the probable 
presence of contending perspectives on social reality amongst community 
members but also in the assumption that those working in communities are all 
committed to the social reality of homo sociologicus. Thus, the challenge facing 
community practitioners can also exist at a personal level as well as in the conduct 
of complex relationships with some community members, who may see little point 
in community initiatives. 
Chapter 7 draws together the strands of thought in this Thesis, which lead to the 
following conclusions. Firstly, there have been calls for community workers to 
reflect over their motivation (for example see Holman. 1994 and McCulloch. 1997). 
however these exhortations focus on the individual's commitment to a specific set 
of values, thus a socialist creed, a feminist outlook or an anti-racist agenda can be 
promoted as fundamental underpinnings to community praxis for the professional 
practitioner. Whilst the anti-discriminatory initiatives implemented at community 
level since the nineteen seventies are undoubtedly praiseworthy, nevertheless, the 
same credibility cannot be extended to those advocating a specific ideology that 
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would exclude those community members who are not its adherents. Indeed, 
suggesting that community practitioners should wholeheartedly embrace certain 
political attitudes so they can become the type of person suited to working in a 
community setting leads to the paradoxes faced by the practitioners surveyed for 
this Thesis. Therefore, instead of those working in communities adopting a 
ritualised role that supposedly would legitimise their presence in the social 
structure of a community (Manning, 1992: 133), it is recommended that they 
should explore their praxis through the dynamics and expected outcomes of 
Figure 7.2. Thus, they should provide community members with a morally 
defensible disclosure of their personal values, attitudes and beliefs that gives due 
respect to these community members "as persons with knowledge, understanding, 
feelings and interests who come together in a shared educational process" 
(Margetson, 1998: 39). In this scenario, the Dixon and Dogan typology provides a 
framework that enables the community practitioner to describe, in the beginnings 
of a language of communicative rationality, exactly what commur^ity members can 
expect from a new epistemology of practice as he or she feels freed from the need 
to maintain an ideological fagade. 
Secondly, the synthesis of transcendental realism and analytical dualism offers 
a new way to contextualise knowledge that accommodates the divide between 
objectivity and subjectivity and structure and agency without conflating any of the 
constituent parts. Here, different types of knowledge can be evaluated in a 
community context as the ideas, beliefs and practices of homo hierarchus, homo 
economicus, homo sociologicus and homo existentialis are opened up "for an 
infinite regress, a recursive movement of ethical and moral reflection that has no 
ultimate foundation" (Ravn, 1991: 105). Obviously, the challenge for the 
community practitioner is to effectively engage with homo hierarchus, homo 
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economicus and homo existentialis, a dilemma that cannot be underestimated. 
However, in this complex paradigm, progress might be made through the 
recognition that individuals are entitled to pursue their own legitimate 
understanding of social reality. When engaging with others is built on a 
fundamental respect for difference then constructive uhity-in-diversity may be 
achieved. In aspiring to propagate this notion of mutual respect the community 
practitioner could critically examine the traditional relationship of contractual 
accountability that exists between himself or herself and his or her management 
group. This group, although usually consisting of a majority of local people, is 
often totally reliant on a local authority for its funding, thus it can be driven by a 
technical ratioriality that relies on the maximisation of outcomes and the 
minimisation of costs. Therefore, this structure might inherently reflect a naturalist 
structuralist perspective on social reality. Thus, the practitioner might need to seek 
to supplement this agreement through an informal contract with a|l community 
members that, in its basis of honest reflection over differing but equally legitimate 
opinions and constraints, can lead to a sense of renewed capacity for social 
interpretation. 
Thirdly, achieving the knowledge, skills and attributes necessary to be an 
effective community practitioner can be described as a rail journey where 
passengers decide on their own embarkation point. This analogy usefully 
illustrates the dilemma for those practitioners who, whilst possibly strongly 
committed to anti-discriminatory praxis, might fail to observe the complexity of 
each individual's contending social reality perspectives as they left the train well 
before its destination. Thus, practitioners might express attitudes such as "I know 
my people" or "I know which buttons to press to achieve my aims" that render 
community initiatives as attractive only to a minority of the members of a 
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community. This approach will frustrate policy makers as they aspire to use 
community as a means of delivering inclusive social policies. Therefore it seems 
desirable that a rudimentary re-evaluation and revision of the training curriculum 
for community practitioners should take place. 
Finally, it should be remembered that community members are volunteers and, 
as such give freely of their time and effort to contribute to their fellow citizens well 
being. In this context the findings of an American Survey conducted by Snyder 
and Clary (1995: 111-124) into motivations for volunteering and giving are 
salutary: 
• Values — for some volunteers the action of volunteering satisfies deeply held 
beliefs about the importance of altruism (the social reality perspective of homo 
sociologicus). 
• Understanding — for some volunteers the action of volunteering helps a 
person to understand their own motivations, comprehend why they wish to 
serve others and why a particular organisation assumes an importance in this 
paradigm (the social reality perspectives of homo hierarchus and homo 
sociologicus). 
• Career — for some volunteers the action of volunteering helps them to learn 
new skills and thus achieve better job prospects or chances of promotion (the 
social reality perspective of homo economicus). 
• Social — for some volunteers the action of volunteering is about creating more 
social contacts and meeting people (the social reality perspective of homo 
sociologicus). 
• Esteem — for some volunteers the action of volunteering helps to raise an 
individual's self esteem as they feel that they are undertaking a virtuous act 
(the social reality perspective of homo sociologicus). 
336 
• Protective — for some volunteers the action of volunteering might assist a 
person to escape from pessimistic feelings of guilt and loneliness (a strand of 
the social reality perspective of the homo existentialis). 
Therefore, it is apparent that people volunteer for a variety of reasons that 
accord with differing perspectives on social reality. Thus, self-interest is present, 
as well as altruism, leading managers, in the wider voluntary sector, to have a use 
for the Dixon and Dogan typology as a reflexive framework in the management of 
their staff in a similar fashion to that of community practitioners in the facilitation of 
community members. 
At this time of unprecedented individual autonomy, where success often hinges 
upon the capacity of the individual to understand and accommodate their 
superiors, peers, subordinates, clients, customers and suppliers, the words of the 
first great political scientist, Machiavelli, ring true "he who would wish for success 
must act in unison with the times" ([1525] 1898: 512). 
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Community Workers 
And Community Reality! 
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this survey. The results will be used 
in a PhD thesis that has the aim of contributing to the development of the 
theoretical understanding of managing community. 
This research is being conducted under the auspices of the Sociology and 
Social Policy Group, School of Sociology, Law and Politics at the University 
of Plymouth and is supervised by Professor John Dixon (01752 233274). 
Thus, in compliance with the University's ethical code of research, the 
source of all answers will be treated as strictly confidential. 
The following questionnaire is divided into two sections. The first section 
asks you to select your preferred choice from a number of statements. The 
second part of the questionnaire consists of twenty-four propositions. For 
each of these items please select an appropriate response from a set of 
categories constructed along a continuum from agreement to disagreement 
There are no correct answers and your replies should be based on your 
initial reaction to the content. 
Once again thank you for your assistance with this project. 
Alan Sanderson (01208 812610) 
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SECTION 1. 
This section is concerned with ascertaining your preferred philosophical position in 
relation to the following statements. Please tick the appropriate box that 
corresponds with your chosen answer. 
1. Human Nature. 
a) "Individuals are essentially free beings who seek liberation from the 
interference of others as they continuously pursue their own pleasure." 
b) "Individuals have a natural aptitude for virtuous actions as they constantly 
strive for the right knowledge, the right speech and the right conduct." 
c) "Individuals are rational and recognise that they can rise above their feelings 
and passions by striving for good conduct, loyalty and sincerity. This can only 
be made possible through conforniity to norms, imposed by a social order, that 
detennines both how they should live and encourages them in the habit of self-
control." 
d) "Individuals are essentially unique beings, free, through acts of their own will, to 
choose who and what to make of themselves." 
2. Facts. 
a) "A fact is a statement that I believe because it helps me work out how to 
produce beneficial results for myself, after all matters are considered." 
b) "A fact is a statement that has been verified by experts using reason and the 
scientific method." 
c) "There is no such thing as a fact, for nothing is knowable with absolute 
certainty." 
d) "A fact can only be validated through discussion with others, because only then 
can there be the appropriate mutual understanding of what is meant by a 
factual statement." 
3. 
a) 
b) 
c) 
d) 
The Social World. 
"I consider the social world to be objective and knowable, and one in which 
social forces mould human behaviour." 
"I consider the social world to be unknowable, thus human behaviour is 
unknowable and therefore unpredictable." 
"I consider the social world to be subjective and knowable through 
understandings that result from discussions with others, thus individual 
behaviour is determined by how people collectively interpret reality." 
"I consider the social world to be objective and knowable, and one in which 
individual intentions mould human behaviour." 
373 
4. Community. 
a) "Community is just another constituent of the hierarchical social order." 
b) "Community is a fictitious body of self-interested individuals." 
c) "Community is another instrument of potential or actual external control." 
d) "Community is a collective committed to engaging in discourses that build 
shared values and attitudes amongst its membership." 
5. 
a) 
b) 
c) 
d) 
6. 
a) 
b) 
c) 
d) 
Decisions. 
"I make personal decisions on the basis that I decide what I will think." 
"I make my personal decisions on the basis that I have, with other community 
members, collectively decided what I will think." 
"I make personal decisions on the basis that they decide what I must think." 
"I make personal decisions on the basis that they decide what we should think." 
Ethics. 
"The moral rightness of an action can best be judged by the goodness of its 
consequence, hence the end justifies the means, which makes such an action 
intrinsically good." 
"As there is no single true morality across time, societies and individuals a 
moral act is one where a good action is accompanied by good intentions, and 
the right emotions and feelings." 
"Moral beliefs are just matters of personal taste because moral truths are 
simply unknowable." 
The end of moral activity lies in an individual finding her or his station or 
position in life and then carrying out its duties." 
a b c d 
SECTION 2 
This section is concerned with your attitude towards the. general aims of 
community organisations and responses to initiatives from community members. 
Please put a tick in the box of your choice. 
1. Communities should make decisions that preserve national social unity. 
Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree 
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2. Communities should make decisions based on a group consensus that avoids 
individual personal risk. 
Stronsiy agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree 
3. All community projects should be managed to achieve measurable 
improvements to individual well-being. 
Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongtv disagree 
4. National loyalty is more important than loyalty to your local community. 
Strongtv agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree 
5. Collective agreements amongst community members are impossible, as we 
cannot know how other people think. 
Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree 
6. Making voluntary contributions and sacrifices to the shared aims of our 
community is desirable. 
Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree 
7. A community can only be understood as a collection of self-interested 
individuals. 
Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree 
8. As individuals cannot influence community outcomes apathy towards 
community is justified. 
Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree 
9. Community is a social entity that can empower activists in community matters 
to achieve the "good life" for all community members. 
Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly, disagree 
10. Communities should be lead by community members with proven expertise 
and experience. 
Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree 
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11 . Community members only make voluntary sacrifices to their community if their 
personal potential benefit exceeds any costs incurred. 
Stronsly asree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree 
12.Cqmniunity just represents another unavoidable mechanism of potential or 
actual control over the individual. 
Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree 
13. Community is just another part of the nation's social order. 
Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree 
14. A personal commitment to discussing ideas and values with other community 
members should be valued. 
Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree 
15. No individual sacrifices should be made for the community unless benefits can 
be expected in return. 
Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree 
16. Individual community members will benefit from being involved in collectively 
making group decisions. 
Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree 
17. If community members obsen/e their duties to their communities then the state 
should accept its obligations to these communities. 
Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree 
18. Community organisations are fictitious as they only exist as a network of 
relationships amongst self-interested individuals. 
Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree 
19.As the social world cannot be known and understood then community 
decisions can only be based on risk minimisation aspirations. 
Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree 
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20. If community plays its part in maintaining the social order then community 
members should be willing to make voluntary sacrifices on its behalf. 
Slrongty agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree 
21.Management of community affairs is just about management for individual 
survival. 
Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree 
22. Community members should be only interested in maximising their material 
wellbeing when making decisions in community settings. 
Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree 
23. Community members can understand their community or a community through 
consultation with other community members. 
Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree 
24. Community decision taking should be concerned with supporting people in the 
pursuit of their rational self-interest. 
Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree 
thank you for taking part in this project 
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Abstract 
Successful leaders in the public sector must satisfy the. often contending, aspirations 
of the state, the private sector and civil society as well as their people and the end-
users. This paper, therefore, argues that such a.complex leadership paradigm must 
be addressed through a philosophically coherent and holistic approach to leadership, 
one that can facilitate practitioners' understanding of values, attitudes and behaviours 
that form an appropriate leadership style in specific relational situations. This 
assertion is realised by application of the paradigm of philosophical dispositions 
developed by Dixon and Dogan. This provides a taxonomy that, through a process of 
deductive logic, draws upon both historic and contemporary thought in the philosophy 
of the . social sciences' dichotomous perspectives on epistemology (naturalism and 
hermeneutics) and ontology (structure and agency) to develop four contending 
philosophical dispositions,(methodological configurations): (1) naturalist structuralism, 
which underpins the obligation-driven homo hierarchus; (2) naturalist agency, which 
underpins the self-interested (free-riding) homo economicus; (3) hermeneutic-
structuralism, which underpins the conversation-saturated homo sbciologicus; and (4) 
hermeneutic agency, which underpins the existential outsider. These philosophical 
dispositions act as perceptual filters through which pepple receive and interpret 
information about how the social worid. and the organisations within it, works and how 
other people behave in it and thus give rise to conflicting perceptions on what 
constitutes "good" leadership. Therefore, senior civil servants who find themselves in 
a particular politico-administrative situations where only one of four methodological 
families can provide them with a way of satisfactorily describing and explaining their 
socio-political and organisational worid are confronted with the leadership challenge 
of devising strategies that can accommodate a variety of contending epistemological 
and ontological Imperatives. Thus, leaders must learn to vary their leadership 
approach by taking Informed leadership stances, depending on the politico-
administrative and organisational contexts in which they are situated, whilst 
maintaining their own ethical integrity. This situational approach to leadership can be 
effectively evaluated by reference to experience. The paper concludes by offering a 
number of hypotheses for public sector leaders that can guide their selection of the 
most appropriate leadership qualities and skills in specific relational situations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
\Nhen we say we want more leadership in the public sector, what we are really 
looking for is people who will promote institutional adaptations in the public 
interest. Leadership in this sense is not value neutral. It is a positive espousal 
of the need to promote certain fundamental values that can be called public 
spiritedness (OECD, 2001: 15 
Stogdill's (1950: 3) timeless and classical defined of leadership — as an influencing process 
aimed at setting and achieving goals — goes a long way in explaining why good leadership is a 
critical determinant for organisational effectiveness, especially in times of rapid change. The 
delivery by public agencies of cost-effective services presents senior civil servants with leadership 
challenges as they contend with structural adjustments, politico-administrative refonns and new 
managerialist agendas in a world that is more open with dynamic global environments and 
technological pressures (Dixon and Kouzmin 2003 and 2004, Dixon et al. 2004a and b. Kouzmin et 
al. 2001). Indeed, the nature of the public sector is increasingly changing, with greater emphasis 
being placed by governments on the management of . public resources and organisational 
perfomiance; and with greater expectations being held by not only more-aware users but also other 
stakeholders — even service providers — all of whom pose serious leadership and organisational 
challenges. 
Senior civil servants must now deal with the 3Es — economy, efficiency, effectiveness. Thus, 
they are confronted with ever rising expectations about the organisational imperatives of, among 
others, flexibility, responsiveness, de-regulation, commercialisation and even privatisation, which 
have place dynamic demands on leadership imperatives: subordinate needs and aspirations, 
executive and political imperatives, market demands, IT advances, reality of dispersed knowledge, 
and global economic shifts. Any discussion on public sector leadership should include components 
that are based on process, context, and evaluation, all of which are influenced by how leadership 
problems and issues are describe, explained, understood, judged and addressed. The subject of 
leadership is at the centre of an intense debate among researchers, teachers and practitioners, 
one that generates emotive and evocative undertones that add to the public sector's already long 
list of paradoxes (Dixon et al. 2004). At the heart of this leadership discourse are sets of 
contending and incompatible judgments about the ultimate constituents of social reality and how 
they can be known. Thus, how leaders choose to interrogate their socio-political and 
organisational reality depends on their philosophical disposition. 
A PHILOSOPHICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANALYSIS OF LEADERSHIP PRACTICE 
People in leadership roles in the public sector have selective screens through which they 
receive knowledge of how their socio-political and organisational'world works and how other people 
behave in them. These provide the value-oriented means by which they order occurrences so as to 
give clarity of meaning to what would othenwise be an anarchic stream of events. These selective 
screens "operate through inclusion and exclusion as homogenizing forces, marshalling 
heterogeneity into ordered realms, silencing and excluding other discourses, other voices in the 
name of universal principles and general goals" (Storey 1993: 159). They have both cognitive-
rational (objective meaning) and communicative-rational (normative meaning) dimensions, which 
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intermingle to produce an assumptive world; a "cognitive map of the world out there" (Young 1979: 
33). The result is a hierarchically structured sets of leadership beliefs, values and norms that they 
construct as a result of their interaction with their internal and external environments, which can be 
categorized as immutable core values, adaptive attitudes, and changeable opinions (Parsons 1995: 
375). How such leaders interrogate the socio-political and organisational reality in which they 
operate as civil servants, and so build their assumptive world, depends, then, on their 
epistemological predisposition (their contentions about what is knowable, how it can be known, and 
the standard by which the truth can be judged) and their ontological predisposition (their 
contentions about the nature of being, what can and does exist, what, their conditions of existence 
might be, and to what phenomena causal capacity might be ascribed) (Dixon 2003. Dixon and 
Dogan 2002, 2003a. b. c. d. 2004), 
Epistemological predispositions relate to people's contentions about what is knowable. how it 
can be known, and the standard by which the truth can be judged (Hollis, 1994). They can be 
based on naturalist propositions, whereby social knowledge must be grounded in objective material 
phenomena and must take the fomri of either analytical statements derived from deductive logic or 
synthetic statements derived from inductive inference. Or they can be based on hermeneutic 
propositions, whereby social knowledge rests on subjective interpretations, derived from cultural 
practice, discourse and language, generated by acts of ideation that rest on intersubjectively 
shared symbols, or typifications that allow the reciprocity of perspectives. 
Ontological predispositions relate to people's contentions about the nature of being, what can 
and does exist, what their conditions of existence might be, and to what phenomena causal 
capacity might be ascribed (Hollis, 1994). They can be based on the stmcturalist proposition that 
"social structures impose themselves and exercise power upon agency. Social structures are 
regarded as constraining in the way they mould people's actions and thoughts, and in that it is 
difficult, if not impossible, for one person to transform these structures (Baert. 1998: 11). Thus, 
action derives from social structures. Or they can be based on the agency or individualist 
proposition that "individuals have some control over their actions and can be agents of their action 
(voluntarism) enabled by their psychological and social psychological make-up" (Parker, 2000: 
125). Thus, action derives from individual intention. 
From these epistemological and ontological dichotomies emerge four methodological families — 
see the Dixon-Dogan model in Figure 1 (Dixon 2002, Dixon and Dogan 2002. 2003a, b, c, d, 2004) 
— each of which provide a set of lens through which the nature of their socio-political and 
organisational wortd is perceived. These differing perceptions represent, logically, the only possible 
ways of describing and explaining that reality. They are the foundations of people's assumptive 
wortds, which enable them to frame appropriately the reality they encounter (Rein and SchOn 
1993), thereby becoming the prisms through which they perceive and analyse their socio-political 
and organisational world. 
Insert Figure 1 here 
A PHILOSOPHICAL TAXONOMY OF "GOOD" LEADERSHIP P R A C T I C E 
Each of the methodological families identified in Figure 1 supports a coherent set of public 
interest perceptions and governance philosophies, enquiry methods, leadership practices and 
behavioural presumptions. Each, then, offers its adherents a set of "good" leadership practice 
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propositions. Each, however, is fundamentally philosophically flawed. In other words, leaders who 
deny naturalist or hermeneutic epistemology will be unable to deal with managennent issues that 
stem from the excluded epistemology. Similarly, the denial of structuralist or agency ontology will 
make them unable to deal with leadership issues that stem from the excluded ontology. 
The Naturalist-Structuralist Perspective 
Public sector leaders who are predisposed to a naturalist-structuralist philosophical stance 
perceive the social world to be a knowable objective reality, which they would characterize as a 
(hierarchical) social order based on positional authority, expressed through orderiy differentiation 
(Dumont 1970). As obligation-driven homo hierarchuses, they would be favourably disposed 
towards the proposition that the public interest is knowable and can be promoted and protected — 
and, thus, society is governable — but only if there is continuity between the past, present and 
future, which can only be preserved by the societal governing elites — in which they are prominent 
— who have the society's common good at heart and who thus can best articulate public interest 
propositions to be promoted and protected by them using the much coveted power of the state 
(Dixon 2002). 
They would have a disposition towards a public agency that has a bureaucratic orientation 
(Weber [1915] 1947), and is characterised by high complexity, high formalization and high 
centralization (Bums and Stalker 1961), and with a primary concern for inputs and getting the 
process right. This they would be inclined to picture (Morgan 1986) as a machine or a brain. Their 
inclination would be to engage in the top-down bonding, through the fostering of an appropriate 
espirit de corp, with an insistence on hierarchical obedience and organisational loyalty (Burns 
1966, Bums and Stalker 1961, Radner 1992, Taylor [1911] 1947). It.would have a decision-making 
process that presumes decisions are the product of institutional activity using functional-analytic 
analysis to generate a set of objective facts, which are used to make satisfycing decisions (Simon 
1960) that produce incremental change. In terms of Thompson's (1967) decision-making strategies 
matrix, they would prefer computational decision-making strategies, because they are inclined to 
be certain about both outcome preferences and their beliefs about cause-effect relations. 
Homo hierarchus leaders, with their orderiy hierarchical differentiation perceptions (Dumont 
1970), would be sympathetic to Herzberg's (1966) presumptions of the *Adam' conception of 
human nature, and to McGregor's (1960 and 1967) Theory X human nature assumptions. They 
would anticipate that dissatisfaction at WOTV, is, in terms of Herzberg and others' (1959, see also 
Herzberg 1966) job hygiene vjork environment factors, because of working conditions, status and 
security. Their respect for rules and regulations would make them particulariy sensitive to the 
procedural justice achieved by the methods used to determine remuneration, a key status indicator 
(Adams 1965, Greenberg 1987). They would believe that people can best be motivated by the 
organisational satisfaction of their material and psychological needs. The needs they would focus 
on would be Maslow's (1970). physiological, safety (security), social (affiliation) and esteem needs; 
Ardrey's (1967) identity, security and stimulation needs; Adier's (1938) power needs; White's 
(1959) competence needs; and McCelland's (1961, see also McCelland et al. 1953) achievement, 
power and affiliation needs. Their underiying rxiotivational presumptions are that people have a set 
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of valued personal material and psychological needs that are knowable by them and can be 
satisfied through work. Their psychological contracts with people would be designed on the 
presumption that they exercise legitimate, expert and knowledge power (Boulder 1990. French and 
Raven 1959. Hales 2001). and that people are predominantly calculative, and thus would make 
quite explicit claims on the rights and obligations of the organisation in terms of the needs that 
would be met in return for services rendered (Handy 1976: 41). All people would be expected to 
have a v/ork commitment, in Morrow's (1983) terms, based on the value they place on their 
organisational loyalty, which would achieve a weak form of Etzioni's (1961) remunerative-
calculative organisational engagement. -
The leadership style of homo hierarchus would be parental (Nichols 1986), within a benevolent-
authoritarian or consultative type of leadership system (Likert 1961 and 1967). This style is 
characterized by Hersey and Blanchard's (1969 and 1993) high relationship and high task 
behaviour pattern, which broadly corresponds with Blake and Mouton's (1982 and 1984) team 
leadership style. In terms of Tannenbaum and Schmidt's (1957) leadership behaviour continuum, it 
involves them making and announcing decisions. The focus of leadership is thus on explaining 
decisions, providing opportunities for clarification, and monitoring performance, thereby ensuring 
control. 
The homo hierarchus leaders' approach would, thus, involve the application of a hierarchical 
command-and-control process that permits them to determine and police what are acceptable 
(desirable) or unacceptable (undesirable) behaviours in terms of the desired organisational 
outcomes. They would thus build an organisational culture that emphasizes role, supports 
compliance and permits little questioning of the rules and orders once they have been given by a 
legitimate authority (Bardach and Kagan 1982). This would support a dub culture, whereby strong 
leaders have power and use it (Handy 1979). The appropriate control mechanism would be 
external control, given the weaker coercive influence of needs-satisfying motivators. This would 
involve both formal and impersonal rules relating to Inputs (about recruitment, qualifications and 
experience), processes (as technical methods .and procedures) and outputs (as performance 
measures and standards); and informally transmitted values (as organisational ethos or 
philosophy) achieved by direct supervision in the form of personal monitoring and work surveillance 
(Hales 2001: 47-48). 
"Good" public sector leadership would, thus, be perceived as being process dhven, with a focus 
on compliance. Thus, they would ensure that organisational policies and practices are implemented 
that give minimal discretion to subordinates. Administrative processes would be strictly controlled 
by rules and regulations that define who should complete a task, how and when it should be done. 
Control would be exercised ex ante (Feldman and Khademain 2000: 150). This is premised on 
human behaviour being predictable on the basis of rational thought constrained by Hierarchically 
determined values and beliefs, with organisational commitment presumed to be both to correct 
procedures and to superiors. 
The Naturalist-Agency Perspective 
Public sector leaders who are predisposed to a naturalist-agency philosophical stance 
philosophical stance would consider the social wortd to be a knowable objective reality, which they 
' would characterize as an aggregation of individuals, each of whom Interact, exercise their freedom 
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of choice and establish contractual relationships. As self-interested homo economicuses, they 
would be favourably disposed towards the proposition that the public interest is knowable and can 
be promoted and protected—and. thus, society is governable—but only v^hen the societal 
governing elites' role — including their own — is. essentially, limited to defining, protecting and 
enforcing property rights by means of a managerialized (that is, privatised and contracted-out) and 
de-politicised civil service in a hollowed out state (Dixon et al. 2004). 
They would be favourably disposed towards a public agency that has an entrepreneurial 
orientation (Mintzberg 1989), and is characterized by low complexity, low formalization and low 
centralization (Burns and Stalker 1961, Hague 1978), with little or no techno-structure, but a 
significant degree of horizontal and/or spatial sub-unit differentiation (Williamson 1985 and 1986). 
and with a primary concern for outputs and outcome. This they would picture (Morgan 1986) as a 
living organism or in a state of flux and transformation. Their inclination would be to ensure that 
decisions should be taken closest to the point v4iere the need for such decisions arises. It would 
have a decision-making process that could become consultative when necessary, and which uses 
instmmentally rational analysis, premised on the self-interest motivation of all actors, to facilitate 
optimal decision-making. In terms of Thompson's (1967) decision-making strategies matrix, they 
would prefer judgmental decision-making strategies, as they are inclined to be certain about 
outcome preferences, but uncertain in their beliefs about cause-effect relations. Thus, they would 
be willing to operate at the edge of competence, by dealing with what they do not yet know using 
an integrative approach to problem solving that challenges established leadership practices by 
going beyond received wisdom (Kanter 1984 and 1989). 
Homo economicus leaders, with their rational economic man perceptions (Schein 1980). would 
be sympathetic to Herzberg's (1966) 'Adam' conception of human nature, and would thus presume 
that people are concerned predominantly with satisfying their safety, security and inter-personal 
relations needs. They would also be attracted to McGregor's (1960 and 1967) Theory X human 
nature assumptions: that people are essentially indolent, unambitious, self-centred: are indifferent 
to organisational needs and prefer to be directed so as to avoid responsibility; and are gullible. So, 
they would accept Barnard's (1938: 159) proposition that "incentives represent the final residue of 
all conflicting forces in organisation" and that people are rational agents who respond to.inputs 
(such as instructions) in systematic ways and can best be motivated by financial incentives (see 
also Bushardt et al. 1986, Claris and Wilson 1961, de Grazia 1960, Whyte 1955). They would 
anticipate that dissatisfaction at wori< is, in terms of Herzberg and others' (1959, see also Herzberg 
1966) job hygiene work environment factors, because of money, status and security. Their sense of 
competition would make them particulariy sensitive to remuneration equitability in terms of the 
distributive justice outcomes achieved (Adams 1965, Greenberg 1987). Their undertying 
motivational presumption is that people respond only to financial incentives. This is because they 
presume that people value financial reward as a means of satisfying their material and 
psychological needs, the most important of which are Maslow's (1970) physiological, safety 
(security) and esteem needs, and Riesman's (1950) and Packard's (1959) prestige needs (see also 
Furnham 1984, Porter and Lawler 1968); that people can justify their efforts only in terms of those 
rewards; that people do not anticipate that any increased individual perfonnance will become a new 
minimum standard; and that organisational performance can be measurably attributed to an 
subordinate's wort^ contribution (Handy 1976: 25). Their psychological contracts with people would 
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be designed on the presumption that they exercise resource, reward, economic or exchange power 
(Boulder 1990, French and Ravan 1959. Hales 2001), and that people are calculative, and thus 
would make quite explicit material rewards that would follow the rendering of sen/ice. This would be 
expressly incorporated into principal-agent contracts. People would be expected to have a wori< 
commitment, in Monrov/s (1983) terms, based on their careers, which would achieve Etzioni's 
(1961) remunerative-calculative organisational engagement. 
The leadership style of homo economicus leaders would be that of a developer (Nichols (1986), 
within a consultative leadership system (Likert 1961 and 1967). This style is characterized by 
Hersey arid Blanchard's (1969 and 1993) low relationship and low task behaviour pattern, and 
broadly corresponds v\rith Blake and Mouton's (1982 and 1984) impoverished leadership style. In 
terms of Tannenbaum and Schmidt's (1957) leadership behaviour continuum, it involves leaders 
defining limits and followers making decisions. This facilitates subordinate autonomy by 
appropriately delegating decision-making and implementation responsibility. 
The homo economicus leaders' approach to leadership would, thus, involve creating incentives 
(rewarding of desirable behaviours) and disincentives (punishing of undesirable behaviours), which 
are embodied in performance-reward contracts. They would thus build an organisational culture 
that is focused not only on task, whereby leadership is regarded as solving a series of task-related 
problems involving the adjustment, redefinition and renegotiation of individual tasks (Handy 1979). 
but also on supporting quid pro quo exchanges between individuals. The control mechanism they 
would institute would thus be self-control (under the self-determined coercive influence of material 
incentives). This involves the modifying, repressing or inhibiting of behaviour to conform with a set 
of "internalized rules and norms of behaviour relating the processes (methods of work) and outputs 
(standards) and internalized values relating to the ethical conduct of those carrying out the wort^ 
i tself (Hales 2001: 47). They would expect this to induce instrumental compliance (Etzioni 1961) 
with the organisational rules and procedures from people, on the basis of their economic 
calculation of the net compliance benefits. 
"Good" public sector leadership would, thus, be perceived as being results driven, with a focus 
on performance. Thus, such leaders would seek to improve results by relying on a decentralised 
authority distribution, so as to expand the ways in which work is conducted, with people expected 
to use their devolved authority to achieve leadership-established targets, and with control being 
exercised ex posf '(Feldman and Khademain 2000: 150). This is premised on human behaviour 
being predictable on the basis of self-interest Thus, people are presumed to be instrumental, 
applying functional-strategic rationality to make purposive and predatory decisions on the basis of 
their ovm self-interesL organisational commitment can, thus, only occur if it is personally profitable. 
The Hermeneutlc-Structuralist Perspective 
Public sector leaders who are predisposed to a hermeneutic-structuralist philosophical stance 
would consider the social worid to be a subjective social reality, knowable only as it is socially 
constructed, which they would characterize as a collection of communities of interest with which 
individuals voluntarily engage. As the conversation-saturated homo sociologicus. they would be 
favourably disposed towards the proposition that the public interest is knowable and can be 
promoted and protected—and. thus, society is govemable—but only if it is assumed that society's 
survival, stability and wellbeing depend on sophisticated and subtle interpersonal interactions 
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taking place between interest groups and the societal governing elites — in which they play a 
pivotal role — on the basis of a sense of mutual trust and a shared commitment to an agreed set of 
public interest propositions that they have helped build up and that they then work to promoted and 
protected. 
They would have a disposition towards a public agency that has a missionary orientation 
(Wlintzberg 1989), and is characterized by low complexity, low formalization and low centralization 
(Bums and Stalker 1968. Hague 1977. Mintzberg 1978). and a primary concern on process, as 
much as goals and end-states. This they would picture (Morgan 1986) as a political system, or a 
configuration of cultures. Their inclination would be to empower groups of people to take 
responsibility for their own work design and perfonmance. Their organisation would have a 
decision-making process that is collegial, harmonious and trustworthy, and that involves the 
application of critical rationality in its continual striving to unearth the collectively determined 
sensible and practicable good, achieved by a group consensus through discourses on contestable 
values and standards. In terms of Thompson's (1967) decision-making strategies matrix, they 
would prefer compromise decision-making strategies, as they are inclined to be uncertain about 
competing outcome preferences, but certain in their beliefs about cause-and-effect relations. 
Homo sociologicus leaders, with their social man perceptions (Schein 1980), would be 
sympathetic to Herzberg's (1966) presumptions of the 'Abraham' conception of human nature, and 
would thus presume that people are concerned predominantly with satisfying human needs of 
understanding, achievement, and psychological growth and development. They would also be 
attracted to McGregor's (1960 and 1967) Theory Y human nature assumptions, which are that 
people find work as natural as rest and recreation, can assume responsibility, are not resistant to 
organisational heeds if they are committed, can be creative in solving organisational problems, and 
are willing to direct their behaviour towards organisational goals. They would anticipate that 
dissatisfaction at wori< is, in terms of Herzberg and others' (1959. see also Herzberg 1966) job 
hygiene work environment factors, because of working conditions, status and security. Their sense 
of collegiality would make them particularty sensitive to remuneration equitability issues, both with 
respect to the distributional justice outcomes achieved and, perhaps more importantly, to the 
procedural justice achieved by the methods used to determine remuneration (Adams 1965, 
Greenberg 1987). They would believe that people can best be motivated by setting goals (Locke 
1968. Locke and Latham 1990) to which they can make a commitment. Their underlying 
motivational presumption is that people want to share responsibility for goal setting (House and 
Mitchell 1974) because there is a congruence between individual and organisational goals. This 
enables an organisation to meet people's needs, the most important of which are Maslow's (1970) 
social (affiliation or acceptance), esteem and self-actualization (distinctive psychological potential) 
needs, Ardrey's (1967) identity, security and stimulation needs, Alderfer's (1972) existence, 
relatedness and growth needs, and McCelland's (1961, see also McCelland et al. 1953) 
achievement, power and affiliation needs, and Herzberg and others' (1959, Herzberg (1966) 
achievement, recognition, Their psychological contracts with people would be designed on the 
presumption that they exercise personal, referent and normative power (Boulder 1990, French and 
Ravan 1959, Hales 2001), and that people are cooperative, and thus would be premised on the 
idea that people tend to identify with organisational goals, which they pursue creatively in return for 
just rewards. People should thus be given more voice in their selection and more discretion on the 
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choice of goal-achievement strategies (Handy 1976: 41). People would be expected, in Morrow's 
(1983) terms, to have a work commitment based on the value they place on work as an end in 
itself, on their absorption and involvement in their job. and on their organisation and sectional 
interest loyalties, which would achieve Etzioni's (1961) normative-moral organisational 
engagement. 
The leadership style of homo sociologicus leaders would be that of a coach (Nichols 1986). 
within a participative-group type of leadership system (Likert 1961 and 1967). This style is 
characterized by Hersey and Blanchard's (1969 and 1993) high relationship and low task behaviour 
pattem, which broadly corresponds with Blake and Mouton's (1982 and 1984) country club 
leadership style. Under this leadership style the production of outcomes is incidental to the lack of 
conflict and good fellowship. In tenms of Tannenbaum and Schmidt's (1957) leadership behaviour 
continuum, it involves leaders permitting followers to function within the limits they define. The 
leadership focus is thus on sharing Ideas and facilitating group decision-making, thereby 
empowering individuals. 
The homo sociologicus leaders* approach to leadership would, thus, involve inspiring a sense of 
performance consciousness in the form of a mutually agreed set of high performance expectations. 
Communicating a values-driven performance philosophy would do this by stimulating and 
facilitating the necessary behaviour change by empowering people to become creative risk takers 
and innovators. They would build an organisational culture that would be centred existentially on 
the person, such that the organisation would be perceived to exist in order to help people achieve 
their personal goals (Handy 1979). Peters and Waterman (1982) have argued that communicating 
a values-driven performance philosophy can be achieved by means of leadership by wandering 
around (see also, Peters 1994). The appropriate control mechanism would be mutual control, 
involving the group enforcement of behaviour norms relating to inputs (as standards of recruitment 
to the group), processes (as wori< methods), outputs (as performance standards), and values (as 
ethical standards) (Hales 2001: 47). The expected response induced would be compliance 
because of moral commitment (Etzioni 1961). 
"Good" public sector leadership would be would, thus, be perceived as being inclusion driven, 
with a focus on building capacity to achieve results. Thus, leaders would encourage people, as well 
as perhaps members of the general public and other relevant organisations, to work together 
towards the achievement of results over which they may have little direct influence. This they would 
seek to achieved by increasing subordinate engagement with the organisation, which they would 
see as a product of decentralising authority, and emphasising empowerment, teamwork, and 
continuous performance improvement Leadership control is accomplished by the way they 
implement participation (Feldman and Khademain 2000: 150). This is premised on human 
behaviour being predictable on the basis of group-constructed understandings. Thus, people are 
presumed to be cooperative by nature; ever willing and able to construct the mutual 
understandings that fonri the basis for reasoning, what Gergen and Thatchenkery (1998: 26) 
describe as "communal negotiation, the importance of social processes in the observational 
enterprise, the socio-practical functions of language, and the significance of pluralistic cultural 
Investments in the conception of the true and the good." They are thus presumed able and willing 
to engage in critically reflective, intersubjective communications, in order to gain understanding in a 
group context (see also Cooperrider and Srtvastra 1987, Reason and Rowan 1981. Gergen 1994). 
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This means that because discourse occurs in an open environment characterized by broadly 
diffused transformations (Bakhtin 1981, Foucault 1978). patterns of human activity are ever 
dynamic, at times incrementally, sometimes disjointediy (Gergen and Thatchenkey 1998: 28). 
Thus, people' organisational commitment is to those with whom they share common values and a 
common vision. 
The Henmeneutic-Agency Perspective 
While those who are predisposed to a hermeneutic-agent philosophical disposition, which, as 
Goffman ([19591 1990) notes, embraces a wide range of behaviour, would deny the possibility of an 
objective social reality and, therefore, the predictability of social action. They would, thus, presume 
themselves to be incapable of describing, analyzing and understanding (let alone changing) social 
reality with any degree of certainty. They would consider that no experience can be fully shared by 
two individuals. All that is knowable, then, is what is in a person's own field of contemporaneous 
consciousness, which cannot be escaped — "I am my world" (Wittgenstein ([1922] 1961: 5.63), 
"the world is my idea° (Schopenhauer [1818 and 1844] 1969: 1). In this world, individuals simply 
exist, it is up to them not only to decide their own fate, for which they alone are responsible, but 
also to define their own identity, or essential characteristics, which they do in the course of living 
out their lives in the most authentic and fulfilling way possible (Heidegger (1927) 1967, Nietzsche 
[1986] 1966, Sartre ([1946] 1973). As sceptical existential outsiders, they would presume the 
public interest is unknowable, because of capriciousness and uncertainty, and thus cannot be 
intentionally and instrumentally promoted and protected. Nevertheless, society is still governable, 
but only if the societal goveming elites permit them to exercise of the coercive power of the state so 
as to enables elites to govern as they see fit. 
They would have a disposition towards a public agency that has a bureaucratic orientation 
(Weber [1915] 1947), and is characterised by high complexity, high formalization and high 
centralization (Burns and Stalker 1961), and with an obsessed with control. This they would picture 
(Morgan 1986) as a psychic prison or an instrument of domination, with organisational processes 
that give rise to "low-cooperation, rule-bound approaches to organisation. Their inclination would 
be to ensure that their public agency can accommodate ambiguous, mutually reinforcing, 
perceptions of its intent, understanding, history and organisation (March and Olsen 1976). They 
would never resolve organisational conflicts, organisational uncertainties would always be avoided, 
and organisational solutions would inevitably be shortsighted and simplistic. This is because they 
perceive decision-making processes are dominated by the unknowing and the untrustworthy, which 
means that policy, because of the limits of human cognition, can only be the product of garbage 
can-like decision processes (March and Olsen 1976). This is described by Cohen and others 
(1972: 2) as "a collection of choices looking for problems, issues and feelings looking for decision-
situations in which they may be aired, solutions looking for issues to which they may be answers,' 
and decision makers looking for work." 
Existential outsider leaders would be sympathetic to Herzberg's (1966) presumptions of the 
'Adam' conception of human nature, and to McGregor's (1960 and 1967) Theory X human nature' 
assumptions. They would certainly believe that people would be generally dissatisfied with 
Herzberg's and others' (1959. see also Herzberg 1966) job hygiene work environment factors, 
particularly policies and administration, supervision, woricing conditions, money, status and 
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security. Their cynicism and distrust would make Ihem particularly sensitive to the issues of equity 
of remuneration, both in terms of the distributional justice outcomes achieved and the procedural 
justice achieved by the methods used to determine remuneration (Adams 1965. Greenberg 1987). 
So to them compliance occurs only because of fear of punishment that would diminishes people's 
capacity to meet their physiological and safety (security) needs (Maslow 1970). Their underiying 
motivational presumptions are that people have to be sufficiently fearful of punishment to ensure 
compliance, and that they have the power to punish. Their psychological.contracts with people 
would be designed on the presumption that they would exercise coercive, physical or threat power 
(Boulder 1990, French and Ravan 1959, Hales 2001). and that people would comply explicitly with 
the rules to avoid punishments (Handy 1976: 40). People would be presumed to have no work 
commitment, which would result in Etzioni's (1961) coercive-alienative organisational engagement. 
The leadership style of existential outsider leaders would be that of a driver (Nichols 1986) 
within an exploitative-authoritarian type of leadership system (Likert 1961 and 1967). This style Is 
characterized by Hersey and Blanchard's (1969 and 1993) low relationship and high task behaviour 
pattern, which broadly corresponds with Blake and Mouton's (1982 and, 1984) task leadership style. 
In terms of Tannenbaum and Schmidt's (1957) leadership behaviour continuum. It involves leaders 
making decisions and announcing them. This involves leaders providing specific instructions and 
closely supervising wori< performance, thereby ensuring dominant leadership. They would thus 
build an organisational culture that emphasizes power, and reinforces the authority of a superior 
over people, so supporting a club culture under which strong leaders would be permitted, if not 
expected, to exercise power (Handy 1979). 
Their approach to leadership would involve hierarchical command-and-control, with the 
expected response being alienative compliance (Etzioni 1961). born of the fear of force, threat and 
menace. The expected control mechanism would be external control (Hales 2001; 47), particulariy 
by means of random direct supervision. This could encompass the "contrived randomness" mode 
of control with hierarchical accountability (Hood 1998: 64-68, see also Rose-Ackerman 1978). 
"'dual key' operations (that is, several people needed to commit funds or other resources, or 
separation of payments and authorization) with an unpredictable pattern of posting decision-
makers or supervisors around the organisation's empire" as welt as "random internal audits' (Hood 
1998: 65). 
"Good" public sector leadership would be perceived as being survival driven, with plausibility as 
the basis for reasoning, involving a Weickian-like sense-making process (Weick 1995). Thus, they 
engage in non-rational. Inspirational-strategic reasoning because they consider validity, truth, and 
efficiency to be in-elevant. They would act on the presumption that what the organisation is capable 
of doing can only be establish by trial and error, which means that Its goals can only evolve from 
action. Learning can thus only be; achieved only by trial and en-or. Technology is always unclear. 
And who is involved in what is ever changing, because participation is fluid. This characterizes 
March's (1988 and 1994) organized anarchy (see also Cyert and March [1963] 1992, March and 
Olsen 1976 and 1989). Their underiying premise is that human behaviour is unpredictable, 
because agency is defined by subjective perceptions of social reality. What an individual bejjeves 
to be real is, in fact, reality. 
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IMPLICATIONS FOR LEADERSHIP PRAXIS 
Senior civil servants vjho find themselves in a particular leadership situation where only one of 
four methodological families seems to provide them with a way of satisfactorily describing and 
explaining their socio-political and organisational wortd are confronted with the leadership 
challenge of devising strategies that can accommodate a variety of contending epistemological and 
ontological imperatives. These deliberations can be guided by the philosophical taxonomy 
presented] beginning with the supposition that people only adopt one disposition in all leadership 
(relational) situations they encounter. For instance homo hierarchus (naturalist structuralist) 
leaders who demands hierarchical obedience and organisational loyalty in order to address 
politico-administrative imperatives that demand that they delennine and police what are acceptable 
(desirable) or unacceptable (undesirable) behaviours, may well become (1) homo economicus 
(naturalist agent) leaders when addressing market imperatives that require, for example, the 
acceptance and accommodation self-interest motivations; (2) a homo sociologicus (hermeneutic 
structuralist) leaders when addressing organisational imperatives that require, for example, the 
behaviour changes that follow the empowering of people to become creative risk takers and 
innovators; or (3) existential outsider, (hermeneutic agent) leaders when they are confronted with 
imperatives they cannot analyse and understand (let atone address) with any degree of certainty, 
necessitating the use of non-rational, inspirational-strategic reasoning that holds validity, truth, and 
efficiency to be Irrelevant. The extent that a person's leadership values, attitudes and behaviour (1) 
remain consistent; (2) are willingly but superficially adapted to meet particular needs in particular 
leadership situations; or (3) are capable of accommodating radically different status and role 
relationships in different leadership situations becomes a matter for specific empirical investigation 
(Olli 1995 and 1999). Similariy. in any leadership (relational) situation, the level of conviction that 
an individual feels towards his or her chosen philosophical disposition will vary, possibly subject to 
the extent of their familiarity with the circumstances that prevail and the subject matter being 
addressed. However, throughout these psychological processes, philosophical precepts will 
continue to mediate each person's access to, and understanding of, their social reality. Thus, a 
leader's practice will benefit from comprehending the possibilities of synergy between contending 
dispositions. 
The Ontolbgical Proposition 
The contention here lies between structure and agency. Quite simply, the committed 
individualist concludes that structure has no causal capacity — human actions derives from the 
intentions of "lone, atomistic and opportunistic" individuals (Archer 2000: 4); whilst the committed 
structuralist believes that people are nothing more than "society's beings" — merely Durkheim's 
"Indeterminant material" — human actions are constrained and moulded by structural phenomena 
(Archer 2000: 19). These polar views are not substantiated by the historical and contemporary 
philosophical theorising that underpins the Dixon-Dogan paradigm of philosophical dispositions, as 
they fail to adequately explain the complexity of human society (Archer 2000). 
Alternatively other academics have proposed various types of central conflation (such as. 
Bourdieu 1998, Giddens 1984 and 1993, Schatzki 2002). Thus, elaborate site ontologies, featuring 
social reality as a contingent mesh of practices and material orders, have been constructed. 
Alternatively, the proposition has been offered that individuals (agency) and social structures 
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(structure) are interdependent in a relationship of duality therefore constitutive to each other. 
However, both of these constructs do not have the explanatory power to explain the following two 
propositions: "that, (1) structure necessarily pre-dates the action(s) which transform it, and, (2) that 
structural elaboration necessarily post-dates those actions" (Archer 1995: 168). Therefore, the 
notion of analytical dualism, which is advocated by the school of critical realism (Bhaskar 1979, 
Archer 1989 and 1995), provides the social ontology that is both relevant and explanatory to the art 
of public sector leadership. 
The vertical axis in Figure 2 can measure the extent of ontological elaboration amongst 
adherents of all four philosophical dispositions. This scale is assessed from observations that keep 
structure and agency analytically separate. Following this separation it is the "the conjunction 
between the two elements which...[furnishes]...the key to structural stability or change" (Archer 
1989: XV). For the modification of structural factors (morphogenesis) structural emergent properties 
must be produced by an organisation, which exert causal influences on social interaction. This 
would.be, for instance, the case when politic-administrative reform seeks to change in the method 
of public services delivery from the bureaucratic model to the managerialist model. In addition, 
causal relationships should also exist between groups and individual agents, arising from a process 
of social interaction, that can elaborate upon the configuration of the organisation by modifying and 
introducing new structural relationships (Archer. 1995: 168). Without these dynamics the existing 
organisational structure will just be reproduced (morphostasis). Thus, the ontological proposition 
has now been developed into a framework that can enable public sector leaders to take account of 
every stakeholders* potential role in the elaboration of organisational structure. 
Figure 2 about here 
The Epistemological Proposition 
It has been argued that the objective or "purposeful rational" elements within organisational 
environments have subsumed the subjective or critical aspects of human consciousness 
(Habermas 1970 and 1971). It is proposed that this suppression of hermeneulic understanding will 
alienate people from an organization. Thus, public sector leaders should employ an 
epistemological synthesis of transcendental realism, which enables them to embrace constructive 
arguments that are offered without fear of retribution, based on both empirical and emotional 
judgments (Bhaskar 1979). This approach recognizes "that there are causal laws, generalities, at 
wori< in social life but it is wrong to accept...the reduction of these laws to empirical regularities** 
(Bhaskar 1979: 27). Therefore, when leaders offers factual knowledge they must also 
acknowledge the inherent unreliablity of the underpinning empirical observations in a paradigm 
where "the objects of our knowledge exist and act independently of the knowledge of which they 
are the objects'* (Bhaskar 1979: 14). In this uncertain environment, people must be empowered to 
employ their subjectivity to supplement available empirical data about social phenomena. Thus 
knowledge can progress through the construction and rigorous scientific testing of hermeneutic-
based hypotheses. So, there is the potential here for the reconciliation of the divide between 
naturalism and hermeneutics. This unity can become enshrined in the notion that "the concept of 
knowledge enters our repertoire of concepts on the back of testimony" (Welbourne, 2001: 125). 
Therefore, thoughtful leader who utilises the components of transcendental realism, can encourage 
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testimony in the belief that all people will grow to recognise the value of subjective opinions as 
differing points of view become apparent. 
The axis of objective/subjective synergism featured in figure 2 has now become relevant to all 
four philosophical dispositions. Therefore, it is proposed that, in conjunction with the axis of 
ontological elaboration, leaders can map the present degree of organisational harmonisation 
amongst their stakeholders before, during and after implementing a strategy for change. 
The acceptance of this synthetic philosophical stance generates two serious epistemological 
and ontological challenges for those engaged in public sector leadership. First, it requires them to 
be philosophically reflective, and thus able not only to identify their own and others epistemological 
and ontological predispositions. Second, it requires them to understand and accept the strengths 
and weaknesses of the contending methodologies for their performance as leaders. In essence, 
this requires them to embrace the following leadership propositions, which are discrete yet totally 
inter-linked. 
First, adept public sector leaders would be epistemologically and ontologically sophisticated 
enough to accept that what constitutes "good" leadership is an essentially contested concept, 
clarifiable through constructive discourse. Thus, they would actively seek insights into what might 
work in particular leadership situations. There is, for example, no justification for avoiding 
constructive discourse in open forums, as this engagement is an essential means of judging 
strength of feeling. Open, constructive discourse must been seen as normal, even if it has the 
propensity to create conflict, and as essential to the creation of creative opportunities for leaders to 
engage with those holding contending philosophical perspectives to understand and find solutions 
to problems and issues. Only then can they anticipate the reactions of people to particular 
solutions, which can then form part of a critical path analysis, thereby making expectation 
management an integral part of process by which problems and issues are defined and their 
solutions are fonmulated, evaluated and.implemented. And it is only when inter-personal conflict is 
frankly addressed — reflecting a tolerance of acceptable levels of disagreement — that all 
stakeholders can feel some ownership of eventual solutions. 
Second, adept public sector leaders would be sceptical of any empirical generalizations or 
testimonial assertions about the causation and consequences of, and solutions to, problems and 
issues. There is no "correct" solutions to problems or issues. Detailed analysis can only produce at 
best suppositions that require fijrther reflexive interpretation to deepen understanding. Indeed, the 
"best" solution cannot be a compromise between opposing opinions that is unsatisfactory to all, as 
such scenarios reflect the actions of leaders who have ceased to lead. Identifying satisfactory 
compromise solutions requires leaders to engaging in acts of ideation with those who hold different 
philosophical dispositions and thus have different understandings of problem causation and 
solution. This would allow the necessary perspectives reciprocity needed for a reflexive 
interpretation to emerge that would ensure an appropriate contextualization of meaning in temis of 
problem or issue causation and "besf solution. 
Third, adept public sector leaders would leam how to comprehend and evaluate the intended 
meaning of the contending arguments based on a diversity of epistemological and ontological 
perspectives. They would settle in their own minds competing epistemological and ontological 
truth-claims with consistency and without recourse to intentional activities and motivated processes 
that enable self-deception or self-delusion. They would thereby confront unpleasant truths or issues 
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rather than resort to the mental states of ignorance, false belief, unwarranted attitudes and 
inappropriate emotions (Haight 1980). They would accept that the best outcomes that can be 
expected from constructive discourses are sets of achievable aspirations, implementable 
strategies, and tolerable levels of hostility and organisational disharmony to ensure the attainment 
of specified goals. They would, thus, view "good" leadership as an iterative process that involves 
leaming-by-doing and leaming-from-experience about what is the right thing to do and how to do 
things right. 
CONCLUSION 
The configuration of epistemological and ontological perspectives that gives rise to a set 
methodological families offer incompatible contentions about what is knowable and can exist in the 
worid in which public sector leaders conduct their affairs. Thus, they have incompatible contentions 
about the forms of reasoning that should be the basis for leadership thought and action, and about 
how people behave or are prone to behave in given situations. Each of them is, however, 
fundamentally flawed because of underlying epistemological and ontological premises are 
fundamentally flawed. 
The broad conclusion drawn is that "good" public sector leadership requires leaders: 
to recognize the limitations of their cognitive map of politic-administrative and organisational 
reality, thereby avoiding epistemological and ontological arrogance; 
• to seek out and engage with those who disagree with their cognitive map of that reality; 
• to treat all knowledge claims sceptically, accepting that there are multiple standards by which 
they could be justified, particulariy if they come from any ascendant epistemic community 
(whether founded on naturalism or hermeneutics); and 
• to settle competing epistemological and ontological asseverations with consistency and without 
recourse to the self-deception or self-delusion that permits them to avoid unpleasant truths. 
Their challenge is to accept Barrett (1958: 247) proposition that "the centuries-long evolution of 
human reason is one of man's greatest triumphs, but it is still in process, still incomplete, still to 
be." 
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Figure 1: Epistemological and Ontological Underpinnings of Contending "Good" Public 
Sector Leadership Propositions 
Naturalism Hermeneutics 
Ontology 
Structuralism 
Agency 
Naturalist Structuralism: 
Presumes an objective social 
worid, knowable by the 
application of the scientific 
method, in which structures 
exercise power over agency, 
which makes human behaviour 
predictable. 
'A good public agency should 
have a bureaucratic orientation 
with a primary concern for inputs 
and getting processes right, thus 
good public sector leadership 
should be process driven, with a 
focus on compliance." 
Hermeneutic Structuralism: 
Presumes a subjective social 
worid. knowable only .as it is 
socially constructed, with 
people's action being 
determined, and made 
predictable, by their collective 
interpretation of this reality. 
"A public agency should have a 
missionary orientation, with a 
primary concern for process, as 
much as goals and end-states, 
thus good public • sector 
leadership should be inclusion 
driven, with a focus on building 
capacity to achieve results." 
Naturalist Agency: 
Presumes an objective social 
worid. knowable by the 
application of the scientific 
method, in which people are 
agents of their actions, with their 
behaviour made predictable by 
their unconstrained self-interest. 
"A good public agency should 
have an entrepreneurial 
orientation with a primary 
concern for outputs and 
outcomes. Thus good public 
sector leadership should be 
results driven, with a focus on 
performance." 
Hermeneutic Agency: 
Presumes a subjective social 
worid that Is contestably 
knowable as what people 
believe. it to be, with agency 
constrained by their subjective 
perceptions of social reality, 
which makes human behaviour 
unpredictable. 
"A public agency should have a 
bureaucratic orientation with a 
primary concern for control. 
Thus good public sector 
leadership should be survival 
driven, with plausibility the basis 
for reasoning that makes sense 
of situations as they arise." 
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Figure 2: Leadership and the Philosophical Dispositions 
Ontotogical Elaboration 
Axis 
Naturalist Structuralism Hermeneutic Structuralism 
Harmonisation 
Organisational 
Objective/Subjective Synergism Axis 
Naturalist Agency Hermeneutic Agency 
© 2004 John Dixon, Alan Sanderson and Smita Tripathi 
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COMMUNITY AND COMMUNITARIANISM: 
A PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION 
Abstract 
This paper draws upon contemporary perspectives in the philosophy of the social sciences to identify 
four contending perceptions of community. It then locates the communitarian perspective, within this 
framework, so as to explore the limitations of its epistemological and ontological premises. 
Communitarians claim to understand the dynamics of an "authentic community." They maintain that 
enlightened citizens, experiencing this spontaneous social construct, will discover the futility of the 
liberal and existential self because both deny the significance of shared values and attitudes, and thus 
wil l realize the fundamental conu^diction of this position in the light of the inherently social nature of 
human beings. Through increased social cohesion, arising from citizens' active participation in 
community discourses, authoritarianism will be constrained and mutuality, which nurtures a more 
egalitarian society, will be promoted. The realization of these assertions, however, must rely on 
communitarianism accommodating citizens* difTering ontological and epistemological understandings 
of their social worid. 
Key Words: Communitarianism, social theory, community. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The dilemma for communitarians is that there is a gap between communitarian aspirations and 
community reality, in terms of community engagement. This paper identifies the foundations of that 
dilemma, by providing a philosophical critique of the key elements of the philosophical stance known as 
"communitarianism," particularly its understanding o f community, human nature and individual identity. 
In this regard, communitarianism is recognised as possessing two characteristics within its theoretical 
base that sustains a broad consensus amongst community theorists, activists and workers: the 
acknowledgement of "community^* as an essential component within the formation of individual identity 
and as the means for citizens to . achieve improved levels of personal well-being. Furthermore, 
democratic community forums are accepted as being a source of common agreement for the 
identification of social goods and their equitable distribution (Cross, 2001:1). • 
Etzioni (1995 and 1997) constructs his case for communitarianism around a fundamental assertion 
that individuals should have a key role in furnishing the needs of their neighbours. He, thus, argues that 
individuals, once they have met their personal responsibilities, have an obligation to promote the well-being 
o f relatives, friends and others in the various communities to which they belong (Etzioni, 1995: 144). These 
include (Eczioni, 1995: 119-22) all types of social groups, such as schools, organizations, families, 
neighbourhoods and interest groups. This case, for the application of reciprocity in care and compassion, is a 
common theme in communitarian literature, as theorists (Bellah, 1995-96; Sandel, 1992; Tarn, 1998) argue 
for a balance between individual rights and collective obligations and responsibilities. 
Communitarians' acknowledge that an individual may influence another person's understanding of 
reality, and accept a social world conceived through the medium of group discourse. Sandel (1992: 19) 
pondered on the possibility of citizens being able to choose their purpose without any structural constraints 
from their cultural inheritance. Moments of deepest self-understanding only come i f a person is 
unencumbered by personal attachments and commitments. However, It is questionable whether existing 
aspirations are an essential part of a person's self-identity without the presence of strong convictions and the 
capacity to substitute revised values and attitudes at wi l l (Sandel, 1992: 23). I f people do not interpret their 
social meanings through who they are and what they have experienced, but instead focus on who they will 
become, then as Sandel concludes, the "liberal self is lef l to lurch between detachment on one hand, and 
entanglement on the other" (1992: 24). Therefore, the communitarian believes, axiomatlcally, that 
unrestricted human autonomy wil l result In greater social cohesion. As Mclntrye notes, citizens *Svill grow to 
understand themselves...only in the context of the community" (cited in Arthur, 1998: 357). 
The evident gap between communitarian aspirations and community reality Is a source of frustration 
to those who promote community as a source of intentional individual collective action. This, however, 
requires a reconciliation of conflicting and competing values, beliefs and attitudes held by people about 
community and community engagement, which Is a product of their perceptions about how the social world 
works and how other people behave. Underpinning these competing world-views are competing 
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philosophical predispositions about what constitutes genuine knowledge and what gives rise lo human 
actions. There is, therefore, an imperative for a philospphical exploration into the reluctance of citizens to 
participate in the affairs of their communities, even when such an involvement may achieve benefits for all 
members. 
This paper uses a conceptual framework drawn from the philosophy of the social sciences to 
investigate perceptions of community»collective action, voluntary sacrifices for the collective, and apathy, so 
as to explore the factors that influence community-engagement decisions, and their implications for public 
policy. It has three objectives: (1) to identify the contending perceptions of community derived from the 
epistemological and ontoiogical dichotomies embedded in social theory; (2) to establish that 
communitarianism is philosophically flawed; and (3) to identify the episiemological and ontoiogical 
challenges facing communitarians i f they are to engage, for collective benefit, with people who do not share 
their philosophical perspectives and ethical values. 
A PHILOSPHICAL FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING C O M M U N I T Y 
People have selective screens through which they receive knowledge of how the social world works 
and how other people behave (Dixon, 2003). These provide the value oriented means by which people order 
events, so as to give clarity of meaning to what would otherwise be an anarchic stream of events. They have 
both cognitive-rational (objective meaning) and communicative-rational (normative meaning) components, 
which intermingle to produce an assumptive world: a "cognitive map of the world out there" (Young, 1979: 
33). How people interrogate the social world, and so build their assumptive world, depends on their 
epistemological and ontoiogical predispositions (Dixon and Dogan, 2003). 
Epistemological predispositions relate to people^s contentions about what is knowabte, how it can be 
known, and the standard by which the truth can be judged (Hollis, 1994). They can be based on naturalist 
propositions, whereby social knowledge must be grounded in material phenomena and must take the form of 
either analytical statements derived from deductive logic or synthetic statements derived from inductive 
inference. Or they can be based on hermeneutic propositions, whereby social knowledge rests on 
interpretations, derived from cultural practice, discourse and language, generated by acts of ideation that rest 
on intersubjeclively shared symbols, or typifications that allow the reciprocity of perspectives. 
Ontoiogical predispositions relate to people's contentions about the nature o f being, what can and 
does exist, what their conditions o f existence might be, and to what phenomena causal capacity might be 
ascribed (Hollis, 1994). They can be based on the stnicturalist proposition that "social structures impose 
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themselves and exercise power upon agency. Social structures are regarded as constraining in the way they 
mould people's actions and thoughts, and in that it is difficult, i f not impossible, for one person to transform 
these structures (Baert, 1998: 11). Thus, social action derives from social structures. Or they can be based on 
the agency proposition that "individuals have some control over their actions and can be agents of their 
action (voluntarism) enabled by their psychological and social psychological make-up" (Parker, 2000, p. 
125). Thus, social action derives from individual intention. 
These epistemological and ontological dichotomies give rise to four methodological families. These 
represent, logically, the only possible ways o f describing and explaining the social world. They give rise to 
philosophically coherent enquiry agendas and methods (see Mollis 1994: 19), which determine how 
investigations are conducted, how evidence is assessed, and how what is true or false is to be decided. They 
are the foundations of people's assumptive worlds, which enable them to frame appropriately the social 
world they encounter (Rein and SchOn 1993), thereby becoming the prisms through which they perceive and 
analyze that world. These methodological families are captured in Figure I . 
Insert Figure 1 here 
C O M M U N I T Y : DEMARCATING A QUADRIPARTITE REALITY 
The methodological prisms demarcated in Figure I present four contending perceptions o f 
community. 
Hermeneutic-Structuralist Perspective 
Those of this philosophical disposition consider the social woHd to be a subjective social reality, 
knowable only as it is socially constructed, with people's action being determined by their collective 
interpretation of that reality. Adherents of this disposition embrace many interpretations of social reality, but 
of particular interest here are those who believe that society is based on voluntary, unranked natural 
groupings inspired by common objectives and shared values, beliefs and attitudes. They would presume that 
people conduct their affairs in a social order in which everyone belongs, negotiates their own position, and is 
committed. They would consider human nature to be circumstantial, a product o f people's past social 
formations, and they would be inclined towards Aquinas's ([1264] 1974; 127) proposition that 'there is in 
man a natural aptitude to virtuous action". Agreement on the desirability of a course o f social action would 
follow the emergence of a values-based group consensus: "we decide what we wili thmk^\ 
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They would be predisposed to a critical rationality that emphasizes the importance of sororal and fraternal 
cooperation. This would involve processes in which all committed actors are empowered and enabled to 
make and question arguments, which make good argument and the validity of normative judgments the final 
authority (Bakhtin, 1981; Foucault, 1978; Gergen and Thatchenkey, 1998), involving the use of 
intersubjective communications to construct mutual understandings as the basis for reasoning and for 
reaching an agreed understanding (de Haven-Smith, 1988: 85). They would, thus, place stress on the 
valuative dimension of discourse. Moral acts would be seen as good actions accompanied by good intentions 
and the right emotions and feelings, such human qualities would be considered virtuous and socially valued 
as individuality traits. Thus morality is predicated on virtue ethics. 
They would presume that people are willing to make voluntary sacrifices for a community, or 
voluntary contributions to community action, once they have been agreed to by the collective. Community, 
then, would be seen as a collective that places high value on commitment to engage in discourse. People's 
engagement with its structures and processes would be contingent upon making a moral commitment to the 
achievement of agreed community goals by means o f agreed community structures and processes. Apathy 
would be unjustifiable, unless engagement is intended merely to support the established community order 
rather than to be real and meaningful. 
Naturalist-Structuralist Perspective 
Those of this philosophical disposition would consider the social woHd to be a knowable "objective 
reality", one that has a hierarchical social order based on positional authority, expressed through orderly 
differentiation (Dumont, 1970), the rules for which establish a sense of identity and provide the foundations 
for deontological moral arguments. They would presume people conduct their affairs in a social order in 
which everyone has, and knows, their pre-ordained place, although that may well vary over time. They would 
consider that people have a basic instinct for seeking material pleasure and avoiding pain, but their 
redemption comes from them conforming to the norms imposed by hierarchical social order. Agreement on 
the desirability of a course of social action would follow a cognitive commitment derived from rational 
calculations made in the context of structural processes, such as prescribed rules and procedures, would be 
predisposed to a rationality that is functionally.analytical, although they would consider the intellect (reason 
and rational calculation) to be rightly constrained by structurally determined affects (values and beliefs). In 
addressing issues, they would search for alternatives, prioritized by their importance, urgency and values 
contestability, which would give rise to satisfactorily efficient and effective solution (Simon, 1957 and 1976). 
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They would presume that people are willing to make voluntary sacrifices for a community, or 
voluntary contributions to community action, only i f rational calculations suggested that such behaviour was 
expected by the powers that be and would minimize any threat of them being excluded fi^m the guardianship 
of the collective. Community, then, would be considered just one constituent of the hierarchical social order 
in a knowable objective world. Their engagement with its structures and processes would be contingent upon 
their place in the social order, which determines their socially imposed roles. Apathy would be acceptable, 
for individuals can only act within the sphere of competence assigned to them, and would be taken to imply 
consent to the actions of the community's powers that be. 
Naturalist-Agency Perspective 
Those of this philosophical disposition would consider the social world to be a knowable "objective 
reality*', one that has a social order characterized by competition, freedom of choice, contractual relationships 
and consequentialist ethical propositions. They would hold that self-determining individuals decide their own 
social roles and that they conduct their affairs in a social context where no one has a pre-ordained place and 
their commitment is only to themselves. They would consider that there is biologically determined universal 
human nature that can be characterized as self-serving and selfish (Dawkins, 1976; Wilson, 1975 and 1978), 
which means that people are malleable. Agreement on the desirability of a course of social action would 
follow the calculation of a favourable personal material benefit-cost quotient: " / decide what I will thinJ^\ 
They would be predisposed to a formal rationality that is synoptical, teleological, and instrumental and 
that presumes people make purposive and predatory (rational choice) decisions on the basis of self-interest 
(Elster, 1985). They would place stress when looking at issues on the feasible means, which would determine 
not only which problems are solvable, but also which goals are worth considering, rather than on contestable 
objectives, the resolution of which would delay action by initiating pointless values discourses. Thus, they 
would subscribe to the belief that these "unexceptionable" ends (such as maximizing efficiency or material 
well-being) are so crucial that they inevitably justify the means used to achieve them, despite any moral or 
ethical risks involved. 
They would presume that people are unwilling to make voluntary sacrifices for a community, or 
voluntary contributions to community action, unless the personal benefits o f such behaviour exceed any 
personal costs generated. They would be most willing to act as "free riders" in order to minimize their 
personal cost of community action (Weimer and Vinning, 1991: 51). Community, then, would be 
perceived as "a fictitious body, composed o f . . . individual persons" (Bentham cited in Etzioni, 1988, p. 
5). Their engagement with community structures and processes would be contingent upon the benefits of 
participation exceeding the costs of so doing. Apathy would be justifiable, but would also refiect implicit 
consent. 
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Hermeneutic-Agency Perspective 
Those of this philosophical disposition (Goffman, [1959] 1990) deny the possibility of an objective social 
reality and, therefore, the predictability of social action. Al l knowledge is, to them, based on personal 
experience and interpretations of social reality. Thus as no experience can be fully shared by two or more 
individuals, relations between individuals cannot provide a definitive explanation of their behaviour. They 
would thus presume that all the human actors behave in a way that is ultimately unpredictable, because 
agency is defined by each individual's subjective perceptions of social reality (Kierkegaard [1846] (1941). 
They would also presume themselves to be incapable of identifying any definitive causes and likely 
consequences of social action. As moral sceptics, moral opinions are matters of personal preference, which 
means that people have to make their own ethical choices, and thus cannot be held responsible to others for 
their actions. 
Those inclined towards an hermeneutic-agency philosophical disposition, as Goffrnan ([1959] 1990) 
notes, embrace a wide range of behaviors, but of panicular interest here are those exhibiting behavior 
manifesting as the absence of any desire to explain or influence events, or to hold any value commitments. 
To them, social order is characterised by anomie (Durkheim, 1952), normlessness, distrust (Sztompka, 1996: 
38) and the existentialist proposition (Sartre, ([1946] 1973: 32) that "man is condemned to be free." At the 
extreme, individual autonomy would be seen as being minimal, with little scope for personal transactions. 
Thus, people are presumed to be unable to take control of their lives and to conduct their affairs within a 
social order in which everyone believes they know their place, but no one belongs or cares. In the words of 
Sartre ([1946] 1973: 28): "Man simply is. Not that he is simply what he conceives himself to be, but he is 
what he wills, and as he conceives himself after already existing—as he wills to be after that leap toward 
existence. Man is nothing else but that which he makes of himself" Since the desirability of a course of 
action can never be established, agreement would only follow anticipated coercion: "//rey decide what I must 
thinie\ 
They would be predisposed to nonrationality (Fortes, 1972), for the canons of rationality, validity, truth, 
and efficiency are simply irrelevant. Thus, when considering issues they would focus on maximising 
opportunities for at least preventing the worst outcome or minimizing damage. 
They would presume that people are unwilling to make sacrifices for a community, or voluntary 
contributions to community action, unless they were coerced to do so by other people from an 
untrustworthy collective. Community, then, would be considered just another instrument of potential or 
actual external control. They would not be willing to engage, voluntarily, in any way with its structures 
or processes. Apathy, as a way of dealing with life's anxieties, would be fully justified on the grounds 
that the individual cannot make a difference. 
THE PHILOSOPHICAL CHALLENGES 
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The array of methodological families summarised in Figure I poses questions about how 
communitarians, who come under the rubric of hermeneutlc-structuralism, can reconcile the tensions, 
generated by their fundamental philosophical flawed epistemology (caused by the denial of naturalism) and 
ontology (caused by their denial of agency) underpining their assumptive world, with those founded on the 
acceptance of alternative epistemology (naturalism) and ontology (agency) and thus alternative 
methodological families (naturalist-structuralist, naturalist agency and hermeneutic agency). 
The communitarians' epistemologlcal challenge relates to naturalist propositions about the objectivity 
of the social world, the appropriateness o f Inductive and deductive reasoning, and the need to discover the 
"universal laws" governing a community in order to ameliorate the human condition within it. To address 
this challenge requires their acceptance, first, that hermeneutic epistemology produces social knowledge of 
great explanatory power, but which is culturally-specific and thus subject to severe relativism, which makes 
prediction problematic; and second, that whilst naturalist epistemology cannot offer substantive explanation 
beyond correlations that demonstrates cause and effect relationships, it can predict consequences with a high 
degree of probability. Epistemologically reconciling * understanding without prediction' with *cortelation 
with prediction' is a challenge that takes communitarians to the core of the contemporary debate on 
episiemology, and thus into the contentious realms of Bhasker's (1975) transcendental realism 
epistemological synthesis. 
The communitarians' face two ontological challenges. The first relates to the agency ontological 
proposition that structures has no causal capacity. The challenge is to address explicitly, as distinct from 
merely denying, the agency proposition that individuals are free agents Independent o f structural imperatives. 
Naturalist-agents consider that self-determining individuals can author their lives through objective choice. 
Hermeneutic-agents, consider agency is defined by each individual's subjective perceptions of social reality. 
To address this challenge requires an acceptance of two ontological propositions. The first is that while 
structuralism can apparently explain the empirically strong correlations between individual behaviour and 
social cohort, it camiot explain outliers derived from acts of free choice. The second relates to the perception 
that the causal capacity of structure has a constraining, rather than empowering, Influence on agency. 
Naturalist-structuralists consider that structures, as objective phenomena, give rise to deontological moral 
arguments and imperatives, and place constraints on individual actions. Ontologically reconciling 'structures 
are empowering' with 'structures have no causal capacity' and with "structures are constraining' is a 
challenge that takes communitarians to the core of the contemporary debate on ontology, and thus into the 
contentious realms of contemporary post-structuration ontological syntheses (Archer 1995; Bhaskar's [1979J 
1998, Bourdieu 1998). 
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In essence, communitarians confront an ideological threat i f they address these philosophical 
challenges. Enhanced community engagement would require the abandonment of fundamental elements of 
their vision of community. They would have to integrate into their vision of community antithetical 
authoritarian notions (such as, theoretical (expertise-based) authority and practical (recognised de facto or 
justified de jure) authority); liberal values (such as, negative freedom and liberty); and existential 
propositions (such as, existence precedes essence in a process which recognises people as having jurisdiction 
over their own awareness of the purposeful possibilities of their actuality, realisable only through acts of wil l 
after personal anguish). They would have to evidence a willingness to engage not only in structural 
discourses that accept, for example, the expertise of the state, the capacity of the state to promote social 
cooperation, and the importance of deontological imperatives, but also in agency discourses that accept 
freedom-enhancing constraints being placed on paternalistic or moralistic interference by community 
structures. 
I M P L I C A T I O N FOR C O M M U N I T Y PRACTITIONERS AND THEORTICIANS 
Community practitioners are regularly given cause to reflect on the singularity of the neighbourhoods 
where they work. These heterogeneous settings wil l feature a complex paradigm of diverse of opinions and 
attitudes, emotional reactions and sentimental attachments, which are discernible in the wide variety of social 
networks that exist in a specific locality (Hoggett, 1997: 15). Arising from this, the worker strives to achieve 
a unity of purpose amongst members of a community, so that progress towards a permanent empowerment of 
citizens can be achieved, in a process whereby enduring change can become a reality. Yet, as (Brent 1997: 
83) points out, the concept of community is "as much about struggle as it is about unity". 
So, community development theorists are left with the task of reconciling the effects of human 
conflict with the imperatives of establishing, and maintaining, high levels of democratic participation 
combined with productive networking in neighboiu-hoods. This gives rise to the supposition that distinctive 
perspectives on community and individual identity can be associated with dominant traits or tendencies 
within human nature and premised on the attractiveness of particular philosophical dispositions in this 
i 
relational situation. Al l of this can contribute to convictions about the validity of an identifiable political 
ideology. Furthermore, such a framework is the first step towards a methodical evaluation of the internal 
community dynamic that can illuminate the origins of disagreements and animosity amongst neighbours, 
which may eventually result in synergies, or even conflation, between doctrines. 
This paper, therefore, offers a way of concentrating critical thought on the implications for local 
governance of community members* adherence to certain commitments about what they believe exists in the 
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social world and the way knowledge can be gained about it. In this regard, it is pertinent to use fundamental 
communitarian principles, which sustain a broad consensus amongst community activists and workers, as a 
suitable conceptual fi^mework for comparison with other methodological families, in pursuit of a method to 
demarcate the boundaries of alternative perspectives. By using this approach, the philosophical 
underpinnings of areas of collective politicisalion can offer fresh insights into individual behaviour, for 
instance: 
• Rousseau's observation that **peoples once accustomed to masters are not in a condition to do without 
them" ([1755] 1993: 33-4]) wi l l be better understood in its application to those community members 
with predispositions that create a desire for a predictable world where social structures can order and 
control their lives. 
• The likely preferences of those who place a premium on individual liberty and freedom of choice, 
described in Hayek's statement as those ^Svho believe that their well-being depends primarily on their 
own efforts and decisions" (1982: 74) can be considered in the detailed profiling of a community. 
• Relationships with community members who are apathetic, perhaps through alienation, and hostile to 
initiatives that appear to offer them benefits can be improved by appreciating their distinctive system of 
values and beliefs. 
CONCLUSION 
Central to communitarianism, as a political ideology, are two presumptions. The first is that the liberal 
or existential self, unencumbered as they are by shared values and attitudes, are unnatural and that normal 
human relationships only thrive through co-operation. The second is that only through increased social 
cohesion, arising from citizens' active participation in community discourses, will authoritarianism be 
consu^ined. Thus, the theme of communitarians is the supremacy of community, where members, through 
active engagement, create a direct democracy that is united around shared core values — considered to be 
indistinguishable from facts — thereby constraining authoritarianism, nurturing mutuality, and promoting a 
more egalitarian society. If, however, human aspirations do vary, as those with alternative philosophical 
dispositions maintain, then communitarianism has an inherent weakness in its naTve conception of 
community as a social construct. 
As communitarianism is premised on a particular worldview, itself premised on a particular 
configuration of epistemological and ontological propositions, the challenge facing communitarians is how to 
convince those holding other woridviews to change their minds. Meeting this challenge would take 
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communitarians into the realms of transcendental realism and morphogenesis (Archer 1995, Bhaskar's 
[1979] 1998, Bourdieu 1998), which is a journey that still needs to be mapped. 
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Figure 1:Philosophlcal Perspectives on Community 
Naturalism Hermeneutics 
Ontology 
Structuralism 
Agency 
Naturalist Structuralism: 
Presumes an objective social 
world, knowable by the 
application of scientific 
methods, in which social 
stnjctures exercise power 
over agency, which makes 
human behaviour predictable. 
Embracing, inter alia, 
anthropological structuralism, 
functional structuralism, 
historical materialism, and 
linguistic structuralism. 
Community: 
Just another constituent of 
the hierarchical social order. 
Community Engagement: 
Willing to make voluntary 
sacrifices for, or voluntary 
contributions to a community, 
if it was expected by the 
powers that be in order to be 
part of the hierarchical social 
order. 
Hermeneutic Structuralism: 
Presumes a subjective social 
world, knowable only as it is ^ 
socially constructed, with 
people's behaviour being 
determined, and made 
predictable, by their collective 
interpretation of this reality. 
Embracing, inter alia, 
hermerieutic phenomenology, 
post-modernism, post-' 
stnjcturatism. and language 
games. 
Community: 
A collective that places high 
value on commitment to engage 
in discourse to build shared 
ideas and values regarding their 
community of interests. 
Community Engagement: 
OWilling to make voluntaiy 
sacrifices for, or voluntary 
contributions to a community, 
once they have, been agreed to 
by the community 
Naturalist Agency: 
Presumes an objective social 
world, knowable by the 
application of the scientific 
method, in which people are 
agents of their actions, with 
their behaviour made 
predictable by their 
unconstrained self-interest. 
Embraces, inter alia, rational 
choice theory. 
Community: 
A fictitious body of self-
interested individuals. 
Community Engagement: 
Unwilling to make voluntary 
sacrifices for or contributions 
to a community, unless the 
personal benefits exceed any 
personal costs generated. 
Hermeneutic Agency: 
Denies the objectivity of social 
reality, which is only contestably 
knowable as what people 
believe it to be, with agency 
constrained by their subjective 
perceptions of social reality, 
which makes human behaviour 
unpredictable. Embraces, inter 
alia, social phenomenology, 
symbolic interactionalism. 
dramaturgical analysis, and 
ethnomethodology. 
Community: 
Another instrument of potential 
or actual extemal control. 
OCommunity Engagement: 
1 Unwi l l ing to make sacrifices 
for, or voluntary contributions to 
a community, unless reciprocal 
benefits f rom an untrustworthy 
collective are expected 
© Dixon and Dogan 2003. 
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A B S T R A C T . 
It is apparent that the strategies seeking to achieve an innovative modernisation of the 
public sector can create a paradoxical public management environment if they establish a 
hybrid organisational form. Such a organisational fonm is conceived when the architects of 
administrative reform seek to combine elements of (1) the neo-liberal market-driven model of 
public administration, set within a minimalist, or hollowed-out. state content to presume that 
the public interest is knowable only as the revealed market preferences. And its antithesis. 
(2) the entrenched Weberian bureaucratic model, set within a coercive state that presumes it 
can detemiine. protect and advance the public interest. Such modernisation reforms embody 
the tensions between the agency ontology of the neo-liberal market-driven model of public 
administration, on the one hand, and the structuralist ontology of the Weberian bureaucratic 
model on the other. Administrative reform so designed creates paradoxes that leave the 
public agencies strategic leadership struggling to make sense of self-contradictory and 
incongruous management situations. This dilemma results in public managers, and their 
staff, striving to design and implement organisational strategies that is enigmatic. 
This paper identifies nine paradoxes that encompass a number of Issues. These include 
contentions over (1) the imperatives of efficiency, effectiveness and economy as against 
equity; (2) the desired control to be exercised by public managers over programme design 
and implementation; (3) the just and effective accountability of staff in relation to their 
remuneration and answerability and (4) the desired culture of public agencies, which has 
traditionally promulgated a safe, stable and predictable employee job environment. 
If a paradox is to be addressed then organisational creativity must be stimulated. In this 
nexus, lateral thought becomes critical. The challenge is to stimulate the art of judgement, 
which can only flourish through the application of the demanding techniques of reflexivity. 
This requires inspired critical self-evaluation and self-deprecation by those confronting the 
ambiguities created by the paradoxes. Therefore, a testing, but rewarding, reflexive 
procedure is needed to accommodate the necessary non-rational perspectives (such as 
Wicksian sense making, "garbage can" decision making, and "muddling through" processes), 
as well as rationalist approaches to problem solving and decision making. 
Thus, management in an inevitably ambiguous public arena must become the prerogative 
of those with creative insights and the capacity for rigorous analysis and evaluation, for only 
they can cope with ambiguity and indetenminacy. in this scenario, it will be necessary to 
foster leaders who are prepared to devote themselves to a career that demands that they be 
capable of perpetual transfiguration and optimal opportunism, and able to oscillate, as 
necessary, between contending ontological and epistemological beliefs. Following this 
proposition the paper concludes with a vision of future leaders of a public sector 
characterised by indeterminacy and ambiguity of goals and indefinability of the public interest 
in tenms of outcomes and outputs. 
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INTRODUCTION 
At the heart of what has become an almost global administrative reform discourse (Peters and 
Savoie 1998) there are contentions about what constitutes good public management. Each 
contention is grounded in conflicting and competing values, beliefs, and attitudes about how the 
world works and how other people behave. The battles fought — and to be fought — over 
administrative reform are. at a fundamental level, a battle over the appropriate role of the state in 
the determination and protection of the public interest. The contending perspectives can be 
characterized as a dichotomy: the traditional hierarchical model (grounded in structuralist ontology 
that presumes social structures mould people's actions and thoughts) and the neo-liberal 
managerialist model (grounded in agency ontology that presumes individuals have some control 
over their actions and can be agents of their actions) (Dixon, Sanderson and Tripathi 2004). Both 
have intellectual legitimacy, and are readily internally coherent, given acceptance of their 
underlying philosophical and value premises. These philosophical and value underpinnings have 
been described and analysed elsewhere and will not be developed here (Dixon. 2003; Dixon and 
Dogan 2003; Dixon and Kouzmin 2003; Dixon. Davis and Kouzmin 2004; Dixon. Sanderson and 
Tripathi 2004; Dixon and Dogan 2005 forthcoming). It is to thus nature of these contending models 
that we now turn (Dixon, 2003; Dixon and Dogan. 2003). as a precursor to a discussion of the 
decision risks confronting the architects of administrative reform who are seduced by neo-liberal 
managerialist vision of public sector. Then, the paradoxical consequences of imposing neo-liberal 
managerialist values and practices onto a hierarchical politico-administrative system are explored. 
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: THE CONTENDING PERSPECTIVES 
The Traditional Hierarchical Model of Public Administration 
The hierarchical model, which has long dominated public administration, is grounded in the 
hierarchical mode of societal governance (Dixon, 2003). This is premised on the presumption that 
the politico-administrative institutions of the state are best placed to determine, protect, and 
promote the public interest (conceptualised, after Lasswell (1930: 264) as displaced private 
interests). Thus, the only legitimate individual autonomy-social control balance is one that emerges 
as a product of political institutions engaging in aggregate and integrative processes to derive the 
"will" of the people. Once this individual autonomy-social control balance has been decided upon, 
the coercive state uses its statutory powers to design and directly deliver the public services 
needed in the public interest. 
Essentially, public administration under this model has five dimensions: politics and policy 
making, implementation of the law; the delivery of public services; and governance, as the 
executive branch of government. Governments seek to exercise discretionary power, stressing the 
legitimising democratic values of representative government, and the need for political 
responsiveness and public accountability, through elected officials, to the citizenry. The politico-
administrative dichotomy makes government responsibility for the identification of the salient 
dimensions of the public interest, which place constraints and obligation on public officials. They 
are expected to take a wider view of their responsibilities, conceptualised as a form of moral 
endeavour. Public officials are, thus, engaging in formulating and implementing policies that 
allocate resources and status and impose values in a way that is binding on society as a whole. 
Public officials under this mode should be focussed on their legal obligations and 
responsibilities as adjudicators — their legal authorities or mandates. Their decisions and actions 
should be underpinned by the values emphasising due process, individual rights and equity or 
fairness. In this style of politico-administrative arrangements, a "good" public official is a person 
who considers that serving the public is a high calling, a privilege; albeit one that generated its own 
status and social privileges. The task of administering public bodies is a distinctive professional 
occupation — one that draws intellectually on the disciples of law, history and the humanities — 
carried out in the context of a merit-based, career service. Thus, public officials — as members of 
an elite in whose hands the apparatus of government is placed — provide continuity, perhaps even 
the wisdom of experience, as politicians come and go. 
Those predisposed to the philosophies and values underpinning the hierarchical model have a 
disposition towards the Weberian model of public administration. This can be characterised as a 
collection of hierarchical organisations, under formal control by politicians, embedded with a culture 
that emphasises role, supports compliance and permits little questioning of the rules and orders 
once they have been given by a legitimate authority. So this structure reinforces hierarchical 
obedience, organisational loyalty and the inculcation of management values that emphasis inputs, 
process and risk aversion (the organisational and managerial characteristics of this model have 
been further developed in Dixon, Sanderson, and Tripathi 2004). "Good" public management, 
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then, is perceived as "managing for process", with a focus on employee compliance involving the 
application of a hierarchical command-and-control process that permits managers to determine and 
police what are acceptable (desirable) or unacceptable (undesirable) employee behaviours in 
terms of the desired organisational outcomes. 
The Neo-Liberal Managerialist Model of Public Administration 
The neo-Iiberal managerialist model, which takes a more business-like approach to public 
administration by minimizing any distinction between the public and private sectors, is grounded in 
the self-governing mode of societal governance (Dixon 2003). This is premised on the public 
interest being knowable only as an expression of the "will" of the market — as a set of aggregated 
revealed market preferences — which cannot be instrumentally protected by an inherently 
inefficient and ineffective state (Weimer and Vining, 1992). Thus, the minimalist state prefers to 
plead the unknowabilily and the unprolectability of the public interest to justify privatising public 
services (other than those public goods that the market cannot deliver), and devolving to the 
judicial system the responsibility of enforcing statutory rights and contractual obligations. This task 
is to be pursued with zero non-compliance tolerance and full restitution as the ultimate sanction — 
thereby conflating the public and private interests. 
Essentially, public administration under this model considers that any residual functions 
delivered by the hollowed-out state must be geared towards maximising efficiency, economy, and 
effectiveness. This requires bureaucrats to adopt private-sector approaches to the management of 
resources. Public management, then, is simply a less efficient form of business management; less 
efficient because of the inherent constraints of public ownership, such as legislative accountability. 
Bureaucrats under this model should be focussed on their managerial obligation to serve 
customers (including politicians) at the lowest possible cost. In this style of politico-administrative 
arrangements, a "good" bureaucrat is a person who cost-effectively manages public resources to 
meet the needs of customers. Thus, public managers — an elite in whose hands the management 
of the residual functions of government is placed — are expected to manage resources under their 
control so as to achieve management-determined input and output targets at a minimum cost to 
government. The task of managing public resources is a distinctive professional occupation — one 
that draws intellectually on the disciples of economics and management — carried out in the 
context of contractual organizations that conduct their affairs in accordance with performance-
reward contracts 
Those predisposed to the philosophies and values underpinning the neo-Iiberal managerialist 
model of public administration have a disposition towards business-like provision of services by 
government, including public services, policy design and development services, and regulatory 
services. This can be characterised as a collection of organisations that have a decentralised 
authority distribution and a culture that is focussed on the task and reinforces the view that 
management is about solving task-related problems. These objectives can be accomplished by 
adjusting, redefining and renegotiating individual tasks. Thereby the importance of achieving 
organisational outputs and outcomes is reinforced through the management values of efficiency, 
effectiveness, economy, and risk management (the organisational and managerial charactehstics 
of this model have been further developed in Dixon, Sanderson and Tripathi 2004). "Good" public 
management, then, is perceived as "managing for results", with a focus on the achievement of 
management-established targets at the lowest possible cost by creating incentives (rewarding of 
desirable behaviours) and disincentives (punishing of undesirable behaviours), embodied in 
performance-reward contracts This ensures instrumental compliance by employees. 
THE DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 
CHALLENGES OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM 
The intellectual rationale for adopting the neo-Iiberal managerialist vision of the administrative 
reform lies in economic rationalism, which postulates a world view premised on the reductionism 
within the principles of neo-classical economics and its off-spring, rational choice theory, with its 
dominant concern for allocative efficiency (Kouzmin, Dixon and Korac-Kakabedse, 2002). This 
vision, which is the rallying point for the economic rationalists in government seeking to downsize 
the politico-administrative system, insists on cost-efficiency and cost-effectiveness in all elements 
of the public sector. Therefore attention is focussed on the affordability — rather than the 
equitability — of budget-funded delivery of public services. In turn, this leads to a de-coupling of 
policy advising and regulatory functions from service delivery functions of government, a necessary 
precursor to their privatization. Once this privatisation process is completed, attention turns to 
contracting-out to the private sector as many of the remaining activities of government as possible. 
After this is achieved and the managerialist vision of the public sector has been successfully 
implemented, the product is a hollowed-out, minimalist state that is content to conflate the public 
and private interests. 
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There are, however, architects of administrative reform who, whilst captivated by the neo-liberal 
world-view — inevitably because it offers a way of reducing public expenditure, enhancing the 
performance of public agencies delivering public services, or both — reject the neo-liberal 
proposition of the unknowability and the unprotectability of the public interest by the state. They, 
thus, cling to the notion that the state must determine, protect and promote the public interest and 
thus seek to integrate elements of both models. They are. thus, drawn to an understanding of the 
role of the middle- and executive-level public official that does not conform to politico-administrative 
realities. 
Administrative reforms predicated on the tenets of economic rationalism pose decision risks for 
the architects of those reforms (Dixon, Dogan and Kouzmin. 2002; Dixon and Hyde. 2003). These 
risks stem from the adherence of neo-classical economics to two philosophical propositions (Dixon, 
Dogan, and Kouzmin, 2002): neo-positivism and methodological individualism. The adherence of 
neo-classical economics to the naturalist epistemological principle of neo-positivism causes 
economic rationalists to reject hermeneutic knowledge contentions that are the product of social or 
individual construction (such as individual expressions of anxiety and insecurity, or collective 
notions of fairness, distributional justice and equity, community solidarity and social cohesion, and 
integration and inclusion). Because such constructions are culturally specific, subject to severe 
relativism and thus open to constant revision, making explanation contingent on culture and 
prediction problematic, the analytical framework of economic rationalism cannot accommodate 
such knowledge. The adherence of neo-classical economics to the ontological belief that 
individuals are agents of their actions, causes economic rationalists to reject the structuralist 
proposition that ordered social interrelationships determine human action by moulding people's 
actions and thoughts through structural imperatives such as patterns of obligations, duties and 
loyalties. The economic rationalism framework ignores such causal capacities. 
OFor the architects of administrative reform, these denials give rise to four decision risks. The 
first is that knowledge foundation of any administrative reform informed by epistemological 
principles of neo-positivism may be incorrect or incomplete. Predications are likely to prove 
inaccurate and unreliable (particularly long-term predictions, when unknowable uncertainties are 
presumed to be knowable as risk probabilities) because of the use of naturalist epistemological 
methods. This is compounded by knowledge gaps caused by the denial of hermeneutic knowledge 
contentions; namely the validity of emotional experiences, shared values and beliefs. 
The second decision risk is that any administrative refonm designed on the premise of agency 
ontology may not be capable of achieving its objectives. This risk derives from the principal-agent 
problem (Alchian and Demsetz. 1972; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling. 1976). given 
the incapacity of naturalist epistemological methods to identify causal relationships and agency 
ontology propositions to integrate structural imperatives. Central to this are two problems. 
Because of the uncertainty and opportunism associated with adverse selection and moral hazard, 
principals will not be able to specify completely and comprehensively their explicit or implicit 
contracts with agents, in terms of the activities, outputs and outcomes agents are expected to 
deliver. Further, principals will not be able to enforce the executed contracts between agents and 
their customers with a zero non-compliance tolerance and full restitution as the ultimate sanction. 
The third decision risk is that any administrative reform that ontologically denies that agency is 
constrained by structure may fail because of the accountability problems generated. These 
problems relate to the relationship between the principal—ultimately, a collective of politicians, 
whom economic rationalists perceive to be inherently rent seeking with coercive power and in-
advisedly concerned with the "protection" of an unknowable "public interest" — and agents, 
whether managerialist public managers or private managers delivering contracted-out public 
services. In contention is the degree and form of public accountability that should be expected of 
those who take managerial decisions and actions that have a bearing on the "public interest". 
The final decision risk occurs because compliance with an administrative reform requirements 
may not be forthcoming if the reform strategies have been designed on the premise of a rational-
choice agency ontology that emphasizes motivation by material incentives. Such an approach 
discounts the importance to public managers of structural motivators, such as a sense of 
obligation, duty, and loyalty or a sense of collective solidarity, cohesion, integration, and inclusion. 
Where administrative reform architects have sought to impose neo-liberal managerialist values 
and practices onto a hierarchical politico-administrative system that continues to adhere to the 
proposition that the state is best placed to determine, protect and promote the public interest, they 
have done so without addressing, perhaps without understanding, or even after denying, the 
decision risks inherent in managerialist administrative reform (Dixon. Davies and Kouzmin 2004). 
The result has been the creation, perhaps unintentionally but certainly inevitably, of a counter-
productive paradoxical public management environment. 
420 
THE PARADOXES IN NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT ENVIRONMENT 
Nine paradoxes can be identified as the outcome of administrative reform that has sought to 
superimpose neo-liberal managerialist values and practices onto a hierarchical politico-
administrative system. Each paradox has concomitant dilemmas, anomalies, contradictions, 
confusions and uncertainties, which almost inevitability lead to inadequate or inequitable treatment 
of some stakeholders. 
Paradox 1 
That public managers are expected to manage "efficiently" and "effectively", and so be 
accountable for the efficient and effective management of "inputs' used to produce "outputs" 
(which may be difficult. to quantify, or even adequately conceptualise), which generate 
"outcomes" (which may be difficult to measure, or even adequately conceptualise), which relate 
to "programme objectives'* (which may be difficult to articulate in mutually compatible and 
quantifiable terms), which must be compatible not only with "policy objectives' (which 
government may be unwilling or unable to articulate in quantifiable terms, and which may. 
themselves, be mutually incompatible, particularly in a multi-level political structure) but also 
with "customer objectives" (which may. also, be mutually incompatible). 
Paradox 2 
That while management accountability for service delivery efficiency and effectiveness has 
increased public managers at best share control over service delivery design or implementation 
with politicians. 
Paradox 3 
That while results-oriented management behaviour is encouraged, over-achievement is not 
adequately rewarded and under-achievement is not adequately punished. 
Paradox 4 
That while more risk taking, in the context of better risk management, is encouraged at the 
rhetorical level, politicians and public sector auditors are reluctant to accept risk-taking 
behaviours that either threaten political agendas or administrative probity. 
Paradox 5 
That judicial and merit review agencies are able to reverse administrative decisions, yet public 
managers are held accountable for perfonmance outcomes. 
Paradox 6 
That public managers are encouraged not to tolerate sub-optimal performances, even when 
such performances conforms to cultural norms, and any challenging of them is likely to effect 
personal survival within the organisation and/or to generate interpersonal conflicts. 
Paradox 7 
That public managers are expected to increase both quality and productivity while at the same 
time decreasing costs. 
Paradox 8 
That public managers are expected to meet customer needs as well as ensuring that services 
provide value for money and meet the performance accountability expectations of legislative, 
executive and judicial accountability mechanisms. 
Paradox 9 
That public managers are expected to share a significant degree of decision-making power with 
their subordinates while being unable to devolve accountability for the consequences of any 
decisions made or actions taken as a result. 
Dealing with these management paradoxes has become a challenge for public managers 
operating in this New Public Management environment. Every paradox, as vicious self referential. 
seIf<ontradictory cycles need to be accommodated by being re-framed as a puzzle, a conundrum, 
or a complexity. Thus, they should be placed into their broader organisational or societal context, 
so as to diminish their apparent absurdity, contradiction or hypocrisy; or the emotional responses 
they stimulate should be addressed. Learning how to managing efficiently and effectively in such a 
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setting requires the inculcation of philosophies and paradigms that help public managers cope with 
ambiguity, complexity, and indeterminacy. 
In an environment where paradoxes need to be re-framed, re-conceptualised and/or coped with, 
the usefulness of both objectivity as a basis for establishing reality and the assumed superiority of 
the rational approaches to problem analysis, problem-solving and decision-making must be 
questioned. Therefore the a-rattonal (as distinct from irrational or unreasonable) sentient abilities 
(intuition) has a role to play, especially when the subject in focus falls outside the realms of the 
rational (such as emotions); or is beyond the scope of rational analysis because of its 
paradoxicality, complexity; or unpredictability. Indeed, developing and drawing upon emotional 
intelligence — an individual's ability to understand and manage his or her emotions and 
interpersonal relationships (Goleman 1995) — is an aspect of the necessary coping strategy for 
dealing effectively with any emotional tensions produced by a paradoxical situation. This involves 
developing: 
• the ability to recognize and identify your feelings, such as anger or frustration, in order 
to act more appropriately; 
• the capacity, using psychological techniques, to deal with feelings in a productive and 
appropriate manner; 
• the ability to managing your emotions to the extent that you can delay the immediate 
gratification of an impulse and can maintain a positive outlook, thereby sustain self-
motivation; 
• the capacity to empathise in order to be sensitive to and understanding other's feelings; 
and 
• the ability to interact with others in a positive and productive manner. 
Developing more intuitive public managers may well be the way to enable them to manage 
more effectively in a paradoxical management environment. This supposition is premised on the 
notion that intuition is the capacity to pay attention to, rather than ignore flashes of creative insight. 
However such insight must be subjected to rigorous evaluation in order to create a balance 
between the rational and the intuitive thought processes. Nevertheless this may be the key to 
public sector managers developing the necessary creativity and judgement to address the 
emotional responses stimulated by a paradox. In essence, managing ambiguity, complexity and 
indeterminacy required wisdom, as well as management knowledge and skills. 
MANAGING AMBIGUITY, COMPLEXITY AND INDETERMINACY 
The attainment of wisdom by public managers is the secret of their acquisition of a more 
accurate apprehension of the tnje causality of organisational phenomena. This will enable them to 
avoid being deceived by naive consciousness, under which they treat causality as an established 
static fact that is superior to, and in control of, other facts. Therefore attaining wisdom involves 
commitment to a learning process that improves understanding of the relationship between 
knowledge, decisions, and action. Such wisdom must encourage both management and 
organisational values and perspectives to be formed, re-framed or laterally reconceptualised, in 
order to help make sense of the options available in relation to future courses of actions (Weick 
1995). In this paradigm the basis of their selection will come under the rubric of instrumental 
judgment, as distinct from moral and political judgment, both of which are particularly relevant to 
the policy-advisory role of the public manager. 
Judgment, as an irreducible part of public management, requires a capacity to place information 
into an appropriate, even if a somewhat paradoxical, value framework to determine how best to 
blend and manage contradictory demands and pressures. Thus, axiomatically, management 
development must put stress on enhancing an individual's capacity to make judgements. 
Soberingly, in the art of judgment there is no science that will help the executive better perform his 
or her most essential and characteristic functions. This warning notwithstanding, an effective 
management development process requires decision making as its primary focus, rather than the 
mastery of the knowledge of management techniques. This, in turn, requires the concurrent 
enhancement of first, the learners' ability to analyse relevant value frameworks. Secondly, the 
learners' cognitive processes, especially those that transcend formal logic, to explore the dialectical 
operations in adult thought. This begins with the spirit of inquiry, so learners must be encouraged 
to ask and to discover important questions and problems. Self-understanding is also an essential 
attribute that can only be achieved by individuals engaging in reflectivity and thereby facilitating 
relevant perspective transformation by making them critically aware of their own specific 
perceptions, meanings, behaviours and habits, especially in terms of their efficacy (discriminant 
reflectivity) and their underlying value judgments (judgmental reflectivity). 
Managerialist-informed administrative reform has forced public managers to grapple with their 
own behavioural change requirements, which has left them with the expectation that they will need 
to become more entrepreneurial in order to survive. This has meant exploring how to become 
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more performance oriented and whether, to what extent and how to apply private sector 
management practices. Yet. traditionally, the public sector has not expected its managers to model 
themselves on conspicuous examples of successful private sector managers, let alone the much-
publicised unsuccessful, but well-compensated, corporate entrepreneurs - although some would 
say that they might do well to do so. 
Public agencies have come to recognise that in order to achieve the required management 
behaviour change they must create an environment that encourages responsible administrative 
action, which is not just a matter of following written procedures or rules. That responsible action is 
merely legally correct action is far too limiting a perspective to address adequately the normative 
concerns of public administration. Responsible administrative action in situations where the routine 
application of rules is problematic presupposes ability, and a willingness, to perceive decision 
choices in a way that they may be informed by an appreciation of rules, but not determined by 
them. When action is perceived as determined by rules, the sense of personal responsibility for 
that action evaporates and thus problem definition is forced into preconceived and often arbitrary 
categories of meaning. 
The willingness of public managers to accept personal responsibility for their administrative 
decisions and action depends on the psychological dimensions of their personal experience and its 
influence on their ability to take responsibility for the consequences of their decisions and actions. 
The creation of an environment that supports the taking of responsible administrative decisions and 
actions has in effect been an important priority for implementing reform. Middle and executive 
public managers have increasingly been given more freedom to act outside the postulated 
organisational perspectives, where those perspectives neither adequately address the 
management problem concerned, nor serve the needs of the service recipients, nor articulate 
adequate or legitimate standards limiting or enabling administrative discretion. They have 
increasingly been discouraged from engaging in reified thinking — that unconscious tendency to 
apprehend aspects of the social world through particular, typically institutionalised, categories of 
meaning. 
How public managers should be developed depends very much on how their management and 
policy-development roles are viewed within an organisational setting. This, in itself, set in a context 
defined by the prevailing (perhaps changing) regulatory and accountability regimes. A 
managerialist-informed administrative reform, lamentably, seeks to give a sense of clarity about the 
management role of the public managers, yet that role remains both ambiguous and imprecise, the 
administrative reforms notwithstanding. By placing more emphasis on public servants acquiring 
the capacity to manage better the financial, human and physical resources at their disposal, at the 
expense of acquiring an intimate knowledge of the wide variety of policy decision-making 
processes and policy constituencies, the risk is that they may become less able, even less willing, 
to understand and address the complexities of the regulatory and accountability regimes, not too 
mention the ethical challenges created by the juxtaposition of administrative power with ambiguity, 
complexity and indeterminacy. All of this impact upon, if not governs, the way they must manage. 
Public management has long endured the image that private management enjoys stronger 
management knowledge and skills. It has become almost axiomatic that there is a need within the 
public sector for competent and confident managers with the management and leadership 
capabilities required to enhance their organisation's performance within a politico-administrative 
environment. At one level it is acknowledged that because public agencies had long been 
delivering services, middle- and executive-level public managers generally have the technical and 
organising competencies needed to produce and distribute services within acceptable tolerance of 
a specified budget allocation. But these capabilities, alone, are no longer enough. Public 
managers are increasingly being expected to adapt to ever-changing external (policy or martlet) 
and internal (organisational) environments, which is especially challenging for those confronting the 
risks and uncertainties associated with commercialisation. Ultimately, the challenge to be 
addressed is related to the pressures that refonm has unleashed for the creation of a new set of 
management competencies needed by public agencies, whose managers must now be: 
• more outcome and perfonmance oriented, whilst maintaining, if not improving, technical 
standards and service quality; 
• . better able to put in place the organisational and behavioural changes needed to achieve the 
desired level of public agency performance given the permitted degree of martcel orientation; 
and 
• better able to manage scarce physical, financial and/or human resources, so as to improve 
productivity and service quality. 
In this context, the implementation challenge facing public agencies is to provide their managers 
with cost-effective management development. 
Indeed, the efficacy of forcing public agencies to performance management pressures crucially 
depends on the capacity of its middle- and executive-level public managers to manage efficiently 
and effectively the public production processes involved, so as to achieve short-term performance 
and financial objectives, while simultaneously securing long-term organisational viability, perhaps 
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within a zero-sum bureaucratic environment. This requires them to adapt their management 
behaviour by integrating the management skills that enable them to be (multi) goal-directed, (multi-
dimensional) performance-oriented, customerr and stakeholder-driven, and risk-sensitive resource 
managers in a risk averse environment, with the policy skills that enable them to be strategic policy 
advisors (in a fluid political landscape) and managers of a policy process that might well be well 
have all the attributes that Cohen, March and Olsen (1972) identified in their garbage-can theory of 
decision-making. To add to the challenges of management behaviour change, it inevitably all takes 
place in the context of major and frequent structural and procedural changes, which involves public 
managers accepting more responsibility for ill-specified delegated decision-making and addressing 
ever-changing, perhaps even contradictory political, organizational and financial imperatives with 
respect to service delivery, human resource and financial management. The ideal-type executive-
level public managers must now be akin to Nietzsche's ((1879] 1974; [1883-85] 1968) existential 
Urbermensch — the heroic superman — the incarnate will to power who challenges convention 
and forever seeks self-realization, for he or she must be: 
• a visionary leader with energy and resilience; 
• a pragmatic strategic management thinker; 
• an effective persuader and communicator; 
• a concensus-seeking decision-maker willing and able to make timely decisions; 
• a networker capable of solving problems; 
• a consummate resource manager; 
• an effective coach to his or her staff and able to resolve conflicts; 
• a committed life-long learner able to integrate readily new ideas and learn new behaviours; 
and even 
• a successful entrepreneur. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR LEADERSHIP 
Successful public managers, as leaders in a public sector that is subject to managerialist-
informed administrative reform, must satisfy the, often contending, aspirations of the state, the 
private sector and civil society as well as their employees and the end-users. They must deal with 
the 3Es — economy, efficiency, and effectiveness. Thus, they are confronted with ever rising 
expectations about the organisational imperatives of. among others, efficiency dividends, 
performance management, commercialisation and contracting out, which have place dynamic 
demands on leadership imperatives: subordinate needs and aspirations, executive and political 
imperatives, market demands, IT advances, reality of dispersed knowledge, and global economic 
shifts. 
Leadership as a subject evokes mixed reactions especially in the context of an ambiguous and 
changing public sector. The increasing complexity and uncertainty, the demands imposed by 
shared-power environment (Henton, Melville and Kimberiey 1997) and inter-organisational and 
cross-sector partnerships necessitate leadership capability from apex to the service-delivery coal 
face along both lateral and vertical lines. This leadership must be capable of leading even when 
goals and milestones cannot be specified in advance or are ever in a state of flux. Leadership is. 
thus, not only about 'implementation' but the 'enactment' (Weick. 1995), or emergence (Allison and 
Hartley, 2000) of outcomes. This creative style of leadership requires establishing frameworks and 
contexts within which new developments and outcomes can be nurtured and facilitated, influenced 
and persuaded. This must allow scope for negotiation and consensus building while retaining 
elements of command and authority. 
A review of recent leadership research provides some meaningful insights into the role of 
leadership and the implications of these roles in the modernisation and improvement of the public 
sector. From Stogdill's (1950) classical definition of leadership, three elements can be discerned 
that have formed the lynchpiris of leadership research for subsequent decades: influence, group 
and goals (Bass. 1990). The ability of the leader to have an impact on groups, by influencing their 
behaviours in the direction of particular goals, has implications for performance-oriented 
organisations. The main challenge for public sector leadership is the ability to manage and lead in 
an extremely ambivalent and paradoxical realm. In this the ability of the leader to "engage in sense 
making on behalf of others'" and to arrive at social consensus through shared meanings (Pfeffer, 
1981) assumes significance. This idea of leadership, as a set of processes for influencing 
employees and stakeholders, enables the unknown to be identified and addressed (Heifetz. 1994). 
This moves away from the traditional perception that leadership must provide solutions to problems 
towards leadership that seeks to transform dynamics occurring between individuals, groups, and 
organizations to find creative solutions. This brings us to the concept of transformational 
leadership (Burns, 1978; Bass and Avolio, 1990; Stace and Dunphy, 1994; Heifetz. 1994; Tichy 
and Devanna, 1990; Dess and Picken. 2000; Morrison and Milliken, 2000). Such leadership 
involves motivating and influencing people and shaping and achieving outcomes: what Nadler and 
Tushman (1989) describe as the processes of envisioning, energizing and enabling. However, the 
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transfonmational leadership research tends to overiook, by and large, the situational and contextual 
constraints, which Brunner (1997) describes as contextual complexity that might restrict the 
success and manoeuvrability of the transforming leader (Keller, 1992; Leavy and Wilson, 1994; 
Bryman, Gillingwater and McGuinness 1996). 
A new approach to leadership emerged in the 1980s and 1990s: dispersed leadership (Manz 
and Sims. 1991; Sims and Lorenzi, 1992; Katzenbach and Smith, 1993; Kouzes and Posner, 1993; 
Hosking. 1988. 1991; Knights and Willmott, 1992) embracing Manz and Sims's idea of Nietzschian-
like SuperLeadership (1991), and Bennington's (1997) community leadership, grounded on the 
proposition that dispersed leadership should involve "leading others to lead themselves" (Sims and 
Lorenzi, 1992: 295). Under this approach, followers are motivated to assume leadership 
themselves, which is, in fact, a theme that Bums had included in his 1970s perspective on 
transformational leadership. 
Leadership is, therefore, the ability to build capacity, empower, and represent teams within 
organizations and stakeholders in the community-at-large, with particular emphasis on leadership 
empowerment processes. This is useful because the complexity and chaos of the public sector 
requires leaders to promote organisational learning (Weick 1976, Weick and Westley. 1999; 
Brunsson, 1985; Argyris. 1990; Senge, 1990; Dixon, 1994). Emergent organic leadership also 
requires not only improvising and leveraging small wins, as learning moments, in an arena of chaos 
and complexity (Weick, 1976, 1995) but also achieving a balance between influencing and 
persuading, negotiating and empowering, not only within the organisation but also at the cross 
roads of different cultures and organisations (Hartley and Allison, 2000). This also means, 
following Kotter (1990). that there is a need to avoid the dilemmas of an organisation being over-
managed and under-led, or of a reactivist management strategy being promulgated. Getting this 
balance right would assist public sector organisations in their implementation of new initiatives and 
strategies, and their management of ambiguity and the implementation of cultural change. 
CONCLUSION 
The battles fought over administrative reform are disputes between contending perspectives on 
the appropriate role of the state and what constitutes the essential essence of the public sector. 
These are battles that have long been won or lost in many Anglo-American countries. Other 
countries following in their path can learn many lessons from that body of experience. 
The more thoughtful architects of civil service reform will recognize that they will have to engage 
in discourses that accepts the expertise and legitimate authority of the state, that values the 
legitimate knowledge of all those affected by administrative reform, and that acknowledges the 
importance of deontological imperatives in any society with strong collectivist traditions. 
Nevertheless there are, indeed, limits to downsizing of the public sector. Eventually, a government 
that wishes to reduce its role in society confronts a set of core responsibilities that cannot be 
avoided and cannot be contracted out: the judiciary and law, defence, internal security, policy 
advice and the framing and monitoring of contracted services. When government hits the limits of 
small government, ministers and their advisers will confront, once more, the issues addressed of 
how to structure those public functions that remain, how to manage public servants better, how to 
become more responsive to citizens. These are not problems that have been solved anywhere; 
rather, they are problems deferred, put aside while governments privatize and contract out. 
The aspiration to build a responsive and cost-effective public sector that appropriately balances 
public and private interests is an honourable one. Yet if in so doing administrative reform imposes 
neo-liberal managerialist values and practices onto a hierarchical politico-administrative system 
that adhere to the proposition that the state is best placed to determine, protect and promote the 
public interest, the result is the inevitable creation of a counter-productive paradoxical public 
management environment. These paradoxes need to be acknowledged and addressed. The 
challenge is to stimulate the art of judgement, which can only flourish through the application of the 
demanding techniques of refiexivity. This requires inspired critical self-evaluation and self-
deprecation by those confronting the ambiguities created by the paradoxes. Therefore, a testing, 
but rewarding, reflexive procedure is needed to accommodate the necessary non-rational 
perspectives (such as Wicksian sense making, "garbage can" decision making, and "muddling 
through" processes), as well as rationalist approaches to problem solving and decision making. 
Thus, management in an inevitably ambiguous public arena must become the prerogative of 
those with creative insights and the capacity for rigorous analysis and evaluation, for only they can 
cope with ambiguity and indeterminacy. In this scenario, it is necessary to foster leaders who are 
prepared to devote themselves to a career in public management that demands that they be 
capable of perpetual transfiguration and optimal opportunism, and able to oscillate, as necessary, 
between contending ontological and epistemological beliefs. Thus, leadership must foster a 
leadership ecology that creates space for reflective thinking and consensus building, so as to allow 
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employees, teams, and stakeholder networics to make effective and efficient contributions to the 
management of ambiguity, complexity and indeterminacy. 
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The distinctiveness of the foundation degree can be found in the integration of the 
following characteristics: accessibility; articulation and progression; employer 
involvement; flexibility; and partnership. While none of these attributes are unique 
to foundation degrees, their clear and planned integration within a single award 
underpinned by work-based learning makes the award highly distinctive. 
Quality Assurance Agency, 2005 
Introduction 
The Accessible Higher Education — AcHE — project is an ambitious Higher 
Education (HE) in Further Education (FE) design and delivery initiative of the 
University of Plymouth Colleges Faculty (UPC), conducted in conjunction with the 
University of Bournemouth and supported by European Social Fund, under its 
Objective 3 Programme. It commenced in September 2004 and will run until 
DjBcember 2006, but its outcomes will be taken further under the auspices of 
UPC's Higher Educational Learning Partnership Centre of Excellence in Teaching 
and Learning, 
The AcHE project's aim is to build the capacity of its 19 participating Colleges of 
Further Education (CFEs) across the South West to design and deliver Foundation 
Degrees (FDs) with a focus on the management of people and organisations 
involved in the provision of public services, so as to permit students to seamlessly 
progress from FD study at C F E s to Honours Degree (HD) study at the University 
of Plymouth. 
Partnership 
The germ of the idea for this project emerged through experience gained from 
the first FD in Public Services approved by the University of Plymouth in 2002 for 
provision at Plymouth C F E . From the early stages of the development of this FD. 
hitherto unprecedented levels of co-operation and support between the Plymouth 
C F E and University staff in the design and approval processes, which continued 
through the subsequent assessment and quality assurance processes, resulted in 
a relatively smooth and productive formulation and delivery. The mutual support 
and co-operation continued and lead to the agreed design of a Stage 3 B S c 
(Hons) Public Services Programme and the trial of the Public Services Transition 
Programme to support and ease the path of FD students wishing to move into the 
HD programme. The AcHE project has drawn on this experience and is replicating 
it in the participating C F E s that have a desire to develop, design and deliver FDs 
in public services (embracing the uniformed public services, local government 
public services, health services, and not-for-profit services). 
By a process of co-operation rather than competition, C F E s are encouraged to 
identify local niche local markets and to design and deliver an FD that will target 
those needs, thereby ensuring their FDs financial sustainability in a competitive 
educational market environment. It is hoped that this ethos will create a genuine 
spirit of community amongst the providing C F E s , one that will, over time and with 
encouragement, create opportunities for mutual support and assistance. Most 
importantly, the students should be able to benefit from the collaboration and 
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sharing of resources and collaborative thinking facilitated through the C F E 
networks of the Universities of Plymouth and Bournemouth. 
The AcHE Team (see footnotes 1-6) is working closely with the relevant staff in 
the participating C F E s to understand and support their needs with respect to the 
design, approval and delivery of FDs. 
FD Approval Documentation and Curricula Development 
This support is provided through a series of workshops with FD development 
teams leading up to the development of approval documentation for the 
sponsoring university. These workshops focus on identifying niche local market 
opportunities and the construction of programme aims, learriing outcomes, an 
appropriate degree structure and module curricula. Particular attention is given to 
achieving the appropriate intellectual progression from Stage (Year) 1 to Stage 
(Year) 2; and to the drafting of module descriptions that have appropriate aims, 
learning outcomes (using the appropriate level descriptors), content, teaching and 
learning methods, and assessment. 
FD Teaching and Learning Support Material 
This support is to be provided in the fomi of a knowledge pack that facilitates 
the teaching of modules, the completion of which are essential to ensure that 
students are equipped to meet the challenges of Stage (Year) 3 learning at HD 
level. Each of these knowledge packs includes a conceptual map.of the subject 
area; textbook. recommendations; supplementary reading lists; supplementary 
readings; sample discussion topics, case studies and class exercises; sample 
assessments; and guidance on how to use the knowledge packs. The subject 
areas that will be supported include the public sector's socio-political context, 
human resource management, budgeting and public sector resources, 
organisations; and research methods. 
Staff development activities 
This support is provided by means of workshops, away days, seminars and 
individual mentoring; with many of the events being conducted on site at the 
participating C F E s . It focuses on the following four key areas: 
• personal development, particularly in preparation for the teaching of Stage 
(Year) 2 modules; 
• HE provision at University; 
• programme administration; and 
• module teaching, learning and assessment. 
Accessibility 
AcHE's ultimate beneficiaries are students in economically disadvantaged and 
remote areas of the South West who might not otherwise have progressed into 
HE. Thus, its wider mission is to support the aims of the widening participation 
agendas of both the sponsoring universities and the participating C F E s and to 
build a community of providers of public services education that can sustain and 
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support the provision of high quality, vocationally relevant FDs in public services 
(broadly defined) for the benefit of students in the region. 
Employer Engagement 
The strength that many C F E s have in developing relationships vy/ith employers 
is that, unlike many Universities, they can build on existing networks established 
through successful F E provision. Indeed, a successful FD must, first and foremost, 
meet employer needs, for only then can it enhance employability for its graduates. 
So. the AcHE project supports enhanced employer engagement by convening 
meetings with key employers, employer umbrella organisations and sector skills 
councils. This is to ensure that the development and design of FDs is fully 
informed by an understanding of local and regional employer needs and demands. 
Employer engagement is often considered as potentially the most problematical 
aspect of the development and design of a FD. The usual assumption is that 
employers, particularly public sector employers, will be reluctant to engage in the 
design process and. if they become engaged, they will place little value on the 
academic dimensions of FD programmes. However, the experience of FD 
development teams that are supported by the AcHE project has shown that 
selected public sector employers — conspicuously those delivering uniformed 
public services — want to engage with C F E s to design and deliver effective FDs, 
with an academic content, that meet their needs. In the South West, the Devon 
and Cornwall Constabulary and the Devon and Cornwall Police Authority are 
exemplary in this regard. However, as these partnerships emerge, the challenge 
that must be addressed by C F E s and universities is how to incorporate identified 
employer needs and values into the design of a University-approved programme 
of study. This imperative raises issues surrounding the debate over the academic 
and vocational divide in FD provision. For employers, the challenge is to go 
beyond identifying the knowledge, skills and attributes required to do a particular 
job or task, to recognising the need for their employees to understand the context 
within which a particular job or task is undertaken and to be problem solvers, so 
that they can do the job better. Academic training develops these cognitive skills, 
which is an intrinsic element of study at the HE level. 
In terms of the support that employers are prepared to give C F E s delivering FD 
programmes, the AcHE evidence supports the assertion that the greater the 
involvement and sense of collaborative provision in existence, the more wedded 
the employers will become to the qualification. The public sector employers that 
have participated in work-based learning activities at Plymouth C F E , for example, 
have also become involved in setting and facilitating action research projects as 
well as becoming actively engaged in some aspects of student assessment. 
Furthermore, the involvement of employers can mushroom across a range of 
subject areas in which employers have the ability to advise and also to participate 
in the delivery of some of the curriculum. Far from being disinterested, these 
employers show not only commitment but concern for the development of students 
in terms that demonstrate a long-term appreciation of the benefits that FD 
graduates can bring to their organisations. 
In fact, there is a growing recognition amongst some public sector employers 
that FDs can provide focussed and relevant vocational and academic development 
for potential and existing staff. Indeed, the level of commitment of some senior 
public sector employees has been the most pleasing aspect of employer 
involvement in the design of an array of FD programmes in the region. This degree 
of employer involvement is evidenced by the willingness of senior management 
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from Devon and Cornwall Police Authority and Devon and Cornwall Constabulary 
to become actively involved in a range of student learning activities. 
However, the engagement of the local government community in the South 
West in the design and delivery of FDs has been rather more problematic, with the 
conspicuous exception of Cornwall County Council. This scenario is evident 
despite (1) the efforts of Government to improve the performance of local 
government's capacity to deliver better and cheaper local public services; (2) the 
Audit Commission's naming and shaming of poor and weak local government 
authorities and (3) the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister's exhortations for local 
government to attract, retain and equip high calibre staff in all of its public services. 
Thus, local government has been reluctant to embrace FDs. which is evidenced by 
the failure of the local government community to nationally embrace the idea of 
establishing its own sector skills council. Unfortunately, this apparent disinterest in 
vocationally relevant HE provision by local government is manifest in the South 
West. Therefore, there is a need to build robust relationships between C F E s and 
local government through a shared commitment to prepare and enhance the 
employability of young people in the public sector throughout the region. 
Flexibility, Articulation and Progression 
The reverse engineering of FDs in public services is the informing philosophy of 
the AcHe project. The University of Plymouth's BSc (Hons) Public Services 
Programme provides a one-year top up that enables FD graduates to acquire an 
HD. It reverses the traditional logic of a third-year study at university by offering no 
electives. Thus, it focuses on the key elements of public management (people 
management, budgeting and resource management, organisations in the public 
sector, and the delivery and evaluation of public services) and it has a significant 
research component in the form of a major dissertation. So, the FDs being 
supported by the AcHe Project are being reverse engineered to ensure that their 
graduates are equipped to meet the challenges of third-year university study. But, 
this does not mean a replication of the learning outcomes attained by a student 
completing second-year university study. Instead, it requires FD students to have 
the prerequisite academic knowledge, learning and research skills to make a 
particular transition. In essence, some 40 percent of the curricula in a FD in public 
service, approved by the University of Plymouth, is expected to be centred on 
specific prerequisite areas of knowledge and skills. The remaining 60 percent can 
then be focussed on meeting the identified local employers' needs and 
requirements. 
Many successful FD students want to use their two years of HE study in F E to 
progress to the third year of HE study and obtain an HD. The experience of the 
University of Plymouth's first in-take into its BSc (Hons) Public Services 
Programme in 2004-05 is insightful.^ Perhaps because they experienced only a 
limited transition programme, the move from college to university was affected by 
student uncertainties. Thus, as they pondered over the values and purposes of 
university, they wondered whether they would be welcome in an environment that 
has traditionally viewed vocational courses as failing to offer the rigor of a proper 
academic education. Therefore, we — their lecturers and tutors — had to apply 
reflexive practice to ensure that we adopted the best means to effectively deliver 
^ Of the initial graduating cohort students at the Plymouth CFE's FD in Public Services, 
92 percent so progressed on to the HD programme, and almost 50 percent of them 
graduated with Upper-Second Class Honours Degrees. 
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academic knowledge whilst proactively combating any subliminal, and 
unintentional, discrimination that malingers in the structural norms of a university. 
As a starting point in a process of reflexivity, we had to understand our new 
students' academic aspirations, learning attitudes and social behaviours in the 
classroom before contemplating the fundamental rules of discourse that should be 
applied in the learning process. We had to do this without the accumulated 
knowledge about a cohort of students that comes with regular exposure to them in 
their first and second years of study. 
It is reasonable to assert that student's optimise their learning when they feel 
comfortable about being taught by a lecturer. But, universities sometimes pay little 
attention to this comfort factor, particularly in third year, when relationships 
between students and lecturers have been established by previous contact. 
Instead, there is an established, although not universal, opinion that students 
should take responsibility for their own learning thereby releasing teaching staff 
from the burden of unnecessary intrusion, so that they are able to get on with their 
research. However, this narrow vision of the role of the third-year module lecturer 
does not meet the expectations of students who have experienced both the 
consistent support and personal involvement offered by C F E lecturers, and 
perhaps the interest of employers in their progress. Put quite simply, university 
lecturers teaching FD graduates must be prepared to adopt a more student-
centred approach to the learning process. This requires them to do more than 
imparting knowledge by lecturing at students in a way that demonstrates their 
erudition. Rather, they must adopt teaching and learning facilitation methods that 
are flexible enough to accommodate both individual and group learning needs at 
third-year university level. 
Achieving a seamless transition for FD study to HD study will also place 
demands on C F E lecturers of Stage (Year) 2 modules. Students in their second 
year of FD study must be intellectually challenged by being asked to critically 
review and synthesise knowledge and to solve intellectual problems; to 
demonstrate that they have learnt how to learn and thus can become independent 
learners willing and able to take responsibility for their own learning; and to 
evidence that they have the self-management, project-management and analytical 
skills to undertake a supervised research project. Meeting this challenge may well 
involve challenging the norms of F E workload, teaching and assessment practices. 
The delivery of FDs that equip students for progression to HE creates threats 
and opportunities for C F E s and universities. Understanding and minimising the 
threats and exploiting the opportunities require improved channels of 
communication between university lecturers and their C F E colleagues. The word 
colleague is used here deliberately as it engenders both the notions of empathy 
and collegiality that are necessary to underpin these relationships. Of course, 
there is no quick and easy way to achieve this aim but, what is a complex 
paradigm of feelings and emotions, can be positively addressed by a culture of 
mutual respect reinforced through both university and C F E staff meeting regularly 
or undertaking short-term placements in partner institutions. The AcHE Project has 
greatly benefited from the secondment of the manager of the FD Public Service 
Programme at Plymouth C F E to the team. Her presence has developed the 
Team's collective understanding of our shared task and lead to purposeful 
meetings with our C F E colleagues that have dismantled the barriers of 
misunderstanding. Additionally, from a student's perspective, this dialogue is 
evidence that the lecturers in both organisations are committed to achieving a 
seamless progression from FD study to HD study. 
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student Feedback 
The knowledge we have acquired from our first cohort of HD students, through 
conducting focus groups and analysing an end of year questionnaire, has 
significantly informed the priorities of the AcHE Project. It is apparent that the 
theme of difference — between being college FD student and being university HD 
student — is evident to these students. This feeling was manifest in their concerns 
about their preparedness for HD study. First, they expressed concerns about the 
underdevelopment of particular skills: 
• writing skills, particularly referencing and plagiarism, which they needed to 
write the 15,000 words of assessment; 
• ability to manage a dissertation, particularly the concept of a literature search, 
which they needed to write their 6,000 word dissertation; 
• time management skills, which they needed to meet university deadlines; and 
• information technology skills, which they needed to access, analyse and 
present information. 
Second, they expressed concerns about their lack of understanding of what HD 
study involves, particularly: 
• the type of language used by university lecturers and their expectations in 
relation to students* theoretical and analytical understanding; 
• the amount of reading expected by university lecturers; 
• the degree of self-awareness and self-regulation university lecturers expect 
from third year undergraduates; and thus 
• lack of self-esteem they felt in joining the third year as "university freshers". 
Our respondents had not seen themselves as 'University of Plymouth' students 
throughout their FD studies, and they also doubted that they were 'university level' 
undergraduates, which their HD grades would suggest is not true. This finding is, 
however, not surprising, given the widening participation agenda for FD's but it 
needs to be addressed if large numbers of students are to be encouraged to make 
the transition from FDs and HDs. Whilst students were constantly told by college 
lecturers that they are part of a university structure, they, nevertheless, clearly did 
not feel it! 
However, giving students a university identity from the beginning of their FD 
does create particular problems. The geographical spread of students across the 
UPC network, which extends throughout the South West, requires the University of 
Plymouth to provide access, through its student portal, to extensive information 
about both course material and social events. This endeavour needs to be 
supported by academic and administrative staff in partner colleges. As the AcHE 
Team has found, if college-based students consider themselves as part of a 
university structure then the more likely they are to progress. This feeling can be 
stimulated through positive personal contact with university staff both in colleges 
and during periodic visits to the university. It is also productive for university 
lecturers to provide input about students' action research projects and the skills 
centre assessment in their Work Based Learning Module. 
The AcHE team have also recognised that, with the expected growth in student 
numbers, there is a need to formulate and implement a comprehensive transition 
programme. Good transition arrangements should start early and be seamless, 
thus it is essential that their outputs and outcomes become an integral part of FD 
programmes. Through this approach, the student becomes aware, from the 
beginning of the FD course, of the structure of their degree and the value of a 
natural and expected progression to Stage 3. Also the concerns that may be felt 
by college students about progression into a university environment can be 
gradually alleviated during both Stage 1 and 2. 
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Conclusion 
Undoubtedly, FDs will play an increasingly critical role in the years to come in 
improving access to HE and in offering vocationally relevant, high quality HE vtfith 
HD progression for those so inclined. However, in designing and delivering 
effective FDs it is essential that a strong committed partnership of employers, 
colleges and universities be built, so as to ensure enhanced employability is an 
outcome, and to address the particular sensibilities and needs of this distinctive 
cohort of college-based HE students who wish to progress onto HD study. 
As members of the AcHE Team, we have found working for the Project to be a 
dynamic and rewarding experience, and collectively we can recommend this 
model of intervention as a purposeful and productive means of furthering HE in FE 
and, particularly the FD ethos. We, thus, offer these thoughts on our experience to 
date to our colleagues in colleges and universities for their consideration, on the 
basis that they can inform the construction of suitable frameworks for designing 
and delivering, seamlessly, FDs and HDs that allow vocationally inclined students 
to achieve to their highest academic potential! 
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The Concept of Governance 
Governance is the process of establishing the "conditions for ordered rule and collective action" 
(Stoker 1998: 17). derived from the Latin gubemare — to rule or to steer It constitutes, according to 
Garland (1997: 174), "the forms of njle by which various authorities govern populations, and the 
technologies of self through which individuals work on themselves to shape their own subjectivity". 
The Commission on Global Governance (1995: 2) defines it, more pragmatically, as "the sum of 
many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs." 
Biersteker (1992: 102) holds that "governance is essentially purposive and should be distinguished 
from order ["the presence of regularity or similar patterning"], which does not require conscious 
purpose or intent. Order can exist without governance, but governance requires some form of 
order." Kooiman (1999) identifies three "governing orders": action contingencies between different 
partners (problem-solving and opportunity-creating); institutional aspects (conditions); and 
governing principles (legislation, norms and economic development). 
The concept of governance has been routinely used in the socio-political realm for several 
centuries, generally in Mayntz's (1993: 11) sense of "a mode of social co-ordination or order". 
Young (1994: ix) usefully distinguishes between governance systems ("social institutions or sets of 
rules guiding the behavior of those engaged in identifiable social practices") and government 
systems ("organizations or material entities established to administer provisions of governance 
systems"). Kooiman (1999: 70) defines societal (or socio-political) governance as: "all those 
interactive arrangements in which public as well as private actors participate aimed at solving 
societal problems, or creating societal opportunities, and attending to the institutions within which 
these governing activities take place." The United Nations Development Program (UNDP 1997: 2) 
defines it more narrowly as; 
the exercise of political, economic and administrative authority of a country's affairs at all 
levels. Governance comprises the complex mechanisms, processes and institutions through 
which citizens and groups articulate their interests, mediate their differences and exercise 
their legal rights and obligations...Governance includes the state, but transcends it by taking 
in the private sector and civil society. 
Burns (1999) describes this as organic governance. Governance, then, is the exercising of political, 
economic and administrative authority to manage a society's affairs, which is cleariy broader than 
government. 
Societies in all countries can be characterized by their increasing diversity, dynamics and 
complexity of their socio-economic, political, cultural and natural environments (Kooiman 1999. 
Pierre and Peters 2000), which have changed greatly from those which existed even 25 years ago. 
In particular, they are experiencing dynamic processes of economic and social differentiation, 
which have made them "institutionally rich" (Streeck 1991: 27). This has changed the role of 
governments as they seek to respond to the governance challenges of this new worid, which 
Moran (2000: 11) identifies as "distrust, fear of risks, consumerism, legalism and democracy". In 
recent decades governance has thus achieved a new level of prominence for four fundamentally 
interrelated reasons (Alcentara 1998, Kooiman 1999, Majone 1997, Miller and Rose 1990. Pierre 
and Peters 2000, Rhodes 1996 and 1997, Stoker 1997). Weller et al. 1997). First, there has been a 
growing awareness that governments are not the only crucial actors in addressing major societal 
issues. Secondly, it has become widely accepted that patterns of state-society interaction can no 
longer be considered static and unilateral. Secondly, traditional and new modes of state-society 
interactions are needed to tackle these issues. Thirdly, governing arrangements and mechanisms 
necessarily differ not only for levels of state-society interaction but also by sector. Finally, and 
concomitantly, many governance issues are inter-dependent and/or become linked. Governments 
are now confronting the challenge of determining how best to identify, protect and promote the 
public interest in a world that is becoming increasing diversity, dynamics, inter-dependent and more 
complex. 
The Public Interest 
The concept of the public interest draws upon three traditions of political thought: 
utilitarianism (the proposition that the wellbeing of society should be the overriding goal of public 
policy, thus social action is right if it maximizes social wellbeing by, in Benthamite terms, achieving 
the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people [Bentham [1789] 1970, Mill [1863] 1968]), 
civic republicanism (the proposition that the different interests that exist in civil society should be 
subordinated to the interests of all those in that society); and the general will (the outcome when 
citizens make political decisions for the good of society as a whole rather than for the good of a 
particular group. [Rousseau [1762] 1973]). It has two distinct formulations: the common interests of 
people as members of the society (Gross 1964: 522); and the aggregation of the private interests 
of those effected or likely to be effected by a collective action (Apperiey 1996b). It overiaps the 
concepts of the common or collective good (the good that is commonly or collectively shared by a 
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group of persons that cannot be disaggregated (Reeve 1996b]). It stands in contradistinction to 
private interests. Indeed, Lasswell (1930: 264) conceptualized the public interest as displaced 
private interests: "the displacement of private affects upon public objects. The affects which are 
organized in the family are redistributed upon various social objects such as the state." 
Government as the Trustee of the Public Interest 
What constitutes the public interest is a matter of politics. Political institutions seek to derive 
the "wriir of the people ascertained through aggregative processes — political campaigns and 
political bargaining — and integrative process — deliberation between politicians and those they 
seek to govern. Riker (1982: 238), however, following in the footsteps of Adam Smith ([1776] 1977) 
and Kenneth Arrow (1954), has pronounced that governments do not — and cannot — know the 
"will" of the people. 
Determining what is in the "public interest" involves societies, through political mechanisms, 
making judgements — informed by the societal public discourses on the contending desired 
societal responses to perceived societal problem-solving and opportunity-creating scenarios — 
about the way individuals and collections of individuals want manage their common affairs. This, 
inevitable, involves governments making judgements on the appropriate balance they should strike 
between furthering self-interested individual autonomy — promoting positive freedom — and 
upholding public-interested collective control — constraining positive freedom to promote negative 
freedom. 
Positive freedom (Beriin 1969, Goodin 1982) is the freedom to take control of one's life, 
which can be identified with Rousseau's notion of moral self-government. It is having the ability to 
do, choose and achieve outcomes — optionality — attained by empowerment, which is inherently a 
collective, rather than an individual, pursuit. This is based on three premises (Hyde and Dixon 
2001). The first is that all individuals have capacities or latent, but desirable, qualities. The second 
is that positive freedom consists of the realization of these capacities, which may therefore be 
conceptualized, in the broader sense, as individual autonomy. The third is that social conditions are 
the decisive influence on the realization of these capacities. 
Negative freedom (Beriin 1969, Goodin 1982) is freedom from control, interference or 
exploitation, which can be identified with the Hobbesian idea of the absence of constraint or 
obstacles. It is the right of self-determination — autonomy — the absence of external constraints 
on individual action. This is also based on three premises (Hyde and Dixon 2001). The first is that 
individuals require the private space to identify appropriate personal goals and ambitions. The 
second is that personal goals and ambitions have value only if they are freely chosen. The third is 
that voluntary action—choice and personal responsibility — enables individuals to meet important 
spiritual needs. 
That the state still has the dominant role in matters of societal governance is axiomatic 
(Peters 1998). Once a government has determined, in the context of designing an appropriate 
societal response to a perceived societal problem-solving and opportunity-creating scenario, the 
appropriate balance between self-interested individual autonomy and public-interested collective 
control that is in the "public interest", it can choose to use — or not to use — its coercive power to 
protect and promote its perception of the "public interest". The outcome of this choice decision has 
profound implications for the precise nature of the collective action — if any — that is put in place 
to manage a society's common affairs (Kooiman 1993 and 1999, Peters 1996 and 1998, Peters 
and Savoie 1998, Rhodes 1997). The state, of course, has "the ability to make people...do what 
they would not otherwise have done" (Allison 1996: 396), but, as Fiathman (1980: 6) contends, 
"power as distinct from episodic uses of raw force and violence — is impossible in the absence of 
values and beliefs shared between those who wield power and those subject to it." 
0 
Governmentality 
Foucault's ([1978] 1991: 18-19) concept of governmentality — "the contact between the 
technologies of domination of others and those of the se l f — focuses on the two poles of 
governance — the governed's response to the processes of those who seek to govern them (Dixon 
2003). Whether this response is one of compliance or antagonism depends upon how they justify, 
to themselves and to others, the limitations that they tolerate being imposing upon them in the 
"public interest". This crucially depends on the level of trust that prevails between them. 
Trust 
In a socio-political system, trust exists in so far as its members act according to, and are secure 
in. the expected futures constituted by the presence of each other (Lewis and Weigert 1985). It 
enhances the likelihood of tolerance, co-operation, and facilitates human agency — even to the 
extent of personal sacrifices for the collective well-being (Sztompka 1997). It reduces systemic 
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complexity, by ensuring that those who seek to govern do so on the basis of shared expectations 
about future behaviour of all the actors engaged, thereby enabling them to design and implement 
policy responses to perceived societal problem-solving and opportunity-creating scenarios with 
more confidence that the "public interest" will be protected and promoted as a result. The basic 
governance function of co-ordinating socio-economic interaction is, thus, more achievable, with 
greater co-operation and compliance being the consequence. Fukuyama (1995: 7) expresses this 
point admirably: "a nation's well-being, as well as its ability to compete, is conditioned by a single, 
pervasive cultural characteristic: the level of trust inherent in a society." 
While there is agreement on the importance of trust, there are contending perspectives on how 
it can best be understood (Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman 1995, McAllister, 1995). A useful 
distinction can be drawn between particulahst trust — the particular trust one person has of another 
person — and generalist trust — the general trust one person has of everyone else, individually as 
well as collectively in institutions. Stolle (1998: 500) argues that the extension of trust from a 
person's own group to the larger society occurs through "mechanisms not yet clearly understood." 
An even more sceptically, Rosenblum (1998: 45, 48) calls the purported link "an airy 'liberal 
expectancy'" that remains "unexplained". Trust, then, informs individual expectations about the 
future behaviour of others. Soberingly. Dasgupta (1988: 53} points out: "The problem of trust 
would...not arise if we were all hopelessly moral, always doing what we said we would do in the 
circumstances in which we said we would do it." 
Ethics 
Standards of behaviour govern the lives of individuals. They fashion their self-image and 
represent their actuality (Hegel. [1820]: 1991: 190). They draw upon diverse ethic premises to 
justify what to them constitutes acceptable standards of behaviour in terms of what human actions 
are "good or bad", "right or wrong", or "virtuous or shameful". However, such a pattern of idealistic 
impulses may require moral agents to confront, or to obfuscate over, inconsistencies in their 
behaviour that might be the outcome of a compromise arising from the imperatives of necessity. So 
ethics can also be fashioned by pragmatism. 
Ethics can be regarded as a self-policing mechanism, one that can stimulate self-control, 
motivate adherence to matters of principle, accentuate feelings and give rise to particular lines of 
thought. There are, however, contending ethical perspectives that can be drawn upon by 
individuals seeking to justify to themselves, and to others, the limitations (if any) that they are 
prepared to tolerate being imposing upon them by those who seek to govern them, in the "public 
interest". These contending perspectives are informed by contending perspectives about how 
people understand the social world and about how they explain other people's behavior. 
Societal Governance: Demarcating a Quadripartite Social Reality 
People have selective screens through which they receive knowledge of how the social worid 
works and how other people behave (Dixon 2003). These provide the value-oriented means by 
which people order events, so as to give clarity of meaning to what would otherwise be an anarchic 
stream of events. They have both cognitive-rational (objective meaning) and communicative-
rational (normative meaning) components, which intermingle to produce an assumptive world: a 
"cognitive map of the worid out there" (Young 1979: 33). How people build their cognitive map of a 
particular societal problem-solving and opportunity-creating scenario depends on how they wish to 
relate to those who seek to govern them in that governance setting. People can, of course, choose 
to construct quite different cognitive maps for different governance scenarios because they wish to 
have different relationships with those who seek to govern them in different governance settings. 
How people go about interrogating the social worid infonns how they describe, understand, explain 
and judge a particular governance setting. This depends on their epistemological and ontological 
predispositions (Dixon 2003, Dixon and Dogan 2002 and 2004). 
Epistemological predispositions relate to people's contentions about what is knowable. how it 
can be known, and the standard by which the truth can be judged (Hollis 1994). They can be based 
on naturalist propositions, whereby social knowledge must be grounded in objective, material 
phenomena and must take the form of either analytical statements derived from deductive logic or 
synthetic statements derived from inductive inference. Or they can be based on hermeneutic 
propositions, whereby social knowledge rests on subjective interpretations embedded in day-to-day 
expressions derived from practice, discourse and language (Winch 1990). Human knowledge is, 
therefore, generated by acts of ideation (personal reflections and ruminations). 
Ontological predispositions relate to people's contentions about the nature of being, what can 
and does exist, what their conditions of existence might be. and to what phenomena causal 
capacity might be ascribed (Hollis 1994). They can be based on the structuralist proposition that 
"social structures impose themselves and exercise power upon agency. Social structures are 
regarded as constraining in the way they mould people's actions and thoughts, and in that it is 
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difficult, if not impossible, for one person to transform these structures (Baert 1998: 11). Thus, 
social action derives from social stnjctures. Or they can be based on the agency proposition that 
"individuals have some control over their actions and can be agents of their action (voluntarism) 
enabled by their psychological and social psychological make-up" (Parker. 2000: 125). Thus, social 
action derives from individual intention. 
These epistemological and ontological dichotomies give rise to four methodological families. 
These represent, logically, the only possible ways of describing, explaining and evaluating the 
social world. They are the foundations of people's assumptive worlds, which enable them to frame 
appropriately the social world they encounter (Rein and Schon 1993), thereby becoming the prisms 
through which they perceive, analyse and judge that world. These methodological families are 
captured in Figure 1. 
Insert Figure 1 here 
The methodological prisms demarcated in Figure 1 present four contending perceptions of 
societal governance. 
The Naturalist-Structuralist Perspective 
Those who are predisposed to a naturalist-structuralist philosophical stance perceive the social 
world to be a knowable objective reality, which they characterize as a hierarchical social order 
based on positional authority, expressed through orderly differentiation (Dumont 1970). As 
obligation-driven homo-hierarchus, hierarchists would presume that people conduct their affairs in 
a social order in which everyone has a known place in a pattern-maintaining hierarchy: my social 
role is determined by them. 
The social context for hierarchists is one where institutionalized, hierarchical classifications not 
only keep people apart but also regulate their interactions by making them subject to the control of 
others and to the demands of roles that are socially imposed. Life's ends are pre-selected — / will 
do whatever they judge to be in my best interest — and the means of their achievement are 
prescribed by others: my priorities are determined by what they expect of me; my future concerns 
are determined by what they decide is important for me; and what I am committed to is decided by 
them. To hierarchists, then, "allegiance is owed from each individual to "authority." which is to. say 
power conceived as legitimate and bound by responsibility" (Scnjton 2001: 25). Their interpersonal 
relationships are governed by a set of entrenched social norms (Hart [1961] 1994. Raz 1975), 
which must be understood as patterns of rationally governed behaviour maintained in groups by 
acts of conformity (Hetcher 2004), which constitute the known and accepted rules by which people 
conduct themselves and their affairs. 
To hierarchists, people are presumed to be errant, with a basic instinct for seeking pleasure and 
avoiding pain, but they would consider that their redemption comes from them doing what is 
morally right, achieved by conforming to the shared norms of a hierarchical social order that 
encourages in them the habit of self-control and provides norms that determine how they should 
live. In Hegelian terms, duty is the relationship of the individual to his state, for citizens exist for the 
sake of the state, their freedom "means little more than the right to obey laws" (Russell 1946: 764). 
Free will must be rendered as the capacity of individuals to obey prevailing social norms, thereby 
ensuring more orderly and mannerly behaviors, which would bring to and end the normlessness 
and unpredictability of the relatively random world they live. A person's moral worth is measured by 
the actions undertaken from that sense of duty. Life's meaning depends on doing one's duty, and 
meaning secures action. Who a person becomes, then, is contingent upon to whom that person is 
bound and obligated. 
Ethics. Hierarchists would adopt the deontological ethical position (Fried 1978) that there are 
human actions that are intrinsically right or wrong. Their concern is with act-centered morality — 
what should I do? Their focus is on discovering ethical principles by reason (rather than by 
reference to empirical ("practical" or "common rational") knowledge. This gives rise to the Kantian 
distinction between a categorical (moral) imperative (a generalized moral judgement about human 
conduct — constituting a moral code of conduct — "which declares an action to be objectively 
necessary in itself without reference to an purpose" (Kant [1788] 1909: 38)); and a hypothetical 
(moral) imperative ("which expresses the practical necessity of an action as a means to the 
advancement of happiness...as a means to another purpose" [Kant [1788] 1909: 39]). Actions 
taken on the basis of categorical imperatives that make particular obligations or duties intrinsically 
right are, themselves, intrinsically hght. Ethical propositions that emphasize duty and obligation — 
made de rigueur in their specifics by trusted authority figures — would be seen as justifiable 
reasons for social actions that demanded conformity with the norms settled on by the social order, 
for they determine how people should live by encourage the habit of self-control, thereby enabling 
them to be well-ordered selves (Plato [c380s] 1952). The moral considerations that bear on the 
rightness of an action includes promises made that must be kept, not harming others, and gratitude 
to benefactors (Ross 1930) 
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Trust. Hierarchists consider that the granting of trust must be preceded by the confirmation that 
those being trusted adhere to a fundamentally common set of innate moral values Moralistic tnjst is 
a feeling, as well as a judgement and a disposition to act, that binds people together (Usianer 
2002). It is based upon "some sort of belief in the goodwill of the other" (Seligman 1997; 43). It 
must involve positive feelings, at one pole, and negative ones, at the other, premised on a belief 
that no one should try to take advantage of anyone else (Silver 1989: 276). The moral dimension of 
trust is important because it is a statement about how people should behave. If people are 
confident that those they wish to tnjst, including those who seek to govern them, share a moral 
belief that reinforces honest behaviour, then they will trust them. 
Public Interest. To hierarchists, the "public interest" is grounded in the notion of the societal 
"common good", as articulated by a society's politico-administrative elite. It can be promoted and 
protected — and, thus, society is governable — but only if there is continuity between the past, 
present and future. This can only be preserved by the societal politico-administrative elite — in 
which they must be prominent — who have a society's "common good" at heart and who can best 
articulate "public interest" propositions to be promoted and protected by them using the much 
coveted power of the state. 
Governance Mode. Hierarchists would see the public sphere as being cleariy demarcated from the 
private sphere, with the public sphere being the proper domain of the societal politico-
administrative elite. They would be perceived as having the right to rule. They would, however, be 
expected to accept responsibility for the well-being of those who give them loyalty and obedience. 
So. government would be perceived as being benign in intent and benevolent in outcome. 
Hierarchists would give allegiance, and be deferential, to those who govern them, because of 
their adherence to the principle of rational-legal authority (Weber's [1915] 1947). Under this 
principle, authority rests on the legality of normative rules and on the right of those elevated to 
authority to give commands. Hierarchists believe that the collective acceptance of this logical 
hierarchical social order, and its delegated authority structure, facilitates orderly and efficient 
processes. They would, in essence, prefer a strong state, a weak civil society and weak markets. 
Hierarchists would advocate the adoption of the hierarchical mode of governance. Under this 
governance mode, individuals or organizations are subject to a set of enforceable rights and 
obligations designed and implemented by governments with a territorial mandate. As Mars, (1998: 
8) remarks: "Hierarchy is a mode of governance characterized by a very close structural coupling 
between the public and private level, with central coordination, and thus control exercised by 
government." To protect and promote the "common good", hierarchists would expect government 
to exercise of legitimate or expert power (French and Raven 1959). So. they would accept the 
imposition of njles that "ask. command, demand, permit [and] caution" (directive rules [Onuf 1989: 
86]) with a zero non-compliance tolerance and substantial sanctions. They would also expect such 
rules to solicit compliance on the basis of a cognitive commitment (Etzioni 1961) derived from 
rational calculations made in the context of structural processes (such as rules and procedures 
prescribed by those in or with authority) and supported, by a deontological moral code. Such 
compliance — as a matter of a habit —would, they believe, be the product of a sense of obligation 
to obey a sanctioned command from those in a superior position or with knowledge and skills; and 
they would expect others to do so as well. 
Hierarchists would be attracted to a political meta-narrative that legitimises the hierarchical 
bonding of individuals, reinforces the supremacy of the collective over the individual in all spheres 
of life, and preserves authority structures. They would be attracted to the idea of guardian-style 
approach to government, which has its origins in Plato's The Republic. Plato argued that rulership 
should be entrusted to that minority of people who. by reason of their superior insight and virtue, 
are particulariy qualified to govern (Hendriks and Zouridis 1999: 125). It recalls the Hegelian ideas 
of the state as a spiritual entity or, as Hennis pleads (cited in Messner 1997: 80), a state with 
"power to create unity." and able to act as "protector, guardian, promoter of morality...guarantor of 
moral standards." Thus, the state should be elitist, stable, reactive but strong, and even coercive if 
necessary. 
Salient Governance R isks . Hierarchists face the salient governance risk that the politico-
administrative elite are unable to sustain the loyalty of those they seek to govern because they 
cannot adequately protect and promote the "common good", because they cannot understand the 
causes or solutions to hierarchical governance problems. These have identified by Mayntz 1993 as 
knowledge problems (lack of appropriate, governance knowledge), governance capacity (lack of 
appropriate governance instruments), implementation problems (lack of appropriate organizational 
capacities), or motivational problems (lack of compliance by the governed). Any inability of 
hierarchists to address hierarchical governance problems would occurs either because either they 
are unable to understand the nature and causation of any governance problems that cannot be 
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analysed and explained by the application of naturalist methods (which can offer reasonably 
reliable predictions, but cannot identify unambiguous causal relationships) and/or they cannot 
accommodate behavior that is induced by self-interest or jointly affirmed (as distinct from 
entrenched hierarchical) social norms; or because their proffered solutions, which presume a 
structuralist ontology (involving demands for obedience) are unable to secure the behavioral 
responses required either from individuals who are no longer loyal to the powers that be. or from 
individuals who are not motivated by arguments grounded in hierarchical duty and obligation. 
The Naturalist-Agency Perspective 
Those who are predisposed to a naturalist-agency philosophical stance philosophical stance 
would consider the social worid to be a knowable objective reality, which they would characterize 
as an aggregation of pre-endowed and self-determining, albeit under socialised (Granovetter 1985: 
483, 487), individuals, each of whom voluntarily interact by exercising their freedom of choice to 
establish relationships. As self-interested (free-riding) homo economicus, individualists would 
presume that people conduct their affairs in a social order in which no one has a place and 
commitment is only to one's self: my social role is determined by me. 
The social context for individualists is made up of "other people" (Watkins 1968) with whom they 
would presume it to be appropriate to engage in fleeting instrumental interpersonal relationships. 
Thus, they would demand the right to maximum freedom to negotiate with whom ever they choose. 
Life's ends are self-determined — / will do v^hatever I judge to be in my self-interest — and the 
means of their achievement are knowable to me: my priorities are determined by v\/hat I expect of 
myself; my future concerns are determined by v^hat I decide is important for me; and what I am 
committed to is depends on what is in my best interest. The individualist social order is dominated 
by two beliefs. The first is that people can author their lives through choice (Hobbes ([1651] 1962: 
103). The second is that people can intentionally change their future: (Bacon [1623] 1997, 
Machiavelli [1513] 1977). Indeed, whether people are willing to share and collaborate with others, 
and so engage in collective action, depends on the strength of their belief that their material well-
being is contingent upon the co-operative interdependence. 
People are presumed by individualists to be self-determining, with the necessary hopes, beliefs 
and desires needed to take self-seeking actions. Free will permits individuals to choose what is 
best for them, only constrained by the collective in the event that it is likely to result in harm to 
others (Mill [1863] 1968). A person's moral worth is measured by the actions undertaken that have 
been personally favorable whilst either having been to the benefit others or, at least, not having 
been to their detriment. Life's meaning depends on one's material well-being. Who a person 
becomes, then, is contingent upon how well that person negotiates with others. 
Ethics. Individualists would accept that the rational agent should be bound only by self-given 
ethical principles that originate in the exercise of reason (Christman 1989, Dworkin 1988). Thus, 
they would uphold the propositions of the right to self-determination of the rational agent (Kant) and 
of the capacity of a person to reason and acquire moral ideas (Condorset). As they seek to 
respond to ethical problems by means of reason they are ethical realists. Their concern is with act-
centered morality — what should I do? Their focus is on establishing the facts — moral facts — 
about the actual consequences, improvements, and goodness of action that can be defined in 
terms of some non-moral position (such as individual pleasure or utility) — and rules for action that 
should determine what is right action {moral realism) (Brink 1989). Actions are judged to be right if 
they produce, or are likely to produce, good consequences (Gouinlock 1972, Meyers 1986), 
premised on the proposition that it is possible predict the net beneficial consequences of an action. 
OThus, individualists are ethical consequentialists in that they prefer to judge the Tightness of 
their actions by the value of their actual, or even intended, effects in terms of producing the most 
good {act-consequentialism, or, in utilitarian terms, act-utilitarianism), even if this is not the 
intention, which, perhaps, it should not be (a precept of indirect act-consequentialism). Moreover, 
actions can also be right either if they are in accordance with the preferences of those assessing 
the rightness of those actions {preference-utilitarianism) or if they follow a set of rules general 
acceptance of which would best promote the most good {rule-consequentialism or, in utilitarian 
terms, rule-utilitarianism) (Scarre 1996, Scheffler 1988). 
1 
Trust. Individualists consider that the granting of tnjst must be preceded by an assessement of the 
consequences of trusting others. Thus, it is reducible to a risk probability (Gambetta 1988) — the 
trustworthiness of the behaviour of others — as economists and game theorists have argued (see. 
for example, Williamson 1985) — with the dynamics of trust being reduced to probability updating 
on the basis of observed behaviours (Luhmann 1979, Offe 1999). Yamigishi and Yamigishi (1994) 
call this knowledge-based trust, which makes the decision to trust another person is essentially 
strategic. If people are confident that their behavioural predictions of others, including those who 
seek to govern them, then they will trust them. 
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Public Interest. To individualists, the "public interest", following Smith ([1776] 1977), is linked to 
individual self-interest, which is only knowable as the aggregated revealed preferences expressed 
in the mari<etplace. They would call upon Arrow's (1954) demonstration of the impossibility of 
rationally determining a collective preference ranking of any set of possible collective actions to 
refute the knowability of the "will" of the people on collective action outside the marketplace. The 
"public interest" can be promoted and protected — and society is governable — but only when the 
societal politico-administrative elites' rote is limited to ensuring society's safety and security and to 
enforcing property rights. This proposition is based on the premise that the right to own private 
property is the most efficient way of running society (Becker 1977). 
Governance Mode. Because individualists see the public sphere as a threat to the private sphere, 
they believe that it should be made smaller wherever and whenever possible. They also believe 
that the public sphere should take no intentionally instnjmental actions for enhancing people's 
wellbeing, as it cannot know their preferences. Because the societal politico-administrative elite are 
inherently coercive, intrusive and constantly at risk of being inefficient, individualists believe that 
they must be treated with constant vigilance. This requires government to be held strictly 
accountable for its inputs and outcomes by means of effective public scrutiny, so as to ensure not 
only that any private costs incurred are both minimized and compensated by the collective, but 
also that the martlet provision of public services is maximized. Government would thus be seen to 
be intrusive in intent and malevolent in outcome. 
Individualists would question whether there is any basis upon which government can claim 
legitimate authority, as it perpetually acts as a pedantic rent seeker (see, for example, Tilly 1990). 
They would tolerate government only to the extent that it ensures society's security and safety, acts 
as a Rawlsian agency of justice (Rawls 1971), and provides a judicial-legal framework that defines 
and enforces property rights, which are the subject of exchange between individuals, so permitting 
private ends to be peacefully pursued (Hobbes [1651] 1962, Oakeshott 1975). They would be 
willing to give allegiance to those who govern them and to engage with the governance process, 
but only so as to ensure that the balance between autonomy and control always favors the 
individual over the collective. 
Individualists would advocate the adoption of the market self-regulation mode of governance 
(Polanyi 1957).Under this governance mode, individuals or organizations are subject to a set of 
enforceable rights and obligations embodied in negotiated contracts with a zero non-compliance 
tolerance and full restitution as the ultimate sanction. Thus, buyers and sellers conduct their affairs 
in accordance with their contractual obligations within the rules of the law of property, tort and 
contract. Compliance would be instrumental (Etzioni 1961), based on economic calculations of 
compliance costs and benefits. This means that they would find ways of minimizing, if not avoiding, 
any changes that involve a net compliance cost; and they would expect others to do so as well. 
They would prefer, in essence, strong mari<ets, a weak civil society and a weak state. 
Kooiman and van Vliet (2001: 360) see this mode of governance as subsumed under the 
broader rubric of self-governance: "the capacity of social entities to provide the necessary means to 
develop and maintain their identity, by and large, by themselves — and thus show a relatively high 
degree of social-political autonomy." They distinguish a systems- (structure-) oriented perspective 
on self-governance — an autopoietic system, which, drawing upon the biological metaphor of a 
closed living system that is self-referencing, self-organizing and self-steering, governs itself through 
a labyrinth of interaction processes involving the constituent members that make up its identity — 
from an actor- ^agency-) oriented perspective — an actor constellation system, which draws upon 
internal or Eigen dynamics, where positive and negative feedback are central, to argue that a social 
system governs itself by means of a process of mutual stimulation between identifiable actors who 
are searching for mutually reinforcing or curbing behavior patterns (see also Kooiman 2000 and 
Kooiman and Associates 1997). Hayek (1991) talks of spontaneous, or grown, order, which stands 
in contradistinction to organised, or made, order. 
Accordingly, individualists would be attracted to a political meta-narrative that advocates the 
individual's moral supremacy over a collective. They would believe that the collective's intrinsic 
coerciveness and intrusiveness inevitably result in the imposition of unnecessary constraints on 
positive freedom and individual responsibility, which generate perverse incentives and constrain 
market behavior. They would posit that the collective has an obligation to create opportunities for 
entrepreneurial exploitation. When confronted with democracy, individualists would be attracted to 
the idea of a protective democracy, which draws upon Locke's raison d'etre for government: "the 
protection of individual rights, life, liberty and estate" (cited in Held 1987: 6). Thus, the state should 
be minimalist, reactive but enabling. 
Salient Governance Risks . Individualists face the salient governance risk that the mari<etplace is 
unable to maximise the material well-being of consumers and producers in a society because of 
mart<et failure (most notably caused by the existence of imperfect competition, public goods, 
externalities and information asymmetries), thereby threatening government intervention. Any 
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inability individualists to address the problems of market self-regulation occurs either because 
either they are unable to understand the nature, consequences and causation of problems that 
cannot be explained only by the application of naturalist methods (which can offer reasonably 
reliable predictions, but cannot identify unambiguous causal relationships) and/or they cannot 
accommodate behavior that is induced by ideational considerations (such as hierarchical or jointly 
affirmed loyalty and obligation considerations); or because their proffered solutions, which presume 
an agency ontology (involving individual material incentives and disincentives) may be ineffective 
because they are unable to secure the behavioral responses required either from self-interested 
individuals, because uncertainty, asymmetrical infomiation. opportunism and unenforceable 
contracts, or from individuals who are not motivated by self-interest arguments. 
The Hermeneutic-Structurarist Perspective 
Those who are predisposed to a hermeneutic-structuralist philosophical stance would consider 
the social world to be a subjective social reality, knowable only as it is socially constructed. 
Meaning thus hinges on interpretive, communicative, sense-making activities (Berger and 
Luckmann 1967. Geertz 1973, Schutz [1932] 1967). and is created through specific communicative 
events, or "conversations", which draw upon shared experience and consciousness in a particular 
milieu. As conversation-saturated homo-sociologicus, enclavists would presume that people 
conduct their affairs in a social order in which no one has a pre-ordained place, but everyone 
belongs and is committed: my social role is determined by us. 
The social context for enclaves is highly participative in groups that have a negotiated order 
(Hood 1998: 9). Life's ends are negotiated — / will do whatever we judge to be in my best interest 
— and the means of their achievement are negotiable: my phorities are determined by what we 
expect of me; my future concerns are determined by what we decide is important for me; and what 
I am committed to is decided by us. Enclavists place high value on personal relationships, on being 
seen as trustworthy, dependable, popular, and very committed to a common ensemble of precepts, 
concepts, ideas and values derived from discourses. Indeed, a significant constituent of the 
enclavists' identity — their sense of who they are — is their awareness of themselves as belonging 
to an egalitarian social order that is based on personal authority and on voluntarism. 
Enclavists would consider that human nature is circumstantial — a product of people's social 
formations: "a person is not a natural object, but a cultural artefact" (Harr6 1983: 20) — shaped, in 
varying degrees, by culture and circumstance. It is other-referential, thereby making it informed by 
comparisons with the virtuousness with others. All the recognisable properties people have, 
therefore, come from joining in "'society's conversations'" (Archer 2000: 87). Free will can only be 
discovered collectively, and exercised individually only in the context of the critical collective 
discourse that produces a shared meaning of what constitutes "virtuous action". A person's moral 
worth is measured by the virtuous actions undertaken. Life's meaning depends on with whom one 
engages, and meaning secures action. Who a person becomes, then, is contingent upon with who 
that person willingly talks and interacts. 
Ethics- Enclavists adhere to moral relativism (that there is a diversity of moral judgements across 
time, societies and individuals [descriptive relativism] and that there is no single true or most 
justified morality [meta-ethical relativism] [Foot 1978]). Their concern is with agent-centered 
morality — what sort of person should I be? Their focus is on their and other's personal conduct. 
They thereby adhere to the principle of virtue ethics — character ethics. This is premised on a 
moral act being one voluntarily conducted in accordance with a set of jointly affirmed social norms 
(about what it is to be human being seeking to realize his or her full potential) and accompanied by 
good intentions and the right emotions and feelings (Vardy 2003: 43-4). This ethical stance 
underlines the absolute superiority of the human qualities over abstract ethical principles. Not to act 
in accordance with jointly affirmed social norms with good intentions and the right emotions and 
feelings would be wrong, so jusfify group criticism and condemnation, even exclusion. 
Trust. Enclavists consider that the granting of tnjst must be preceded by the building up of mutual 
expectations of reciprocity — goodwill (Ring and van de Ven 1992). And the symbols used to signal 
trustworthiness must have meaning for all involved. Such a shared meaning can only be attached 
to trust following participation in the intersubjective communication process that bridges disparate 
groups and individuals, each with socially constructed societal roles, norms, expectations 
(Bacharach and Gambetta 2001, Ganzaroli et al. 1999). If people are confident that they have 
understood the signals of trustworthiness given by those they wish to trust, including those who 
seek to govern them, then they will trust them. 
Public Interest. To enclavists. the "public interest" is knowable only as an inclusive set of 
negotiated "categorical interests" (or "categorical goods") (Streeck and Schmitter 1991: 236). 
These would reflect the shared values and language that have created a social bond and a social 
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identity for a particular group of people — a community-of-interests — as determined through 
constrained, consensus-seeking group-norming and -fonning values discourses. The public 
interest can be promoted and protected — and. thus, society is governable — but only if there is 
sophisticated and subtle interpersonal interactions taking place between interest groups and the 
societal politico-administrative elite. 
Governance Mode. Enclavists see the public sphere as having a blurred boundary with the private 
sphere, which should be expanded if it conceals any unequal power relations in .the private sphere. 
They would have a preference for the public and private spheres to work together to promote their 
particular "categorical interests" in the "public interest". Because enclavists see the public sphere, 
like the private sphere, as always being at risk of being amoral, if not actually immoral and corrupt, 
it has to be treated with constant vigilance. This would require the people to participate actively in, 
and give their consent to, collective decisions. Then, and only then, would the public sphere 
become benign and paternalistic, and a means of securing the good life for everyone. Government 
would, thus, be perceived by enclavists to be intrusive in intent but could be made benevolent in 
outcome. They would prefer, in essence, a strong civil society, a weak state and weak markets. 
Enclavists would advocate the adoption of the interactive or network co-governance mode of 
governance. Under this governance mode, there is a co-determining, co-protecting and co-
promoting of the "public interest" (Kooiman 2001, Kooiman and van Vliet 1995) by means of 
voluntary regulatory regimes that permit discretion and have a low non-compliance tolerance and a 
capacity to reward. Individuals or groups of individuals in a community-of-interests would 
voluntarily cede some autonomy to a voluntary governance network to which they belong, one that 
has "the capacity to get things done without the legal competence to command that they be done" 
(Czempiel 1992: 250). In return, they gain agreed common rights and acceptable common 
obligations. By so belonging, they share, with other network members, a collective commitment to 
a common set of governance values and a presumption that network interactions should be based 
on group loyalty, trust and reciprocity (see Alcentara 1998. Peters 1998. Rhodes 1996 and 1997). 
Compliance would be voluntarily, and would be contingent upon not compromising their moral 
commitment (Etzioni 1961) to those with whom they share common values. This means that they 
would find ways of minimizing, if not avoiding, any governance processes that did not promote their 
"categorical interests". And they would expect others to do so as well. 
Kenis and Schneider (1991; 41-42) define a network as 
a relatively stable set of mainly public and private corporate actors. The linkages between 
the actors serve as channels for communication and for the exchange of information, 
expertise, trust and other policy resources. The boundary of a network is not, in the first 
place, determined by formal institutions but results from a process of mutual recognition 
dependent on functional relevance and structural embeddedness. 
Streeck and Schmitter (1991: 228) talk of interest governance, also referred to as democratic 
corporatist governance (BOrzel 1997, Kickert et al. 1997. Kooiman 1993, Kooiman and Van Vliet 
1993. Mayntz 1993, Merrien 1998, Messner 1997). Laumann and Knoke (1987) identify the 
following forms of networks: state-directed, concertation, pressure pluralist, clientele pluralism, 
parantela pluralism, industry-dominant pressure pluralism. 
Enclavists would be attracted to a political meta-narrative that bonds group members together 
against outsiders, and that reinforces the group's responsibility to promote their perceptions of 
equality, the dignity, and rights of the individual, a sense of fellowship and community, and 
negative freedom. When confronted with democracy, they would be attracted to idea of a 
deliberative democracy (Cohen 1989, Fiskin 1991). which draws upon Aristotelian proposition that 
a polity should enable citizens to participate in deliberative power because government 
emphasizes "the importance to effective democracy of fair and open community deliberation about 
the merits of competing political argument" (Uhr 1998: 4). Thus, the state should be inclusive, 
cooperative and proactive. 
Salient Governance Risks . Enclavists face the salient governance risk governance risk that a co-
governance mechanism is unable to negotiate an inclusive set of "categorical interests" that can be 
protected and promoted in the "public interest". Any inability of enclavists to address network 
governance problems occurs either because either they are unable to understand the nature and 
causation of any interactive governance problems that cannot be analysed and explained by the 
application of hermeneutict methods (which can offer unambiguous explanations about causal 
relationships, but makes knowledge subject to severe relativism, dynamic and open to constant 
revision, which, in turn, makes prediction problematic) and/or they cannot accommodate behavior 
that is induced by self-interest or hierarchical loyalty and obligation considerations; or because 
their solutions, which presume a structuralist ontology (involving jointly affimned social norms), are 
unable to secure the behavioral responses either from individuals who no longer motivated by 
jointly affirmed social norms, or from individuals who are motivated by self-interest or hierarchical 
loyalty and obligation considerations. 
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The Hermeneutic-Agency Perspective 
While those who are predisposed to a hermeneutic-agent philosophical disposition, which, as 
Goffman ([1959] 1990) notes, embraces a wide range of behaviours, they would presume 
themselves to be incapable of describing, analysing and understanding — let alone judging or 
changing — social reality with any degree of certainty. They would deny the knowable of the social 
worid as either set of objective truths derived by inductive or deductive reasoning, or as a social 
construct built up by discourse. To seek to share knowledge of the personal experiences of others 
is considered futile, as no experience can be fully shared by two individuals. They would accept 
that all that knowable is what is in an individual's own field of contemporaneous consciousness, 
which cannot be escaped — "I am my worid" (Wittgenstein ([1922] 1961: 5.63). "the worid is my 
idea" (Schopenhauer [1818 and 1844] 1969: 1). They would continually strive to deal with the real 
by discerning the true reality as it becomes or manifests (Zubiri [1989] 2003): "in what we do we 
recognise what we are" (Schopenhauer ([1839] 1999: 109); and "I am myself and my 
circumstances" (Ortega y Gasset [1929-31] 2002: 53). As social reality's traits are revealed, it is 
individually assembled on the basis of what an individual believes to be real. The social worid. 
then, is an individual constmct created in accordance with an individual's distinctive understanding 
of it. As sceptical existentialists, outsiders would presume that people conduct their affairs in a 
social, order in which everyone has a place but no one belongs: my social role is determined by 
events outside my control. 
The social context for outsiders is one where people see themselves as detached from a social 
order yet still subject to its binding prescriptions. Life's ends are transient and capricious — / will do 
whatever luck and circumstance dictate — and the means of their achievement are unknowable to 
anyone: my priorities are determined by what life's trials and tribulations require of me; my future 
concerns are determined by circumstances and opportunities outside my control; and what I am 
committed to depends on what I have to do to address life's challenges. Theirs is a reaction to 
existence that results in self-chosen isolationism: "there is no significance in human life beyond 
what humans themselves invest in it" (Davies 1992: 21). 
The oufs/der's perception of human nature is self-referential. It is up to people not only to use 
their unbridled freedom to decide their own fate, and so determine their own destiny for which they 
alone are responsible, but also to define their own identity, or essential characteristics, in the 
course of living out their lives in the most authentic and fulfilling way possible (Heideggar ([1927] 
1967). Free will involves individuals in a life-long struggle with their interpretations of other people's 
perceptions of them, which ameliorates their capacity to recognise their own unique consciousness 
and thus their supremacy over the forces of social constraint. It can only be exercised by those 
willing to embrace, take on and defeat life's endless cycle of trials and tribulations. A person's 
moral worth is self-referential. Life's meaning depends on one's self Who a person becomes, then, 
is contingent upon who that person wishes to be. 
Ethics. Outsiders, as moral sceptics, would deny that anyone can have moral knowledge (true 
moral beliefs), because they either cannot be justified or are simply unknowable. Moral beliefs 
(opinions) remain matters of personal taste or preference — "a virtue has to be our invention, our 
more personal defence and necessity ...each one of us should devise his own virtue, his own 
categorical imperatives" (Nietzsche [1888] 1969: 121). 
Moral conduct, for outsiders, is grounded in the existential ethical proposition that people should 
confront life's perplexities and dilemmas, which then shapes their own ethical choices, and so 
expresses their own moral judgements. Not to do so is wrong, justifying self-condemnation. Their 
concern is with act-centered morality — what should I do? Their focus is on their own conduct, for 
who are they to judge the conduct of others. Any moral statements they may choose to make, 
derived from their moral norms (their moral judgements) can only express their moral emotions, 
which reveal their moral sentiments (those of their feelings that are central to moral agency 
(Gibbard 1990). 
Trust. Outsiders consider that the granting of trust must be preceded by personal experience with 
those to whom trust is to be extended. If people are confident that their experiences with another 
person, including those who seek to govern them, justify the extending of trust, then they will trust 
that person. 
Public Interest. To ou(s/ders, the "public interest" is unknowable, because of capriciousness and 
uncertainty, and thus cannot be intentionally and instrumentally promoted and protected. 
Nevertheless, society is still governable, but only if powers that be exercise of the required coercive 
power to govern as they see fit 
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Governance Mode. Outsiders would not discriminate between the private and the public spheres, 
both of which they see as being unknowable, capricious and fearful realms. Neither can be trusted. 
Both are indifferent to people's needs. Thus, any engagement with the public sphere is pointless, 
as little benefit can be expected from any collective action. The governmental process would be 
characterised by outsiders as one dominated by unknowing and untnjstworthy vested interests, 
which respect neither the truthfulness of facts nor the sanctity of abstract values. They would 
realistically accept that public policy is. because of the limits of human cognition, the product of 
garbage can-like decision processes (March and Olsen 1976). Government might, perhaps, be 
sometimes benign in intent, the consequences of which are unknowable, but it is inevitably 
malevolent in action, the consequences of which are experienced. 
Since the "public interest" cannot be intentionally and instrumentally promoted and protected, 
then it makes no difference to outsiders who has the authority to exercise the power of the state. 
Government would be perceived by to be intnjsive, perhaps benign in intent but certainly 
malevolent in outcome. Outsiders would, thus, resignedly expect to be coercively alienated any 
who seek to govern them. Thus, they would be unwilling to engage voluntarily with any governance 
process. They would prefer, in essence, a weak state, a weak civil society and weak mari<ets. 
Outsiders would have no preference for any particular mode of societal governance; none can 
be trusted to protect and advance their interests. The best they would hope for is a governance 
mode that ignores them, and certainly does not require their constructive engagement. Their 
compliance with the wishes of those who seek to govern them would be alienative (Etzioni 1961), 
born of fear of force, threat and menace, in the belief that the power being exercised is not 
legitimate. This means that they would find ways of minimizing, if not avoiding, any changes they 
did not agree with; and they would expect others to do so as well. 
Outsiders would thus be attracted to a political meta-narrative that reinforces their existentialist 
preoccupation with the human condition and acknowledges the limitations of reason and 
intentionality, therefore it would emphases plausibility (rather than accuracy), sense making (Weick 
1995), and non- or reversible decision-makings. They might be allured to the anarchist proposition 
that a society without the state is desirable, but they would certainly doubt its feasibility. They 
would be broadly amenable to the notion that people have no general obligation to obey the 
commands of the state, and this might instill in them a vague sense of hope that the state could be 
abolished. Their scepticism would come to the fore when they ponder on whether there could ever 
be a transition to some kind of stateless society that delivers social order. This is regardless of 
whether such a stateless society is based on natural taws and perfectionist ethics (Hurka 1993) in 
the classical or socialist tradition; on natural rights and egoism in the individualist tradition; or on 
permanent and irreducible pluralism in the postmodernist tradition (Miller 1991) Thus, the state 
should be non-coercive, non-exploitative and tolerant. 
Salient Governance Risks . Outsiders face the salient governance risk that their disengagement 
from any mode of governance is unjustifiable because their denial of the knowabity of social reality, 
and the unexplainability of human behaviour, has led them to an unjustifiable exaggeration of the 
unpredictability of social action. Even if all knowledge is based on personal experience, an 
individual's taken-for-granted stock of knowledge {natural attitude [Husseri [19311 1960]) itself is 
based on the expectation of reciprocity which, whilst never complete, may be so near as to provide 
high probability of quasi-prediction and, by implication, the possibility of quasi-structuralist 
causation. Thus their scepticism misguided. 
Ethical Antagonisms, Distrust and Governance 
This quadripartite division of perspectives on societal governance creates tensions with 
societies as adherents to particular perspectives seek to establish and enhance their credibility by 
drawing upon specific ethical principles to determine what should constitutes an acceptable 
societal responses to a perceived societal problem-solving and opportunity-creating scenario. 
Mistrust, even distrust, can be built up in the face of emerging ethical antagonisms over what 
human actions are "good or bad", "right or wrong", or "virtuous or shameful". 
The Hierarchists' Ethical Antagonisms. Hierarct)ists have an ethical need to be able to deduce 
their duty and obligation imperatives, which tell them which human actions are "right" or "wrong". 
This will enable them to be well-ordered selves conducting their affairs in a stable social order, 
where government is legitimately empowered to judge what is in their best interest. The moral 
scepticism of outsiders would robustly challenge the hierarchists' fundamental moral exigency that 
notions of loyalty and duty should be consistently observed throughout the nation state, for should 
this imperative be ignored, anarchy would certainly follow. They would be suspicious of 
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individualists and their belief that free human beings can only be motivated by material reward, as 
this notion fails to accommodate the need for sustaining the "common good" to maintain a stable 
social order. Similarty, the enclavists predilection towards moral relativism, and their acceptance 
that a moral act is one that is voluntarily conducted in accordance with a set of jointly affinmed 
social norms, would be distrusted because the resultant social norms cannot provide precise and 
stable guidelines that can inform citizens on how to understand their interpersonal duties and 
loyalties, and their obligations and responsibilities to the state. Thus, hierarchists would be 
distrustful of any governance perspective grounded in these alternative ethical premises. 
The Individualists* Ethical Antagonisms. Individualists have an ethical need is to be able to 
identify the net beneficial ends achieved by self-governing individuals undertaking market 
transactions that they judge to be in their best interests, which tell them which human actions are 
"good" or "bad". This enables them to ascertain whether those personally favourable market 
actions produce outcomes that are, at leasL not detrimental to others. Profound concerns would 
arise from the enclavists' belief in the efficacy of individuals' altruistic and virtuous actions within a 
pattern of mutually dependent but unconditional obligations to other members of a community-of-
interest, for this denies the individualists' fundamental ethical precept that success for self, which 
follows the actions of self-interested individuals, is good unless others are harmed as a 
consequence. They would distrust hierarchists' motivation in upholding a moral code that expects 
individuals to discover their proper position in life and then to carry out their designated dufies and 
obligations. Finally, individualists would distrust the outsider's affimnation that there can be no 
benefit in learning a code of ethics, because consequential principles enshrine individual autonomy 
and freedom from harm. Under these circumstances, individualists would be distrustful of any 
governance perspecfive grounded in these alternative ethical premises. 
The Enclavists' Ethical Antagonisms. Enclavists have an ethical need is to be able to engage 
with like-minded others in a community-of-interest to jointly affirm social norms, which tell them 
which human actions are "virtuous" or "shameful". This enables them to build a moral commitment 
to that community, which they empower to judge what is in their best interest In proselytising their 
ethical beliefs, they are particulariy concerned about the ethical principles of individualists, which 
reduce their social responsibilities to not harming others. To enclavists, the individualists' 
unencumbered self is as an empty confused entity suffering from a lack of clear social aims, values 
and beliefs. This distrust is replicated in /7/erarc/7/s/s' absolute denial of the capacity of a member of 
a community-of-interest capacity to choose their own moral code of behaviour. Thus, the 
hierarchists' self — encumbered by the self-centred aims of dominant hegemonies — is denied the 
capacity for growth into a complete, empowered entity. Finally, enclavists' are suspicious of 
outsiders' paramount concern for their own ethical authenticity, which appears like a self-indulgent 
myth. Because outsiders treat communities-of-interest as irrelevant, enclavists distrust a doctrine 
that seems to senselessly justify self-exclusion from meaningful and moral engagements with 
others. Under these circumstances, enclavists would be distrustful of any governance perspective 
grounded in these alternative ethical premises. 
The Outsiders* Ethical Antagonisms. Outsiders have an ethical need is to be able to deny that 
anyone can have moral knowledge, which tell them that no human acfion can be judged to be 
"good** or "bad", "right" or "wrong", or "virtuous" or "shameful". This enables them to deriving their 
own ethical values, attitudes and behaviour in the light of their own intentions and their 
interpretations of their own social interactions, thereby justifying their unwilling to engage voluntarily 
with any governance process that is unknowing and disinterested in what is in their best interest. 
Outsiders would profoundly distrust what they perceive as the hierarchists' authoritarian moral 
attitude that emphasize duty and obligafion to the powers that be, which can be used to constrain 
individual free will by force, threat and menace. Whilst the principles of ethical consequentialism 
adhered to by individuaslists do not assume the same degree of determinism, nevertheless, like 
the pursuit of virtue by enclavists, they assume that individuals can use a pre-defined framework to 
determine their ethical beliefs. For the outsider this is nonsense. Under these circumstances, 
outsiders would be distrustful of any governance perspective grounded in these alternative ethical 
premises. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has explored four contending perspectives on what should constitute the "public 
interest" and on whether and how it can be protected and promoted. These contending 
governance perspectives are underpinned by ethical premises that are mutually incompatible. 
Adherents to each perspective would champion their preferred governance response as the most 
appropriate societal responses to any perceived societal problem-solving and opportunity-creating 
scenario. Hierarchists would prefer the hierarchical governance mode. They would expect 
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compliance on the basis of a cognitive commitment derived from rational calculations made in the 
context of the njles and procedures prescribed by those in or with authority — ethically 
underpinned by deontological duty and obligation imperative — with non<ompl iance being 
attributed to deviant behaviour. Individualists would prefer the martlet self-regulating mode. They 
would expect compliance to be instrumental, based on economic calculations of compliance costs 
and benefit — ethically underpinned by the consequential imperative of no harm to others — with 
non-compliance being attributable to rogue market actors. Enclavists would prefer voluntary 
interactive network governance mode. They would expect compliance on the basis a moral 
commitment to share common values — ethically underpinned by imperatives of virtuous 
behaviour — with non-compliance attributable a lack share common values. Outsiders would have 
no preference for any mode of societal govemance, all of which they would consider to be 
unknowing and exploitative. They would expect people not comply with any governance obligation 
with which they disagreed — ethically underpinned by the imperatives of skepticism, with 
compliance attributable to the alienation-inducing fear of illegitimate force, threat and menace. 
How well governments can. or, perhaps more importantly, are popularly perceived as being able 
to listen to listen to. acknowledge and reconcile this quadripartite govemance discourse — and 
thus can build up trust with the adherents to the contending governance perspectives — wilt 
determine the governed's response — compliance or antagonism — to their governance 
processes. At stake is the governabilily of societies in which hierarchists, individualists, enclavists 
and outsiders are gemiinating the seeds of mutual misgivings. Over time, these misgivings might 
well develop into mistrust, perhaps distnjst, even cynicism that is sustained by an intolerance of 
alternative perspectives on the collective actions that should be taken to protect and promote the 
public interest. 
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Figure 1 Epistemological and Ontological Underpinnings of Contending Societal 
Governance Perspectives 
Naturalism Henmeneutics 
Ontology 
Structuralism 
Agency 
Naturalist Structuralism: 
Presumes an objective social 
worid, knowable by the 
application of the scientific 
method, • in which structures 
exercise power over agency, 
which makes human behaviour 
predictable. 
Ethics: deontological 
Trust moralistic 
Public Interest common good 
Govemance Mode: hierarchy 
Govemance Balance: strong 
state, a weak civil society iand 
weak markets 
Government benign, 
benevolent, should be elitist. 
stable, reactive but strong. 
. even coercive if necessary 
Govemmental Approach: 
guardian-RjIership 
Hermeneutic Structuralism: 
Presumes a subjective social 
worid, knowable only as it is 
socially constnjcted, with 
people's action being 
determined, and made 
predictable, by their collective 
interpretation of this reality. 
Ethics: virtue 
Trust mutual expectation of 
reciprocity 
Public Interest categorical 
interests 
Govemance Mode: interactive 
Govemance Balance: strong civil 
society, a weak state and 
weak markets 
Govemment intrusive. 
potentially benevolent (in 
. outcome), should be inclusive. 
cooperative, proactive 
Govemmental Approach: 
deliberative democracy 
Naturalist Agency: 
Presumes an objective social 
worid, knowable by the 
application of the scientific 
method, in which people are 
agents of their actions, with their 
behaviour made predictable by 
their unconstrained self-interest. 
Ethics: consequentialism 
Trust probability, knowledge-
based 
Public Interest market 
preferences 
Govemance Mode: martlet 
Govemance Balance: strong 
markets, a weak state and 
weak civil society 
Govemment Intrusive, 
malevolent, should be 
minimalist, reactive but 
enabling 
Govemmental Approach. 
protective democracy 
Hermeneutic Agency: 
Presumes a subjective social 
worid that is contestably 
knowable as what people 
believe it to be. with agency 
constrained by their subjective 
perceptions of social reality, 
which makes human behaviour 
unpredictable. 
Ethics: scepticism 
Trust personal experience 
Public Interest unknowable 
Govemance Mode: none 
Governance Balance: weak civil 
society, a weak stale and 
weak martlets 
Govemment intrusive, 
exploitative, perhaps benign 
(in Intent), malevolent (in 
action), should be non-
coercive, non-exploitative, 
tolerant, inactive 
Govemmental Approach: 
anarchism (in theory) 
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Abstract 
Public , servants, who are working in a bureaucratic public sector, embrace 
community participation subject to carefully prescribed premises. Firstly, 
community organisations are Instruments of policy implementation legitimately 
subject to state manipulation and secondly, community members should make 
rational decisions in pursuit of fulfilling duties owed to the state. In this paradigm, 
by the use of education and persuasion, communities can proselytise to their 
dissenting members through processes of group involvement that promote the 
recognised virtues that contribute to the maintenance of the existing social order. 
However, the Increasing ineffectiveness of command-type public policy 
instruments has resulted In the creation of a new post-bureaucratic public 
management. This scenario requires policy makers to perceive the egalitarian and 
pro-active involvement of community members In the Implementation and 
evaluation of public services as critical to dealing with Issues of fairness, 
distributional justice, equity, social stability and incluslveness. 
The conundrum facing public servants is the likelihood that some community 
members, in the new age of post-bureaucratic management, would prefer the 
following alternative conceptualisations of community: 
• A hierarchical model of community, under which societal common good has 
priority over local community interests; 
• A network model of community, under which the categorical good of 
community organisations constitutes what is in the community's best interests; 
• A market model of community, under which the revealed market preferences of 
individual community members has priority over local community interests; 
• An anarchical model of community, under which the community interest Is 
taken to be unknowable. 
Thus, public servants aspiring to empower communities, are frustrated by 
differing perspectives on community engendered by community members 
contending values, attitudes and beliefs. Therefore, if a community empowerment 
programme aims to be inclusive then public servants should manage, rather than 
just facilitate, community initiatives. This approach demands holistic management 
that aims to achieve unity-ln-dlverslty with community reality modulated by a 
consensus over the legitimacy of contending perspectives on the social world. 
Moreover, public servants, when engaging with communities should explore, 
reflect on and then contextualise their unit of analysis from contending social 
reality perspectives. Resulting from this process some common ground between 
contending perspectives might be discernible permitting consensus building to 
take place even though this may result in the dis-empowerment of existing politico-
administrative powers. Therefore, public servants, delivering post-bureaucratic 
community management find themselves as instigators, utilising a subtle and pre-
planned strategy. In an iterative process that encourages communities to play an 
effective role in the Implementation of public policy. 
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Introduction 
Public servants would understand individual initiative being restrained in a 
bureaucratic public sector through the imposition of "recurrent patterns of social 
behaviour that determine the nature of human action" (Parker, 2000:125). Thus, 
the objective of the governing elite in relation to community organisations is to 
exercise effective controls so that they can achieve their maximum utility, through 
productive and reproductive capacities, to serve the state. As Pareto observed, 
achieving this goal is a delicate matter thus, the "governing classes frequently 
merge a problem of maximum utility of with maximum utility for the community" 
([1902] 1966: 254) asi they attempt to ensure subservience and stability. If such a 
strategy succeeds then elite groups can legitimately manipulate subservient 
community members, as they become instruments of policy implementation. 
Therefore, the first objective for this paper is to highlight the imperatives for the 
bureaucratic model of community inten/ention. Then, from a post-bureaucratic 
managerial perspective, the second objective is to examine four contending 
conceptualisations of community, each with a discrete understanding of 
community engagement, which may exist amongst community members. Finally, 
the third objective is to offer some recommendations to the post-bureaucratic 
public servant for the development of a managerial strategy to address the 
challenge of inclusive community empowerment. 
Bureaucratic Community Organisations 
Scruton's opinion about the value of community initiatives is that without 
adequate control, the majority of community members would be afflicted with 
blatant "sanctity, intolerance, exclusion, and a sense that life's meaning depends 
on obedience, and also a vigilance against the enemy" (cited in Miller, 1999: 177). 
Thus, the bureaucratic public servant would invite community participation as an 
activity that carries out duties owed to the state in the maintenance of the existing 
social order. Moreover, community initiatives should, to the greatest extent 
possible, be based on authoritative edicts that can be understood as "the rational 
co-ordination of the activities of a number of people" (Schein, 1980: 15). In these 
plans of action, the state uses voluntarism as a source of cheap labour, facilitated 
by the unemployed working on community projects in return for state benefits. 
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Furthermore, funding would be rigorously monitored to ensure that paid workers 
focus on explicit objectives that have been systematically broken down into 
standardised and simplified tasks (Brooks, 1999: 113). So, the chosen style of 
community management reflects the key features of a rational approach to work 
with functions divided and allocated before being re-combined "through a 
hierarchy of authority and responsibility" (Schein 1980: 15). Therefore, local 
government professionals, skilled in disciplines such as town planning, public 
health and social work, would use their technical and administrative expertise to 
instruct community members in the best way to achieve their objectives. These 
experts would present themselves to the community as capable of delivering the 
results of logical or common sense legality (Thompson, 1990: 61). Furthermore, 
the public servants involved would welcome the opportunity to be involved in new 
community initiatives as "an expansion of power means more office positions, 
more sinecures, and better opportunities for promotion" (Weber, 1968: 911). 
A regime of bureaucratic community management would anticipate that the 
effects of Homans (1951) exchange theory would underpin their aims and 
objectives. This model proposes that individual community members would only 
co-operate with their neighbours to the extent that they would mutually benefit 
from the interaction and they would avoid contact with people of different status 
who are unable to assist in the furtherance of their interests. Thus, public servants 
would be willing to exclude, or pay little attention to, human emotions and values 
that have not been a product of expert deliberation (Etzioni, 1993: 1068) as 
emotions are regarded as secondary to instrumental tasks in a process where it is 
assumed that groups of people are malleable, and sometimes the exclusion of 
minorities in a locality may be desirable. 
Alternatively, the bureaucratic public servant does not wish to be perceived as 
deliberately neglecting some community members as it is necessary, for the 
maintenance of stability, that citizens do not feel robbed of their property or honour 
through neglect of the obligations that power confers. Therefore, working 
relationships in communities need to be regularly reviewed and re-negotiated to 
avoid entrapment in a dogmatic unresponsive framework. In this context the public 
servant would be mindful of Schumpeter's observation that "wants are nothing like 
as definite and...[peoples]...actions upon these wants nothing like as rational and 
prompt" (1987: 257) as the demands for standardisation and regulation require. 
However, informed by this notion, good community management must still focus 
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on community members complying with imposed policies and practices. Arising 
from this strategy, it would be envisaged that an appropriate espirit de corp would 
develop fostering community loyalty and commitment (Dixon and Dogan, 2003a: 
465). 
Public servants utilising a bureaucratic model of community engagement would 
draw comfort from the notion that the outcomes that arise from "the analysis of 
political processes is largely not a genuine but a manufactured will" (Schumpeter, 
1987: 263), which can be regarded as the product of the existing political state of 
affairs. Therefore, they would be unperturbed by any exhortations that demand the 
adoption of democratic egalitarian processes. Although some citizens proselytise 
the benefits of "the creation of an exclusively therapeutic experience" through local 
people defining their values, aims and objectives (Hoggett and Miller, 2000: 361), 
the bureaucratic public servant would believe that community members find that 
their predominant inclinations favour an imposed framework of scientific social 
regulation. 
However the bureaucratic model of community intervention, with its command-
type public policy instruments has been acknowledged as increasingly ineffective 
(Kooiman, 1993; Weimer and Vining, 1997) and this inadequacy is being attributed 
to policy failures (Bovens and t'Hart, 1990; Bovens a/.. 2001; Gray, 1998; 
Sieber. 1981). 
Post-bureaucratic Management and Community 
In seeking to resolve the increasingly constrained role of the state in direct 
public service provision, strategies have been employed that require a wide range 
of service delivery arrangements (Dixon, Davis and Kouzmin, 2004). Thus, there 
has been a movement from centralised to devolved (local and regional) 
mechanisms with an increasing emphasis on managerialised (corporatised and 
commercialised quasi-public), communal (private non-profit), and market (private-
for-profit) provision. This latter form of delivery assumes particular importance due 
to the dominance of contemporary neo-liberal economic policy agendas and 
encompasses the desire of policy makers to impose managerialist values and 
practices throughout the public sector. However, by introducing the disciplines of 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness into the pubic policy arena uncertainties 
have arisen over the articulation and measurement of objectives which are often 
difficult to quantify (Dixon and Hyde, 2003; Dixon ef a/.. 2004). Furthermore, the 
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policy objectives envisaged by government and those outcomes expected by 
community members may be incompatible with the interests and motivations of the 
reformed public services. 
In- this new management environment policy makers perceive that the 
involvement of community members in the implementation and evaluation of the 
provision of public services is critical to dealing with issues of fairness, 
distributional justice, equity, social stability and inclusiveness. However, before 
public servants promote a new agenda of community empowerment they could 
pmdently consider the possibility that alternative and contending 
conceptualisations of community exist amongst its members (Dixon, Sanderson 
and Dogan, 2005). 
The Hierarchical Model of Community 
Community members who believe that the common good of society has priority 
over local community interests presume an objective social world. This world Is 
knowable by the application of the scientific method in which social structures 
exercise powers over agency, which makes human behaviour predictable. 
Moreover, their Utopia is a v is ion remin iscent of Plato's Republic, featuring a social 
order where e v e r y o n e has. and is aware of,-their pre-ordained posit ion. In such a 
society, an elite would exercise knowledge-based power through a sophisticated 
legal system that has benefited from a tradition of tried and tested remedies. 
Thus, Socrates asserts that (Plato, 2000: 155-6): 
if our rulers are to be worthy of the name, and their auxiliaries likewise, then I 
think the auxiliaries would be prepared to carry out orders, and the rulers 
would issue those orders either in obedience to the letter of the law, or, in 
placesvwhere we have left the interpretation of the law to them, in obedience 
to its spirit. 
Therefore, those community members who advocate the benefits of the 
hierarchical model of community take actions that can be posited as predictable as 
their rational decisions are taken based on prescribed rules, procedures and what 
strategy is best able to produce justice. These presupposed precepts lead to the 
development of a code that defines what actions are right and pemiissible, and 
thus what actions are wrong (Sanderson, 2006: 3). As Blackburn observes "they 
take us beyond what we admire, or regret, or prefer, or even what we want other 
people to prefer. They take us to thoughts about what is due. They take us to 
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demands" (2001: 60). As Kant concludes, these demands are derived a priori or 
from pure reason instead of individual experience. He insisted that for people to 
accept moral laws their construction must be "freed from everything which may be 
only empirical" (Kant, [1785a] 1998: 289). Thus, individuals do not construct their 
morality by considering the consequences of their actions, but, instead, discover 
their inherent capacity to act morally.or dutifully. This process of enlightenment 
lies at a deeper level than that of affectation, as individual behaviour should fully 
comply with the intent of a duty, rather than just observe its tenets, if a person is to 
achieve the particular postulates of Kantian "good will." From this process of 
subjective awareness there arises a code of objective ethics, which accords with 
the thinking of the elitist in that impartial standards of behaviour are created, which 
can be subject to dispassionate judgement. As Kant maintains, judgement must 
be passed on what is right and what is wrong by the use of pure practical reason 
thus making morality absolute. 
When a person acknowledges their moral obligations, they accept "the 
categorical imperative," or that moral rule that recognises that human 
characteristics — such as loyalty and duty — possess a discrete inherent value. 
This distinction is clarified by Kant in his statement that if an "action is good only 
as a means to something else, then the imperative is hypothetical; if it is conceived 
as good in itself and consequently as being necessarily the principle of a will which 
of itself conforms to reason, then it is categorical " ((1785b] 2003: 2). Following 
this assertion he proceeds to confinn the existence of "but one categorical 
imperative, namely this: Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same 
time will that it should become a universal law" (Kant, [1785b] 2003: 6). This 
fundamental principle is often cast into the popular saying "do unto others as you 
expect them to do to you" although this cliche does not fully accommodate the 
extent of Kant's insight. 
The Community Management Agenda 
Communities are envisaged as contributing towards the preservation of 
established hierarchical institutions by being diligent in combating the infiltration of 
community organisations by radicals attempting to cause social unrest to further 
their aim of liberating the oppressed. Thus, a system of duties and obligations 
create interdependency amongst societal members that supersedes any notions of 
individual liberty as state and society combine together to form a nation. The 
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moral imperatives that underpin this synergism transcend manipulation as they set 
forth beliefs, not attitudes or opinions, interpreted as the taith. Secondary 
associations, such as the family, the institution of marriage, the church, and 
neighbourhoods then reflect these values. In this scenario, society develops 
organically in a complex and subtle evolutionary pattern that is devoid of the 
uncertainties inherent within the dynamics of radical change. 
Using Goodin's (2002: 583-9) alternative models, for organising mutuality and 
reciprocity, the hierarchical model of community management prefers the 
prevalence of "mutually conditional obligations" that arises from an ethereal bond 
between the elite and their subservient fellow citizens. Within this uniting force, 
subjects are required to discharge their duties to the state only if the state 
discharges its duties to its,own subjects, with this principle applying vice-versa. 
Therefore, transferring welfare programmes to local democratic forums, which may 
be parsimonious or discriminatory, is unwise. 
The Community Engagement Agenda 
Community members who prefer the hierarchical model o f . community 
management would accept the following propositions about community 
engagement. 
Desire to Engage in Community: People conduct their affairs by assuming their 
pre-ordained position in a social order where everyone has, and is aware of, their 
place. Thus, an individual would desire community involvement if their pre-
ordained position and/or their special skills make the hierarchical social order 
expect that they would so participate. 
Capacity to Engage in Community: The position an individual occupies in the 
community would be contingent on their place in the social order, which would 
determine acceptable community roles. Those who express apathy towards any 
community involvement would be tolerated as they are deemed as implying their 
consent to community decisions made by those who are more capable and 
competent than them. 
Processes of Community Engagement: It would be expected that community 
members would be willing to make voluntary sacrifices for their community, as this 
social construct forms part of the hierarchical social order, which must be 
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preserved by ail citizens. Within community forums decision-making would reflect 
the will of the elite with others prepared to accept the decisions made by their 
superiors in the social order. 
The Network Model of Community 
Community members who believe in maximising the concentration of power in 
community institutions and voluntary regulatory frameworks to empower 
community members, presume a subjective social world under which the 
categorical good of community organisations constitutes what is in the 
community's best interests. This world is knowable through its social construction, 
with people's actions being determined, and made predictable by their collective 
interpretation of this reality. Thus, the network model of community is founded on 
the social nature of human beings with its inclusive communities being (Tam, 
1998:31-2): 
built upon the structures involving human interactions — not just in families 
and neighbourhood areas, but also in schools, business organisations, state 
institutions, professional and community groups, voluntary associations, and ' 
international networks. In all cases, necessary reforms need to facilitate the 
development of citizens' attitudes and abilities as effective participants of 
inclusive communities, with the help of education, work opportunities, and 
collective protection. 
I 
All these participant groups are expected to aspire to achieve "new communities in 
which people have choices and readily accommodate divergent subcommunities" 
(Etzioni, 1995a: 122), whilst still maintaining common values and belief systems. 
In this process, the unfulfilled "unencumbered sel f finds that their fundamental 
desire to create a purposeful self-idenfity is only possible through relationships 
with other community members. Arising from this understanding, it is expected that 
greater social cohesion would result from unrestricted human autonomy in a 
process where, as Mclntyre notes, citizens "would grow to understand 
themselves...only in the context of the community" (cited in Arthur, 1998: 357). In 
this paradigm, Sandel (1992: 19) has recognised that a citizen cannot choose their 
purpose in life without recourse to their cultural inheritance. This rich history of 
attachments and commitments is an essential part of an individual's-social reality 
but is only accessible through the medium of group discourse". Therefore, if the 
individual becomes deprived of community interaction they would be unable to 
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reach their true potential, as they are forced into a meaningless conundrum, 
rootless and unclear about their true vocation. 
Community members who advocate network governance embrace an ethical 
code that can facilitate the creation by a community of a continuum of significance 
in matters of conformity, progressiveness and prescriptiveness (Driver and Martell. 
1997: 29-32). This is not a proclamation that moral relativism between 
communities should go unchecked in an atmosphere of unwavering neutrality as 
there is a role for the supra-community, or the nation state. In this political 
framework the supra-community "readily accommodates subgroup differences — 
as long as these do not threaten a limited set of core values and shared bonds" 
(Etzioni, 1995a: 160). • These common commitments would include the 
preservation of social and religious tolerance and the protection of fundamental 
human rights (Etzioni, 1995: 160). 
The promotion of recognised virtues throughout communities is fundamental to 
the network model, as these principles are expected to "significantly enhance 
social order whilst reducing the need for state intervention in social behaviour" 
(Etzioni, 2000: 26). Thus, by using education and persuasion as inculcators of 
reasoned and virtuous action, high moral standards can be achieved in ail types of 
communities (Etzioni, 1998: xxxvi). Coercion is excluded from this paradigm 
although a role is envisaged for "permissible paternalism" (Goodin, 1998: 122-3). 
The Community Management Agenda 
Mutuality, in that it embraces both reciprocity and self-interest, is an important 
element in the network model of community management but, whilst individual 
interests can be pursued, any potential excesses should be tempered by 
strategies of protection and mutual obligation (Selznick, 1996: 4-5). So, arising 
from this principle of mutualism, it becomes necessary for each community 
member to understand that they have "both a right and a duty" to participate in the 
affairs of their community (Bellah, 1995/6: 4). 
In promoting the necessity for community members to participate in their 
communities, Etzioni argues that there is a need to confront "inauthentic 
democratic politics" (1968: 637). This type of government restricts societal power 
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for the majority to a periodic vote at an election that probably offers a restrictive 
choice. However, the network model seeks to stimulate the active society where 
there would be an emphasis on "the egalitarian distribution of power" (Etzioni. 
1968: 517). In seeking to achieve this aim, the principle of subsidiarity is invoked. 
This asserts that a group, or groups, that are in the closest proximity to a problem 
should attend to its resolution, with intervention by other groups restricted to the 
time when support is required. So only when the family unit cannot achieve its 
aims should the local school, health centre, or other larger organisation take 
responsibility (Etzioni, 1995a: 44). Thus, state dependence becomes downgraded 
to the choice of last resort as active communities take control of their own destiny. 
Voluntary participation by individuals in community initiatives is regarded as a 
praiseworthy activity. Such altruism facilitates community members to use their 
time and effort to help other community members without personal gain thereby 
fostering improved social relations. Inherent to such a strategy is an emphasis on 
individuals recognising their responsibilities to others through their personal faith in 
the beneficial effect achieved by a supportive moral and social order. 
The ontological assumptions that underpins the networi< model is founded on 
"the non-reducibility and the significance of collectives, institutions, relations, 
meanings and so on" (Fraser, 1999: 21). Individuals do not enter a direct 
relationship with the state but instead local social institutions mediate in any 
contact with positional authority. Moreover, individual interdependence is 
strengthened through co-operative enquiry, or the interpretation of fundamental 
collective principles, that makes the values and attitudes of community members 
"a product of a complex interplay of people and organisations" rather than the 
result of directives from a governing elite (Parsons, 1995: 185). 
When making network policy, a premium is placed on the understanding of 
emotional considerations through the conceptualisation of equity, or the treatment 
of people in a fair but different manner that might achieve equality in their 
opportunities (Blakemore. 1998: 24). Through this process community members 
would expect an increase in the level of participation in community governance 
and the incidental attribute of improved social cohesiveness. 
The Community Engagement Agenda 
Community members who prefer the network model of community would accept 
the following propositions about community engagement. 
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Desire to Engage in Community: It is only through engagement by the individual 
in their community of locality or communities of interest that they can realise 
the/re fundamental identity and thus their purpose in life. Therefore, the 
individual's desire, although it may need stimulation, is inherently pre-eminent in 
their personal aims and objectives. 
Capacity to Engage in Community: Every individual, as soon as they can 
effectively communicate with other community members, can engage fully in 
reaching community decisions that reflect a consensus of opinion amongst the 
group. 
Processes of Community Engagement: Every individual would voluntarily 
engage with other community members (possibly aided by gentle persuasion) in 
an egalitarian and respectful way in order to develop a close and purposeful social 
bond. It would be expected that this bond would be underpinned by a code of 
values that emphasises the maintenance of social inclusion and the 
responsibilities held by every citizen to other community members. Thus, 
language would be laden with value judgements that reflect community members* 
mutually agreed norms of behaviour. 
The Market Model of Community 
Community members who believe in the preservation of the competitive free 
market unfettered by unnecessary collective interference presume an objective 
social world. This world is knowable by the application of the scientific method, in 
which people are agents of their actions, with their behaviour made predictable by 
their unconstrained self-interest. Thus, the notion of the autonomous individual 
exercising rational freedom of choice resides at the core of their perception of 
social reality. Therefore, there is a general acceptance that all human beings are 
predatory and capable of making decisions based on objective knowledge that 
informs purposeful risk taking. In this scenario the revealed market preferences of 
individual community members has priority over local community interests. 
Advocates of the market model can accept that individuals may visualise a good 
society as one in which such values as truth, honesty and justice are predominant. 
However, whilst these individual expectations can, when aggregated, reflect the 
qualities of certain abstract principles, they cannot be extended to a collective 
agreement about specific outcomes in particular situations. For 
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instance, as each individual continually experiences new circumstances that 
provide previously undiscovered facts about social reality it is impossible for a 
collective to compose a set of precise opinions that exemplifies the shared moral 
code of the group. Thus, defining issues of criminality through "a shared 
understanding of w/hat v^e must guard against" (Tam, 1998: 120-1) is an 
unrealistic objective. Instead, individuals should choose and then implement their 
own consequentialist moral principles guided by the notion of undertaking good 
actions that would benefit the majority. These objectively knowable moral 
principles make extensive collective discourses about values redundant. 
The market model of community accommodates active citizenship, however this 
is based on "the view that if citizens of a democratic society are to preserve their 
basic rights and liberties...they must also have to a sufficient degree the political 
virtues...and be willing to take part in public life" (Rawls, 1988: 272). Thus, the 
priority for community engagement would be to ensure that the relationships of 
spontaneous exchange, created by self-interested networks of individuals, is not 
hindered or obstructed by local sanctions or boycotts instituted by other overly 
zealous community members who are ideologically opposed to market 
mechanisms. 
The Community Management Agenda 
Community members who prefer the market model are not opposed to 
mutuality. However, in maximising the efficiency of actions in pursuit of self-
interest, they would individually find themselves asking the question — what would 
I gain from this action that would benefit others? Therefore, they would feel some 
comfort with the ethos of Local Exchange and Trading Schemes, whereby 
individuals help each other on the basis of reciprocal exchange. This type of 
structured reciprocity is also replicated in the notion of time banks, which "record, 
store and reward transactions where neighbours help neighbours" (Williams, 2003: 
291) making any involvement in volunteering beneficial to the participant. This 
informal one-to-one community involvement may incorporate self-help schemes 
that directly increase an individual's material well-being. Alternatively, they may 
accommodate a community member's altruistic motivations, which are interpreted 
as belonging in the private sphere, that stimulate benevolent activities such as 
shopping for an elderly neighbour or child minding for a single parent (Williams, 
2003: 285-94). 
469 
The market model clearly distinguishes between the public and the private 
spheres, with family life belonging in the private sphere. This belief has been 
intensified by the emergence of the contemporary autonomous nuclear family 
where, freed from traditional cultural restraints, family life can result in both men 
and women developing their careers whilst sharing the obligation of parenting. 
Such a situation has become possible by the establishment of individual rights, 
particularly those concerning equality of opportunity, which have changed the, 
often oppressive, nature of the traditional family unit. So, any erosion of personal 
liberty, both through constraints placed on adults and the community's interference 
in the evolution of a child's personality, should be opposed. 
The Community Engagement Agenda 
Community members who prefer the market model of community management 
would accept the following propositions about community engagement. 
Desire to Engage in Community: This notion is pleasant but irrelevant to the 
fundamental purpose in life — the making, and the preservation of, the material 
wealth that can offer security, peace of mind and ultimately freedom for the 
individual. 
Capacity to Engage in Community: The notion of community is explained as a 
fictitious concept that is composed of individuals who can choose to engage in 
contractual relationships where they would exercise their economic power in a 
self-interested and self-seeking manner. Therefore, the capacity for community 
engagement would usually follow a material cost-benefit analysis, although 
community members may also choose to enter unsolicited altruistic transactions 
because of the benefits that might be reaped for the psyche. 
Processes of Community Engagement: They would presume that people are 
unwilling to make voluntary sacrifices for a community so the processes of 
engagement are contingent upon the benefits from participation exceeding the 
costs of involvement. In this scenario, no community member has a pre-ordained 
position and their only loyalty is to the furtherance of their own well being. 
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The Anarchical Model of Community 
Community members who presume a subjective social world that is contestably 
knowable as what people believe it to be, must seek to understand their existence 
by means of their subjective perceptions. Thus, the acquisition of knowledge is 
only possible through personal experience reflecting the Sartrerian notion of 
existence proceeding essence. For instance, objects and animals possess 
universally recognisable characteristics that create an embedded network. But 
human subjects create their own essence, in a process where they are either 
subsumed by the compositional arrangements they encounter in their lives or they 
understand and utilise the potentialities of their own agency. During this lifelong 
journey of choice between the affirmation of individual will or acquiescence to the 
false constraints of detemiinism each person will be alone, confined within their 
own reality and unable to share their observations and conclusions with anyone 
else. 
Adherents to the anarchical model of community can display apathetic attitudes 
towards community initiatives as they experience alienation from their fellow 
citizens. Altematively, they can be committed "outsiders" (Wilson, 1956) with 
highly sophisticated systems of philosophical, political and ethical beliefs. 
Therefore, it is important to emphasise the wide cultural diversity that manifests 
amongst these individuals, thus avoiding the error of labelling them as a social 
sub-stratum or residuum, characterised as the Marxist "lumpenproletariat" (Marx 
and Engels. [1848] 1967: 93) or as the "underclass" (Murray et al.,1996). 
Anarchical community members accept the philosophical standpoint that denies 
the proposition that a social context can bring meaning to life. Therefore, they 
dispute essentiaiist arguments that maintain there are some fixed essential 
properties that determine peoples' behaviour. Thus, they would oppose any 
attempt to exclude individuals from their communities after they had failed to 
comply with dominant values and attitudes, perceiving such action as the 
inevitable malevolent outcome of a collective informed by flawed philosophical 
preconceptions. Therefore, adherents to the anarchical model would be cautious 
about their involvement with community organisations. They would expect to 
receive benefits for any contribution made towards the work of the collective, 
whose actions would be considered unpredictable as community is just another 
instrument of potential or actual control engineered by individuals in an attempt to 
render people as determined automata. Moreover, they reason that the 
471 
reification of a social construct is implausible in "that there are no principles that 
govern the social realm as a whole" (Schatzki, 2002: 141) so any attempt to 
describe and analysis social reality is merely speculative ideation. Therefore, 
there is no acceptance of belonging to a community, making apathy an acceptable 
response to exhortations to "become an active citizens." 
The anarchical model requires its adherents to search for a moral code that 
entails a personal journey of discovery, leading the individual to choose how they 
would conduct their relationships with others, and the norms of behaviour that are 
contingent on these decisions. Thus, they reject the notion of a community 
consensus over what is right and what is wrong or what is good and what is bad. 
Instead, they maintain that people must individually confront or avoid their moral 
dilemmas by either making their own choices or denying their responsibilities. 
The Community Management Agenda 
Anarchists expect the state to exercise coercive power over them as they 
identify themselves as citizens who repudiate voluntary compliance. However, 
they consider that such action is in contravention of their rejection of obligations 
and duties, which leaves them free to choose who they are, and the manner that 
they should behave. Therefore, devolution of a part of the state's decision-making 
apparatus to the community level would be welcomed as this shift of power would 
allow individuals to have more control over their lives. However, forward planning 
is pointless in a world of unpredictability, where the best decisions should be 
based on inspiration and the minimising of risks, with lengthy procrastination over 
available options being an acceptable strategy. 
Joining a group is acceptable to anarchists on the basis that this action would 
not compromise their striving for authenticity. However, the group members would 
pledge themselves to the achievement of some common purpose, thus every 
individual would accept a reciprocity of enforcement which underpins each group 
member's view of themselves. As the group becomes operational, the members 
would then develop reciprocity of dependency. "Thus, freedom, as common 
praxis, initially produced the bond of sociality in the form of the pledge; and now, it 
creates concrete forms of human relationship" (Sartre, [1960] 1976: 466). The 
pledged group, however, accepts that no experience can be fully shared by two 
people. Thus, the unpredictability of human behaviour can render mutuality 
gullible, as it fails to move beyond reciprocity of participation in community 
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organisations, thus neglecting individual agency. Moreover, the doctrine of 
mutuality also maintains that, in working for the common good, community 
members would achieve, in an unprecedented meeting of minds, an agreed 
understanding of community values. 
The proposition that no opinion is more probable or likely than another is 
embraced, so, sceptical ethical principles are employed as epistemic standards, 
when individuals are confronted with demands that community members should 
readily embrace all manner of community responsibilities while, in the medium 
term, a moratorium should be enforced against new rights (Etzioni, 1995a: 5). 
Whilst anarchists would presume that there are no certainties in their mode of 
reasoning they would nevertheless strive to make sense of their reality. Therefore, 
in this search for plausibility, if they accept some community responsibility as it 
appears to be the right thing to do, that decision would be the product of their own 
perceptions. Moreover, these responsibilities would only be accepted if they had 
been identified as a result of individual subjective reasoning. 
The Community Engagement Agenda 
The existential outsider would accept the following propositions about 
community engagement. 
Desire to Engage in Community: The anarchist presumes that all human actors 
behave in ways that are ultimately unpredictable. Thus, there cannot be any 
credibility in the notion of structural causation. Therefore, why .engage in a 
collective that is incapable of understanding the causes and probable 
consequences of social action? 
Capacity to Engage in Community: As the concept of community is perceived 
as a pointless attempt by community members to take control over a setting that is 
unknowable with virtually no capacity for personal transactions, then the statement 
"capacity to engage in community" is a contradiction in ternis. 
Processes of Community Engagement: The anarchist demands an inauthentic 
approach to joining a collective through a process of developing reciprocity of 
enforcement, that underpins each individual's pledge to a group. Thus, community 
groups might be coercive and manipulative as they presume that there are 
certainties that can inform their decision-making. 
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Empowering Community: Planting the Gene of Inclusiveness 
Public servants who aspire to empower communities so that they can make 
meaningful contributions to the implementation of social policy must aim to 
achieve inclusive engagement. Thus, they are inspired by the need to unify 
aftitudes and beliefs towards new initiatives so that they can be dealt with 
positively rather than becoming the focus of disagreements, gossip and negativity. 
However, post-bureaucratic public servants encounter a frustrating conundrum — 
different conceptualisations of community may exist amongst community members 
that demand the management skills of a pragmatic enabler rather than the reactive 
qualities of a facilitator. 
In seeking to develop holistic community management, the public servant could 
profitably begin by considering the network model of community. This model is 
unique in its assertion that the categorical good of community organisations 
constitute what is in the community's best interests. Thus, it underpins the 
preferred principles of the committed community activist — the individual 
community member most likely to participate in community initiatives. 
The public servant would recognise the following notions as being fundamental 
to the community activisf s doctrine: 
• Individuals have a fundamental need to socialise with other human beings and 
can only achieve their full potential by working within collaborative groups that 
concur with a set of common aspirations. 
• Community members must discover their shared values, attitudes, and beliefs, 
thereby enabling the development of a strong moral code that is necessary to 
redress conterhporary social deficits (such as increasing criminality and 
inadequate parenting). 
• Communities should mediate between the individual and the state to facilitate 
local co-operative enquiries into the evaluation of policies and to ensure 
neighbourhood influence over community-based service delivery. 
• Communities should, extol the virtue of mutuality, thereby promoting the need 
for high levels of meaningful participation in community decision-making 
processes by community members. 
• It is imperative for citizens to recognise the weaknesses inherent in 
individualism and authoritarianism that have undermined social progress 
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towards an egalitarian society. Thus, the preponderance of individual rights 
must be redressed in favour of the duties and responsibilities owed by 
individual citizens to their community or communities. 
These propositions clearly define the fundamental elements of strategy and 
objectives that should lie behind any community project but adherents to the 
hierarchical, market and anarchical models of community would find collaboration 
challenging. These challenges encapsulate the following barriers to consensus: 
The Hierarchical Model of Community 
• Community members would have to recognise community as a.dynamic social 
mechanism ciapable. in its own right rather than as an instrument of the state, 
of bringing measurable improvements to the lives of its members. 
• Community members would have to accept that the concept of community-
based moral relativism would take precedence over the moral imperatives 
inculcated by the state. 
• Community members would have to accept the notion that community has a 
critical role in mediating between the needs of community members and 
available resources of the state. 
• Community members would have to accept that they have mutually dependent, 
but unconditional, obligations to all the other members of their community or 
communities. 
• Community members would have to accept that the human trait of altruism 
could be an efficient and effective inspiration for community members to 
participate in the formulation and implementation of social policies that would 
benefit their needy neighbours. 
The Market Model of Community 
• Community members would have to accept that the social construct of 
community has a causal capacity, which can protect the free market for goods 
and services from interference by the state. 
• Community members would have to accept the agreed moral code of their 
community despite restrictions this may impose on their individual search for 
objective moral truths. 
• Community members would have to accept that volunteering for community 
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work by joining an organised group is more praiseworthy than undertaking 
individual action. 
• Community members would have to be willing to undertake work in their 
communities that does not offer them the chance of material gain. 
• Community members would have to agree that community values are relevant 
to both the public and private spheres. 
The Anarchical Model of Community 
• Community members would have to accept that community initiatives can be 
effectively fomnulated then efficiently executed, and that they will make a real 
difference to the well being of community members. 
• Community members would have to agree that the accumulated experience 
and understanding possessed by community members can be communicated 
with a personal meaningfulness that leads to a consensus about a community's 
essential values, attitudes and norms of behaviour. 
• Community members would have to agree that community represents a means 
of liberation from the control of the state. 
• Community members would have to agree that community members should 
make voluntary sacrifices to other community members on the understanding 
that this practice might not be reciprocated. 
• Community members would have to agree that, in accepting community 
responsibilities, the needs of the individual would be accommodated by the 
community. 
Therefore, a complex community paradigm confronts the public servant 
attempting to achieve some short-term recognition by displaying an ability to 
achieve community orientated public sector objectives and reassure her or his tine 
manager of the long-term benefits of community engagement. 
In this formidable and sometimes ambiguous environment, the public servant 
needs time and resources to research the particular contending, yet equally 
legitimate dispositions that exist amongst a specific community. Then, having 
established the existence of differing dispositions, the public servant needs to 
reflect on and contextualise these various perceptions. Through this process, a 
balanced view of the impacts and risks arising from any new initiative will become 
apparent together with the possibility of achieving some common ground between 
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community members who hold contending dispositions. Thus, some consensus 
building can take place if a momentum exists that emphasises openness and 
honesty. In this mediation process, that aims to achieve a unity-in-diversity that 
leads the community to recognise "a notion of freedom as being realisable only 
through commitment, and not despite it." (Ravn, 1991: 109), the last vestiges of 
bureaucratic control may have to be dis-empowered to demonstrate the real 
empowerment of community as a new associationai form. 
Conclusion 
Public servants who are required to deliver post-bureaucratic community 
management find themselves in the role of a pro-active instigator of community 
policy rather than a reactive facilitator. Thus, using their research capabilities, 
they need to explore the contending conceptualisations of community that exist 
amongst community members so that they can devjse a subtle and pre-planned 
strategy. This strategy must accommodate the imperatives of: 
• Blending together community members through an understanding of local 
cultures and conditions. 
• Combating deliberately disruptive elements within the community by 
championing openness and honesty. 
• Through mediation transferring management responsibilities for social policy 
initiatives to community members who can sustain the agreed collective principles 
that enable them to work together. 
• Reporting on progress regularly to highlight any possible risks and issues. 
• Keeping collaboration agreements between community members of contending 
dispositions flexible so that the scope for co-operation evolves with a changing 
agenda. 
• Showing faith in the ability of the community to deliver by recognising 
incremental achievements. 
• Always building on common ground, even when viewpoints seem intractable, 
by focussing on solutions within the community's control 
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Abstract 
The traditional role of the British State in determining and protecting the public 
interest was informed by deontological ethical principles that determined what 
actions were right or wrong, what constituted the concepts of good or bad. 
However, in seeking to achieve an innovative modernisation of the public sector, 
this hierarchical mode of governance has now undergone a transformation into a 
hybrid organisational form of new public management that seeks to combine 
elements of the neo-liberal market-driven model of public administration with its 
antithesis — the entrenched Weberian bureaucratic model. 
It is proposed that lower income communities embraced sceptical tenets of 
morality as a bulwark against the perceived insincerity of neo-liberal conservative 
market orientated outcomes. Thus, they acceded to a physiological strife founded 
on the fundamental difference between deontological and consequential ethical 
outcomes. Moreover, new labour's political elite has exacerbated this ethical 
scepticism through a strategy of managerialism, producing an ethically ambiguous 
scenario causing uncertainty for all stakeholders. 
In this ambivalent contemporary public arena, where efficiency and 
effectiveness are as important as notions of equity in the delivery of policies that 
are underpinned by a regulatory vision of "the public good", political leadership 
seems destined to cope with an indeterrnlnacy that requires perpetual 
transfiguration and optimal opportunism. This inexorably leads to the risk of both 
overt and direct political authoritarianism at any level of government. 
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In the Oscar winning film "Network" Howard Beale. the mad prophet of the 
ainA/aves, exhorts his poor, disaffected and disadvantaged audience to throw open 
the windows of their dilapidated apartment blocks, put out their heads and yell "I'm 
as mad as hell, and I'm not going to take this anymore!" As Americans respond in 
their thousands the unmistakable sense of purposelessness in an uncertain, and 
often malevolent society, is instantaneously apparent. These people have little 
faith in the integrity and sincerity of the state having witnessed ambiguity, and 
sometimes, rampant hypocrisy in the attitudes, opinions and behaviour of their 
elected representatives. They struggle to find any moral codes or sets of 
principles that offer a means of interpreting the issues and agendas of modern life. 
Of course, this bleak picture of public discontent might be designated as belonging 
in the realm of cinematic invention. However, as the scenario resonates with the 
scepticism and cynicism that pervades those in contemporary British Society who 
0 
experience "the restricted citizenship of those who are poor" (Beresford et a/., 
1999: 27), it seerns to warrant more than dismissal as dramatic license. 
It is probable that, as the role of the state in advanced liberal democracies has 
become increasingly restrained due to the ineffectiveness in both the formulation 
and Implementation of public service policy provision (Hult and Walcott 1990, 
Kooiman 1993, Weimer and Vining 1997) and the policy constraints caused by 
fiscal controls that have arisen from the globalisation of economic supply and 
demand (Bovens and t'Hart 1990. Bovens et ai, 2001, Gray 1998. Sieber 1981) 
that the traditional precepts of bureaucracy had to give way to the canons of the 
hollowed-out state that are infomied by the principles of neo-liberal doctrine. 
However, these clear distinctions offer an overly simplistic framework for an 
adequate appreciation of the particular course of events that have characterised 
recent policy-making by the British State. Undoubtedly a traditional bureaucracy 
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was challenged by neo-liberal conservative doctrines that upheld the principle of 
privatisation and recognised the supremacy of the market-based economy. 
However, a subsequent new labour managerialist state, that accords supremacy 
to regulation rather than ideological conviction, has eclipsed this economic and 
social experiment. Nevertheless, whilst acknowledging the differing ideological 
configurations, it is argued here that there has been a sustained growth in ethical 
scepticism caused by the belief that the state has embraced values that are 
unjustified, unreasonable and uncertain during the various political administrations 
of Margaret Thatcher, John Major and Tony Blair. In order to contextualise this 
assertion this paper begins by briefly reviewing the ethical foundations of the 
traditional bureaucratic state. 
Deontological Ethics and the Bureaucratic Model 
In this ethical paradigm the appropriate role of the state accords with 
deontological principles that restrain individual initiative by imposing "the recurrent 
patterns of social behaviour that determine the nature of human action" (Parker, 
2000: 125). Thus, bureaucratic structures that function like sophisticated 
machines with a clearly defined hierarchy of full-time and salaried personnel, 
separated from the resources that they direct, (Weber [1904] 1976) employ their 
knowledge and that of their professional subordinates to exercise control over 
individual agency. So, structure has assumed a causal capacity as individuals' 
decreed duties become objectively knowable. 
Therefore, deontological ethics are concerned with what individual duties are, 
who has rights, and what strategy is best able to produce justice. These 
fundamental precepts lead to the development of a code that defines what actions 
are right and permissible, and thus what actions are wrong. As Blackburn 
observes, "they take us beyond what we admire, or regret, or prefer, or even what 
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we want other people to prefer. They take us to thoughts about what is due. They 
take us to demands" (2001: 60). As Kant concluded, these demands are derived a 
priori or from pure reason instead of individual experience. He insisted that for 
people to accept moral laws their construction must be "freed from everything 
which may be only empirical" (Kant, [1785a] 1998: 289). Thus, individuals do not 
construct their morality by considering the consequences of their actions, but, 
instead, discover their inherent capacity to act morally or dutifully. This process of 
enlightenment lies at a deeper lever than that of aiffectation, as individual 
behaviour should fully comply with the intent of a duty, rather than just observe its 
tenets, if a person is to achieve the particular postulates of Kantian "good will." 
From this process of subjective awareness there arises a code of objective ethics, 
which accords with' the thinking of the elitist in that impartial standards of 
behaviour are created, which can be subject to dispassionate judgement. As Kant 
maintains, judgement must be passed on what is right and what is wrong by the 
use of pure practical reason thus making morality absolute. 
When a person acknowledges their moral obligations, they accept "the 
categorical imperative," or that moral rule that recognises that human 
characteristics — such as loyalty and duty — possess a discrete inherent value. 
This distinction is clarified by Kant in his statement that if an "action is good only 
as a means to something else, then the imperative is hypothetical; if it is conceived 
as good in itself and consequently as being necessarily the principle of a will which 
of itself conforms to reason, then it is categorical " ([1785b] 2003: 2). Following 
this assertion he proceeds to confirm the existence of "but one categorical 
imperative, namely this: Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same 
time will that it should become a universal law" (Kant, [1785b] 2003: 6). This 
fundamental principle is often cast into the popular saying "do unto others as you 
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expect them to do to you" although this cliche does not fully accommodate the 
extent of Kant's insight. 
Pure human reason, which inspires individuals to observe the categorical 
imperative, was effectively tempered by Edmund Burke's political vision of the 
supremacy of good order. In his envisaged sequence of events, politics was to be 
inspired with a religious vision to explain the unfair distribution of resources 
(Gaede, 1983: 110). Thus, as religion is the grand prejudice, using the suffering 
experienced in this life as a portent of rewards in the next, Burke dismisses his 
detractors with the assertion "you think you are combating prejudice, but you are 
at war with nature" ([1790] 1993: 49). Moreover, the well ordered state, a product 
of a slowly evolving and traditionally informed pattern of governance acts as a 
moral mainstay as custom reconciles us to everything" (Burke, [1756] 1987: 148). 
In this schema subjects enter a special relationship with their society as "it is a 
partnership in all science; a partnership in all art; a partnership in every virtue and 
in all perfection" (Burke. [1790] 1993: 96). This ethereal bond is held together with 
a code of deontological ethics where the elite accept their obligations to their 
subjects in return for the proper fulfilment of duties owed to the state and its 
dominant hegemonies. 
Burke's prosthetic to re-inspire political dialogue had an influential and lasting 
effect. Its enduring relevance and effectiveness is reflected in Walter Bagehot. the 
Victorian constitutional expert, finding the attitude of the English working class 
towards authority as rudimentarily "deferential" ([1897] 1963: 235). Moreover, this 
observation could have been labelled quintessentially European as the masses of 
Germany. France and Britain enthusiastically marched to war in 1914, more than 
adequately demonstrating the manner that majoritarian democratic societies were 
able to harness the notion of patriotism through gradual, and sometimes even 
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overdue, concessions to their poorer citizens to ensure their compliance in an 
endeavour of unparalleled massacre. However, as the example of the Russian 
Revolution was to emphatically demonstrate, these manoeuvres were for the 
highest stakes with permanent social change a consequence of their failure 
(Hobsbawn, 1987: 164). 
The inter-war years witnessed pressure on the British State "to take on greater 
social responsibilities and to intervene to provide direct help to the most vulnerable 
sections of the community" (Stevenson. 1984: 306). The further concessions 
made during this period were then incorporated in the institutions of the Welfare 
State in the 1940s. This balance of rights and obligations were to become 
"genuinely popular with the mass of the electorate of all classes" (Glennerster, 
1995: 12) during the subsequent decades. 
However, by the 1970's the notion of a political social policy settlement was 
disintegrating in the realities of rampant inflation, industrial strife and substantial 
increases in the price of oil. The traditional bureaucracy, with its deontological 
ethical underpinnings, appeared incapable of addressing the need for economic 
re-structuring thereby ushering in a decade of what was to become known as 
"Thatcherism". This body of thought had found some of its fundamental ethical 
tenets in the principles of consequentialism where free beings can only be 
motivated by material reward. It is in this imperative, which now informed the 
formulation of public policy, that the seeds of scepticism might have been sown. 
Consequential Ethics and Neo-iiberal Conservatism 
In this ethical paradigm the appropriate role of the state accords with 
consequentialist principles that recognises that an individual has both the causal 
capacity to act and the discernment to objectively assess whether the likely results 
from their actions will have good or bad consequences. Thus, "the moral value of 
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any action always lies within its consequences and it is by reference to these 
consequences that actions, and indeed such things as institutions, law and 
practices are to be justified if they can be justified as all" (Smart and Williams, 
1973: 79). 
In making the value judgement that an action that results in the greatest 
happiness for the greatest number of people is morally right the proposition 
expresses a value-predicate — happiness — that is applied to the subject — the 
greatest number of people — so. neo-conservatives could accept that ethical 
statements should be articulated in the terms of social aggregation and expect the 
value-predicate of happiness to be analysed in objective denominations that 
measure the extent of material well-being (Taylor, 1975: 176). The need for such 
an instrument of measurement becomes clearer with the practical application of 
the act-utilitarian doctrine. This states that "the only reason for performing an 
action A rather than an alternative action B is that doing A will make mankind (or, 
perhaps all sentient beings) happier than will doing B" (Smart and Williams, 1973: 
30). Thus, the neo-liberal conservative perspective, in embracing act-utilitarian 
ethics, require an objective means of assessing the anticipated consequences of 
actions, so as to be able to determine what would constitute the greatest 
aggregate or accumulative happiness. Therefore, as neo-liberal conservatives 
would choose to negotiate the preferred constituents of their own well-being with 
others, they rely on the mechanisms of the free mari<et to act as an instrument of 
evaluation of social activity that facilitates judgements of ethical consequences. 
Nevertheless, Plant (1999: 20-1) can identify three propositions that 
demonstrate the unprincipled nature of the mari<et. When these are combined, 
they offer a convincing case for the rejection of the martlet's capacity to convert 
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the abstract notions of "right" or "happiness" into synthetic statements that can be 
measured in terms of each individual's transactions. 
The first proposition, made by Hayek (1960) and Acton (1971). maintains that a 
just market transaction is one devoid of coercion. As individuals enter into free 
exchanges, where inequalities of power are redressed through the freedom to 
negotiate and enter into binding contracts in the full awareness of their personal 
rights and responsibilities and of the outcomes arising from their actions, such 
transactions cannot be deemed to be unjust. 
The second proposition is that premeditation is a necessary pre-requisite for an 
action to be deemed unjust, which means that outcomes from self-interested 
market transactions cannot be unjust. Instead, the myriad number of daily 
transactions, which together constitute market activity, produce a spontaneous 
order amongst market participants that is not directed by pre-determined 
measures of income re-distribution (Hayek. 1978: 183). 
The third proposition is, as Nozick notes, that while players in the market can 
serve moral imperatives "the market mechanism does not especially reward us for 
satisfying those desires, rather than other desires that are neutral towards or even 
retard those people's development" (1981: 514). Thus, as no generally agreed 
principles for the distribution of goods exists, there can be no moral case for the 
free market to answer. 
However, as Plant concludes, neo-liberal conservatives, by embracing these 
three propositions and endorsing the act-utilitarian ethical principle, are 
conceptualising their primary unit of social transaction — the market transaction — 
"as happenings outside one's moral seir (Smart and Williams, 1973: 104). By 
implication, then, neo-liberal conservatives "should be willing to agree that...[act-
utilitarianism's]...general aim of maximising happiness does not imply that what 
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everyone is doing is just pursuing happiness" (Smart and Williams, 1973: 113). 
Instead, ostensibly rational action to maximise probable benefit can sometimes be 
irrational. In this case, it can perpetuate a maleficent outcome, or one that, whilst 
not intended, could or should have been anticipated, on a particular social group 
without offering any justification that such a situation is inevitable in bringing the 
best results for the majority. 
Therefore, if neo-liberal conservatives wish to address the moral dilemma of 
foreseeable, adverse unintended outcomes arising from their actions they could 
consider the ethical consequentialism developed in Rawls theory of justice (1971), 
with its aim of ensuring the stability of the state. Rawls recognises that if citizens 
are to obey the state then a basic scheme for ordering society should include an 
agreement between those citizens and the state as to how that society would be 
conducted. These aims require a political consensus over the application of the 
concept of justice that extends to the details of how the principle can be morally 
justified. So, to achieve such an understanding, Rawls proposes a hypothetical 
situation. In this scenario self-interested and rational citizens who are ignorant of 
• 
the position they would occupy in a future society must choose the highest 
possible level of income and equality of opportunity for the poorest that is 
acceptable to all in that society. It is assumed that all participating citizens wish to 
pursue the greater good and would be prudent enough to realise the need for 
future social stability. Thus, the outcome would establish not just fairness but the 
following principles of justice, stated in their order of priority, that underpin the 
structures of a just society (Rawls, 1971: 320): 
"First principle: Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total 
system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. 
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Second principle: Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they 
are both: 
(a) To the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings 
principle, and 
(b) Attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of 
opportunity." 
These Rawlsian principles are designed to govern the manner the basic 
political, economic and social institutions, mould and voluntarily constrain the 
agent. Therefore. Rawls has constructed an artificial situation vyhere citizens have 
co-operated with the objective of advancing their self-interest by ensuring the 
fairness of social outcomes. Thus, this agreement is envisaged as the product of 
a wide reflective equilibrium that has successfully challenged citizens to confront 
their values and re-assess their priorities to ensure an effective and equitable 
meritocracy in their own self-interest. 
Therefore, if neo-liberal conservatives dismiss Rawl's theorising then they must 
face the apparent failure of mari<et mechanisms to eradicate poverty. Although 
the trickle-down effect from wealth creation may lift some citizens from absolute 
deprivation they would continue to suffer relative imbalances in their property 
rights that leaves them dis-empowered relative to the affluent. This outcome 
reflects a desire in the maricetplace to separate economic reality from social reality 
giving rise to the mechanical economic machine metaphor. So, instead of 
realising some individual's internalised desires for freedom, the mari^etplace can 
present a series of constraints that impel acquiescence to economic rationality 
(Bourdieu. 1998: 96). It follows that "adaptation becomes the highest goal of 
character formation" (Beck. 1998: 13) in the free market environment leaving those 
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who adhere to the tenets of consequentialism to ponder whether they should 
"rejoice in the martlet economy, but reject the mari<et society" (Plant, 1999: 24). 
There is no doubt that the decade of Thatcherism benefited some lower income 
communities. For instance, those who had paid rent for most of their lives where 
allowed to buy their council houses and experience the middle class benefits of re-
mortgaging to buy a new car or in taking the holiday of a life-time. Similarly, lower 
income families could now own part of the equity of a privatised utility as 
previously nationalised industries were floated on the stock exchange and neo-
liberal consen/ative acolytes promulgated dreams of a share owning democracy. 
Thus, many lower income families were motivated to take advantage of wealth 
creating opportunities as a means of embracing the virtues of self-responsibility 
and self-achievement in a paradigm that could lead to the realisation of their own 
self-worth. Nevertheless, the theoretical drawbacks of consequentialism, in the 
spectre of mari<et inequalities, haunted this ideological experiment as the trickle-
down effect failed to materialise and Rawl's philosophical vision remained strictly 
theoretical against a backdrop of a UK market driven economy suffering from high 
levels of structural unemployment. Therefore, the application of a dose of ethical 
consequentialism had rendered lower income communities bereft of the certainties 
that were inherent in the ethereal bond of deontological ethics. This state of affairs 
could have contributed to the nullification of the traditional working class virtues of 
patriotism, obedience and compliance and the creation of a code of uninspiring 
ethical scepticism where apathy and disillusion are paramount. 
The Ethical Dilemma of New Public Management 
The election of the new political elite, branded as new labour, in 1997 did not 
herald a return to deontological ethical premises but instead signalled the arrival of 
a hybrid organisational form of new public management that sought to combine 
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elements of neo-liberal conservatism with bureaucratic structures. This synergism 
results in the state employing a diverse combination of organisations to deliver 
public services. These encompass traditional centralised provision to devolved 
provision at both local and regional level and employ a variety of organisational 
forms ranging from corporatised and commercialised quasi-public to private-for-
profit and private-non-profit (Dixon and Dogan, 2002). This complexity reflects the. 
desire of those formulating policy to impose managerialist values and practices on 
service providers resulting in a counter-productive paradoxical environment (Dixon 
et a/., 2005). In this scenario the most problematic paradox is: 
that public managers are expected to manage "efficiently" and "effectively", and so 
be accountable for the efficient and effective management of "inputs" used to 
produce "outputs" (which may be difficult to quantify, or even adequately 
conceptualise), which generate "outcomes" (which may be difficult to measure, or 
even adequately conceptualise), which relate to "programme objectives" (which 
may be difficult to articulate in mutually compatible and quantifiable terms), which 
must be compatible not only with "policy objectives" (which government may be 
unwilling or unable to articulate in quantifiable terms, and which may, themselves, 
be mutually, incompatible, particularly in a multi-level polifical structure) but also 
with "customer objectives" (which may, also, be mutually incompatible). 
This ambiguous public arena is offered by new labour's proselytisers as a site 
where civil renewal and acfive citizenship can take place, facilitated by a plethora 
of performance management targets, which are to provide a recipe for efficient, 
effective and economic outcomes that can be contrasted to the failed neo-liberal 
conservative project. However, this vision is overly opfimistic as this scenario 
seems to offer citizens, who are dependent on equitable public policies, an ethical 
framework that is too weak to sustain the re-discovery of the virtuous notion of 
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responsibility towards the state. Instead, the question arises as to whether the 
exhortations of policy makers for lower income communities to participate in 
altruistic involvement for the delivery of public services and the governance of 
community affairs is fundamentally misplaced in an overly confident managerialist 
rhetoric (Active Communities Directorate, 2004; Blunkett, 2003, 2004; Chanan. 
2003; Civil Renewal Unit, 2003, 2004, 2005; Home Office Research, 2003; 2004a, 
b; ODPM 2005a, b, c; Rodgers and Robinson 2005). 
Furthermore, governance by performance objectives, geared to efficiency and 
effectiveness, throws up the challenge of how desired "outputs" and "outcomes" 
are achievable without overt government intervention. So, the ethically sceptical 
citizen, having been deprived of the deontological bond of trust with the state after 
suffering what could be regarded as the unprincipled nature of market transactions 
might have their sceptical assumptions re-enforced as the regulatory state exerts 
its political authority to achieve its aims and objectives. This authority perceives 
"society as comprised of a web of obligations, which may override individual 
freedom: obligations amongst individuals in communities and between the citizen 
and the state" (Driver and Martell, 1998: 169). thus, the state can demand that 
the individual fulfil their civil duties without offering reciprocal obligations in return. 
Conclusion 
In its traditional role, the British State was informed by deontological ethical 
principles that decreed if the state exercised extensive power to control the lives of 
its citizens this power should . be exercised in conjunction with benevolent 
paternalism. Thus, an ethereal bond existed that fostered the virtues of 
paternalism, obedience and compliance in lower income communities as an elite 
accepted responsibility for the state's decision-making and action-taking 
processes. However the neo-liberal conservative project, underpinned by 
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consequentialist ethical principles, was committed to the state refraining from 
interfering in the lives of citizens as they pursued their own legal pleasures. 
Implicit within this paradigm is the precept that the cost of government 
administration should be minimised by use of the mechanisms of the free market, 
which are more effective and efficient than centralised bureaucracies. However 
some citizens, in particular those on a low income, experienced the outcome of 
market transactions that were adverse or difficult to comprehend. Thus, it is 
contended that ethical scepticism grew alongside distrust of market solutions for 
the delivery of essential public services. 
The second contention is that new labour's political elite, with their belief in the 
managerialised. regulatory and ethically hybrid state, have been unable to reverse 
the growth of ethical scepticism despite their concern to promote active citizenship 
and civil renewal. This may reflect new labour's constitutional radicalism, which 
places an emphasis on individual responsibilities rather than individual rights. 
Therefore, it is appropriate that a debate should take place over what 
constitutes the public good. This should address the importance that society 
wishes to accord to the values of equity, distributional justice, community solidarity 
and social stability in the regulatory provision of public services. John Stuart Mill 
captures the risks inherent in neglecting this dialogue: 
a State which dwarfs its men, in order that they may be more docile instruments in 
its hands even for beneficial purposes - would find that with small men no great 
thing can really be accomplished (Mill, [1859] 1989: 15). 
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